Jersey Unreported Judgments

Matrimonial - reasons for dismissing the Petitioner's claims against the Third Party.

[2018]JRC042

Royal Court

(Family)

21 February 2018

Before     :		J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner, and Jurats Blampied and Ronge
Between	A		Petitioner
And	B		Respondent
And	C		Third Party

Advocate M. C. Goulborn for the first Petitioner.

Advocate L. J. Glynn for the Respondent.

Advocate O. A. Blakeley for the Third Party

judgment

the COMMISSIONER:

1.        The petitioner and respondent are engaged in proceedings for ancillary relief following their divorce and over two days, the Court sat to consider a preliminary issue that had been referred up by the Registrar, namely the petitioner's claim to be entitled to financial relief in respect of the property of the third party.  In our view, the claim is hopeless.

Background

2.        The third party is the respondent's mother, and on 7^th January, 1998, her father conveyed to her the reversionary interest in the family property, reserving to himself the life interest.  He subsequently died in 1999 at which point she became entitled property absolutely.

3.        The property comprises a main house with seven bedrooms, a three-bedroomed cottage and a two-bedroomed flat with 4½ vergées of land.  It is the home and principal asset of the third party, who is now aged 71, and who has very recently retired from work.  She has two children, namely her son, the respondent, and a daughter ("the daughter"). Prior to his marriage to the petitioner, the respondent occupied the flat rent free.  The cottage was let out.  The petitioner moved into the flat with the respondent in January 2000, and they were married the following August. When the daughter returned from university, she lived in the main house.  When the petitioner and the respondent's first child was born, they swapped accommodation with the daughter, moving with their child into the main house and the daughter and her partner moving into the flat.  When the daughter started having children, she and her family moved into the cottage, and the flat was let out.

4.        The petitioner and respondent went on to have two more children, and they all shared the main house with the third party.  They had a separate living room from the third party, but the kitchen was communal.  That remained the position until the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent broke down, and she and the children left the property in January 2014 to move into rented accommodation. 

5.        The marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was beset with financial difficulties.  The respondent ran a gardening business from the property when they first met in 2000, from which he earned approximately £200 per week.  In late 2000, early 2001, he then started a business called D Company, again from the property, for which two agricultural loans were taken out, which the third party agreed could be secured on the property.  That business was not successful, and it was sold for no consideration, the purchaser taking over the debts.  The two agricultural loans were therefore repaid in full.

6.        In or around 2002, the respondent and the petitioner took out a loan with E Company for approximately £27,000, which the third party again agreed could be secured over the property by her guaranteeing the debt.  The respondent used the whole of this borrowing to purchase two cars and a boat.

7.        In approximately 2005, the respondent borrowed £50,000 from HSBC in order to set up F Company, again operated from the property.  The third party again agreed that this debt could be secured on the property by her guaranteeing the debt. The business was not successful.  When it was sold, the respondent retained 10% of the profits on the F crop, but they were wiped out by disease. 

8.        On 6^th June, 2006, the petitioner and the respondent took out a loan of £100,000 from HSBC, which was used to pay off the £50,000 HSBC business loan, to pay off overdrafts on the petitioner and respondent's bank account and joint credit card debts, and to refund £21,000 to the third party.  There is a dispute as to what this latter sum represented.  The third party agreed that this borrowing could be secured over the property by her guaranteeing the debt.

9.        The petitioner had a greater earning potential than the respondent, in that when they met, she was employed as a G.  She stopped work on the birth of the first child, and thereafter, stayed at home looking after the children, save that she worked part-time between September 2003 and July 2004 and between January 2007 and October 2007.  From December 2008 she returned to full-time work.  The petitioner and the respondent's financial position during the marriage was exacerbated by the decision to educate the children privately.

10.      The third party decided to help the petitioner and respondent financially from the outset by giving them the rent received firstly from the cottage, when it was let, and then from the flat when it was let, and this continued for some 14 years.

11.      The outgoings on the property were paid by the third party, but the arrangement was that the petitioner and the respondent would contribute one half and the daughter and her husband one quarter, the petitioner and the respondent's larger share reflecting their enjoyment of the majority of the main house and the receipt of the rental income from the flat.  The third party would prepare monthly handwritten invoices for both families, and they generally covered such regular outgoings as insurance, rates, water, oil, electricity and garden maintenance.  The petitioner and the respondent were often unable to pay their invoice, in which case the third party would keep a note of what was owed.

