Jersey Unreported Judgments

Judicial Review - application for the privacy/anonymity orders to continue

[2019]JRC032

Royal Court

(Samedi)

28 February 2019

Before     :

J. A. Clyde-Smith., Commissioner sitting alone.

 

Advocate W. A. F. Redgrave for the Applicant.

Advocate H. Sharp for the Chief Officer.

judgment

the COMMISSIONER:

1.        The applicant applies for the continuation of privacy/anonymity orders made by the Court on 19^th November, 2018, when leave was granted to the applicant for a Judicial Review of a decision of the respondent to refuse consent to the normal operation of accounts in which the applicant has an interest.

2.        The privacy/anonymity orders made by the Court were in these terms:-

"1.       There shall be a hearing in private on a date to be fixed, to give directions in respect of measures relating to anonymity and privacy (if not agreed in advance by the parties and approved by the Court).

2.        The proceedings through to the conclusion of the anonymity and privacy hearing shall be held in private and any judgments therein shall not reveal the identity of the applicant."

3.        I have concluded that anonymity should continue and my description of the background facts will therefore be curtailed in order to protect the anonymity of the applicant.

Background

4.        The applicant is the Chief Executive Officer of a company that acts as adviser to a hedge fund which invests, inter alia, in equity positions and financing.  Both the applicant and the company are named as defendants in a number of class actions commenced in the United States in 2017, in which they are alleged to be involved, with others, in a series of manipulative share issuance - sales transactions in publicly quoted companies, described as "a fraudulent course of conduct".  The allegations are being investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the relevant regulatory authority in the United States, but both the applicant and the company deny that they have acted improperly in any way.

5.        The applicant is a discretionary beneficiary of a Jersey proper law trust, which through a wholly owned BVI company has invested in, and received dividends from the hedge fund.  In or around July 2018, the Jersey administrators of the BVI company filed a suspicious transaction report, following which a decision to withhold consent to the normal operation of its accounts was taken by the States of Jersey Police, and which decision is the subject of the Judicial Review.

6.        It seems clear from the affidavit of DS Fitzgerald, a supervisor attached to the Financial Intelligence Unit within the States of Jersey Police, dated 16^th January, 2019, that the suspicion of the administrators related to the allegations in these class actions. 

7.        The applicant has filed two affidavits in which he states, inter alia, that:-

(i)        The class action proceedings in the U.S. are civil proceedings, in which the allegations are disputed.

(ii)       The SEC is a regulatory body, and not a criminal authority.  No regulatory proceedings have been commenced.

(iii)      The applicant is not aware of any criminal investigation in any jurisdiction into these matters and the applicant has not been charged with any criminal offences.

None of this is disputed by Advocate Sharp acting for the respondent.

8.        The applicant goes on to say that lawsuits of this kind are commonplace in the U.S.  This explanation was provided by the applicant's U.S. lawyer:-

"Specifically regarding the civil class action lawsuits which we discussed at our meeting, the types of securities litigation class action lawsuits at issue here are often used in the U.S. as play by sophisticated plaintiffs' attorneys to prey on vulnerable defendants and have been called 'excessive and sometimes abusive' by none other than former SEC Commissioner, Paul Atkins.  Atkins further states that 'courts require plaintiffs to show only that the company's stock declined and that there was an alleged inaccuracy or omission in the company's public disclosures', without any actual reliance on such misstatements.  This framework has led to 'an explosion of costly nuisance litigation and attempts to shake down corporations'.  Importantly, unlike in other jurisdictions in the world, a plaintiff in the U.S. does not face costs or any other penalty if a lawsuit such as this is dismissed.  A creative and ruthless plaintiff's attorney is free to file as many such lawsuits as he can, routinely seeking early settlement and a payout typically of 30-40% in contingency fees.

