Jersey Unreported Judgments

Manslaughter - reasons for the sentence imposed

[2021]JRC005

Royal Court

(Samedi)

12 January 2021

Before     :

T. J. Le Cocq, Esq., Bailiff, and Jurats Ronge and Christensen

The Attorney General

-v-

Andrew Nisbet

M. R. Maletroit Esq., Crown Advocate.

Advocate M. P. Boothman for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

THE BAILIFF:

1.        On 19^th August 2020 we sentenced Andrew Nisbet ("the Defendant") for the manslaughter on 6^th August 2019 of his 68-year-old mother, Pamela Nisbet ("Mrs Nisbet") whom he fatally stabbed (AG v Nisbet [2020] JRC 167).

2.        Although originally charged with murder with manslaughter in the alternative, the Crown, in the light of the psychiatric evidence, accepted the Defendant's plea of guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility in that he was suffering from such an abnormality of mind that his mental responsibility for the killing was substantially impaired. 

3.        We sentenced the Defendant as follows:

(i)        Ordered that the Defendant shall be subject to a treatment order for an indefinite period pursuant to Article 65 of the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016 (the "2016 Law"), to be carried out at Brockfield House, an approved establishment in accordance with Article 5 of the 2016 Law, where the Defendant is already present by virtue of the Court's previous orders;

(ii)       Ordered that the Defendant shall be subject to a restriction order for an indefinite period pursuant to Article 68 of the 2016 Law;

(iii)      Granted the Defendant leave of absence from Brockfield House in circumstances where the responsible medical officer believes it necessary in the interests of the patient's health or safety, the protection of other persons, or it is appropriate for the treatment of the Defendant on the condition that in those circumstances the Defendant is accompanied by at least one member of staff from Brockfield House; and

(iv)      Ordered that the Defendant shall be examined by his responsible medical officer at intervals of not less than nine months, and that written reports of such examinations shall be sent to Her Majesty's Attorney General containing the responsible medical officer's opinion as to whether the restriction order should continue in effect, and opinion as to where any further treatment of the Defendant is to be carried out.

And furthermore the Court:

(v)       Made a restraining order pursuant to Article 5 of the Crime (Disorderly Conduct and Harassment) (Jersey) Law 2008, as amended by the Telecommunications (Amendment No. 3) and Crime (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law 2016, for an indefinite period from this day, in the terms set out in the Schedule attached thereto.

4.        The Restraining Order prevents the Defendant from contact with his father and other members of his family.

5.        At the sentencing hearing, we indicated we would provide our reasons at a later date.  These are our reasons.

6.        The Defendant was forty years of age at the time of the offence and he was residing with his partner and their 18-month-old son in a one-bedroom annexe to his parent's property in St. Peter.  The Defendant's parents, Mr and Mrs Nisbet were residing in the main house.

7.        The Defendant and his partner had moved into the annex in November of 2017, having relocated from Scotland to Jersey before the birth of their son.  Mr and Mrs Nisbet had agreed that they could stay in the annexe on a temporary basis.

8.        It is common ground that the Defendant regarded his parent's property as the family home and he wanted to reside there long term with his partner and their son.  Shortly after moving into the annexe, the Defendant began to make requests of his parents to make significant alterations to the annexe.  He planned to develop it into a substantial separate dwelling.

9.        The Defendant's parents did not consider the annexe to be suitable and did not agree to all of the alterations.  This initially caused the Defendant to be frustrated with them and often he became angry and it was a cause of tension between him and his parents.

10.      It is common ground that the Defendant suffered a deterioration in his mental health and he became fixated on the idea that he and his family must remain at his parent's property.  When his parents did not, on an occasion, in January 2018 agree to his demands to install a heat pump in the annexe he jumped from a second storey window and seriously injured his legs.

11.      The Defendant continued to make demands of his parents about the living arrangements and they found things increasingly difficult because of the Defendant's deteriorating behaviour.  As an alternative the Defendant's parents purchased a separate three-bedroomed house and offered it to the Defendant and his family at a low rent.  That offer was declined and the Defendant refused to leave the annexe.

12.      The Defendant's parents eventually, in the absence of any agreement as to the living arrangements, decided that the Defendant had to leave.  This increased the tension and on two occasions in July of 2019 the Police were called to the property as the Defendant had entered the main house, shouted at his parents in relation to the eviction and had refused to leave.

13.      Formal eviction proceedings were commenced and a summons was served on the Defendant on 7^th August requiring him to appear in the Court on 9^th August 2019.

