Before : |
Sir Michael Birt, Commissioner, and Jurats Marett-Crosby and Grime |
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Between |
The Minister for Health and Social Services |
Applicant |
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And |
1. A (the mother) 2. B (the father) 3. C (maternal grandmother) 4. D (maternal grandfather) 5. Alexander (acting through his guardian Eleanor Green) |
Respondents |
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IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002
AND IN THE MATTER OF ALEXANDER (CARE ORDER)
Advocate H. J. Heath for the Minister.
Advocate A. T H. English for the First and Second Respondents.
Advocate E. L. Wakeling for the Third Respondent.
Advocate C. R. Dutot for the Fifth Respondent.
The Fourth Respondent was not represented.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. On 7th December, 2015, the Court sat for the final hearing in the care proceedings instituted by the Minister in respect of Alexander (this is not his real name), who is aged 6. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found that the threshold criteria for making a care order were met but, with the consent of the Minister and all the other parties, made no order, with the result that Alexander will remain in the care of his parents. We now give our reasons for that decision.
2. Following his birth, Alexander was subject to a chaotic lifestyle. He was at times looked after by the First Respondent ("the mother") but also by the Second Respondent ("the father"), the mother's former husband, the former husband's parents and the Fourth and Fifth Respondents, the mother's father and step-mother (together" the maternal grandparents"). An added complication was that Alexander was born with a genetic disorder which affects his overall development and includes learning difficulties, generalised hypertonia, short stature, feeding problems, challenging behaviour and visual difficulties as well as disrupted sleep.
3. Eventually the mother felt that she was unable to provide appropriate care for Alexander and on 21st March, 2012, a residence order was made in favour of the maternal grandparents. However, Alexander suffered emotional harm and neglect during that period. There were marital difficulties and the maternal step-grandmother was drinking to excess. Eventually in June 2014 the maternal step-grandmother moved into the Women's Refuge and it was agreed that the maternal grandparents could no longer look after Alexander. Accordingly, on 8th August, 2014, he was moved into foster care and on 29th August, 2014, the Court granted an interim care order. The maternal grandparents have since separated. Prior to these proceedings the mother's daughter by her previous husband had been freed for adoption on 4th November, 2013.
4. Thereafter a considerable number of assessments were carried out and the Court received several reports. The consensus in these reports was that the mother and the father were taking positive steps to address their issues and that there was a realistic prospect of their being able to provide good enough parenting for Alexander. They had by then moved to live in England.
5. On 11th March, 2015, a revised care plan was presented to the Court. That revised care plan envisaged that the mother and the father would travel to Jersey for a four week period of assessment and that, if all went well, they would return to England with Alexander who would then live with them under the interim care order. That period of assessment duly took place and was positive. As a result, on 31st March the Court approved the revised care plan and gave leave for Alexander to be removed from Jersey pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002. He therefore left foster care and travelled to England on 9th April, 2015. He has since lived with the parents in England.
6. The Minister has prepared a threshold statement which lists the basis upon which, as at 8th August, 2014, Alexander was suffering and was likely to suffer significant harm and that such harm was attributable to the care given or likely to be given to him if an order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him. Whilst the maternal step-grandmother does not accept all the allegations which refer to her, all parties accept that the threshold for making a care order is met. Having read the various reports, we agree.
7. Having determined that there are grounds upon which the Court could properly make a final care order, the question then is what, if any, order should be made applying the well-known criteria set out in Re F and G (No. 2) [2010] JCA 051 at paragraph 8.
8. We have had the benefit of reports from Ceri Owens, the social worker in the Children's Service allocated to Alexander, and the guardian together with statements from the parents and from each of the maternal grandparents. The Court has also had the opportunity of reading various earlier reports including a psychological report on the mother and the father by Dr Caritt-Baker, a psychological report on Alexander by Dr Williams and a detailed parenting assessment on the mother and the father carried out by an independent social worker in January 2015. It was on the basis of the encouraging progress outlined in these latter reports that the decision was made to allow Alexander to go and live with his parents in England in April 2015.
