Jersey Unreported Judgments

Disciplinary proceedings.

[2022]JRC126

Royal Court

(Samedi)

10 June 2022

IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF JERSEY LAW 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE REPRESENTATION OF HM ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING ADVOCATE ANDREW BEGG

Attorney General in person.

Advocate C. J. Scholefield for Advocate A. P. Begg.

Decision

the bailiff:

1.        On 7^th and 8^th June 2022, we sat to hear the Representation of the Attorney General in disciplinary proceedings against Advocate Andrew Begg ("Advocate Begg").

2.        At the end of the hearing we indicated that we would defer the question of any sanction until 4^th July 2022 at 10:00 a.m. and would hand down a decision as to what we find proven with reasons to follow.  This is that decision.

3.        There were three principal issues before the Court.  They were:

(i)        whether delays between April 2018 and April 2019, and May 2019 and September 2019 which were the responsibility of Advocate Begg amounted to misconduct;

(ii)       Whether Advocate Begg's failure to forward to his client an open email sent by BCR on 27^th March 2019 ("the open email") was misconduct and, if so, whether it amounted to a lack of integrity or to dishonesty on the part of Advocate Begg; 

(iii)      Whether Advocate Begg's alteration of a without prejudice save as to costs email sent by BCR on 27^th March 2019 ("the without prejudice email") before forwarding it to his client was misconduct and, if so, whether that misconduct was a want of integrity or was dishonest.  The email in question was altered by the removal of its date (which would have revealed that it had been received several weeks before by Advocate Begg) and the word "inordinate" from the phase "inordinate delay".

4.        It was accepted on the part of Advocate Begg that the delays referred to in paragraph 3(i) above amounted to misconduct and it was further accepted by Advocate Begg that the alteration of the words of the without prejudice email on 27^th March 2019 was also misconduct but whilst that misconduct amounted to a lack of integrity, he did not accept that it was dishonest. 

5.        The findings of the Court are as follows:

(a)       the delays set out in paragraph 3(i) above which were attributable to Advocate Begg were excessive, amounted to misconduct, and that misconduct was moderately serious;

(b)       With regard to the failure to forward the open email of 27^th March 2019, we note that the email began with a preliminary paragraph which pointed to BCR's clients' exasperation at the delays in answering their queries and contained a phrase suggesting that BCR's clients were close to reporting Advocate Begg to the Law Society for the delays.  In our judgment Advocate Begg's failure to pass this email on was clearly because it contained criticism of him and was to avoid embarrassment with or criticism from his client.  It was a deliberate withholding of information which had it been provided might have caused his client to take different actions.  It was not in her best interests; it was deliberate, and in the context, dishonest;

(c)       With regard to the removal of the words "inordinate" and the date from the email without prejudice on the same day, in our judgment those details were removed because they implied criticism of Advocate Begg or would have given rise to concerns by his client as to the delay in passing the email on, and were accordingly done to avoid embarrassment and difficulties with his client, were not in her best interests, were knowing and deliberate and were in the circumstances dishonest.

6.        As we have said, in the light of these findings we will proceed with submissions as to sanction on 4^th July 2022.

Authorities

Law Society of Jersey Law 2005.