14.      The Defendant's parents kept the Defendant's General Practitioner and Mental Health Services appraised of the situation and risk assessments were carried out prior to notice of eviction being served.  A Mental Health Assessment was conducted on 1^st August 2019 in order to determine whether the Defendant should be detained at Orchard House, but agreement could not be reached on whether the grounds of detention were satisfied and therefore Defendant remained in the community.

15.      On 6^th August 2019, a Strategy Meeting was held with representatives from the Police, Children's Service and Mental Health Services to discuss the Defendant's mental health and the eviction.  A consultant nurse from the Adult Mental Health Service and a social worker attended at the Defendant's home to speak with him and the Defendant told them that if he were to be evicted, he would get arrested and kill himself.  The Defendant was described as being clearly unhappy, disappointed and let down.

16.      At approximately 6pm Mrs Nisbet agreed to have a further discussion with the Defendant and his partner in the main house concerning the eviction.  The Defendant's father did not wish to participate and went into the next-door room.  The discussion did not go well and Mrs Nisbet was not able to agree to the proposals that the Defendant and his partner had put forward as to future living arrangements.

17.      Mr Nisbet, who was within ear shot, heard the Defendant's partner leave the kitchen.  Approximately three minutes later he heard his wife scream which he described as "a bad scream not an upset scream".  He went to the kitchen and saw his wife lying on the floor bleeding from her neck.  She was still breathing.  The Defendant was standing near her with a Leatherman knife in his hand. 

18.      Mr Nisbet, who has medical training, told the Defendant that he needed to get to his wife to help her and the Defendant waived a knife towards him and would not allow him to approach his injured wife.  He eventually managed to get hold of a walking stick and hit the Defendant's wrist in an attempt to knock the knife out of his hand.  The stick broke.  Mr Nisbet recalled saying to the Defendant "Andrew for Gods sake let me go and look after your mother" and the Defendant's response was "I can't do that".  Eventually Mr Nisbet forced him out of a side door of the kitchen and locked him out.  He called 999 whilst attempting to resuscitate Mrs Nisbet who had by that time lost a significant amount of blood. 

19.      The Defendant returned to the annex in possession of his knife.  His partner described him as looking panicked and when she asked what had happened, he responded "I don't know, I just couldn't cope any more".  He told her the Police would be coming and that he would be going with them and she would need to look after their son.

20.      At approximately 7pm armed Police Officers and an Ambulance crew arrived at the property.  Officers entered the annex and the Defendant identified himself and was arrested and made no response to caution.  The blood-stained knife was located in the bathroom.

21.      Mrs Nisbet had lost a significant amount of blood and suffered a cardiac arrest.  The Paramedics found no signs of life.  Their attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful and she was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital at 7:44pm.

22.      The Defendant was interviewed the following morning in the presence of his legal adviser and provided no comment interviews to all material questions.

23.      The Defendant advised that he wished to read a prepared statement.  On 9^th August 2019, the Defendant was further interviewed and his prepared statement was read.  He stated that he had heard voices in his head during the discussion with his mother.  The voices said he was useless, and that he would never be safe.  He then heard a voice several times "you have to".  He states "the next thing I remember standing a few feet away from my mother who was lying on the floor.  I realised that I had a knife in my hand and I felt very confused". 

24.      The postmortem examination on Mrs Nisbet concluded that she died as a result of a single stab wound to the left side of her neck.  There were no defence type injuries or blunt force trauma identified.

25.      On 29^th August 2019, the Defendant was directly indicted to the Royal Court and reserved his plea to murder.  The Court ordered his transfer to Brockfield House, in the United Kingdom, a medium secure psychiatric unit in Essex.  The purpose of this transfer was for a mental health assessment to be conducted in that specialised psychiatric unit to identify risk management measures that should be adopted for the Defendant's welfare and to consider treatment options.  The Defendant was assessed and the assessing doctor recommended that he remain at Brockfield House to receive treatment. 

26.      The Defence instructed Dr Richard Latham ("Dr Latham") to assess the Defendant and opine on the availability of a diminished responsibility defence.  That assessment was conducted in March 2020.  On 3^rd April 2020, the Defendant appeared in the Royal Court by video link and entered a not guilty plea to murder and indicated a guilty plea to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility.

27.      The Crown instructed its own expert, Dr Ian Cumming, ("Dr Cumming") to assess the Defendant and also to opine on the availability of a diminished responsibility defence.  That assessment took place on 11^th May 2020.