These types of lawsuits rarely go to trial and often do not survive initial scrutiny for failure to state a claim.  The allegations in the lawsuits here focus primarily on supposed misstatements or material omissions by the [public] companies.  This is important because the plaintiffs gloss over the fact that [the applicant] and [the applicant's] entities do not share the same legal exposure as the public company defendants here, who are obligated to file periodic and current SEC reports.  [The applicant] and [the applicant's] entities, as mere third-party financing sources for the companies, are not obligated to make the same disclosures.  So, knowing the legal claims against 'the applicant' are tenuous, the plaintiffs suggestively sweep in [the applicant] and [the applicant's] entities wholesale into the alleged misconduct of the public companies without a legal or factual basis.  Yet, the plaintiffs allege no control or influence by [the applicant] of the [public] company's operations or governance.  And the plaintiffs make no factual allegations regarding any communications or activities underlying any promotional activity or illegal trading."

9.        Published U.S. literature produced by Advocate Sharp (Cornerstone Research) supported the applicant's assertion that lawsuits of this kind are commonplace in the U.S. and showed that of the class actions against companies in the S & P 500 from 1997 - 2017, 50% were settled and 43% were dismissed.  Overall less than 1% of filings ever reached a trial verdict.

10.      However Advocate Sharp pointed out that through the class actions brought against the applicant, these allegations were in the public domain and, indeed, the first result of a Google search of the applicant's name referred to the U.S. "fraud lawsuits" in which the applicant was involved.  The applicant's case is that because such lawsuits are so common in the U.S., the reputational damage of this was limited.  However, to be publicly identified in proceedings in Jersey as being suspected of criminal conduct would have a severe impact upon the applicant, the employees of the applicant's companies and the investors in the hedge fund.  The applicant put it this way in the  first affidavit:-

"23      Such publicity would have grossly unfair and unjustified effects.  My ability to conduct business, through [the BVI company] or otherwise, would be severely prejudiced, as suggestions of criminality are likely to be picked up by the media, public companies with which I engage in business, other institutional colleagues and competitors, and financial institutions.  It is one thing to be the subject of speculative lawsuits or regulatory investigations, but to be alleged to be a suspect in relation to a crime is considerably more serious.  Any publication of a report linking me to suspected criminal behaviour would be potentially searchable by all internet search engines and thus have the capacity to cause me reputational damage for years, if not decades ahead.

24.      Not only would my day-to-day business operations be crippled, but my business reputation would be stained immeasurably, and future opportunities would be impaired, by any association with supposed criminal activity.  Any such publicity could provoke additional baseless lawsuits and more intense scrutiny by regulators.  These lawsuits and investigations, no matter how groundless, use significant investor funds and create hardship for my employees and other business relationships.  On a personal note, my family and my community would also be harmed significantly by publicity of unfounded links to criminal conduct."

11.      The applicant went into further details as to the consequences in the second affidavit, as follows:-

"4.   If I were to be publicly associated with criminal conduct the detriment to my business would be severe and immediate.  It is inevitable that all prime brokerage accounts connected to me (including ...) would be shut down.  Prime brokerage is a generic term for the speciality services that financial institutions provide to hedge funds.  These include, amongst other things, securities lending, leveraged trade executions and global custody services.

5.        The loss of prime brokerage accounts would be catastrophic to the operation of my business.  As a result of losing these services, my business would not be able to operate, and it would be a near certainty that the funds would have to either close or suspend trading, assets would have to be liquidated urgently (almost inevitably at a loss), investors would surely suffer losses and/or seek to withdraw their funds, and all employees would have to be made redundant or would depart pre-emptively to join rival institutions.

6.        My name has been publicised in relation to civil class-action law suits, however a suggestion of criminal behaviour is a fundamentally different proposition.  As I explained in my First Affidavit (para 5), securities litigation is extremely common in the United States with nearly one-quarter of the S&P 500 companies currently being sued by class-action plaintiffs.  Accordingly the market reaction to involvement in civil proceedings, while detrimental, does not carry the same consequences as a public suspicion of criminality.

7.        In my view, it would be fundamentally unjust if, in order to invoke the Royal Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the SOJP, I were to be forced to risk catastrophic consequences to my business and losses from which I could never recover regardless of how events might ultimately conclude."

12.      In these circumstances, the applicant says that if anonymity cannot be guaranteed, then the applicant will be unable to pursue the application and justice will be denied.