The petitioner's claim

12.      The petitioner's claim was made firstly in contract in that she alleged that in January 2000, there was an oral agreement between the third party and the petitioner and the respondent that as pleaded "the petitioner and her children would be entitled to reside in the property whilst it remained in the ownership of the third party and/or that the property would be sold and the petitioner and/or the respondent would be entitled to a share of the proceeds of sale."  It was alleged that this agreement was intended to be legally binding between the parties.  She claimed that in reliance on this contract she and the respondent took out the loans referred to above, which were secured upon the property, and over time, expended their own money on improving the property.  As a consequence, they did not make provision to purchase an alternative property of their own.

13.      In the alternative, the petitioner claimed that the third party had been unjustly enriched by the increase in the value of the property, due to the time and money spent by the petitioner and/or the respondent on the works and improvements to the property.

14.      In the further alternative the petitioner made a claim to a beneficial interest in the property on the basis of proprietary estoppel because of what she alleged were clear and unequivocal promises or assurances by the third party during the course of the marriage that the property would always be the home of the petitioner and the respondent, or that it would be sold, and on any sale, they would receive a proportion of the sale proceeds to purchase their own home.

15.      Other alternative claims for equitable relief based on alleged unequivocal promises by the third party were also pleaded.

16.      The petitioner sought the following relief: -

"An order that the third party and/or the respondent pay to the petitioner:

a.     The petitioner's share of the costs of works and renovations to the property;

b.    The petitioner's share of the loss of her time invested in the work and improvements to the property;

c.     The petitioner's share in the increase of the equity in the property."

17.      Advocate Goulborne, for the petitioner, confirmed that relief was only sought against the third party.  The particulars of loss pleaded by the petitioner and totalling £441,306.40 comprised: -

(i)        The costs of works and renovations to the property in the sum of £65,000 which she alleged she and the respondent carried out. Her claim against the third party would therefore be to half that amount namely £32,500;

(ii)       The sum of £158,806.40 being the salary the petitioner says she would have earned if she had not been engaged in the project management and maintenance of the property; and

(iii)      A reasonable sum to reflect the petitioner's interest in the increase in the value of the property, to be quantified prior to the hearing but estimated at £250,000.

Evidence

18.      The Court had affidavits sworn by each of the parties and heard evidence from them. No expert evidence was called.

19.      The petitioner said that the alleged oral contract was entered into after her marriage to the respondent in August 2000, as opposed to January 2000 as pleaded.  She said there were lots of discussions but could remember the third party saying "This is [the respondent's] home.  Make this your home."  She said the third party wanted the respondent there, as "the man of the house".  The respondent had also made it clear to her that the property would be her home.  She assumed that the daughter would have a similar agreement with the third party.  She did not refer in evidence to any discussion about a possible sale of the property at this early stage.

20.      In reliance on the statement by the third party, the petitioner said that she and the respondent spent some £65,000 on the property over the ensuing fourteen years that they were there.  Although we did not inspect the property, it is clear that it was somewhat dated internally, although in sound condition.

21.      The petitioner set out particulars of the work she said that she and the respondent carried out to the property, and without going into those particulars in any detail, it suffices to say that it was predominantly work of a cosmetic nature (such as re-decorating and re-carpeting), of the kind one might expect any occupier to carry out, and particularly one occupying on such favourable terms.  We will comment on two: -

(i)        When they first moved into the flat, the petitioner and the respondent decided to make the kitchen open plan.  It was not something which the third party had asked them to do.  The petitioner valued this work at £9,000.  The respondent explained that this work actually involved him taking out a door and inserting a lintel which he had picked up at a very reasonable cost, together with some re-tiling. 

(ii)       In the main house, they refurbished a bathroom, work which the petitioner valued at £5,000.  The respondent explained that they re-tiled the bathroom and put in a new toilet and basin, which the third party said had been purchased from B & Q for £200.

22.      The respondent and the third party did not dispute that much of the works particularised by the petitioner had been undertaken, but at a much lower cost than the values placed upon them by the petitioner.

23.      The petitioner claimed to have fitted new PVC windows to the kitchen, utility and second lounge in the main house and to have replaced all of the glass panes in the majority of the windows in the main house, at a cost of £4,000.  She also claimed to have re-tarmacked an area outside the main property for £3,000, and to have carried out various works in the garden, which she valued at £9,000.  The third party denied that the petitioner had carried out these works; she said that anything major in the property was paid for by her.