The Defendant's Mental Condition

28.      All of the experts in this case who have provided reports or given evidence before us agree that the Defendant fulfils the criteria for a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD).

29.      Dr Cumming in his report explains ASD in the following way:

"Autism is diagnosed on the basis of social and communication difficulties, alongside unusually narrow interests, and inability to deal flexibly with change.  Autism affects the individual's judgment about friends or relationships, ability to read cues on social situations, and to understand other people's behaviour or social conventions.  Autism also leaves the individual vulnerable to getting into trouble through social naivety or poor decision making.  Under stress the individual may find it hard to think flexibly about alternative options for problem solving.  Autism typically means a person may not be thinking about the longer-term consequences of their behaviour on others, and leads them to focus narrowly on the present problem facing them.

Because people with autism are also strongly obsessional, meaning that they pursue their current topic of thought to extraordinary detail and in great depth, they can develop 'tunnel vision' that prevents them from seeing the bigger picture, including the repercussions of their current actions."

30.      It appears to be clear that the Defendant developed the fixed belief that the difficulties in his life would be resolved by remaining at his parents' home.  He was not capable of thinking flexibly and notwithstanding his undoubted intelligence he was unable to change.

31.      In evidence, Dr Cumming uses the analogy of a pressure cooker and says in his report:

"though appearing quite a controlled person, he was coping with enormous stress, mainly generated by his own actions and behaviour .... combined with the inflexible thinking which prevented him from resolving the eviction as well as the distress of his partner, this led to his actions and the violence meted out on his mother."

32.      Dr Latham also provides a report and indicates that in his opinion the Defendant's mental health may well deteriorate in situations where he cannot remain in control of the situation.  He expresses his opinion in the following terms:

"[The Defendant] had become fixed, preoccupied and irrationally attached to his aim to stay at the family home.  He was anxious and highly distressed.  He was unable to appreciate other people's perspective and consider alternatives; he only saw one option and was making repeated and desperate attempts to achieve that.  This mental state was abnormal and was subsequently arising out of a developmental condition Asperger's Syndrome.  The Asperger's Syndrome and the symptoms associated with it was the foundation for the way in which his personality and anxiety symptoms were then affecting his overall state.  In other words, the overwhelming distress and anxiety was almost impossible for him to manage because of the underlying Asperger's Syndrome.  Similarly, any sense of entitlement he felt (which may have been associated with a personality trait) was not amenable to reason or rational consideration because of the cognitive state associated with Asperger's Syndrome.  Ultimately, it is likely that the anxiety and distress led to him acting in a way that represented a state of decompensation so that he was unable to exercise ordinary control over his behaviour and use of the cognitive ability he did have, to find an alternative way out of the situation."

33.      A number of reports from the doctors mentioned above and indeed from other experts were placed before us.  Dr Cumming, Dr Nicholas Hallett ("Dr Hallett") and Dr Latham also gave evidence before us.  Dr Cumming and Dr Hallett are practitioners approved by the Minister for Health and Social Services under Article 16 (1) of the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, and Dr Latham is a registered medical practitioner under the Medical Practitioners (Registration) (Jersey) Law 1960. 

34.      We do not think it appropriate and it would unnecessarily burden this judgment to go into the detail of the medical evidence before us.  It was clear from that evidence that the Defendant was suffering from a mental disorder being an abnormality of mind such as a mental responsibility for the killing whilst substantially impaired.  It was further the case that the medical evidence pointed to the benefits of treatment. 

35.      Dr Cumming's evidence suggested to us that the Defendant is capable of change although a time frame for improvement could not be predicted and could well be years rather than months.  He was not, however, a "lost cause".  Significantly better therapy was available in the therapeutic environment proposed than would be available in prison.

36.      Dr Hallett, was the treating clinician at Brookfield agreed with Dr Cumming's assessment relating to the necessity in treatment in managing autism and he agreed that the Defendant should be placed in a psychiatric unit rather than a prison. 

37.      Dr Latham agreed the evidence of Dr Cumming and Dr Hallett and had no further matter to raise that weighed against their conclusions.

38.      We have found the medical evidence, which we have only touched on briefly in this judgment, to be of substantial assistance in considering the correct disposal of this matter.

Manslaughter

39.      Manslaughter is, of course, a customary law offence.

40.      In the AG v Rzeszowski [2012] JRC 198 and AG v Brown [2017] JRC 200 the Court approached sentencing, in both cases for manslaughter, on the basis that they first considered what would have been the appropriate sentence for murder. 

