Care order - reasons for the court granting the applicant an interim care order.
Before : |
J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner, and Jurats Nicolle and Sparrow |
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Between |
The Minister for Health and Social Services |
Applicant |
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And |
A (the mother) |
First Respondent |
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And |
B (the father) |
Second Respondent |
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IN THE MATTER OF ESME, BLAKE, PAIGE AND RHYS (INTERIM CARE ORDER)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002
Advocate P. F. Byrne for the Applicant.
Advocate M. J. Haines for the First Respondent.
Advocate A. T. H. English for the Second Respondent.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. On 31st January, 2018, the Court granted the applicant ("the Minister") an interim care order in relation to the four children of the first respondent ("the Mother") ranging in age from 5 years to 1 month, approving a care plan for their immediate removal from the Mother into local foster care. We now set out our reasons.
2. At the outset of the hearing, the Court granted the Mother's application for special measures to be put in place for the hearing. In April 2017, the Mother had been assessed by Dr Emma House, consultant clinical psychologist at Overdale, as having a full-scale IQ score of 71, placing her within the "borderline" range, making it more difficult for her to understand and process information. A number of recommendations were made for those dealing with the Mother, to assist her in understanding and processing information. Regrettably it would seem that those recommendations were not often followed by those dealing with the Mother.
3. On 6th November 2017, the Mother was referred to Mrs Donna Vibert, a social worker, for an assessment of her needs. Noting that as an adult the Mother did not qualify for social care support, Mrs Vibert said this:-
"She requires an independent advocate to work with her to understand and partake in the child protection proceedings. There is a gap in service provision in relation to this. [The Mother], as an adult, and without her family, does not qualify for social care support; but her low level disability would suggest that she needs instrumental support with her children and advocacy to support her through this very difficult time. She should be given every opportunity to engage meaningfully with the process to ensure that she fully understands it, which would then be in the best interests of the children."
4. In December 2017, Doctor Linda Jeffes, a chartered clinical psychologist, was instructed to prepare a psychological and cognitive assessment of the Mother (and of the second respondent). Doctor Jeffes assessed the Mother as fulfilling the criteria of learning disability, defined as a significant impairment of intellectual functioning, which she advised was a considerable difficulty for a parent. She was concerned that the Mother may not have litigation capacity.
5. In the past, litigants in the position of the Mother have been assisted by the self-advocacy service provided by Mencap (primarily through Ms Ros Byrne-Shaw) but funding for that service had been cut. Mrs Clare Woodhouse, an associate at Mourant Ozannes who act for the Mother, therefore applied for funding for an intermediary out of the legal aid vote, something that had been agreed in principle, but no intermediary was in place for the hearing.
6. Advocate Haines, working on the principles set out in the Capacity and Self-determination (Jersey) Law 2016 (which is not yet in force), advised the Court that in his view, the Mother did have litigation capacity, although that could change, and could participate in the proceedings, provided that the following special measures were put in place:-
(i) The use of short sentences and simple language.
(ii) Short questions for witnesses and in chronological order.
(iii) Avoiding jumping around bundles.
(iv) Using short sentences when giving answers.
(v) Very regular breaks, to enable the Mother to rest and to ensure her understanding of what was happening.
7. Advocate Haines asked for the appointment of an intermediary for any future hearings and relevant meetings, but he was not instructed to and did not seek an adjournment, so that an intermediary could be appointed for the application for an interim care order. A particular concern for the Mother was that the first child was aware of the application, and was understandably very anxious to know whether, when she finished school that day, she would be returning to the care of her Mother, or going into foster care.
8. The fact that the Mother did not have an intermediary to assist her, where the need for an intermediary had been identified in November last year, was of profound concern to the Court, bearing in mind the enormity of the issues before the Court for the Mother, namely the potential removal from her of all four of her children, the youngest being only one month old.
9. However, it was clear that with the special measures requested, she would be able to participate in the proceedings, and as the guardian reminded us, the welfare of the children was our paramount concern, and it was not in their interests for the matter to be delayed.
10. We therefore granted the application for special measures to be utilised during the hearing, and appointed an intermediary for any future hearings and relevant meetings, and resolved to proceed to hear the Minister's application for an interim care order.