24.      There was no documentation supporting expenditure by the petitioner and the respondent on the property.  Apart from physical work carried out by the respondent, it was clear that the third party was the only person financially able to contract with third parties and, on the case of the petitioner, claiming a contribution from the petitioner and the respondent.  The petitioner said that all of the documents in relation to the works carried out to the property to which she and the respondent contributed were contained in a four-drawer filing cabinet at the property, the top two drawers of which were used by the third party and the bottom two drawers by the petitioner.  It would seem that she had received the contents of the bottom two drawers which were hers, but had not had discovery of the invoices contained in the top two drawers.  There had been an order for discovery made against all three parties, and none had been made by the third party.  Accordingly, the petitioner had not had sight of the invoices retained by the third party.  The third party told us that she had provided documentation to Advocate Heath (acting for the respondent), who had filed an affidavit of discovery.  What remained related to her personal finances.

25.      That led to Advocate Goulborn making an application just before closing submissions for an adjournment and a specific discovery order against the third party in respect of all of the invoices held by her relating to the property for the relevant period.  We rejected that application because:-

(i)        primarily, the expenditure claimed by the petitioner, taken at its highest, made no difference to the outcome of the case for the reasons which will become clear below.

(ii)       Proceedings had started as long ago as 18^th March 2015.  There had already been a delay caused by the referral of the matter to the Royal Court, and court time-tabling difficulties.  An adjournment now to another hearing before the same Court would result in the matter being put back to the autumn of this year.

(iii)      Any alleged deficiencies in discovery by the third party should have been raised by the petitioner well in advance of the hearing.

(iv)      The proceedings were causing immense stress to all of the parties involved, and it was of the utmost importance for the proceedings to be brought to an end.

26.      None of the hand-written invoices shown to us contained contributions to any substantial works on the property, but we do need to address the sum of £21,000 which was repaid to the third party out of the loan of £100,000 the petitioner and the respondent took out from HSBC in 2006.  The petitioner says that this was a contribution by her and the respondent to the cost of works carried out by the third party to the property.  Bearing in mind that the petitioner and the respondent contributed one half of the outgoings, this would equate to expenditure by the third party of some £42,000 on the property for which she was seeking a contribution. It was not clear whether the sum of £21,000, of which one half would relate to the petitioner alone, formed part of the claim of £65,000 or was additional.

27.      The petitioner was quite unable to say what works had been carried out by the third party and to which she and the respondent had made such a substantial contribution.  There was no evidence of substantial works being carried out, apart from work to rectify subsidence which the third party and the respondent said had been covered by insurance.

28.      The third party and the respondent said that the sum of £21,000 was to repay the third party for discharging the petitioner's credit card debts, which she had built up without the respondent's knowledge, her payments not being enough to cover the interest due, and goods she had booked out without authority at the business of the third party's brother.  We preferred the evidence of the third party and the respondent on this issue and find that the sum of £21,000 was to repay the third party for the debts of the petitioner which she had discharged.

29.      On the evidence of the petitioner, the possible sale of the property did not arise in 2000, but much later.  She said that in 2009, the respondent and the third party were approached by a prospective purchaser, via an agent, offering them £1,950,000 for the property.  The transaction was not completed, as the purchaser could not secure sufficient funding, but had the sale gone through, the petitioner said it was verbally agreed between the petitioner, the respondent and the third party, on more than one occasion during the discussions surrounding the prospective purchase, that they would use the sale proceeds to purchase their own properties and to live separately.  She understood this to mean that the debt secured on the property would be repaid, and that she and the respondent (and the daughter) would receive sufficient funds to purchase a family home of their own.

30.      The petitioner alleges that following the sale falling through, the petitioner, the respondent and the third party agreed that the property would be marketed for sale so as to give effect to their agreement, and it was placed on the market between 2009 and 2013, with various agents, at an initial asking price of just under £2,000,000, which was dropped in January 2010 to £1,900,000.  The daughter was aware of what was proposed, and a number of estate agents were instructed to find properties for them and many were viewed.  The petitioner alleged that she had the main conduct of the sale and of finding alternative properties.  Nothing came of it, as property prices fell as the result of the economic downturn, and the property was taken off the market in 2013.

31.      Prior to that, a developer had been given a two-year option to develop the land under an agreement drawn up by Bailhache Labesse, and again the petitioner alleges that it was agreed orally that if the option was exercised and the property developed into a number of separate units, they would each have one unit as a family home, with the other units being sold.