41.      The starting point in that consideration is the Criminal Justice (Life Sentences) (Jersey) Law 2014 ("2014 Law") under which a starting point of 15 years' imprisonment would apply for cases which are not categorised as exceptionally serious or particularly serious in accordance with the definitions contained within the 2014 Law and where the offender is an adult.  The Crown argued before us that had the case before the Court been one of murder, a fifteen year starting point would apply and indicated that in the Crown's view the offence would have been aggravated by the fact that the victim was killed in her own home, the Defendant attended the meeting with the victim armed with a knife, and whilst still armed with the knife, the Defendant physically prevented Mr Nisbet from giving first aid to the victim.  There was however no significant premeditation and that circumstances existed which gave rise to a state of anxiety and distress to the Defendant.

42.      The Crown placed before us the Sentencing Council Guidelines for England and Wales relating to manslaughter, which were introduced in November 2018.  As the Crown rightly observes, the Guidelines themselves have no application in Jersey as to tariff but are often used by the Courts in considering issues such as harm and culpability and risk.  Those guidelines say this:

"Cases of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility vary considerably on the facts of the offence and on the circumstances of the offender.  The Court should review whether the sentence as a whole meets the objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and protection of the public in a fair and proportionate way.  The relevant factors will include psychiatric evidence and the regime on release".

43.      It is, of course, open to the Court to impose a discretionary life sentence with a minimum period of imprisonment.  In the case of Brown, however, the Court applied the two stage tests set out by the Court of Appeal in C v AG [2015] JCA 159 in saying this:

"We are of the clear view that the principles identified in the decisions of the English Court of Appeal .... should apply in Jersey.  A discretionary life sentence should be passed only where the offender has been convicted of a very serious offence and where there is a good reason to believe that the offender may be a serious risk to the public for a period which cannot be determined at the date of sentence."

44.      Manslaughter is, of course, a very serious offence.  However, it is the expert evidence to which the Court will have regard in determining whether the second part of that test is satisfied.  The medical evidence before us was not to the effect that the Defendant in this case posed a very serious risk.  Some risk may be posed to other members of his family, particularly Mr Nisbet, should the Defendant maintain the belief that his happiness can only be secured by residence at the family home or some other thing to which Mr Nisbet was perceived as an obstacle.  Even so, it was not suggested that that risk was high and it might be met by other restrictions. 

45.      The Court has the option to make a Treatment Order under Article 65 of the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016 which provides as follows:

"65 Treatment orders

(1)       A court may order that the Defendant be admitted to and detained in a specified approved establishment for treatment, where -

(a)   The court is satisfied, on the evidence of 2 medical practitioners, at lest one of whom is an approved practitioner, that -

(i)            The Defendant is suffering mental disorder of a nature or degree that warrants admission to and detention in an approved establishment for treatment, and

(ii)           The treatment cannot be given to the Defendant without such admission and detention;

(b)   The court is of the opinion, having regard to all the circumstances including (but without limitation) the nature of the offence and the Defendant's character and antecedents and to other methods of dealing with the Defendant, that an order under this Article (a "treatment order") is the most suitable method of disposing of the case; and

(c)   The court is satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of the approved practitioner or some other person representing the managers of the approved establishment in question, that arrangements have been made for the admission of the Defendant to the establishment within 7 days of the date of the order."

46.      There are also powers available to the Court, in terms of restrictions, pursuant to Article 68 of the 2016 Law to protect the public.  Article 68 reads as follows:

"68 Special restrictions on treatment orders

(1)       Where a treatment order is made in respect of a Defendant and it appears to the court, having regard to the matters in paragraph (2), that it is necessary to do so to protect the public from serious harm, the court may further order that the treatment order shall take effect only with special restrictions, either without limit of time or during such period as the court may specify.

(2)       The matters mentioned in paragraph (1) as those to which the court must have regard are:

(a)   The nature and gravity of the offence;

(b)   The antecedents of the Defendant;

(c)   The risk of the Defendant committing further offences if the Defendant remains at liberty.

(3)       A further order under paragraph (1) (a "restriction order") shall not be made unless at least one of the practitioners giving evidence for the purposes of Article 65(1)(a) has given evidence orally before the court.

