Application for an extension of time.
Before : |
George Bompass, QC., sitting as a single Judge |
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Between |
JT (Jersey) Limited |
Appellant |
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And |
Mark Wood |
Respondent |
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Advocate E. B. Drummond for the Appellant.
Advocate H. J. Heath for the Respondent.
reasons
bompass ja:
1. The Appellant applies for a retrospection extension of time of one day, to 25 May 2016, for service of its Notice of Appeal on the Respondent. These are my reasons for acceding to the application, which I have dealt with on paper, and therefore for granting the extension.
2. The intended appeal is against the decision of the Royal Court given by the Bailiff on 26 April 2016. The Bailiff allowed the Respondent's appeal against a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal handed down on 23 February 2015, when the Employment Appeal Tribunal had rejected the Respondent's claim that he had been unfairly dismissed by reason of redundancy and concluded that the procedures adopted were not so irregular as to be unfair. The Bailiff also gave the Appellant leave to appeal.
3. The Notice of Appeal, which was signed on 23 May 2016, ought to have been served on 24 May 2016. It was only on that day that efforts, unsuccessful as it turned out, were made to serve the Notice of Appeal. It was served the next day. Promptly, on 27 May 2016, notice of this present application was given on behalf of the Appellant.
4. In the Skeleton Argument on behalf of the Appellant Advocate E B Drummond helpfully drew attention to the case of Pitman v Jersey Evening Post [2013] (2) JLR 293. In that case Beloff JA as a single judge of the Court of Appeal identified four factors as being normally taken into account by this Court when considering an exercise of the power in rule 16(1) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 1964 to grant an extension. As Beloff JA pointed out, axiomatically the power, entirely in the discretion of the Court, is to be exercised to achieve justice.
5. The four considerations just referred to are (i) the length of the delay, (ii) the reasons for the delay, (iii) the chances of the appeal succeeding if the time for appealing is extended, and (iv) the degree of prejudice to the respondent.
6. The first, third and fourth of these considerations together point compellingly to the extension being granted in the present case.
(a) As to the first, the delay was minimal.
(b) As to the third, in my judgment it is unnecessary, and probably undesirable, for me to express any conclusion as to the Appellant's prospects of success on the appeal. This is because the Bailiff has given leave to appeal, and in doing so formed the view that the appeal is one deserving consideration by this Court. There has been no submission to me that the Bailiff was mistaken as to this. I regard the third consideration as being, in the circumstances of the present case, whether the appeal is worthwhile; and I am satisfied that it is.
(c) As to the fourth consideration, it has been submitted on behalf of the Appellant, and I accept, that the Respondent cannot have been prejudiced by the delay in service of only one day.
7. The one consideration as to which the Appellant did not put forward much to help was the second, namely the reasons for the delay in effecting service. All that the Appellant's evidence explained was the difficulties encountered on the last possible day, 24 May 2016, when attempts were made to effect service. There was no explanation as to why the Appellant had not finalised the Notice of Appeal sooner and had left the arranging of service until the very last possible day, when there would be no opportunity to deal with service difficulties; and difficulties must have been predictable as a possibility.
8. Nevertheless, as I have said, it seems to me that the other considerations point compellingly to the extension being granted. Realistically, as it seems to me, the Respondent by his Advocate, H J Heath, has indicated that he is not opposing the grant of the requested extension.
9. For the reasons I have just given, I direct that the extension is to be allowed. I also direct that any question as to the costs of the Appellant's application should be reserved to be dealt with by the Court of Appeal when it decides the appeal.
Authorities
Pitman v Jersey Evening Post [2013] (2) JLR 293.
Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 1964.