11. The evidence before the Court presented a concerning picture of the environment in which the children lived.
12. The second respondent was not the biological father of the first child, but she treated him as such; the whereabouts of her biological father were not known. We will, therefore, refer to the second respondent as "the Father". He had been assessed by Doctor Jeffes as having an overall cognitive ability in the low average range and had a history of alcohol and drug abuse and self-harming.
13. The children have been exposed to frequent arguments and scathing comments between the parents, with the Father leaving the family home for significant periods of time. Both parents had made allegations and reported incidents about the other. On 24th June, 2017, both parents alleged the other had hit the children. On 30th June, 2017, the Mother reported to the police that the Father had kidnapped the children. On 3rd July 2017, the Mother reported to the police that she was concerned about the children's welfare whilst in the care of the Father. On 14th August, 2017, it was reported that the Father had pushed a door into the Mother's stomach when she was pregnant at the time. On 4th October, 2017, the Mother reported the Father to the police for harassment. On 25th October, 2017, the Mother reported to the police that she had been receiving threatening texts from the Father. On 28th November, 2017, the Mother reported the Father for texting and harassing her.
14. The Father recounted to Doctor Jeffes that "[the Mother] shouts and screams at the children. She favours [the first child] and gives her whatever she wants for an easy life .... She is just messy, with no routines and outings for the kids." On 14th November, 2017, the Father reported that the Mother was always shouting at the children, that the children were not being fed and that all the second child wanted was sweets. On 30th October, 2017, the Father reported that he had seen the Mother push the second child into a wall several weeks ago. On 13th March, 2017, an anonymous referral was made reporting the Mother as shouting at the children, and on 28th December, 2017, the family support worker witnessed the Mother shouting at the second child.
15. On 5th January, 2017, the first child, then aged four, had 11 teeth extracted as a consequence of decay. Bearing in mind that most children of that age have 20 milk teeth, this means that the first child had over half of her teeth removed for want of basic dental care on the part of the parents.
16. On 23rd August, 2017, 24th October, 2017, 7th November, 2017, 14th December, 2017 and 29th December, 2017, the Mother self-reported as struggling with the children's behaviour and caring for them. The first child was displaying emotional and behavioural difficulties placing her at risk from accidental injuries. The second child had been assessed as having significant learning needs and speech and language difficulties, but the Mother expressed herself as being unable to understand why he required speech and language therapy.
17. On 28th December, 2017, a family support worker reported that the third child's face and hands were blue, due to lack of clothing and lack of heat in the house. The Mother did not apparently understand why she was blue or how to operate the heating.
18. During the pregnancy with the fourth child, the Mother missed numerous appointments to ensure the baby's health, which was of particular significance as there were concerns regarding his growth and his kidneys. Currently there are concerns over hygiene with the third and fourth child being reported as having nappy rash caused by wet nappies not being changed.
19. Throughout the Mother's pregnancy with the fourth child, the Father denied paternity, although he now accepts it. He has not been in the family home since November 2017. He went to live with his mother, but it is reported that on 15th December, 2017 he was asked to leave, after threatening her. At the time of the hearing, he was living in the Shelter. He told the Children's Service that after leaving the family home, he had slept with someone who became pregnant but who later miscarried. He reportedly self-harmed twice in December 2017, and in the week prior to the hearing. Over that period, he had been taken to Accident and Emergency on three occasions under the influence of alcohol and drugs.
20. The Minister had made provision for the maternal grandmother to move into the family home to assist the Mother before and after the fourth child's birth. She remained at the property until 24th January, 2018, refusing to return due to the verbal abuse she said she had received from the Mother. The withdrawal of the maternal grandmother was the catalyst for the Minister's application which was filed on the 26th January, 2018. As a result of that abuse, the maternal grandmother is unwilling to help care for the children in the interim save as mentioned below.
21. The Mother receives extensive support from members of the support services who are helping beyond their core working hours. In particular, the family support worker had been attending two or three times a day since the maternal grandmother had left. In addition to this:-
(i) The maternal grandmother still helps with the school and nursery runs.
(ii) A cousin of the Mother assists every weekday morning and at the weekends.
(iii) A family friend also provides help.
There are, in fact, only brief periods during the daytime, perhaps one hour, when the Mother is alone with the children.