The law

13.      The principle that legal proceedings should be heard in public and freely reported is deeply entrenched.  The leading case in this jurisdiction is Jersey Evening Post v Al Thani [2002] JLR 542, which encapsulates the position:-

"15     The speeches of their Lordships in Scott were considered in a recent judgment of this court in G v AG v A, 2000 JLR 56 where Page, Commr. usefully summarized the general principles (2000 JLR at 59-60):

'(a)      The general principle, beyond doubt, is that all proceedings should take place in public in open court.

(b)       The constitutional, legal and practical importance of this principle is such that it should not be displaced except for compelling reasons.

(c)       Whether to order proceedings in camera is something that must be determined in accordance with principle, and not on the basis of what the judge happens to consider convenient or reasonable.  Potential embarrassment on the part of those who have to give evidence is not a sufficient reason, of itself, to justify a hearing in camera.

(d)       The question (of principle) that has to be asked can be expressed in various ways but was put succinctly by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, in Scott (or Morgan) v Scott ....as follows ([1913] AC at 439): 'I think that to justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown that the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order were not made.' There are several classes of case in which it is well established that in camera hearings are often necessary.  But they are no more than illustrations of this wider principle.

(e)       The test is a strict one and I quote again from Viscount Haldane ([1913] AC at 438): 'But the burden lies on those seeking to displace ... [the general rule as to openness] in the particular case to make out that the ordinary rule must as of necessity be superseded by this paramount consideration.  The question is by no means one which, consistently with the spirit of our jurisprudence, can be dealt with by the judge as resting in his mere discretion as to what is expedient.  The latter must treat it as one of principle, and as turning, not on convenience, but on necessity.' '

16       The aim, therefore is to do justice to the parties before the court.  That aim must not be stultified by a rigid application of the principle that justice must be done in public.  Yet the principle of open justice should not be displaced as a matter of convenience or expedience, or to avoid embarrassment to one or more of the parties, but only if it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice."

14.      In Warren v AG [2013] JCA 145, the Jersey Court of Appeal confirmed that these fundamental rules of open justice can be modified if necessary to achieve substantive justice:-

"15.    I start from the premise that open justice and natural justice are as important in the Bailiwick of Jersey as in other civilized jurisdictions.  Together they ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done, to those involved, in particular, in adversarial litigation.  But they are not principles from which no departure is ever permitted.  On occasions the elements of procedural justice have to yield to higher imperatives of substantive justice.  Such occasions are exceptional: and the circumstances which engender them must be exceptional too. ...

15.      The position in England is governed by CPR 39.2 which provides that as a general rule hearings are to be in public, but may be in private where inter alia publicity would defeat the object of the hearing, to protect the interest of a child, patient, party or witness or where it is considered to be necessary in the interests of justice.  It might be said that this broadly reflects the position under Jersey law and so it is instructive to have regard to English case law.

16.      The Supreme Court considered the principle of open justice in the case of In R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State of Justice [2016] UKSC 2, which concerned a prisoner who had been convicted of murder, whose tariff of 15 years had expired and who was detained as a patient in hospital for treatment for mental illness.  He brought Judicial Review proceedings over a refusal of the Secretary of State to consent to him having unescorted community leave and the issue was whether there should be an anonymity order.  Lady Hale, giving the judgment of the Court, said this at paragraph 1:-

"1       The principle of open justice is one of the most precious in our law.  It is there to reassure the public and the parties that our courts are indeed doing justice according to law.  In fact, there are two aspects to this principle.  The first is that justice should be done in open court, so that the people interests in the case, the wider public and the media can know what is going on.  The court should not hear and take into account evidence and arguments that they have not heard or seen.  The second is that the names of the people whose cases are being decided, and others involved in the hearing, should be public knowledge.  The rationale for the second rule is not quite the same as the rationale for the first, as we shall see."

17.      She addressed the rationale for the second rule at paragraphs 18 and 19:-

"18     However, in many, perhaps most cases, the important safeguards secured by a public hearing can be secured without the press publishing or the public knowing the identities of the people involved.  The interest protected by publishing names is rather different, and vividly expressed by Lord Rodger in In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1, [2010] 2 AC 697, para 63:

'What's in a name?  'A lot', the press would answer.  This is because stories about particular individuals are simply more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people.  It is just human nature.  And this is why, of course, even when reporting major disasters, journalists usually look for a story about how particular individuals are affected. ... The judges [have recognised] that editors know best how to present material in a way that will interest the readers of their particular publication, and so help them to absorb the information.  A requirement to report it in some austere abstract form, devoid of much of its human interest, could well mean that the report would not be read and the information would not be passed on.  Ultimately such an approach could threaten the viability of newspapers and magazines, which can only inform the public if they attract enough readers and make enough money to survive.'

