Jersey Unreported Judgments

Matrimonial - further matters relating to the application by the wife or ancillary relief.

[2015]JRC119

Royal Court

(Family)

2 June 2015

Before     :		B. G. D. Blair, Q.C., Commissioner, and Jurats Nicolle and Clapham
Between	A		Petitioner
And	B		Respondent

IN THE MATTER OF L (MATRIMONIAL)

Advocate C. R. Dutôt for the Petitioner.

Advocate I. C. Jones for the Respondent.

judgment

the commissioner:

Introduction

1.        The Court has been hearing an application by A (the Petitioner) for ancillary relief.  The Respondent is B.  They were divorced by Decree Absolute in 2001, but for ease of identification are referred to in this judgment as "the Wife" and "the Husband" respectively.  The Wife is represented by Advocate Caroline Dutôt of Davies and Ingram ("Advocate Dutôt") and the Husband by Advocate Ian Jones of Carey Olsen ("Advocate Jones"). 

2.        To demonstrate that the historical backcloth to the decision embodied in this judgment is wholly exceptional, one need only recount:-

(i)        that the original, purportedly final, ancillary relief order was made by Registrar Obbard in January 2002, more than 13 years ago;

(ii)       that that order was set aside by the Royal Court for deliberate and material non-disclosure more than 7 years later, on 9^th May, 2009; and

(iii)      that the rehearing of the Wife's application for ancillary relief has been taking place more than 5 years after the order for set aside. 

3.        Where direct speech is quoted in this judgment, it generally appears for ease of reference in italic type (with the exception of extracts from case law).  

THE FACTUAL HISTORY

(i) Up to January 2002

4.        The Wife was born in 1967 and is therefore aged 47.  The Husband, born in 1963, is aged 51.  They were married in 1994, when the Wife was aged 26 and the Husband 30.  There are two children of the marriage:-

(i)        Charlie (this is not his real name) born in 1997; and.

(ii)       James, (this is not his real name) born in 1999. 

Both boys are in State education. 

5.        In 1994 they bought a property which is in the style of a maisonette and is a lower apartment.  We will refer to this property simply as "Property Y".  The purchase price was £158,000, of which all but £20,000 was borrowed on a mortgage, the level of which was subsequently increased in disputed circumstances.  Ownership is held through the medium of a jointly held 50% shareholding in a company Y Ltd, in which the other 50% of the shares is held by the person who occupies the upper apartment.  The Wife continues, with the children, to occupy Property Y, but in highly unfortunate circumstances, as we shall describe.  The sum of £51,819 is outstanding on the mortgage (as at May 2015). 

6.        The Wife had left school in 1984, at the age of 16, and commenced employment in the administration section of a local bank in an inevitably junior position.  During the following decade she held various employments with a number of banks, gaining increasing experience and arriving at a situation where, at the inception of the marriage, she was earning £18,000 gross per annum.  When she was several months pregnant with Charlie, she ceased employment, by which time her remuneration was more than £20,000 p.a. 

7.        Her employment history thereafter has been very limited, as will appear when the Court comes to consider her current and prospective earning capacity and the effect upon it of the ill-health from which she has been suffering, but the extent and aetiology of which is in issue. 

8.        The Husband is a qualified chartered accountant.  In about 1996 he joined an established firm named G and Co which provided a range of financial services.  Its principals at that time were Mr E and a man named Mr F.  The structure and evolution of the G and Co business, which later came under the umbrella of a number of corporate entities with the principal business/logo name "S" is heavily documented in the papers placed before the Court. 

9.        Unhappily, the parties' marriage proved relatively short-lived.  Its duration between celebration and the parties' separation was 4 years and 2 months.  In 1998 the Husband formed a relationship with a woman named C.  According to her, and the Husband agrees, they met in 1998.  On 26^th September, when the Wife was three months pregnant with James, the Husband left her and went to live at C's home known as "Property B" which she owned and was held in her sole name.  It is said that there was a brief attempt at reconciliation between the Husband and the Wife; but on 10^th December, 2008, they entered into a Separation Agreement which ordained an interim financial regime pending the intended initiation of divorce proceedings on the grounds of one-year separation.  The core element of the agreement was that, once the baby was born, the Husband would pay maintenance at the total rate of £42,940 per annum for the Wife and the children. 

10.      A year later, in 1999, the Wife filed a divorce petition.  She commenced her financial application against the Husband in 2000.  The key documents within those proceedings are contained in one of the no less than 23 lever-arch files which have been collated in these proceedings.  Most of these files run to between 350 and 450 pages.  We will have more to say later about the history and the conduct of the current proceedings, including (paragraphs 67-69 below) as to this extraordinary volume of documentation. 

11.      After a spirited exchange of affidavits and questionnaires the final hearing of the Wife's application came before Registrar Obbard on January 2002.  The level and the nature of the Husband's remuneration were strongly disputed.  From 2000 there had, including the Husband, been six partners in the S business.  The Husband insisted that he was merely a salaried partner and had no equity interest, actual or prospective.  In early 2000 he had said that his salary and bonus amounted to £98,870 per annum.  What figure he put forward in January 2002 is not cited in the Court's written decision: the Registrar stated more generally that the Husband's income was "high and increasing". 

12.      In any event, the Wife greatly doubted the Husband's presentation, insisting that to her knowledge the Husband was a participant in both the firm's profits and its equity.  The Registrar, however, found that he had to accept the Husband's assertion of his means, which the Wife was unable effectively to disprove.  His written judgment in the wake of the 14/1/2002 hearing was succinct and, it has to be said, by normal criteria very brief.  He went so far as to observe that he found it extraordinary that the Husband had no capital assets of consequence, if that were indeed the case, and recorded his suspicion that the reverse were true.  However, there was insufficient evidence upon the foundation of which the Court could make a primary finding, or draw any inference, of supplemental capital worth in the Husband's hands. 