9. All the evidence before the Court is that this move has been a great success. Ms Owens has visited the parents in England on some six occasions since then. On each occasion she has been extremely pleased with the care which Alexander has been receiving from the parents, who have been wholly engaged and cooperative. The parents are taking a very responsible attitude to his health issues and are engaged fully with the medical services in England. He is doing well and is happy at his school. Although he faces challenges in that regard because of his condition, the parents are working closely with the school and with the local social services to meet his special needs. Alexander is happy and very much wants to stay living with his parents.
10. Ms Owens report discloses that the mother still faces challenges. She suffered from depression after the birth of her son, Harry (this is not his real name), in August 2015 but the father was very supportive and has made it clear that he will step in should there be any deterioration in the mother's mental state.
11. In short, Ms Owens has noticed a considerable change in attitude of the mother. She has developed in maturity and confidence and she and the father are determined not to let Alexander down again in the way that he was let down in the early years of his life.
12. The guardian's report is to like effect and is also very supportive. As to Alexander's physical condition, the parents have listened to the advice which they have been given and are endeavouring to provide Alexander with a range of activities to help his coordination and physical condition. They attend all the many appointments which are organised. The guardian has no concerns that Alexander's physical health will not be adequately met; he is a bouncy, energetic and physically well cared for little boy.
13. As to his emotional needs, Alexander does present challenging behaviour on occasions but he is becoming much more secure with his mother. He loves his parents and is demonstrating increasingly preferential attachment behaviour towards them. He is, the guardian considers, a happy little boy.
14. As to his educational needs, he is enjoying school and has developed good relationships with staff and pupils. He has significant educational needs for which he will need considerable support but this is in hand and the parents are energetic in their approach to his education and fully supportive of what the school is doing.
15. In reality, the choice in this case lies between making no order or making a care order with Alexander remaining in the care of his parents in England. Both the Minister and the guardian recommend that the Court should make no order for the reasons which they set out in their reports. We agree with their recommendation and would summarise briefly our reasons for so concluding as follows:-
(i) Article 2(5) of the 2002 Law reminds the Court that it should only make an order where it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order. We are not satisfied that that is the case here.
(ii) The case for the Minister continuing to have parental responsibility is not made out. The evidence in relation to the period since April 2015 is that the parents are providing 'good enough' parenting and it would therefore not be proportionate to insist that they continue to share parental responsibility for the Minister.
(iii) If a final care order were made, Alexander would remain the subject of 'looked after' children procedures and would be marked as different from his peers. Long-term intervention would be unlikely to make much difference to Luke's day to day living experiences, particularly given the fact that he and the parents will be living in England as opposed to Jersey.
(iv) Whilst there was a risk of significant harm at the date when the interim care order was sought, the evidence at present is that he is not currently at risk of suffering significant harm as a result of his parents' care. In those circumstances, to impose a care order would be very intrusive and not necessary.
(v) The evidence suggests that, because it is the Minister who has had responsibility for safe-guarding Alexander under the interim care order, the local social services in England have taken a lesser role than would otherwise be the case. In particular, certain educational support measures would apparently not be available if Alexander were to remain in the care of the Minister. Conversely, if the interim care order is discharged, the English social services will be fully engaged in the provision of any necessary support. Ms Owens has liaised closely with the relevant authorities in England.
16. In all the circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the Minister and the guardian, which is supported by the parents and the maternal grandparents and accordingly we declare that the threshold criteria as set out in Article 24(2) of the 2002 Law were satisfied in August 2014 but that, in view of the excellent progress which has been made by the parents since then, there is now no need for the Court to make any order. It follows that the interim care order is hereby discharged.
17. We cannot leave this case without repeating the thrust of certain observations we made at the hearing, namely that we congratulate the parents on the changes which they have brought about and we also congratulate the Minister and the guardian for the support which they have given the parents, which has resulted in Alexander being rehabilitated to the care of his parents. With a background such as in this case, no decision is risk free but on the basis of the evidence presented to us we share the optimism of the Minister and the guardian about the future and we hope very much that Alexander has a happy and successful life in the care of his parents.
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