19       Of course, there are now many more ways of disseminating information, through the electronic media, to which that last comment does not apply.  However, Lord Rodger also pointed out that the identities of claimants 'may not matter particularly to the judges.  But the legitimate interest of the public is wider than the interests of judges qua judges or lawyers qua lawyers' (para 28).  Furthermore, the fact that the parties have agreed to anonymity cannot absolve the court from balancing the interests at stake for itself.  Indeed that is when there is the greatest need for vigilance (para 2)."

18.      She concluded at paragraph 20:-

"20     it is now trite law that restrictions on publicity involve striking a balance between the right to respect for the private life of the individuals concerned, protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the right to freedom of expression, protected by article 10 of the Convention:  In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication)  [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 11 AC 593; In re British Broadcasting Corp [2009] UKHL 34; [2010] 1 AC 145.; In re Guardian News and Media Ltd. above.  There are even cases where anonymity is required because of the risk of death or really serious ill-treatment, in violation of the rights protected by articles 2 and 3 of the Convention: A v British Broadcasting Corp (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2014] UKSC 25; [2015] AC 588."

19.      She concluded on the facts of that case, at paragraph 36:-

"The question in all these cases is that set out in CPR 39.2(4): is anonymity necessary in the interests of the patient?  It would be wrong to have a presumption that an order should be made in every case.  There is a balance to be struck.  The public has a right to know, not only what is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are.  This is particularly so where notorious criminals are involved.  They need to be reassured that sensible decisions are being made about them.  On the other hand, the purpose of detention in hospital for treatment is to make the patient better, so that he is no longer a risk either to himself or to others.  That whole therapeutic enterprise may be put in jeopardy if confidential information is disclosed in a way which enables the public to identify the patient.  It may also be put in jeopardy unless patients have a reasonable expectation in advance that their identifies will not be disclosed without their consent.  In some cases, that disclosure may put the patient himself, and perhaps also the hospital, those treating him and the other patients there, at risk.  The public's right to know has to be balanced against the potential harm, not only to this patient, but to all the others whose treatment could be affected by the risk of exposure."

20.      In Natasha Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2016] EWHC 2864 (QB), a case concerned with an order for anonymity of witnesses against whom findings of physical and sexual abuse had been made by the court, Males J gave this helpful summary, having considered the authorities:-

"28     I would summarise the position as it emerges from these authorities, so far as relevant to the present case, as follows:

a.        the court has power to make an order for the anonymity of a witness, but only if it is 'necessary' to do so in order to protect the interests of the witness.  Nothing less than this will do.  Some of the cases emphasise this by saying that anonymity must be 'strictly necessary'.

b.        Although other 'interests' may sometimes be in play, often the interests which made need to be protected are a witness's rights under Article 8 to respect for his or her private or family life.  That is the position here.

c.        In such a case the first question to be determined is whether identification of the witness would interfere with his or her rights under Article 8.  This will only be the case if the consequences of identification reach a certain level of seriousness (or as Lord Neuberger put it in JIH, if the facts and circumstances of the case are 'sufficiently strong'.  Depending on the subject matter of the case and the nature of the evidence, giving evidence as a witness may be embarrassing or sometimes even humiliating, but this will not generally be enough to justify an order for anonymity, by reference to Article 8.  Something more is required, although in view of the wide range of circumstances in which Article 8 can apply, I doubt whether that something is susceptible of precise definition.

d.        If identification would interfere with the witness's right to respect for his or her private or family life, it is necessary to consider (in the terms of Article 8.2) whether that interference 'is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'.  The rights and freedoms of others which will generally require consideration are (or at least include) the right to freedom of expression, including the vital freedom of the press to report court proceedings held in public, under Article 10.  A balance therefore needs to be struck.