13.      The Court was working on reckonable capital assets consisting of:-

(i)        The equity in Property Y.  The value ascribed to the property was roughly £300,000.  As the sum outstanding on the mortgage was then £200,000, the equity was £100,000. 

(ii)       A collateral endowment insurance policy with Standard Life, whose surrender value amounted then to only several thousand pounds. 

(iii)      Otherwise, only chattels. 

The Registrar's judgment was, as we say, silent on the level of income attributed by the court to the Husband. 

14.      The award made by Registrar Obbard was to the effect that there should be:-

(i)        a transfer of the Husband's interest in the parties' shareholding in Y Ltd, so as to achieve the vesting of the beneficial interest in the property in the Wife;

(ii)       assignment of the Standard Life endowment policy to the Wife;

(iii)      the above on condition that the Wife assumed responsibility for the mortgage;

(iv)      spousal maintenance at the rate of £30,000 per annum;

(v)       child maintenance at the rate of £5,200 per annum in respect of each child until the age of 16 years or cessation of full-time education, whichever was to be the later, such maintenance to be RPI-linked. 

For avoidance of doubt these maintenance figures were free of tax. 

15.      As to his rationale, the Registrar was clearly mindful of the short duration of the marriage.  Whilst, as one would expect, he did not have in mind a specific temporal term at the conclusion of which the Husband's obligation to maintain the Wife should, by his Order, be terminated, he plainly envisaged that the Wife should, within reason, exploit what earning capacity she had.  That is apparent from paragraph 12 of the Order, which stated:-

"Spousal maintenance shall be reviewed and may be reduced on a date to be fixed in 4 months' time when the court shall take into account all the parties' financial circumstances, including, inter alia:-

(a)       the [Wife's] success in finding suitable employment;

(b)       the continuance of Family Allowance and the need to repay a Parish Welfare loan;

(c)       the cost of childcare;

(d)       the [Wife's] living expenses in the event of a change of accommodation."

The Registrar observed that, as to spousal maintenance, he was hopeful that it could be reduced before too long; reduction would depend on how soon the Wife would become self-sufficient, she having expressed the intention of obtaining a job; and he was mindful of the Wife's health problems, but at that stage was not making any special allowance for them in his Order.  He also said that he "really [did] not know if [the Husband had] any capital". 

16.      As the curtain fell upon the ancillary relief hearing in January 2002, the Husband had been living with C for around 3 years.  In September 2000 she had changed her surname by Deed Poll to that of the Husband.  A child, Heidi (this is not her real name), was born to them in October 2000 (she is now, accordingly, 14 years old).  She lives with her father (the Husband) and is in private education at a local school. 

17.      In October 2001 the Husband and C entered into a Cohabitation Agreement, this at a time when their relationship was presumably harmonious.  The Agreement included:-

(i)        A recitation that the Husband recognised that C had enjoyed a successful career as an e-commerce consultant and would be disadvantaged in the market place by reason of her time away from her career looking after Heidi. 

(ii)       An expression of his desire to compensate C for giving up her career, to contribute towards the maintenance of Heidi and the general household expenses by paying to C a monthly sum in maintenance and to share legal responsibility for the existing mortgage and any future mortgage registered against Property B. 

(iii)      A provision that the Husband would pay maintenance to C in the sum of £4,000 per month until such time as Heidi finished either secondary or tertiary education, whichever would be the later, such payments to be RPI-linked. 

(iv)      Agreement by the Husband to become jointly and severally liable for the repayment of any existing or future loan secured against Property B.  It was expressly provided that, in assuming such liability, he acknowledged that he would not acquire any interest whether legal or equitable in Property B or its proceeds of sale. 

18.      This agreement was supplemented by a further Agreement between the Husband and C dated 19^th January, 2002, at a time when they plainly envisaged an imminent move from Property B to another property, (Property C) a move which indeed happened in the course of that month.  It was at property C that they continued to live until June 2007.  The agreement included provision for the Husband to share legal responsibility and assume sole liability for any loan raised to finance Property C, he acknowledging that C would be unable to service such loan without his financial assistance.  Significantly, the Husband specifically acknowledged that in assuming liability for any loans on property C he would not acquire any interest whether legal or equitable in the property or its proceeds of sale. 

19.      In January 2002 (in fact the month when the matter was before Registrar Obbard) both the sale of property B by C and her acquisition of the replacement property were in prospect but not, apparently, known to the court.  The acquisition of Property C was completed in 2002.  The purchase price was £775,000, of which £700,000 was borrowed by way of two separate mortgages, each in the sum of £350,000 in favour of the NatWest Bank.  There was for some time a mystery as to the provenance of what, on those figures, must have been a £75,000 deposit.  Initially, the Husband maintained that it derived from the proceeds of sale of Property B and therefore from C.  That presentation, however, was inconsistent with the fact that, as Land Registry documentation later established, completion of the sale of Property B did not happen until April 2002.  We find it likely that, as surmised by the Husband, there must have been a bridging loan of some sort to fill this lacuna.  The Husband is adamant that he did not provide any capital to fund a £75,000 (or any) deposit on the property.  Certainly, the terms of his Agreement with C negate any question of his having any beneficial interest in Property C. 