32.      The evidence of the third party was that at the beginning in 2000, she did indeed tell the petitioner to make herself feel as if it was her own home.  She was just being welcoming, as any parent would be towards a new daughter-in-law.  The petitioner and the respondent were in constant financial difficulties throughout the marriage, and she did whatever she could to assist them, in particular by allowing them to occupy the flat and then the main house free of any consideration, giving them the rental on the cottage, initially, and then the flat, for some fourteen years, an income that was supposed to be her pension, by allowing the respondent to operate his various business ventures from the property without charge and by guaranteeing their debts and allowing the property to be used as security.

33.      The third party said there were constant arguments over money, and the arrangement was not an easy one, with her feeling that the petitioner was trying to take over the main house, to a point where she felt like a lodger in her own home.  She was keen on a possible sale of the property, so that she could herself get her independence back.

34.      The third party confirmed that an offer had been received for the property in 2009, which fell through, and the subsequent marketing and visiting of alternative properties as described by the petitioner, but there was no question of any agreement.  If the property had been sold, she would have helped, and indeed would have wanted to help, both the petitioner and the respondent and her daughter, but until it was sold, she could make no decision as to how much she would have been able to give them out of the proceeds, after seeing to her own accommodation and needs.

35.      The respondent likewise confirmed these discussions and plans over a possible sale of the property, but that is all he said they were.  Nothing could be done until the property had actually been sold, and then it would have been for his mother to decide how much she could afford to give him and the daughter to help secure their own accommodation.  In any event, as he said, nothing came of it.

36.      In addition to money expended on the property, the petitioner asserted that during the periods when she was at home looking after the children, she was investing time in the project management and maintenance of the property, and she said that she could have earned an additional £158,806.40p had she remained in employment.  In evidence she suggested that her being at home freed the third party to work full time. Under cross examination she described this project management as "not so much managing, but keeping an eye on things, looking after the third party's elderly uncle, who also lived there, looking after the respondent", who she described as accident prone "and dealing with any contractors who might be doing work at the property." She was not able to specify any particular projects that she had managed.

37.      Finally, in relation to her claim to an interest in the increase in the value of the property, she said the figure of £250,000 had been suggested by her previous legal adviser and she did not know the basis upon which it had been calculated.  She relied in respect of this part of her claim on a reference to a drive-by valuation of £1,000,000, undertaken on behalf of HSBC in 2006 for the purpose of the £100,000 borrowing (the valuation itself was not in evidence), and the fact that the property was marketed between 2009 and 2013 for £1,900,000.  No expert evidence as to any increase in the value of the property was adduced, let alone an increase attributable to works carried out by the petitioner and the respondent.

Decision

38.      On every issue where the petitioner on the one hand and the third party and the respondent on the other were in dispute, we preferred the evidence of the third party and the respondent. 

39.      In closing submissions, Advocate Goulborn described the alleged contract in this way: -

"An agreement that the house would be sold, and a proportion of the sale proceeds given to the petitioner and the respondent to enable them to purchase a property in their own names."

40.      However, he conceded that even if the evidence of the petitioner was true, the discussions that took place could not possibly meet the four requirements for the creation of a valid contract under Jersey law as set out in Selby v Romeril [1996] JLR 210.  Quoting from that judgment at page 218:-

"In our judgment, it may now be asserted that by the law of Jersey, there are four requirements for the creation of a valid contract, namely (a) consent; (b) capacity; (c) an 'objet'; and (d) a 'cause'.  Counsel for the defendant submitted that here there was no objet.  He referred us again to Pothier (op. cit., Part 1, Chapter 1, para. 53, at 27):

'Les contrats ont pour objet, ou des choses que l'une des parties contractantes stipule qu'on lui donnera, & que l'autre partie promet de lui donner; ou quelque chose que l'une des parties contractantes stipule que l'on fera, ou qu'on ne fera pas; & que l'autre partie promet de faire, ou de ne pas faire.'

In essence, the objet of a contract (or more precisely the obligation which the contract creates) is the content of what the party undertakes.  As to the content of the undertaking, it is the rule that it must be sufficiently certain.  Pothier (op. cit. Part 1, Chapter 12, para 137 at 59) states: 'Pour qu'un fait puisse être l'objet d'une obligation, il faut aussi que ce que le débiteur s'est obligé de faire, soit quelque chose de déterminé'"

41.      Our first finding is that no agreement was ever entered into between the petitioner, the respondent and the third party over the property either at the outset in 2000 or later.  As in any family sharing a property, as they were, there were discussions and plans about the future, and the third party would have wished to help both of her children in any way that she reasonably could.  She was arguably over generous to the petitioner and the respondent, as we show below. The proposed sale and/or development of the property and the purchase of individual units for the family members were aspirations of the family that were never intended to create legally binding contracts between them, so that, for example, the petitioner and the respondent were in a position to require the third party to sell the property and purchase them a property of their own.  The presumption that family arrangements do not create legally binding contracts was not rebutted in this case (see the Court of Appeal decision in I v J [2017] JCA 013 at paragraphs 32-34.)

