Jersey Unreported Judgments

Superior Number Appeal - Health and safety infraction

[2020]JRC259

Royal Court

(Samedi)

15 December 2020

Before     :

Mr T. J. Le Cocq, Esq., Bailiff, and Jurats Dulake, Austin-Vautier and Hughes

States Employment Board

-v-

The Attorney General

Advocate D. A. Corbel for the Appellant.

C. R. Baglin Esq., Crown Advocate.

JUDGMENT

THE BAILIFF:

1.        This is an appeal by the States Employment Board ("the Appellant") against the sentence imposed by the Inferior Number on 22^nd May, 2020, (MacRae, Deputy Bailiff and Jurats Thomas and Averty) (AG v States Employment Board [2020] JRC 089) for one count of contravening Article 21(1)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 1989, as amended.

2.        The Attorney General had moved conclusions in the customary way and had recommended a fine of £20,000.  The Inferior Number imposed a fine of £50,000.  The Appellant appeals on the basis that such a fine was manifestly excessive.

3.        There are two principle arguments advanced in this appeal by the Appellant.  The first is that the Inferior Number in imposing the sentence that it did, appears to have been influenced by sentencing levels in England and Wales assessed on the basis the Sentencing Guidelines for that jurisdiction ("the Guidelines") which is not in accordance with the principles that apply in this jurisdiction.  The second argument is to the effect that the sentence did not reflect the fact that the Appellant was not the main or exclusive cause of the accident that was the subject matter of the charge and that there was an incorrect assessment of culpability with regard to the Appellant when compared to the culpability of other parties not before the Court for sentencing.  The cumulative effect of these two arguments, so it was put before us, was that the fine of £50,000, representing as it did two and a half times the fine recommended by the Attorney General, was in the circumstances manifestly excessive.

4.        Accordingly, in this appeal we are considering both of the arguments put forward by the Appellant and whether or not the sentence imposed by the Inferior Number was for those reasons, or otherwise, manifestly excessive.

Background Facts

5.        It is not, for the purposes of this appeal necessary to set out the full details of this case.  For our purposes the following brief summary, taken largely from the Judgment of the Inferior Number is as follows:

(i)        The Appellant is a corporate body which employs all States of Jersey employees including those employed by the Education Department and in consequence is responsible for the health and safety of all pupils whilst on public school premises;

(ii)       One such school, Grouville School, upgraded its external play and sports facilities in 2016 which included site preparation and ground works for the installation of a new astro-turf pitch which in turn included perimeter fencing and two new gates, one of which was to be inserted into existing fencing, to create a new opening between the playground and the astro-turf pitch;

(iii)      The Appellant sub contracted the works to GWM Engineering and Salvage Company Limited trading as St Helier Iron Works ("St Helier Iron Works") which had been providing services to the Education Department of the States of Jersey for some 35 years.  St Helier Iron Works were clearly aware that the gates were to be used for primary school children as their quote for the job carried the title "Grouville School Fencing and Gates";

(iv)      St Helier Iron Works provided an estimate which was accepted and they were appointed to carry out the work.  In turn they contracted a UK based metal fencing and gate manufacturer who provided St Helier Iron Works with a choice of six different options for the school gates in question.  It was clear from the options presented that three of them were to be preferred as they "allow opening to 180 degrees and eliminate finger traps".  For reasons that were not clear to the Court below nor to us, the Managing Director of St Helier Iron Works did not select one of the safer options but instead selected another.  In interview he indicated that he must have overlooked the warning on the order form.

(v)       Construction was completed early in September 2016.  There is no indication that the Appellant carried out any safety check on the new installation nor is there any indication that the Appellant or anyone on its behalf inspected the gates to ensure that they were suitable and did not contain finger traps;

(vi)      Finger traps are an obvious source of danger for young children.  The Education Department was of course entirely aware of this and in March 2018 an email had been sent to all head teachers expressing concern about recent finger injuries in schools and saying, amongst other things:

"there is a significant amount of guidance produced by various local authorities in the UK to mitigate the frequency and severity of young (primary/reception) pupils being injured by the opening/closing of doors."

There was a recommendation that each primary school undertake a brief review of internal doors including and specifically for risk of finger entrapment.  Although this guidance did not mention external doors or gates it seemed to the Inferior Number as indeed it does to us that the risk of finger entrapment is an obvious one to be considered and guarded against.