(ii) Mid-2002 to September 2005

20.      The ink had not long been dry on Registrar Obbard's order when further litigation was initiated.  The Court has seen an affidavit sworn by the Husband on 23^rd July, 2002, in support of an application for variation of spousal maintenance on the principal ground of the Wife's earning capacity.  We are not aware whether this application was dismissed or simply not pursued: there is no contemporaneous documentation before the Court.  It is notable that in his Affidavit the Husband stated, first, that he was a "salaried partner"; and, secondly, that his income was £145,000 net per annum.  The Wife is, many years later, exercised by the fact that in a NatWest offer of mortgage dated 4^th January, 2002, relating to Property C, under the heading "Special Conditions Relating to Advance", there appeared the requirement for confirmation to be provided by the Managing Partner at S that the Husband's income for the year ended January 2002 was a minimum of £220,000.  The Husband, asked more than 12 years later, could not account for that entry, but it is certainly his case that he did not under-state his earned income in the 2000-2002 proceedings.  We think it improbable that he would have done, and note the £145,000 net figure stated by him in July 2002.  Any such disclosure could easily be checked, not least by reference to the Husband's filed tax returns.  It is not likely that, in his position in the financial services sector, he would present a seriously distorted income figure to the Jersey tax authorities, a fraud which, if uncovered, would be very likely to terminate his career. 

21.      The Wife was now alone bringing up the children and receiving the maintenance for which Registrar Obbard had made provision, £43,000 per annum in total.  On occasion in those early days the Husband was guilty of late payment, but matters settled and no long-term arrears have ever accrued.  Of the maintenance a significant proportion was expended upon financing the mortgage and the Standard Life endowment insurance policy.  The policy premiums have been at the level of £240 per month.  The mortgage repayments were for some years paid on an interest only basis, on which basis they were £1,300 per month.  Later, the Wife became concerned to reduce the capital indebtedness and increased her monthly payments, so that they are now £1,710 per month. 

22.      It would be going too far to say that the Wife was discomforted financially, although as time has passed and the children have grown older she has increasingly insisted that her income has been inadequate and she has had to borrow.  It has been repeatedly asserted by the Husband that at all material times since 2002 he has maintained her "very generously" and that she has enjoyed a "handsome" income which, he points out, compares favourably with e.g. Jersey's Index of Average Earnings as officially published.  As we will see, however, in cross-examination Advocate Jones was unable to make any significant inroads into the reasonableness of the Wife's assertion of current expenditure.  It is fair to say in summary that broadly, and certainly after the 2008 upwards variation described at paragraph 38 below, the maintenance paid has catered for the Wife's and the children's reasonable income needs. 

23.      The Wife has generated little earned income over the years in question, during the greater proportion of which she has not been in any employment.  She has mentioned several short-lived employments which she had for limited periods during the years in and following 2002, but with a frequent record of absenteeism and without holding any of these jobs down.  Her case is that, quite apart from her role and at times onerous responsibility as primary carer of Charlie and James, her earning capacity has, to a grave extent, been adversely affected by ill-health.  This area of the case is analysed in paragraphs 94-105 of this judgment. 

24.      For his part, the Husband continued to live with C and Heidi, now at Property C.  He remained in the S partnership, and the business was developed and expanded. 

25.      In 2005 there was for the Husband a financial metamorphosis.  Negotiation began for the sale of the S business, which was then structured around a company named "S Services".  That company, together with various subsidiaries and a company "S Investments", was sold to the K Group for a total consideration approaching £12 million.  By early summer of 2005 it was highly probable that the transaction would come to fruition; and the Husband, as a 20% shareholder, was looking at an anticipated net windfall exceeding £2.3 million.  According to him, this was his only capital asset, and yet he elected to alienate it in its entirety by the stratagem of settling the shares on trust for the benefit of C and Heidi.  Specifically, in June 2005 the Husband created the L Trust by executing a Settlement Deed the essential features of which were as follows:-

(i)        he, the Husband, was the Settlor;

(ii)       so too was he the sole appointed trustee;

(iii)      the beneficiaries were C and Heidi;

(iv)      the settled funds consisted of the Husband's shares in S Services and S Investments. 

26.      The precise consideration received by the Husband, not in his own right but as trustee of the L Trust, was £2,375,204, which was paid in two tranches, £1,489,775 (from which an expense of £32,996 was immediately deducted) on 6^th September, 2005, the day following the Share Sale Agreement, and £885,429 on 27^th March, 2007.  The Husband has stated that in the infancy of the Trust's existence a supplemental £155,014 was made by way of profit on well-directed investments.  If that sum is taken into account, the effective consideration for the share sale was £2,497,222, a fraction below £2.5 million. 

27.      An obvious question arises for consideration: what was the Husband's motive in alienating from himself a very substantial asset which, if he is telling the truth, comprised not only his sole capital but the fruits of several years of professional industry?  After all, the principal beneficiary of the settlement which he chose to create was a lady to whom he owed no financial obligation in law save (a) in her capacity as mother to Heidi, his third child and (b) to the extent that obligations upon him had been created by virtue of the cohabitation agreements reached in June 2001 and January 2002.  The answer to this question is considered later in this judgment; but the Husband's explanation, when formally expressed, was as simple as it was stark.  According to an affidavit sworn on 18^th December, 2007, in trust proceedings brought against him by C to which detailed reference will shortly be made, the explanation for his creation of the L Trust was:-

"My intention behind placing my entire shareholding into the [L] Trust was to seek to protect my assets from any future attack by my former wife", in other words, the applicant Wife in the current proceedings. 