42.      In any event, there could never have been a legally binding agreement, because the objet or obligations of the third party lacked the requisite certainty; when would the property be sold, how much for and, if sold, what proportion would go to the petitioner and respondent (and the daughter)?  No decision could be made by the third party until the property had actually been sold at a price agreed by her, and then the decision as to the extent she would assist the petitioner and the respondent (and the daughter) would have been hers and hers alone.

43.      The petitioner confirmed in evidence that under the contract she alleged existed, she and the respondent had no obligation whatsoever to the third party, and that lack of even the minimum reciprocity between them would have caused the contract to fail for lack of cause.

44.      Advocate Goulborn did not pursue the petitioner's claim to have a beneficial interest in the property on the basis of proprietary estoppel (or indeed any of the alternative claims for equitable relief other than the claim for unjust enrichment), sensibly in our view in the light of the decisions of the Court in Flynn v Reid [2012] JRC 100 and Carry v Liston [2017] JRC 144.

45.      Proprietary estoppel is defined in Snell's Equity (32^nd Edition) in this way at paragraph 12-009:-

"Where by his words and conduct one party to a transaction freely makes to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or assurance which is intended to affect the legal relations between them (whether contractual or otherwise) or was reasonably understood by the other party to have that effect, and, before it is withdrawn, the other party acts upon it, altering his or her position so that it would be inequitable to permit the first party to withdrawer the promise, the party making the promise or assurance will not be permitted to act inconsistently with it"

46.      In any event our second finding is that no clear and unequivocal promise was ever made by the third party to the petitioner and the respondent in relation to a possible sale of the property and the purchase of a unit for them, let alone promises or assurances that were intended to affect the legal relations between them.

47.      Our third finding is that there was no project management of the property by the petitioner, because, in the words of the respondent, there were no projects to manage.  No substantial works were carried out over the material period that required management, other than works caused by subsidence which were paid for by insurers.  The petitioner was at the property looking after her children, and, in our view, did no more to assist in "keeping an eye on things" than any other home-based family member would be expected to do.

48.      The case ultimately proceeded on the basis of unjust enrichment and we set out the test to be applied as set out in Flynn v Reid, where Sir William Bailhache, Bailiff, said this at paragraph 107:-

"107    So there we have a reference from Lord Hope to two Scottish cases where the law of unjust enrichment has been applied.  In McKenzie v Nutter (supra) Sheriff Principal Lockhart, having summarised the relevant law, described his approach at paragraph 33 as follows:-

'On the basis of the law which I have set out it is clear that the court may allow an equitable remedy in circumstances where one party has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another party.  I propose to deal with this matter under four headings:

(a)       Has the appellant been enriched at the expense of the respondent and what is the nature of that enrichment?

(b)      If so, was that enrichment unjust?

(c)       If so, what remedy, in the particular circumstances of this case, is open to the respondent?

(d)      Is that remedy equitable?'"

49.      Our fourth finding is that the third party has not been enriched through these family arrangements.  If a financial balance sheet were to be drawn up at the date the petitioner left the property, it would show that the petitioner and the respondent: -

(i)        had the use, initially of the flat and then of the main house, free of any consideration for fourteen years.  On the basis that the petitioner and the respondent would otherwise have had to paid rent for their accommodation which equated, say, to that paid by the tenants of the cottage, namely £1,350 per month, that means that over the fourteen years the petitioner and the respondent benefitted by way of rent-free accommodation to the tune of £226,800;

(ii)       were given the rent from the cottage, and then the flat, over a period of fourteen years, which amounts to £190,000;

(iii)      were able to borrow money on the security of the property, ultimately in the sum of £100,000, borrowings which carried a lower rate of interest because they were secured on real property;

(iv)      had a credit card bill of £1,895 and loan on a car of £13,521.60p discharged by the third party.

That equates to a financial benefit to the petitioner and the respondent over the fourteen-year period of some £532,216.60. This figure does not take into account the respondent's free use of the property for his various business ventures and the fact that the third party paid for the private education of the children over four years following the petitioner leaving the property at a cost of £19,000.