(vii)     On 29^th November, 2018, one of the pupils at Grouville School, during the lunch break, sustained an injury.  Pupils were permitted to go between the playground and the pitch and were instructed to close the gate permitting access to the astro-turf pitch.  A seven-year-old pupil was standing on a low wall immediately next to the closed gate on the astro-pitch talking to a friend and looking in the direction of the playground.  He was holding onto the fence with his right hand and his left hand was holding onto the gate.  Whilst he was talking to his friend, his friend opened the gate trapping the boy's left ring finger, fracturing it and severing the tip.  The boy was taken to the Accident and Emergency Department and although the severed tip was found and retrieved it could not be re-attached.

(viii)    On reporting the matter to the Health and Safety Inspectorate the gate was removed and sometime later, in January 2019, the second gate which showed the same hazard was made safe.

6.        We do not in this brief summary of the facts need to set out the course of the investigation nor what was said in interview.  It is clear from the judgment that remedial steps were put in place and guidance issued. 

7.        It is important to reflect, however, that the accident suffered by the child as a result of finger entrapment was in our judgment completely foreseeable and avoidable had appropriate steps and risk assessment been undertaken prior to the gate being put into use.  The Crown in its conclusions and the Inferior Number in its judgment said that in their view this was "an accident waiting to happen" and we agree.  The injury was excruciating for the child and very upsetting for his mother.  Initially, the child required morphine to manage.  Following the injury, the child had to attend the hospital on numerous occasions and, understandably, procedures such as the changing of dressings were extremely distressing and painful. 

Judgment of the Inferior Number

8.        The judgment of the Inferior Number ("The Judgment") after setting out the facts in rather greater detail than we have set out above, cited an excerpt from the case of AG v Petroleum Distribution (Jersey) Limited [2018] JRC 190 in which Bailhache, Bailiff, said:

"19.    ...

"The objective of prosecutions for health and safety offences in the workplace is to achieve a safe environment for those who work there and for other members of the public who may be affected""

We pause to say for these purposes a school and school children are no different from a work place.

""A fine needs to be large enough to bring that message home where the defendant is a company not only to those who manage it but also to its shareholders."

20.            It seems to us that that is a comment which is directed more at the need to raise the level of fines generally to a point where, as was said in the local case of AG-v-Hamel Brothers Limited, it should "sting".  That does mean the courts should take account of the disquiet expressed in some quarters that the level of fine for health and safety offences has been too low.  As was said in Howe, "there has been increasing recognition in recent years of the seriousness of health and safety offences.""

9.        The Judgment also went on to refer to AG v States Employment Board [2010] JRC 205 in which Commissioner Clyde-Smith said, at paragraph 6:

"However, as made clear in Howe, there is no tariff and the circumstances of these cases are different.  The objective of prosecutions for Health and Safety offences in the work place is to achieve a safe environment for those who work there and for members of the public who might be affected.  A fine needs to be large enough to bring home the message and in this case the States Employment Board has clearly got considerable resources."

10.      The Inferior Number then turned its attention to the principles set out in the case of R v F Howe and Son (Engineering) Ltd [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 37 and said this:

"17.      We have regard to the principles set out in R v F. Howe and Son (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 37. 

(i)        How far short of the appropriate standard did the defendant fall? 

The SEB failed to adequately oversee the process for the installation of these gates.  It is correct that St Helier Ironworks choose the gates but they were hazardous and this should have been picked up.  There appears to have been little or no oversight and no inspection in the weeks between installation and the accident.  The fact that procedures have now changed so radically indicates in the Court's view how far below the appropriate standard the SEB fell.  The costs of rectifying these installed gates would have been low.

(ii)       The failure to heed warnings.

The SEB and all schools were aware of finger trapping as a serious issue.  There had been five previous recent incidents and everyone knows that badly designed doors present a danger to children.  This was not a hidden or obscured defect; it was a defect that on reasonable examination would have been obvious to all.

(iii)      Profiting from failure or running risk to save money. 

Plainly there is not suggestion of that in this case.

(iv)      Prompt admission of responsibility. 

The SEB has pleaded guilty and cooperated fully with the Health and Safety Inspectorate. 

(v)       Steps taken to remedy the defects. 

The gates were removed immediately and the design altered to eliminate the risk of finger trapping, but again this rather illustrates how easy it would have been to prevent this accident in the first place.

