Appeal - application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
Before : |
W. J. Bailhache, Esq., Bailiff of Jersey, President; Miss Clare Montgomery Q.C., and David Anderson, Esq., Q.C. |
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Between |
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Respondent/Plaintiff |
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And |
J |
Appellant/Defendant |
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Mr J on his own behalf.
Advocate C. Hall for the Respondent.
judgment
anderson ja:
1. This is the judgment of the Court on Mr J's application of 12 February 2017 for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
2. The Privy Council grants leave to appeal:
"in civil cases for applications that, in the opinion of the Appeal Panel, raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the Judicial Committee at that time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject of judicial decision and may already have been reviewed on appeal; an application which in the opinion of the Appeal Panel does not raise such a point of law is refused on that ground"
(Privy Council Practice Direction 3, para 3.3.3(a).
3. It would plainly not be appropriate for this Court to grant an application for leave to appeal that did not appear to us at least to satisfy those requirements. Indeed, recognising that this Court can only judge the general public importance of a point of Jersey law and that there are many competing demands on the Privy Council and its resources, we think there is force in the view expressed recently by the Court of Appeal to the effect that leave should be granted by this Court only if we are sure of the existence of an arguable point of law, its general public importance and the need for it to be determined at this time: Boru Hatlari Ile Petrol Taşima AŞ and others v Tepe Īnşaat Sanayii AŞ [2016] JCA 199D, paras [23]-[30].
4. Mr J's application for leave to appeal does not in our judgement come close to satisfying this exacting standard. Much of the application focusses on alleged procedural deficiencies before the Royal Court: but Mr J had the opportunity to raise such complaints before us and, to the extent that he did so, we have considered them and judged them to be without merit. In sum, we have failed to identify any arguable point of law, let alone a point of general public importance that it would be appropriate for the Privy Council to consider at this time.
5. We are therefore not satisfied that it would be appropriate for this Court to grant leave to Mr J to appeal to the Privy Council.
Authorities
Privy Council Practice Direction 3.
Boru Hatlari Ile Petrol Taşima AŞ and others v Tepe Īnşaat Sanayii AŞ [2016] JCA 199D.