50.      The third party, on the other hand: -

(i)        Allowed the main house to be used by the petitioner and the respondent and their children for fourteen years, and the property for the respondent's business ventures, for no consideration.

(ii)       Gave the petitioner and the respondent the rental from the cottage and the flat, amounting to £190,000.

(iii)      Acted as guarantor of the borrowings of the petitioner and the respondent secured over the property.  When the petitioner left the property, the third party was left with the liability under the HSBC loan, then at £60,000, because the petitioner and the respondent, both of whom are on legal aid, have no means to repay it. She is discharging this debt through the rental now received by her from the flat.  The borrowing will not be discharged in full until she is 85.

(iv)      discharged a credit card bill in the sum of £1895 and a loan on a car of £13,021.60p.

51.      As can be seen, it is the petitioner and the respondent who benefited financially from these family arrangements over the fourteen years that they lived in the property.  The third party, far from benefiting financially, has been materially impoverished, left with a substantial debt and deprived of a source of pension income in her old age.

52.      The petitioner's claim for unjust enrichment, however, relates to an alleged increase in the value of the property and in that respect: -

(i)        We have no expert evidence as to the value of the property in 2000, when the petitioner first moved in, and in 2014, when the petitioner left.  The fact that the property was marketed at £1,900,000 and not sold for that sum, indicates no more than it was not worth £1,900,000 during the period it was marketed.  As for the 2006 drive-by valuation, we have only seen a reference to it, and not the valuation itself.

(ii)       We have no expert evidence as to whether any increase in the value of the property, if there has been an increase, is in any way attributable to the works which the petitioner says she and the respondent carried out, and the project management she says she undertook.  Judging by the cosmetic nature of those works and our finding that there was no real project management, we have little doubt that the petitioner and the respondent have not contributed to any increase in the value of the property that may have occurred.

53.      Advocate Goulborn placed some reliance on the case of Flynn v Reid, but the facts in that case are entirely distinguishable.  In that case, an unmarried couple who had one child decided to buy a property as a family home, but because the defendant alone had housing qualifications, and only because of that, it was acquired in his name.  He paid the deposit, but the mortgage was taken out in their joint names.  The parties had entered into a written agreement prepared by lawyers, which even though the Court found to be unenforceable, showed a common intention on their part that the value of the property would, after repayment of the bank loan and the deposit, be shared equally. The couple separated with the plaintiff leaving the property, which was retained for some years by the defendant and improved.  It was then sold, with the defendant keeping the net proceeds and challenging the contribution claimed by the plaintiff.  The case was complicated by the contribution made by the defendant after the plaintiff had left, but one can understand how the Court found that the defendant had been unjustly enriched by the contribution made by the plaintiff in the years that she was living at the property.

54.      In the case before us, the petitioner and the respondent had no involvement in and made no contribution towards the acquisition of the property.  That was owned by the third party in her own right.  Out of natural love and affection, she allowed the petitioner and the respondent to live in the property under family arrangements from which they benefited substantially, a benefit which heavily outweighed any works they may have carried out because they wanted to do so.  Furthermore, these were arrangements which left the third party encumbered with a debt which she will not be able to pay off until she is 85.  There has been no enrichment of the third party, quite the contrary, and we can see no justice in the third party being required to make further financial provision for the petitioner.

55.      It is not for us to go into the causes of the breakdown in the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent or the circumstances in which she and the children came to leave the property, but the reality is that the petitioner and the respondent were never more than guests in the third party's property and they, and not the third party, must take responsibility for the fact that after fourteen years of rent-free accommodation, the gift of the flat rental and the use of the property as security for their borrowings, they were unable to secure their own financial position.

56.      We therefore dismiss the petitioner's claims against the third party in their entirety.  They are hopeless claims which have caused untold stress within the family, and have caused irreparable damage to relationships, in particular between the third party and her grandchildren.

57.      In describing these claims as hopeless, we make no criticism of Advocate Goulborn.  He has only recently been appointed to represent the petitioner on legal aid, and so inherited a case that had already been the subject of unfortunate delay.  In our view, he did his best to put forward the case of the petitioner on as sound a legal base as he could.

Authorities

Selby v Romeril [1996] JLR 210. 

I v J [2017] JCA 013. 

Flynn v Reid [2012] JRC 100. 

Carry v Liston [2017] JRC 144. 

Snell's Equity (32^nd Edition).