(4)       Where a restriction order is made in respect of the Defendant -

(a)   The Defendant shall be conveyed to the specified approved establishment within the period of 7 days beginning with the date of the order and in accordance with any directions given by the court for that purpose;

(b)   The mangers of the establishment shall admit the Defendant and thereafter detain and deal with the Defendant as a patient in respect of whom a treatment authorisation had been made under Part 3, except that -

(i)            Leave of absence under Article 24 shall not be granted nor the Defendant be transferred under Article 26 without leave of the court, and

(ii)           Article 27(1) to (5) shall not apply unless and until the restriction order ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph (5).

(5)       A restriction order shall not cease to have effect unless the court is satisfied, on an application made for the purpose by -

(a)   The Defendant, or the Defendant's nearest person appointed or nominated under Part 2; or

(b)   Pursuant to a report under paragraph (6), the Attorney General, that restrictions in respect of the Defendant are no longer required to protect the public from serious harm.

(6)       During the period for which a restriction order remains in effect, the responsible medical officer must -

(a)   Examine the Defendant at such intervals (not exceeding 12 months) as the court may direct; and

(b)   Make a report of each such examination to the Attorney General, containing -

(i)            The responsible medical officer's opinion as to whether the restriction order should continue in effect; and

(ii)           Such further particulars as the court may require."

47.      These are the statutory provisions that apply in the present case.  AG v Michel [2019] JRC 205 appears to be the only Jersey authority in which the Court has opted to make a treatment order with special restrictions.  The Defendant in that case had been suffering from schizophrenia and committed a grave and criminal assault on her partner involving a stabbing with a knife.  The Court, at paragraph 21 of the judgment said this:

"The power to make a treatment order, rather than impose a custodial or other sentence, gives the Court the ability, in an appropriate case, to ensure that the Defendant receives the medical care he or she needs.  The House of Lords explained at paragraph 9 of R v Drew [2003] UKHR 25 the effect of making such an order (without a restriction order), there referred to as a hospital order made under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 which corresponds with Article 65 of the 2016 Mental Health Law:-

"Once the offender is admitted to hospital pursuant to a hospital order or transfer without restriction on discharge, his position is almost exactly the same as if he were a civil patient.  In effect he passes out of the penal system and into the hospital regime.  Neither the court nor the Secretary of State has any say in the disposal.  Thus, like any other mental patient, he may be detained only for a period of six months, unless the authority to detain is renewed, an event which cannot happen unless certain conditions, which resemble those which were satisfied when he was admitted, are fulfilled, if the authority expires without being renewed, the patient may leave.  Furthermore, he may be discharged at any time by the hospital managers or the responsible medical officer.  In addition to these regular modes of discharge, a patient who absconds or is absent without leave and is not retaken within 28 days is automatically discharged at the end of that period (section 18(3) and if he is allowed continuous leave of absence for more than six (now twelve) months, he cannot be recalled (section 17(3)).

Another feature of the regime which affects the disordered offender and the civil patient alike is the power of the responsible medical officer to grant leave of absence from the hospital for a particular purpose or for a specified or indefinite period of time: subject always to a power of recall (except as mentioned above).

There are certain differences between the positions of the offender and of the civil patient, relating to early access to the review Tribunal and to discharge by the patient's nearest relative, but these are of comparatively modest importance.  In general, the offender is dealt with a manner which appears, and is intended to be, humane by comparison with a custodial sentence.  A hospital order is not a punishment.  Questions of retribution and deterrence, whether personal or general, are immaterial.  The offender who has become a patient is not kept on any kind of leash by the court, as he is when he consents to a probation order with a condition of inpatient treatment.  The sole purpose of the order is to ensure that the offender receives the medical care and attention which he needs in the hope and expectation of course that the result will be to avoid the commission by the offender of further criminal acts.""

48.      We have, in addition, had regard to English law.  Articles 65 and 68 are similar to most respects to Sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983.  In the case of R v Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that:

"It is important to emphasise that the judge must carefully consider all the evidence in each case and not, as some of the early cases have suggested, feel circumscribed by the psychiatric opinions.  A judge might therefore consider, where the condition in section 37(2)(a) are met, what is the appropriate disposal.  In considering that wider question the matters to which  a judge will invariably have to have regard to include (1) the extent to which the offender needs treatment for the mental disorder from which the offender suffers, (2) the extent to which the offending is attributable to the mental disorder, (3) the extent to which punishment is required and (4) the protection of the public including the regime for deciding release and the regime after release."