22. Unusually at an interim stage, the Court had the benefit of a full psychological and cognitive assessment of both parents, to which we have already referred. Doctor Jeffes' opinion as to the ability of the parents to care for the children was clear and unequivocal. Taking first the Father, she said this:-
"The concerns for [the Father] as a sole parent lie not in his ability to meet the children's needs but his ability to do so consistently. He currently allows his own relationships and emotional needs to take priority: when he is distressed, the children are marginalised and often lost in the moment. His need to withdraw, to cry, to drink alcohol to excess and to attack [the Mother] takes precedence over the children's need for protection, stability and security.....
The problems that [the Father] has experienced during his life are pervasive and deep-seated. Until he is able to engage in therapy to reflect on his life, his behaviour, relationships and abuse of alcohol and drugs, it is highly unlikely that he will have the ability to meet the responsibility to caring for his children, ensuring that they are provided with a loving, secure home environment. Currently, [the Father] is not a good candidate for therapy as his mental health remains fragile and he tends to deflect blame and deny difficulties."
23. Turning to the Mother, she said this:-
"Over recent years, there has been a high level of professional input to support and promote [the Mother's] parenting skills. Whilst she has basic knowledge with regard to diet, boundaries and routines, her thinking is narrow and concrete and she fails to be consistent or to adapt her parenting strategies according to the child's nature and situation. For the main part, she has retained very little information offered to her by the various professionals who have been working to support her.
It is evident that despite her best effort, [the Mother] has been unable to meet her children's basic needs. Whilst she has made her best effort, the demands of parenting are beyond her ability. It is likely that as the children grow older and their needs become more complex, the deficits in [the Mother's] parenting capacity will become increasingly evident. ...
In my opinion, [the Mother] does not currently have the emotional resources or intellectual capacity to care adequately for her children. To assess ability to change, it is necessary to consider an individual's capacity for reflective thought and critical self-appraisal.
Unfortunately, [the Mother] is not currently in a position to embark on therapy or a programme of parenting training. Her position is defensive inasmuch as she minimises or externalises blame, her thought processes are limited, inflexible and concrete and she fails to internalise new information. ...
[The Mother] is a learning disabled, emotionally immature young woman who is highly vulnerable to entering relationships that will potentially expose the children to sexual, physical and emotional harm.
24. In addition to this, the Court had a report from Dr Tanya Engelbrecht, a consultant psychiatrist with the Alcohol and Drugs Service, which documented the Father's extensive history of suicidal ideation and self-harm and alcohol and drugs abuse. In relation to the risk to himself, she said this at paragraph 16.1:-
"[The Father] experienced persistent thoughts of self-harm, which had been present for years with varying levels of intensity. His suicide attempts have been impulsive and unpredictable. When misusing substances or alcohol, [the Father's] risk of deliberate self-harm and accidental injury is high.
[The Father] has a history of taking impulsive overdoses, whilst under the influence of alcohol. ...
[The Father] engages in reckless behaviour, which may result in him coming to harm. His risk of accidental death is high due to his risk-taking behaviour."
In terms of his risk to others, she said this at paragraph 16.4:-
"[The Father] has a history of impulsive and destructive behaviour. His aggressive behaviour significantly increases when he is stressed or under the influence of substances/alcohol. ...
[The Father] has a history of displaying an anti-authority attitude towards the police, previous employers and the Social Security Department."
25. She advised that at the time of the report, he was not physically dependent on illicit substances or medication with abuse potential. She was of the opinion that his recent alcohol and drugs use appears to manifest as binges, rather than dependent drinking and drug taking during times of stress.
26. As to whether he has the capacity and motivation to remain abstinent from drugs/alcohol she said this at paragraph 17.30:-
"[The Father] is currently receiving interventions to increase his motivation to maintain abstinence from his Alcohol and Drug Service key worker. I am unsure whether he would be able to keep the necessary level of motivation in order to make a significant change to his lifestyle. ...
[The Father's] past behaviour would suggest he would be vulnerable to relapses during times of stress. When his life is settled in terms of a stable relationship, finances, accommodation and social support, his risk of relapse should be lower....
It is not possible to predict the period of time [the Father] will have to remain abstinent before the likelihood of lapses become minimal. The risk of relapse is particularly problematic in the first 3 years of abstinence and never completely goes away."