(iii) Late 2005 to May 2009

28.      The story is, to say the least, convoluted; but it becomes more readily understood when the mind is widely focussed upon the inter-relationship, and sometimes conflict, between what became two parallel sets of litigation, the first between the Husband and C in the Trust jurisdiction, and the second between the Wife and the Husband in the Family jurisdiction, of the Royal Court.  The essential history goes as follows. 

29.      The Court does not know the extent, if at all, to which the sale of the S business attracted public attention; but by June 2006 at latest the Wife had obtained some inkling of the Husband's windfall.  This was grist to the mill of suspicion which she had always entertained with regard to his disclosure in the period leading to the 2002 Order.  In June 2006 the prospect was mooted of Advocate Clarke representing the Wife on a legal aid basis; but he reacted by saying that he was conflicted out of the case, because he had acted for G and Co and had been involved in the drafting of the firm's Partnership Agreement, which happened back in around 2000. 

30.      Advocate Davies came to act for the Wife.  On 14^th August, 2006, she put Advocate Clarke on written notice that she intended to make an application to the Court for the facility to inspect his files.   Advocate Dutôt informed us that, to her understanding, no notification of this intention was imparted directly to the Husband; but it is improbable that Advocate Clarke would not have informed him of what Advocate Davies had said.  There then followed a hiatus which has not been explained to the Court.  The matter remained dormant for some 1¼ years, what might be termed a period of calm before the storm which, subject principally to a moratorium between 2011 and 2013 (see paragraph 59 below), has engulfed the parties ever since.  The only other event of significance which has been drawn to our attention as happening prior to late 2007 was the acquisition by the Husband of a property known as Property M, which he purchased from his parents on 1^st August, 2006, (see paragraph 64 (iii)). 

31.      In November 2007, according to C, she became aware of the fact that since June of that year the Husband had been having an affair with a married woman by the name of N.  N later became divorced from her husband and is now married to the Husband in the instant case: she is referred to hereinafter as "N". 

32.      According to C, she and the Husband had become engaged to be married on 1^st November, 2005.  There are clear indications that their relationship was not entirely stable by the time 2007 arrived.  In a statement by the Husband in Trust proceedings in 2007, to which reference will shortly be made, he stated: "... it should be said that difficulties in our relationship had developed several years ago, with [C] dismissing me from our home on several occasions.  Our separation and the ending of our relationship in early June [2007] was therefore not a surprise to either of us".  It is to be assumed that C would not disagree, because in an unsworn Memorandum sent by her to the Court in July 2014 she herself described her relationship with the Husband as "long-standingly abusive...."

33.      In any event, having discovered about the Husband's affair with N, C consulted solicitors.  The Husband, unsurprisingly, aspired to a private settlement with C and entered into email correspondence with her.  In an email dated 3^rd December, 2007, he made a financial proposal based upon the following recitation of what he stated to be the capital available for distribution:-

Property
Property C	£1,000,000
Mortgage	(£350,000)
Property M	£ 550,000
Mortgage	(£350,000)
Investments
Money market deposit	£ 742,000
Flex LNG	£ 240,000
Illyrian Land Fund	£  80,000
B Global	£  50,000
KP Renewables	£  45,000
A Properties	£  24,000
Wine portfolio	£ 130,000
Skandia	£  70,000
Invesco	£  35,000
Cash	£  10,000
Others
Boat 1	£ 135,000
Boat 2	£  10,000
Cars	£  75,000
Furniture and chattels	£  50,000
	£2,546,000

The Husband's suggestion was simple.  He told C that he regarded the overall assets as being jointly owned in equal shares: accordingly, they should both end with an asset base valued at £1,273,000.  C should have Property C, he should have Property M; and the investments and other assets should be apportioned in a manner which would result in overall equal division. 

34.      The Husband had under-estimated both C's resolve and her perception, indeed awareness, of her, and Heidi's, legal rights.  Even as he wrote the 3^rd December email, C was on the point of issuing legal proceedings against him in the Trust jurisdiction, supported by a Statement which was in fact sworn on the following day, 4^th December.  In that document she narrated the fact and circumstances of the L Trust's creation, expressed her concern at her relative ignorance of the Husband's financial dealings, with particular reference to the trust assets, and sought injunctive relief, which duly came into force, tying his hands and preserving the trust assets in situ.  In his Statement in Response dated 18^th December, 2007, the Husband, to repeat, asserted that his motive in creating the Trust had been to protect his assets from future assault by his former wife.  He also claimed that he had intended the trust assets to redound to the benefit of "the family", thus including himself.  That is as may be, but by that stage not only had he betrayed C, as she would have seen it, and brought their relationship to an end: he had also, in his capacity as trustee, already distributed a substantial proportion of the Trust assets to her. 

35.      To revert, adhering to chronological sequence, to the Family proceedings, in early March 2008 the Wife applied for an increase in the level of maintenance paid by the Husband for her and the children.  The £2,500 per month for her support ordered in 2002 had not changed over a period now of 6 years.  The child maintenance, £866 per month for the two children, had increased in accordance with the Retail Price Index to £1,032 per month.  In her Statement of 5^th March the Wife complained that the global figure of £3,532 per month was seriously deficient in catering for the family's needs.  The Husband retorted that he was paying sufficient for the Wife, but offered an increase of £300 per month to cover both children. 