(vi)      Good safety record.

The SEB does have previous convictions recorded against it although the last case involving an injury to a pupil was in 2014, and we accept the point made by defence counsel that the SEB has a variety of departments carrying out many functions and it would be wrong to look at the previous offences committed by the SEB cumulatively."

11.      Having set out the principles on which it relied from the above judgments the Court then considered the culpability of the Appellant and stated that the Appellant had knowledge of the risk of finger entrapment, albeit specifically referring to interior doors as described in the email to schools in March 2018.  There was no safety check once the gates had been installed and the risk had not been appreciated by the Appellant until a child had been significantly injured.

12.      The Court then made reference to the fact that St Helier Iron Works were not prosecuted and that the defence suggested in some way that should mitigate the sentence of the Appellant.  The Inferior Number in its Judgment expressly disagreed and said: -

"the SEB is not being prosecuted for the design and installation of these gates.  The Attorney General decided not to prosecute St Helier Iron Works, we are told, because the prosecution test was not met and we simply cannot go behind that.  The SEB is being prosecuted exclusively for its own failings and being sentenced as such".

13.      We entirely agree with that approach.  The Inferior Number in its Judgment then identified what it felt to be the nature of the harm that might flow from the risk it had identified.  In the Court's view there was "a high risk of reasonably serious harm" and the Court expressly took that into account in determining its sentence.  It is to be noted that this is somewhat different than the level of risk identified by the Crown in its conclusions which the Crown described as a "moderate risk" of harm.  If the Crown's conclusions were to be taken as the correct level to reflect a moderate risk then clearly the assessment by the Inferior Number that there was a higher level of risk would justify a higher sentence imposed than that contained in the conclusions of the Crown. 

14.      The Court, before imposing the sentence of a fine of £50,000 with a £5,000 contribution to costs simply stated: -

"The Court gives credit to the defendant for its plea of guilty but nonetheless the Court views the sentence moved for by the Crown as being significantly too low."

15.      The judgment does not state why the Court viewed the sentences as "significantly too low".  One of the complaints that the Appellant makes is that the Court did not say how it moved from £20,000 to £50,000.

The Guidelines

16.      The value of the Guidelines has been the subject of discussion in a number of cases in Jersey.  Those cases have spanned Health and Safety decisions, as in the instant case, and also other areas such as sexual offences.  We do not propose to make reference to all of these cases but in our view the judgment of the then Bailiff, Sir William Bailhache in AG v Petroleum Distribution (Jersey) Ltd [2018] JRC 190 referred to above is instructive.  In that case the Court had reserved judgment because the then Attorney General, in fact the Deputy Bailiff in the instant case, had advanced the arguments that the principles in R v Howe & Son had been superseded in England and Wales by the Guidelines and made reference to them in detail.  The Crown, in that case, had submitted that the English Guidelines were a useful cross check and that it would in principle be surprising if a serious health and safety breach in Jersey by a company were to be dealt with significantly different in a jurisdiction to which Jersey was closely connected.  The Court disagreed with the Crown on that occasion saying, at paragraph 14:

"..... It seems to us that this approach therefore paid lip service to the significant decisions of the Royal Court and the Court of Appeal which emphasised that Jersey has its own sentencing jurisdiction.  Indeed it is because that is so, and because there are differences in the sentences which are imposed across a wide range of offences that it would be unsurprising that the outcome is a different range of fines for conduct of this kind than would be applied had the Defendant been prosecuted in the United Kingdom.

15.      This is particularly so because when one looks at the English Sentencing Guidelines for these offences, it is apparent that there has been a move away from R v F Howe and Son in a material respect.  First of all, the English Court is directed by the Sentencing Guidelines to determine the offence category by using the culpability and harm factors in the tables which are shown.  We think this "tick box" approach to sentencing is not appropriate in this jurisdiction, as has been said previously.  We do not therefore approach the matter by seeking to place the offence and offender into defined categories of harm and culpability; that is to apply an approach which is too rigid and unnecessarily inflexible for a small jurisdiction such as our own."