27. The parents rested on the wisdom of the Court as to whether the threshold for the making of an interim care order under Article 30 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 (the "Children Law") was met without admissions as to specific facts save as stated above, namely that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the circumstances in respect of the children were those mentioned in Article 24(2) of the Children Law. The Court had no difficulty in finding that it was met on the basis of the evidence before it and therefore it had jurisdiction.
28. The test for the removal of children at an interim stage is necessarily high, namely that the children's safety requires interim protection (see In the matter of QQ [2010] JRC 217E at paragraph 14). At the interim stage, the Court ordinarily does not have the benefit of expert assessments, which we had in this case. The assessment of the Mother's capability of parenting the children was stark; she was not capable of parenting them.
29. This was acknowledged by the parents, in that the suggestion put by them to the Court was that the Children's Service should install social workers into the family home full-time to assist; effectively, to take over the parenting of the children. As the social worker Miss Janice Butterworth said, that would require a team of social workers to be deployed, which was not a workable solution for the Children's Service, and in any event, the fact that such a high level of support was required made it demonstrably clear that the children were not safe under the Mother's care.
30. The Father was not an option. He had left his mother's home and was living in the Shelter. As Miss Butterworth put it in her report at paragraph 6.1, the Father was currently homeless, using alcohol and drugs and had been hospitalised on three occasions due to drinking and taking drugs over the Christmas and New Year period.
31. Advocate English, for the father, put it to Miss Butterworth that it was upsetting for the Father to have the children looked after by someone else, and that he only misused substances and self-harmed due to the emotional upset of being removed from his children. If they were returned to him he would not abuse substances or self-harm.
32. In the view of the Court, this was putting the Father's needs before those of the children, and in any event, in the light of the history and the assessments of Doctor Jeffes and Dr Engelbrecht, it would be grossly irresponsible to place these children in his care, and certainly not if the purpose of doing so was to address his own emotional needs.
33. A concern of the Court was whether it was necessary to remove all four children from the Mother, in particular, the third and fourth children, the fourth child being one month old (although we were told not being breast fed). The guardian, however, could not support the third and fourth children remaining with the Mother. The evidence, she said, showed a concern about the neglect of the first and second children, indicating a lack of parenting that started at birth. The Mother had struggled with caring with the first child alone. The third and fourth children were particularly vulnerable, as they had no voice; the risk to them was high.
34. There was evidence of neglect of the youngest child during pregnancy, and of both younger children because of the nappy rash, indicating a lack of hygiene.
35. It was not clear to the guardian from the way they interacted in Court that the relationship between the Mother and the Father, had ended, and there was every possibility that the Father would return to the family home if the children were there.
36. The guardian supported the care plan for removal of all four children; she could not support the third and fourth children remaining. The guardian accepted that removal from the Mother could be harmful to the children, but in her view, their safety outweighed any harm that removal might cause.
37. The guardian could not countenance the Father having the children's care, because he had to address his deep-seated issues first. Placing the children with the Father was not, she said, in their interests.
38. In terms of the welfare checklist, we have already considered the capacity of the parents to meet the children's needs, the harm the children are at risk of suffering if they remain in the care of parents who cannot meet their needs and the likely effect of any change in their circumstances. We have taken into account the first child's emotional and behavioural difficulties, and the second child's learning needs. In terms of the wishes of the children, because of their age, it was reasonable to assume that they would wish to be cared for by their parents if it were safe for this to happen. The first child had expressed the wish to Miss Butterworth that she wanted the Father home, and on other occasions, had stated that the Mother had been upset because the Father had been shouting at her.
39. From the evidence before us, and faced with clear advice that the Mother was not capable of parenting the children and that the Father was not in position to do so, the Court had no option but to approve the care plan for their removal. It was, in the circumstances, proportionate and necessary to intervene in this way.
40. This was an interim measure, and the Minister was not seeking to dismiss any prospects of the parents caring for the children. The care plan proposed that a "Parenting, Assessment, Manual" or "PAM" assessment of both parents should be carried out by an independent social worker, and that there should be a sibling assessment of the children; directions were given to that end. Connected viability assessments would also be completed for those family members who had indicated an interest in caring for the children.
41. In conclusion, and for these reasons, the Court granted the Minister an interim care order in respect of the children, approving the care plan for their immediate removal and the contact arrangements.
Authorities
Capacity and Self-determination (Jersey) Law 2016.
Children (Jersey) Law 2002.