36.      On 26^th March the Court inter alia ordered the Husband, through Advocate Clarke, to write to the former partners of G and Co to obtain their consent to the disclosure of the files in his possession relating to the Partnership.  On 17^th April the Husband emailed Advocate Davies with a copy of the Partnership Agreement, shortly after which Advocate Clarke sent copies of his file documentation.  Meanwhile, on 7^th April Registrar Obbard varied the maintenance regime by ordering spousal maintenance at the increased rate of £3,500 per month and child maintenance at the increased rate of £1,500 per month.  His Reasons were reduced to writing and include reference to what he described as the "remarkably lavish lifestyle" of the Husband, as evidenced by e.g. the high level of his credit card transactions.  The Husband impressed him as "a high earning, high spending individual who has the capability of arranging his affairs to benefit himself as well as those of his choosing".  At that time, needless to say, the Registrar had no way of knowing whether the Wife's aspiration to have the 2002 Order set aside would come to fruition.  He was, however, convinced that the maintenance had become inadequate and commented upon the outgoings and liabilities which the Wife had to meet and the fact that she had become in part supported by family and friends.  As to her earning capacity, which the Husband understandably was seeking to assert, the Registrar expressed much lower expectations than he had in 2002.  It would, he said, have to be investigated later, but he was satisfied at that juncture that the Wife was fully occupied looking after the family and attempting to make ends meet.  He mentioned a Doctor's certificate which stated that she suffered from asthma and the fact that it was clear that she had to visit her doctor regularly.  In short, the Registrar's mind was kept open.  Finally, he gave directions in the Wife's December 2007 application, including for the exchange of questionnaires. 

37.      In practice no such questionnaires emerged in 2008.  The Registrar had referred the ongoing matrimonial proceedings to the Inferior Number, and the matter came before the Deputy Bailiff for directions on 4^th August, 2008.  The Wife was directed, as a matter of procedure, to bring a fresh action to set aside the 2002 Order if she was seeking to disturb it: meanwhile the Court declined to make further orders for disclosure against the Husband or, in particular, to require him to reply to a financial questionnaire which inter alia sought extensive disclosure in relation to the L Trust. 

38.      In September and October 2008 the Wife, more than two years after Advocate Davies had first written to Advocate Clarke, mounted an offensive on two fronts.  First, putting her procedural tackle in order, on 23^rd September she did initiate a separate action for set aside of the January 2002 ancillary relief order.  Secondly, on 1^st October she made an application to intervene in the Trust proceedings between C and the Husband and, specifically, for an order that the Husband, C and/or Heidi's guardian ad litem should make disclosure pertaining to the value and form of the L Trust assets and any agreement reached between them.  She also sought an order that the Court should not ratify such agreement until her Representation for set aside in the matrimonial jurisdiction had been heard. 

39.      This application in the Trust jurisdiction was seemingly the catalyst for swift action by the Husband and C.  On 10^th October, 2008, they, together with Heidi through her guardian, reached a Settlement Agreement.  By now, we have had to accept, the die as between the Husband and C was cast.  Many substantial payments had already been made to her by way of capital distribution during the previous three or so years amounting in aggregate to just more than £1,044,000 (this apart from some maintenance payments).  In an attempt to make sense of the somewhat disjointed disclosure of documents made by the Husband in relation to the L Trust, the Court of its own initiative created the document which appears at Appendix A to this judgment and seeks to summarise the overall content and effect of a series of Excel spreadsheets produced by the Husband and drawn by him from his personal computer. 

40.      Whatever the Husband's original hope or intention that the corpus of the trust assets should benefit the family, including himself, the fact was that he had alienated the S Services shares by the creation of the L Trust.  His primary purpose, we are satisfied, was indeed to distance their ultimate proceeds of sale from the Wife, who at one time asserted (paragraph 46 below) that the trust was a sham, but later stepped back from pursuing that radical allegation.  The Husband said in evidence that this purpose was only part of his motivation: he also claimed to have felt heavy responsibility to C and to have been taking steps to "collateralise" their agreements of 2001/2.  Why then, the Court asked him, had he not said so in his evidence in the Trust proceedings?  He responded that C well knew that that was his objective, with the result that he did not need to mention it in his Affidavit.  We reject that suggestion, which rings hollow.  The provision made for C pursuant to the L Trust has far exceeded what had been agreed in 2001-2. 

41.      As a matter of elementary principle, the upshot of the Husband's actions was that he was hoist upon his own petard.   Put simply, he could not say to the Wife that he had validly settled his then prospective windfall upon trust for C (and Heidi) but to C that the resulting assets were, or should become, his and hers in equal shares (still less that they remained in his own beneficial ownership): see, for example, Tinker v Tinker [1970] P. 136. 

42.      The terms of the Settlement are on their face disproportionately favourable to C.  They included, in summary:-

(i)        A mortgage on Property C was to be discharged from L Trust assets, and it was provided generally that any loans secured in C's name upon Property M or other assets not belonging to the Trust were to be repaid as soon as reasonably practicable by the Husband without recourse to Trust assets. 

(ii)       All parties were to use reasonable endeavours to procure that all charges or other security be removed from Property C.  (There was also a totally mysterious reference - which no-one can now explain - to a 2002 charge on Property B). 

(iii)      The Husband was to assume liability for any loans relating to Property M; and he was also to repay a loan said to be £74,100, but in fact £71,400, to the L Trust.  This had been borrowed to assist in the original purchase of Property M.  He says that it has now been repaid.  We are not sure whether it has been. 

(iv)      Broadly stated, the Husband's personal obligations pursuant to the 2001 Cohabitation Agreement for the payment of maintenance to C were to be funded out of the residue of Trust assets.  Such maintenance was now, uplifted by reference to the RPI, £5,155 per month.  There were to be other fixed distributions from the Trust of £10,000 per annum for the purpose of travel expenses and holidays for C and Heidi. 