17.      The Court in Petroleum Distribution went on to point to where the Guidelines were to be useful and, at paragraph 16 it said this:

"16.      Nonetheless, the culpability and harm factors which are described in the tables in question are relevant and helpful - thus the distinction between a case where there has been a deliberate breach of or flagrant disregard for the law and a case where there has been a minor failing which did not fall too far short of the appropriate standard is an entirely appropriate distinction.  Likewise, an incident which causes death or physical or mental impairment or significantly reduced life expectancy falls into a different category from those where there has been minor injury.  There is nothing very difficult about this analysis, but what is relevant is that one does not seek to pigeon-hole an offence into a particular category of harm or culpability."

18.      Finally, the Court identified the correct approach to be taken with regard to the financial circumstances of the offender and said at paragraph 21 et sec as follows:

"21.      In our judgment, the proper approach is for the Court to take into account the financial circumstances of the offender to reduce what would otherwise be a proper fine, where it is appropriate to do so - perhaps taking into account the ability to pay, perhaps taking into account the need to preserve the company's business and the employment of employees within it; or not, as the case may be.  That is a judgment for the Court in relation to the particular circumstances of the case before it.  Those financial circumstances, however, have not been taken into account previously to increase what is a proper fine to something which is not.  In our judgment, the English Sentencing Guidelines do not reflect this principle, and in this respect are an unwelcome development of the approach taken in R v Howe.  We decline to adopt them."

19.      As we have said, we do not propose to set out other cases dealing with the applicability of Guidelines.  In our judgment however, the approach of the Inferior Number in the Petroleum Distribution case is the correct approach for this jurisdiction and the method of assessing the fine that may be applicable in any particular case in general terms is to be taken from the principles set out in that case. 

20.      As the Court has said on many occasions with regard to a number of different types of offending, the Guidelines are not without value.  They are often useful to help place offending as to harm and culpability and to get a sense of its seriousness.  What the Guidelines are wholly inappropriate for, however, is to assess the level of sentence by reference to the tariffs and ranges contained within the Guidelines.  We do not, therefore, think that any reference to what an equivalent sentence in the United Kingdom might be would, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, be of any assistance to the Court in determining the correct sentence for similar offences in this jurisdiction.

21.      We make the point in these terms because the first argument of the Appellant in this case is that the Inferior Number appears, from the exchanges between the Court and Counsel during the sentencing hearing and from correspondence immediately before the sentencing, to have taken into account what the English sentence would have been applying the tariffs contained in the Guidelines. 

22.      It is clear from the transcript that we have seen that there was a significant exchange between the learned Deputy Bailiff and the Crown relating to the Guidelines.  However, this exchange appeared to relate to the Court's assessment of harm and culpability.  At page 6 of the transcript the learned Deputy Bailiff said this: -

"...... Well it is clear from the Petroleum Distribution case and other cases too, that the Royal Court has determined that it does not wish to embrace the English Guidelines.  Obviously, this Court will be entitled to depart from that approach if it wished to do so, but it would need to have a good reason for doing so, but it would need to have a good reason for doing so and would want to notify Counsel in advance of its intention.  That isn't the case.  There are various areas where the English Guidelines have been of assistance to the Court, not that they are binding or directly effective in those areas either, but they have been helpful in the field of sexual offences ......  But is clear in relation to health and safety, that the linear aspect of the English Guidelines, in which the size of the entity prosecuted as directly proportional to the fine imposed, is not one which has attracted Jersey Courts in the past and we aren't going to suggest that it be adopted in this case because that would result in a financial penalty wholly out of proportion to existing Jersey case law.

Having said that, it is sometimes useful, and has been in other cases useful, to see if there are any English cases on similar facts, always guarding against the risk that we, guarding against the possibility of us following them in terms of the penalty that might be imposed. .......

......  I should indicate quite clearly that we do not propose in this case to follow the English Guidelines and, if you .......  and that should be sufficient for you, that we are not in this case going to follow the English Guidelines when it comes to quantification of the fine."

23.      It is apparent, therefore, that there was an exchange in relation to the Guidelines but the Court made it clear that it was not proposing to follow the Guidelines with regard to the level of sentence imposed.

24.      The matter might rest there but for an exchange of communication between the Court and the Crown prior to the sentencing which was of course, copied to the Defence.  In what we understand to be an email originating from the Deputy Bailiff to the Law Officer's Department further information was sought.  In particular, so we understand, the Deputy Bailiff required of the Crown a full list of all cases in which the SEB had been involved, the full set of Guidelines (the Crown having previously supplied only those elements the Guidelines relating to harm and culpability) including the level of sentencing that might be appropriate and, revised conclusions from the Crown based upon what level of fine might be imposed on a UK local authority in England and Wales. 