e.        In striking that balance, the question has been described as whether there is a sufficient public interest in identification of the witness to justify the interference with the witness's Article 8 rights.  Considered in isolation that way of posing the question may suggest that presumption in favour of anonymity unless there is a strong public interest in identification.  However, when this formulation of the question is viewed in the full context of the cases discussed above, it is apparent that this is not so.  I would make three points.  One is that the general rule remains the principle of open justice.  The second is that what matters is not merely the fact of interference with Article 8 rights but rather the severity or otherwise of the consequences for the witness of being identified.  The more severe those consequences, the more likely it is that that anonymity will be ordered and vice versa.  The third is that the weight to be given to an interference with freedom of expression must depend on the extent to which the issues raised by the litigation involve matters of real public interest.  The greater the public interest (as distinct from the separate question whether the identity of the witness is likely to be of interest to the public), the more likely it is that anonymity will be refused.

f.         All these points need to be taken into account. Inevitably, therefore, striking the necessary balance requires close attention to the facts of the particular case."

21.      A number of other English cases were cited to me by counsel, but as they acknowledged they all turned on their particular facts.  However, there were examples of cases concerned with the ambit of police consent powers, where the names of the parties had been anonymised, namely N v Royal Bank of Scotland [2017] WLR 3938, K Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2007] 1 WLR 311 and Governor of Bank of Scotland v A Limited [2001] 1 WLR 751.  The judgments in those cases make no reference to the issue of anonymisation, though in Governor of Bank of Scotland v A Limited, Lord Woolf CJ said this at paragraph 4:-

"Before Laddie J the bank was merely described as a bank.  The defendants to the proceedings were described as A Ltd, Mr B and C Ltd.  The investigations by the authorities which contributed to these proceedings are no longer being pursued.  However, the fact of those investigations having occurred could reflect adversely on the defendants and it is therefore reasonable that their identity should not be disclosed.  For that reason we will describe them in the same way as Laddie J did.  However, the actions of the bank did not reflect any discredit upon the bank and in those circumstances we do not consider there is any justification for the bank's identity not being disclosed."

22.      This application has to be considered against the potential injustice of the Jersey statutory regime where, unlike the English statutory regime, no time limits are set down in which police have to respond, and if that does not happen, the service provider is free to proceed.  The potential injustice of this was recognised by the Court in Gichuru v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Limited and others [2008] JRC 068, where Sir Michael Birt, then Deputy Bailiff, said this at paragraph 12:-

"12     This is clearly capable of causing great hardship and unfairness.  There may never be a prosecution, yet the bank may retain its suspicion.  The result may be that a person, against whom no criminal charges have been brought and against whom there lies only a suspicion, finds his assets informally frozen without there having been any court order to achieve this.  Furthermore, the freezing of the account may continue for an indefinite period.  The position is to be contrasted with the carefully structured protection provided in respect of a saisie, which is clearly intended to ensure that funds are not frozen indefinitely or for an unreasonably long period in the absence of criminal charges."

23.      Further comments were made by Sir Michael Birt in Chief Office of the States of Jersey Police v Minwalla [2007] JLR 409.  In both cases, there were recommendations for reform of the Jersey legislation.  Having said that, Advocate Sharp has drawn to my attention the decision of the Court of Appeal of Guernsey in The Chief Officer, Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service v Garnet Investments Limited Judgment 19/2011, where both Gichuru and Minwalla were considered, and where it was held that in Guernsey (and arguably therefore in Jersey), there were good reasons not to replicate the English legislation in this respect (see paragraphs 43 - 57).

24.      In summary and in the context of this case, the general principle is that proceedings should be held in public and be freely reported, but that principle can be displaced if it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice.  In considering the interests of justice, the Court will take into account the Article 8 Convention rights of the person concerned, as well as the countervailing right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, but the consequences to that person of being identified must be sufficiently severe to justify the displacement of the general principle of open and freely reported justice.

Discussion and decision

25.      Advocate Sharp argued that the applicant's Article 8 rights were not engaged, because of the material already available publicly in relation to the class action proceedings in the U.S. to which the applicant is a defendant.  Even if they are engaged, the second question, he said, was whether the interference with that Article 8 right is justified by reference to Article 10 and the principle of open justice, and in his view, it was.  Here is an applicant, he said, who has declined to put forward evidence about the provenance of assets that are suspected to be the proceeds of crime, and now seeks to bring a legal action that he hopes will be a first step in the moving of funds to the possible frustration of any victims and law enforcement agencies.  There is an overwhelming public interest, he said, in the public knowing about such matters, particularly in the context of Jersey's efforts to be regarded as a well-regulated finance offshore centre. 