(v)       A debt agreed to be owed pursuant to the Cohabitation Agreement in the sum of £187,000, with credit for the value of a particular insurance policy, was to be paid by the trust to C. 

(vi)      There was to be an additional and therefore co-trustee thenceforth; and the Husband was to produce audited trust accounts.  Neither of these steps has been taken. 

The above is by way of summary.  There were other provisions in the Agreement, which is not of course the direct concern of the Wife. 

43.      Further sums of £266,602 and £35,000 respectively were advanced out of the Trust to C on 17^th October, 2008.  This was before a letter dated 30^th October, 2008, was sent by Hanson Renouf, acting for the Husband, to the Wife's solicitors at the direction of the Court in the Trust jurisdiction.  The Court had ordered that the Wife must be informed of the Settlement Agreement and, in effect, given a chance to object to it. 

44.      The Wife's application to intervene in the Trust proceedings and force disclosure of trust information was heard by Commissioner Clyde-Smith (and Jurats) on 14^th November, 2008.  It was dismissed, but solely, the Commissioner emphasised, on procedural grounds which were similar in their substance to those articulated by the Deputy Bailiff 3 months earlier, in August.  In a nutshell, the only platform from which she could launch an assault upon the Trust, or seek information with regard to it, was an Order of Justice comprising a fresh and stand-alone action.  It was perhaps understandable that this decision should take the wind out of the Wife's sails; and it seems that, in any event, her advisers must have taken the view that further action in the Trust jurisdiction should be deferred until the set aside application in the Family Court was determined. 

45.      Attention was thus concentrated on the set aside action, as to which the Husband produced a long Affidavit in January 2009 in staunch defence.  The action finally came before the Deputy Bailiff (and Jurats) on 9^th May, 2009.  It was keenly contested and involved not only legal submissions, but the taking of oral evidence from Advocate Hoy, who had represented the Wife in 2002; from a forensic accountant, Mr Rabet, who opined upon the value of the S Services shares in 2002, as best he could assess it; and from the Husband himself.  Essentially, the Husband was, on certain key points, disbelieved by the Court, whose Judgment requires full perusal if its detailed reasons are to be appreciated.  The essence, however, was that, although the Court was prepared to give the Husband the benefit of the doubt as to whether he had an interest in the equity of the partnership in January 2002, he deliberately failed to disclose that in the closely foreseeable future (less than 6 months from the hearing) he was likely to become a full equity partner.  Mr Rabet had opined that £1,300,000 would be the minimum value of a one-sixth interest in the S Trustees company, in which the business was incorporated, in January 2002.  In the view of the Court, the Wife could have made a strong case for adjournment of her application for a lump sum; and it was inconceivable that the Registrar, who had decided the case upon the premise that the capital in the case was confined to a mere £100,000, would have made the order which he did, had he known the truth.  Accordingly, the 2002 Order would be set aside. 

46.      It must still have been perceived on behalf of the Wife that she needed another string to her bow, because in July 2009 she did institute a separate action attacking the creation and validity of the L Trust.  One is inclined to assume that she and her advisers were concerned (as, in our judgment, they had to be) about the alienation by the Husband of an asset worth well in excess of £2m and the possible absence, in consequence, of capital resources by reference to which any judgment in the Wife's favour could be assessed, and enforced.  The action was dated 20^th July, 2009, and was issued in the Family Court, albeit with various parties cited other than the Husband.  It was essentially what has come to be termed a Pauline action and, briefly stated, sought this relief:-

(i)        a declaration or order that the L Trust be set aside as a transaction to defeat and/or prejudice the Wife's claims;

(ii)       a declaration or order that the Trust was wholly or partially invalid and/or a sham and that the assets held by the Husband in his capacity as the purported sole trustee of the Trust were in fact held by him personally; and

(iii)      a blanket freezing injunction over the assets which, in the litigation, she was targeting.  This injunction was modified in its terms by the Bailiff in 2010, but seems to have remained in force until 2013. 

47.      The Court does not understand why the Pauline element of the proceedings commenced in the Family jurisdiction in July 2009 was not directed too to C, who presumably would have had to be joined in the proceedings.  It does not, however, matter, because for reasons unknown to the Court the assault upon the L Trust was never pursued by the Wife.  At one point enquiry was made of Advocate Dutôt whether she was able (if so inclined) to explain the reason why the Wife had not proceeded.  This was by way not of challenge, but simply request for historical information.  Advocate Dutôt did not know the answer, but the Wife volunteered that the decision not to proceed was not that of herself, but of her solicitors.  It is not for this court to second-guess what view her solicitors (then Mourant Ozannes) may have taken as to the merits, much less to conduct a trial within a trial as to how, if the Wife had proceeded, she would have fared. 

48.      What is, however, worthy of emphasis is what appears to us to be a lacuna in Jersey's law of ancillary relief.  In substance, and by dint of the relevant statutory provisions in combination with judicial interpretation and guidance (see e.g. In the Matter of S [2011] JRC 119), the principles and criteria applied in Jersey are those which prevail in England and Wales.  There are, however, exceptions; and in the context of this extremely troublesome case none is more notable, or has had greater consequence, than the absence in Jersey of a statutory regime which coincides with that conferred upon the English Court by Section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 

49.      Section 37 reads as follows in its material parts:-

"37 Avoidance of transactions intended to prevent or reduce financial relief

(1)       For the purposes of this section "financial relief" means relief under any of the provisions of sections .... 23, 24 [which provide for financial provision and property adjustment] .... and any reference in this section to defeating a person's claim for financial relief is a reference to preventing financial relief from being granted to that person, or to that person for the benefit of a child of the family, or reducing the amount of any financial relief which might be so granted, or frustrating or impeding the enforcement of any order which might be or has been made at his instance under any of those provisions.