25.      The final piece of information sought, namely revised conclusions, is equally surprising.  It appears at first instance that the Court was inviting the Crown to move conclusions based on the Guidelines which, as has been made clear from the above, is an approach expressly against the principle set out in previous cases.  The Crown, as it was bound to do, acceded to the request of the Court and submitted further conclusions.  The Crown did its best and provided the information sought by the Court giving a range of between £20,000 and £130,000 for a similar offence committed by a UK local authority.  The Crown's further conclusions indicated how difficult an assessment it had been because certain information was not available to the Crown in making those further conclusions. 

26.      In any event when the sentencing hearing proceeded before the Inferior Number, the Crown maintained its conclusions based on the established sentencing practice of this Court and, as we have indicated above, moved conclusions in the sum of £20,000.  We should make clear that we agree with the inferior Number assessment of risk of harm and accordingly the conclusions were in our judgment too low.

27.      The two examples of procuring further information, so it is argued by the Appellant, gives rise to the serious concern that the Court in fact applied English sentencing tariffs to the case in point, which can be the only justification for moving from the sentence suggested by the Attorney General to a sentence which was some two and a half times greater.  We can see the force in the submission that such a concern would be raised by the exchange between the Court and the Crown practically on the eve of sentencing. 

28.      However, it is clear that this issue was raised by Counsel for the Defence during the course of the sentencing hearing, Counsel said:

"I just want to be clear Sir, that we are approaching matters on this basis because you received very late yesterday afternoon some additional conclusions from the Crown, and it is quite clear that those conclusions sought to import the tariff and guidelines that are laid down within the UK statutory framework.  Sir, for the reason I raise this now is because, if that is how this Court is going to be looking at matters today, in other words to be looking at the tariff and the UK guidelines, I am almost certainly going to be instructed to seek an adjournment so that I can address you fully on the applicability of those guidelines......."

29.      Prior to raising it in those terms, Counsel for the Defence had made reference to the Deputy Bailiff's appearance, then as Attorney General, in the Petroleum Distribution case and referred to the fact that the Deputy Bailiff, whilst Attorney General, had sought to persuade the Court that the Guidelines would be of assistance in health and safety matters and that the then Bailiff had responded in the way set out in the citations mentioned above.

30.      Express references were made by Counsel to AG v Gas Services (Jersey) Limited [2019] JRC 076A, (a judgment of Olsen, Lieutenant Bailiff, Jurats Ronge and Hughes) in which the Court, said the following:

"35.      In AG v Petroleum Distribution (Jersey) Limited [2018] JRC190 this Court declined to adopt the English Sentencing Council Guidelines, which, it said, contained certain considerations that were "an unwelcome development" (para 21) of the approach taken in the English Court of Appeal case of R v F Howe and Son (Engineers) Limited [1999] 2 CR App R (S) 37.  (We shall henceforth refer to the first case mentioned in this paragraph as "Petroleum Distribution" and to the second as "Howe".)

"36.      With this observation we respectfully agree.  In our judgment there is no place for a box-ticking approach to sentencing in this jurisdiction.  That said, the Court in Petroleum Distribution went on to state that the culpability and harm factors that are set out in the tables appended to the Guidelines:

"are relevant and helpful - thus the distinction between a case where there has been a deliberate breach or a flagrant disregard for the law and a case where there has been a minor failing which did not fall too far short of the appropriate standard is an entirely appropriate distinction. Likewise, an incident which causes death or physical or mental impairment or significantly reduced life expectancy falls into a different category from those where there has been minor injury. There is nothing very difficult about this analysis, but what is relevant is that one does not seek to pigeon hole an offence into a particular category of harm or culpability." (para 16)"

31.      It was in response to those submissions by Defence Counsel that the Deputy Bailiff set out the response from the transcript quoted above.