49.      In R v Birch [1990] 11 Cr App R (S) 202 the Court of Appeal considered a situation where the sentencing court had determined that a treatment order was the most appropriate method of disposing of the case.  The court said this:

"[The Judge] is required to choose between the order without restrictions, which may enable the author of a serious act of violence to be a liberty only a matter of months after he appears in court, and a restriction order which may lead the offender to be detained for a long time: longer in some cases than the period which he would serve if sent to prison .... It is moreover a choice which depends on a prognosis, the ultimate responsibility for which is left with the judge.

This responsibility may be hard to discharge, since the judge will often have nothing on which to base his decision, if he feels reservations about the medical evidence, apart from the considerations stated by the statute, namely the nature of the offence and the antecedents of the offender: which will often consist only of a single episode of fatal violence and a blank criminal record.  Where there is a trial the judge can form an impression of the Defendant as the case unfolds which may enable him to make his own assessment of his dangerousness.  But in the more usual case where a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility is accepted by the prosecution and the court, this opportunity is largely absent .....

Nevertheless section 41(1) is there and the judge must apply it.  Quite plainly the addition of the words "from serious harm" has greatly curtailed the former jurisdiction to make a restriction order: most particularly because the word "serious" rather than "risk".  Thus the court is required to assess not the seriousness of the risk that the Defendant will re-offend but the risk that if he does so the public will suffer serious harm.  The harm in question need not, in our view, be limited to personal injury.  Nor need it relate to the public in general, for it would in our judgment suffice if a category of persons, or even a single person, were adjudged to be at risk: although the category of person so protected would no doubt exclude the offender himself.  Nevertheless, the potential harm must be serious, and a high possibility of a recurrence of minor offences will no longer be sufficient.

..............

It would however be a mistake to equate the seriousness of the offence with the probability that a restriction order will be made.  This is only one of the factors which section 41(1) requires to be taken into account.  A minor offence by a man who proves to be mentally disordered and dangerous may properly leave him subject to a restriction.  In theory the converse is also true.  Courtney shows that a serious offence committed by someone who is adjudged to have a very low risk of re-offending may lead to an unrestricted hospital order.

...........

First, the sentence should not impose a restriction order simply to mark the gravity of the offence (although this is an element in the assessment of risk), nor as a means of punishment: for a restriction order merely qualifies a hospital order and a hospital order is not a mode of punishment.  Secondly, the observations of Lord Parker CL, in Gardiner as to the imprudence in any but the most exceptional case of imprudence in any but the most exceptional case of imposing a restriction for a fixed period rather than for an unlimited period still hold good ....."

50.      We do not, have the option of imposing a hybrid order under which the Defendant could be sentenced to imprisonment coupled with a direction to serve that sentence in an approved establishment.  Such cases, pursuant to Article 67 of the 2016 Law can be made only in cases of murder.

Conclusion

51.      We note of course that the Defendant has no previous convictions and therefore has the benefit of good character.  We note his expressions of remorse which we take to be genuine.  He has also the benefit of his guilty plea albeit it might be considered that such a plea to murder or manslaughter in the alternative was an evitability in the circumstances of this case. 

52.      Our decision-making was much aided by the fact that the experts spoke with one voice.  It is entirely clear that the Defendant was suffering from a mental disorder which requires specialist treatment.  It was further entirely clear that he would never receive that treatment in a prison setting and there would be a material risk that if he were to remain in prison without treatment his mental health would further deteriorate.  For these reasons we believed it to be appropriate to make an order in the terms that we did and as referred to in paragraph 3 above.

53.      This is a tragic case which not only has resulted in the loss of a human life in the most awful circumstances but has also in effect destroyed the Defendant's life, possibly his career and his wider family.

54.      In the light of the fact that the Defendant appears to harbour the hope, in our view, likely to be unrealistic in the extreme, that in some way in the future he may secure a reconciliation with his wider family, and the fact that he may see Mr Nisbet as an obstacle, we thought it appropriate to make the restraining order that we did in the terms set out above.

Authorities

AG v Nisbet [2020] JRC 167

Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016. 

Crime (Disorderly Conduct and Harassment) (Jersey) Law 2008 as amended by the Telecommunications (Amendment No. 3) and Crime (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law 2016. 

Medical Practitioners (Registration) (Jersey) Law 1960. 

AG v Rzeszowski [2012] JRC 198. 

AG v Brown [2017] JRC 200. 

Criminal Justice (Life Sentences) (Jersey) Law 2014. 

Sentencing Council Guidelines for England and Wales. 

C v AG [2015] JCA 159. 

AG v Michel [2019] JRC 205. 

Mental Health Act 1983. 

R v Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45. 

R v Birch [1990] 11 Cr App R (S) 202