(2)       Where proceedings for financial relief are brought by one person against another, the Court may, on the application of the first mentioned person -

(a)       if it is satisfied that the other person to the proceedings is with the intention of defeating the claim for financial relief about to make any disposition or to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal with any property, make such order as it thinks fit for restraining the other person from so doing or otherwise for protecting the claim;

(b)       if it is satisfied that the other party has, with that intention, made a reviewable disposition and that if the disposition were set aside financial relief or different financial relief would be granted to the applicant, make an order setting aside the disposition;

(c)       if it is satisfied, in a case where an order has been obtained under any of the provisions mentioned in sub-section (1) above by the applicant against the other party, that the other party has, with that intention, made a reviewable disposition, make an order setting aside the disposition;

an application for the purposes of paragraph (b) above shall be made in the proceedings for the financial relief in question.

(3)       Where the Court makes an order under sub-section (2)(b) or (c) above setting aside a disposition it shall give such consequential directions as it thinks fit for giving effect to the order (including directions requiring the making of any payments or the disposal of any property).

(4)       Any disposition made by the other party to the proceedings for financial relief in question (whether before or after the commencement of those proceedings) is a reviewable disposition ... unless it was made for valuable consideration (other than marriage) to a person who, at the time of the disposition, acted in relation to it in good faith and without notice of any intention on the part of the other party to defeat the applicant's claim for financial relief.

(5)       Where an application is made under this section with respect to a disposition which took place less than 3 years before the date of the application or with respect to a disposition or other dealing with property which is about to take place and the court is satisfied -

(a)       in a case falling within sub-section (2)(a) or (b) above, that the disposition or other dealing would (apart from this section) have the consequence, or

(b)       in a case falling within sub-section (2)(c) above, that the disposition has had the consequence,

of defeating the applicant's claim for financial relief, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that the person who disposed or is about to dispose of or deal with a property did so, or as the case may be, is about to do so, with the intention of defeating the applicant's claim for financial relief ............".

50.      There is much case-law pertaining to Section 37.  We need not refer to it, save to mention that it was established in Kemmis v Kemmis [1988] 2 FLR 223 that per Nourse LJ the required intention to prevent or reduce financial relief:-

"[does] not have to be [the Respondent's] sole or even  his dominant intention.  It was enough if it played a substantial part in his intentions as a whole. If it were otherwise, section 37(2) would fail to catch the case where a husband makes a disposition with the dominant intention of gratifying his mistress and only the subsidiary intention of defeating his wife's claim for financial relief.  I feel sure that that was not the intention of Parliament."

51.      The annals of ancillary relief (now financial remedy) law in England and Wales demonstrate that Section 37 of the MCA 1973 has for more than 40 years been not just a useful, but an essential, weapon in the Court's forensic armoury.  The reason is too obvious to require expansion.  It seems to us that, had the Court in Jersey been similarly equipped, the facts of the current case would have lent themselves readily to the powers of avoidance of disposition which the Court would have had.  With due deference we think it appropriate to draw this situation to the attention of the Law Commission which we understand is currently undertaking a review of Jersey's law of ancillary relief. 

(iv) June 2009 - July 2013

52.      Following the set aside Order in May 2009 the course of the litigation procedurally and evidentially has been tortuous.  We refer to only some of the detail in this Judgment, although an overall understanding is relevant to certain decisions we have to make, including as to the existence or not of litigation misconduct and its impact on the parties' liabilities for costs. 

53.      On 8^th September, 2009, the Wife made an application for directions in the Family jurisdiction, heard by Registrar Obbard on 15^th September.  On its face this was a leisurely and unnecessary four months after the set aside decision, but probably attention had been diverted to the July 2009 application just described.  The Registrar made standard directions to do with evidence and questionnaires; but what he also did was to direct the Husband to provide information about the L Trust.  Both parties produced affidavits of means, the Wife in September and the Husband in October 2009.  These affidavits (and their successors) have been in the pro-forma style which eschews narrative and in an unusual and complex case can, in the anxiety for succinct presentation, encourage brevity which is in truth unhelpful.  What the Husband said about his means, both in 2009 and in 2014, is summarised in Appendix B to this Judgment, introduced at paragraph 78 below. 

54.      The Affidavits provoked lengthy questionnaires in November 2009.  The Wife's was searching; but in his response to it, and its many successors, the Husband has too often failed to do himself credit, sometimes by a wide margin.  The paradigm example of the defaulting litigant in this context is axiomatically the spouse, usually with his greater financial strength a husband, who deliberately lies, whether by statement or omission, with the intent of concealing financial resources which in truth he has.  But there are other forms of non-cooperation which can create scepticism, suspicion and, as bad as any other consequence, yet more questioning and therefore more costs.  They include answers which, whilst not as such mendacious, are too oblique or are unnecessarily economical with detail which should be provided.  With some hesitation we cite from a decision of the presiding Commissioner when sitting in the Family Division of the High Court in London in 2010 in the case of V v V [2009] EWHC 2901 (Fam):-

"[41]   As to subsequent answers to questionnaire, I need not of course examine every instance of misleading or incomplete response, whether by statement or omission; and in any event some examples will inevitably appear as I examine the detail surrounding the more significant areas of dispute. As a general proposition, however, an assertion by the respondent in oral evidence to the effect that he had been, as he put it, 'as frank as I can' is patently unsustainable.  Various of his answers have been untrue, and many have had a literal truth which nevertheless has disguised the underlying reality. This is all too often the way with respondents who, fundamentally, are unforthcoming. They tend, where possible, to give a literal yes or no type of response, without adding relevant information and saying, in effect, that whereas the short answer is, as the case may be, affirmative or negative, what the applicant also ought (and needs) to know is such and such additional information which, in accordance with the overall obligation of full, frank and clear disclosure, the respondent volunteers. This may seem an elementary proposition, but in my experience its importance is too frequently missed."