32.      The Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of the exchanges relating to the Guidelines before the Court dealing with the sentencing, the fact that the Court clearly had requested and reviewed both the tariff set out in the Guidelines and had sought conclusions based upon that tariff, led to the very real concern on the part of the Appellant that the Guidelines had been used in an inappropriate way not in accordance with the practice of the Jersey Courts and statements of principle set out in previous cases.  The Appellant concluded that as a result, because the tariff based on English Guidelines appeared to give a much higher sentencing bracket, a higher sentence than would normally be the case had been imposed.  In submissions before this Court, the Crown accepted that reference to the tariff that would be applicable in the Courts of England and Wales based on the Guidelines and the preparation of conclusions on the basis of those Guidelines as to the tariff would not be an exercise mandated by prior authority in Jersey. 

Basis of Sentence

33.      The second principle argument put forward by the Appellant relates to the fact that the Appellant could not be considered to be the only cause of the accident although it was the only defendant before the Court.  Accordingly, so the Appellant appears to be concerned, it was sentenced on the basis that it was wholly culpable and there was no sense of, if we may put it that way, "apportionment" of blame.  The Court can and should, so it was argued, take into account the factors which contributed to the accident which were not the fault of the Defendant before it and that this would have illustrated that the Defendants culpability was not as high as might otherwise be thought or, at the very least, that the sentence should be lower.  This argument was put to us on the basis of "disparity" which we do not really understand.  Disparity would refer to a circumstance in which two or more were accused before the Court and one received a sentence that was significantly different from the other with no justification for the distinction between those sentences.  There might in those circumstances be a disparity.  Disparity, as such, does not apply in this case as the Appellant alone was before the Court.  Similarly the argument was put as to one of "causation" and it was suggested that other parties or factors had caused the accident and injuries it being suggested that St Helier Iron Works, for example, might be said to be the cause in part because it had procured the wrong gates which carried with them the inherent danger of trapping in respect of which it had been expressly warned by the supplier.

34.      We accept that many accidents with which the Court deals, and this one in particular, had more than one cause and more than one contributing factor.  That does not provide any mitigation for or is exculpatory of a party before the Court for its own failings if they too were a cause of the accident.  Provided a party is sentenced for what it has done or failed to do and not what another party not before the Court has done or failed to do then issues such as disparity or causation simply do not arise.

35.      It is apparent from the Judgment of the Inferior Number the basis on which the Appellant was sentenced.  It was not sentenced for the actions or failings of any other party but for what it did and failed to do in allowing a situation which, as we have said, was an "accident waiting to happen" to persist for a significant period resulting in a significant injury to a young child.

Conclusion

36.      We must look to the Judgment and the exchanges between the Court and Counsel.

37.      Although it is of concern that the Court sought conclusions from the Attorney General on the basis of a direct application of the Guidelines which should not have happened, it is apparent from the Judgment that the correct principles from R v F. Howe & Son (Engineers) Limited were applied and that no reference to the Guidelines was made.

38.      Furthermore, the Judgment also makes it clear that the Appellant was sentenced for what it did and did not do so and the fact that St. Helier Ironworks was not before the Court (and we do not speculate as to why that is the case or suggest that they should have been so) did not adversely affect the sentence imposed upon the Appellant.

39.      We are concerned, however, that whilst the Judgment assesses the potential harm as serious (as opposed to moderate as assessed in the conclusions of the Attorney General) and we agree with the Inferior Number's Assessment in that regard, that does not to us explain why the Inferior Number imposed a sentence of the substance that it did which, as we have already stated, is some two and a half times the sentence moved for by the Crown.

40.      We accept that sentences imposed in matters such as this should sting because this legislation is designed to protect employees or members of the public.  A substantial departure from previous sentences of this nature for unexplained reasons however is of concern.  A revision for sentencing levels is for either the Superior Number or the Court of Appeal sitting in plenary session (where in either case full information can be provided and argument can be heard).  We cannot in the round, feel that such an increase from the conclusions in this case was justified in its entirety nor that such a high sentence was appropriate.  To an extent, therefore, we view the sentence as manifestly excessive of itself but not for the reasons advanced by the Appellant in this case.

41.      In our judgment, a sentence of a fine of £40,000 adequately reflects the assessment of serious harm and would be more appropriate and we substitute that fine for the fine imposed by the Inferior Number.

Authorities

AG v States Employment Board [2020] JRC 089. 

Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 1989, as amended. 

AG v Petroleum Distribution (Jersey) Limited [2018] JRC 190. 

AG v States Employment Board [2010] JRC 205. 

R v F Howe and Son (Engineering) Ltd [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 37. 

AG v Gas Services (Jersey) Limited [2019] JRC 076A.