26.      Advocate Redgrave for the applicant counters that the origin of the funds that are suspected to be the proceeds of crime have never been in doubt, as they are derived from the business of the hedge fund, which involved, inter alia, the very transactions that are challenged in the U.S. class actions.  It is not, he said, a case like that of National Crime Agency v Mrs A [2018] EWHC 2603 (Admin), in which Mrs A was challenging an unexplained wealth order.  An order for her anonymity was set aside because the Court found unconvincing her claims as to the consequences to her in her own country if she were identified.  She was the wife of a convicted former state banker who was imprisoned for embezzlement, was spending tens of millions of pounds in Harrods and on property and could not explain where it had come from.

27.      The applicant had deposed as to the crippling effect of these funds being effectively being frozen, in that they were sitting idle and could not be deployed for investment or business operations.  There was no evidence, said Advocate Redgrave, that the applicant wished to move funds to frustrate "victims" and law enforcement agencies.  The use by Advocate Sharp of the word "victims" presumes guilt in respect of a person against whom no charges had been brought, and indeed, in respect of whom there was no criminal investigation.  Equally, there had been no court ordered restraints over any funds.

28.      I accept Advocate Redgrave's submission that there has been a developing judicial recognition that persons under police investigation have a reasonable expectation of privacy which is enforceable. In ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWHC 2760 (QB), the High Court held that a suspect in a police investigation into financial crime has a reasonable expectation of privacy which is likely to outweigh the press's right to freedom of expression.  In Sir Cliff Richard OBE v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837, an Article 8 Convention right to privacy was established in relation to a person who is being investigated for a crime prior to a charging decision and the corresponding need for a compelling, countervailing public interest before it is legitimate to identify that person.

29.      The position in this case is different in that the applicant is not seeking to prevent publicity being given to a criminal investigation into the applicant's activities.  Indeed, there is no such investigation.  Instead, property in which the applicant has an interest has been effectively frozen, and the applicant's only remedy lies in the pursuit of civil proceedings, which ordinarily would lead to damaging publicity.  There is a real difference, in my view, between disputed allegations of financial manipulation in civil class actions in the U.S. which are the subject of a regulatory investigation and it becoming publicly known that funds in which the applicant is interested have effectively been frozen in Jersey, because the police are suspicious that it represents the proceeds of the applicant's criminal conduct.

30.      I accept the applicant's evidence both as to the serious damage that could be done to the applicant's financial business in which confidence is key, and that without anonymity in these proceedings, the applicant is effectively left without a remedy under a statutory regime where the informal freeze can last indefinitely.  I am satisfied that we are not concerned here with the avoidance of embarrassment on the part of the applicant, and certainly not with convenience or expedience.  In essence, on the facts of this case, I find that the consequences to the applicant are sufficiently severe to justify the displacement of the principle of open justice. 

31.      Until further order the Judicial Review hearing will therefore be held in private, but the wider public interest will be met by a judgment which addresses and explains the relevant legal issues by reference to the necessary factual background without identifying the applicant by name or by publishing information which would enable the applicant to be identified. I say "until further order" as there will be liberty to apply should the circumstances justifying anonymity change.

Authorities

Jersey Evening Post v Al Thani [2002] JLR 542. 

Warren v AG [2013] JCA 145. 

In R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State of Justice [2016] UKSC 2. 

Natasha Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2016] EWHC 2864 (QB). 

N v Royal Bank of Scotland [2017] WLR 3938. 

K Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2007] 1 WLR 311

Governor of Bank of Scotland v A Limited [2001] 1 WLR 751. 

Gichuru v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Limited and others [2008] JRC 068

Chief Office of the States of Jersey Police v Minwalla [2007] JLR 409. 

The Chief Officer, Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service v Garnet Investments Limited Judgment 19/2011. 

National Crime Agency v Mrs A [2018] EWHC 2603 (Admin). 

ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWHC 2760 (QB). 

Sir Cliff Richard OBE v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837.