Jersey Unreported Judgments

Appeal - application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against decision of the Royal Court.

[2016]JCA200

Court of Appeal

7 November 2016

The Appellant appeared in person.

Advocate G. G. P. White, for the Respondent.

judgment

mcneill ja:

1.        There is before me, sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal, an application by Darius James Pearce ("Mr Pearce") for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against a decision of the Royal Court to dismiss an appeal by Mr Pearce against a decision of the Master striking out Mr Pearce's defence to a claim for judgment in the sum of £268.20 claimed by the respondent.  The judgment below was given on 2 July 2014 by the Royal Court (Bailhache QC, Deputy Bailiff and Jurats): see Pearce v Treasurer of the States [2014] JRC 139B.  The decision of the Master dated 22 October is reported at Treasurer of the States v Pearce [2013] JRC 206. 

2.        Mr Pearce sets out five grounds in support of his application.  Put shortly they are:-

(i)        Judgments of the Royal Court handed down in the Spring of 2016 in different litigations have a significant bearing on the matters raised with the Royal Court in 2014. 

(ii)       Mr Pearce has been under severe emotional distress further preventing any application for leave to appeal at an earlier point. 

(iii)      Not having legal representation at this point in this litigation, Mr Pearce could not have been expected to complete his research in a shorter period. 

(iv)      The decision of the Royal Court was based on matters on which Mr Pearce did not have the opportunity to be heard and, so, there was a breach of natural justice in contravention to his rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as adopted under the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. 

(v)       As the financial resources of Mr Pearce had been fully expended in the cost of representation at the hearing in 2014, he has to all intents and purposes been denied representation in seeking to take matters further. 

3.        Mr Pearce made this application on 4 July 2016.  Following an order of this court, the respondent presented submissions dated 25 July 2016 in which it was contended that Mr Pearce's application should be denied for the reasons set out in those submissions.  Mr Pearce was given an opportunity to make submissions in response but has chosen not to do so. 

4.        The test for deciding whether to grant an extension of time within which an appeal may be lodged was summarised by this court in Syvret v Treasurer of the States [2014] JCA 185 at paragraph 13.  The relevant considerations are (a) the extent of the delay, (b) any explanation for it, (c) the prospects of success and (d) the risk of prejudice. 

5.        In the present case, the extent of the delay, by any standard, has been quite exceptional.  It is not immediately clear whether there have been occasions where leave has been granted notwithstanding such a degree of delay, but one would think that the only compelling reasons might be a lack of knowledge of the decision below having been pronounced or a virtually completely debilitating illness.  Neither of those occurred here. 

6.        As the respondent has indicated, Mr Pearce was represented below, had expressed the view in 2014 that there were grounds upon which to overturn the judgment, had accepted in writing that the judgment below was interlocutory in nature and that leave was required for any appeal and had been in discussion with the Judicial Greffe in 2014, but took no steps to seek leave throughout the whole of 2015 and first half of 2016. 

7.        In such circumstances, it is inevitable that leave for an extension of time will be refused unless there are exceptionally compelling reasons such as inevitable prospect of success for the proposed appeal together with an absence of material prejudice to the respondent.  Such considerations do not arise here. 

8.        Ground (ii) does not suggest that there was a physical illness of such severity as might amount to complete debilitation; and Mr Pearce's ability to engage in the matter after judgment in 2014 shows that, for a period of at least six months immediately following the issuing of the judgment below, Mr Pearce was perfectly capable of deciding to present his application for leave.  

9.        Ground (iii) is inconsistent with Mr Pearce's communications in 2014. 

10.      Ground (iv) could have been raised immediately after the 2014 decision had been handed down. 

11.      Ground (v) does not add anything to Ground (iii). 

12.      The only ground which requires detailed consideration is Ground (i): against the event that the judgments handed down in the Spring of this year show that, upon the basis of their reasoning, the determination of the Royal Court in 2014 ought, almost inevitably, to have gone in favour of Mr Pearce.  As I understand it, the two judgments to which Mr Pearce would make reference are (i) Public of the Island of Jersey v Jersey Electricity Company [2016] JRC 006 and (ii) Public of the Island of Jersey v Jersey Electricity Company [2016] JRC 081A. 

13.      Given the terms of those two judgments I assume that the argument with which Mr Pearce would wish to engage is that, contrary to the judgment below, the Public of the Island of Jersey is not, in itself, a corporate body or legal entity and, accordingly, not separate from the States of Jersey: see paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment below. 

14.      Even if that line of argument were conceived to be all but irrefutable, upon which I make no comment, it would not mean that the decision in 2014 could not have gone against Mr Pearce.  As the Royal Court indicated in paragraph 33, the Master had set out a second ground for his decision, namely, that income from property acquired "for and on behalf of the public" was not exempt from income tax.  As the learned Deputy Bailiff, as he then was, indicated in paragraph 33, even if the primary conclusion of the Royal Court were incorrect, income from properties held for and in the name of the public accrues to the States and the income of the States of Jersey is free of tax.  The two decisions of the Royal Court in the Spring of this year are to no avail in that regard. 

Conclusion

15.      It therefore follows that Mr Pearce's application for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal is refused. 

Authorities

Pearce v Treasurer of the States [2014] JRC 139B.

Treasurer of the States v Pearce [2013] JRC 206.

Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000.

Syvret v Treasurer of the States [2014] JCA 185.

Public of the Island of Jersey v Jersey Electricity Company [2016] JRC 006.

Public of the Island of Jersey v Jersey Electricity Company [2016] JRC 081A.