55.      One area in which the Husband sought to stand firm for many months, and obstinately so, was to do with the L Trust.  Starting in his first Answer to Questionnaire he repeatedly stone-walled the Wife's enquiries as to the creation, corpus, administration and distribution of the Trust's assets, saying, typically: "As the advocates for [the Wife] will be aware, [the Husband] is unable to disclose information in relation to the L Trust" or "is prohibited" from disclosing such information.  There are other examples too numerous to mention of the Husband being unhelpful in his response to requests for documents and/or information.  They include, simply by way of flavour:-

(i)        a suggestion at an early stage that the Husband was "prohibited" from providing information to do with S Investments, of which more later;

(ii)       complaint that various requests were "improper", when plainly they were not;

(iii)      the Wife asked for various information to do with certain properties which are further detailed in paragraph 64 below, in particular (i) Property R, the home where he and N reside with Heidi and the four N children (who are aged 19, 18, 18 and 16) and (ii) another property, Property W, held in N's name but as to which the Husband is liable under a substantial mortgage.  He was not obliged unduly to press his wife (still less her mother) for information which in the ordinary course of their family life had genuinely not been imparted to him.  It was, however, his duty fully to convey the substance of all relevant information already known to or with good reason believed by him.  If he had done so, it may well have been possible to avoid the cost of an expensive subpoena exercise directed at N. 

56.      Predictably, the family court, in the person of Registrar Obbard, was having none of the Husband's resistance to disclosure about the L Trust.   On 26^th April, 2010, he gave a Judgment on a preliminary issue to the effect that all the parties' assets remained relevant (including the assets used to form the L Trust).  He also ordered the Husband to answer an outstanding questionnaire in full and to provide a wide range of specified documentary evidence and information to do with the Trust.  Another two months passed before the Husband issued a Representation in the Trust jurisdiction in which he sought the Court's direction as to whether he should comply with the Registrar's Order.  The hearing of the Representation happened before Commissioner Clyde-Smith in the autumn of 2010, when the Court firmly dismissed any suggestion that there could be non-compliance with the Family Court's directions and made an order for costs against the Husband. 

57.      In consequence, a schedule of deficiencies was answered by the Husband in November 2010, already 18 months after the set aside order.  Yet again the matter fell dormant for another 9 months for reasons which, to the recollection of the Court, were not explained. 

58.      More discovery was sought from the Husband in August 2011, when the matter was again before the Bailiff, who ordered that the Husband should, on pain of contempt, provide all information requested in a then extant schedule of deficiencies by 30^th September, 2011, and should pay the Wife's costs of that hearing on the indemnity basis.  It is to be presumed from the terms of the Order that the delay must have been the fault of the Husband.  Further information was supplied in early October 2011, when at last the Husband began to address the relevant detail as to the L Trust, gave better information as to his historical and current income and also dealt with the progress and ultimate fate of the company S Investments. 

59.      Now there began what became another, this time 1¾ years, hiatus in the proceedings.  It is explained in the Appendix on Delay attached to Advocate Dutôt's August 2014 Case Summary and stemmed from a falling out between the Wife and Mourant Ozannes following the August 2011 hearing.  It is sufficient to say that there were problems to do with the Wife's legal aid for which she bears no culpability.  They should not have happened, certainly not over such a long period. 

60.      The delay described was of grave consequence.  The expense of the litigation had probably become disproportionate even in 2011.  All that was achieved by the stagnation was the certainty of a great increase in the level of costs beginning, as it transpired, in about August 2013.  It was now 4¼ years after the set aside judgment. 

61.      By this stage the Husband had been living with N some years and was married to her.  N's children are not maintained by their father.  N is responsible for payment of her children's school fees, but at least to some extent the Husband is maintaining them.  All in all, the Husband is very successful and highly skilled at what he does and deserves due recognition for what he achieves, not only professionally but in terms of the support which he renders to the many who are, to a greater or lesser extent, dependent upon him. 

62.      That said we refer below to a material degree of financial mismanagement on the part of the Husband, to which he has to hold up his hands.  To take one example, on 26^th October, 2012, he had to enter into a loan agreement with a Mrs J in the sum of £200,000 (now raised to £250,000) at a 6.5% rate of interest.  He explained that this sum was required to pay very large income tax arrears, for which, however, he should have made provision.  As the Commissioner said in an interlocutory judgment in this case in September 2014:-

"..........it is striking that he has not sought to justify his failure to act in the manner to be expected of what I would term a normal and prudent self-employed businessman, (a fortiori, it may be suggested, a man not only with a professional qualification in accountancy, but fully cognisant of the wife's claim against him). Such a man would be expected to make such savings from his gross fee income, net of business expenditure, as would enable him to finance the payment of income tax (at only 20% let it be said), referable to that income."

63.      There was also the purchase on 24^th February, 2012, in N's name, of Property R.  The purchase price was £1,850,000.  Of this sum £300,000 derived from N's mother by way of gift to her.  £375,000 is charged against a property, Property W, of which more elsewhere; but that property does at least yield a commercial rent.  The balance, however, was borrowed by way of a mortgage in the sum of £1,225,000, under which both N and the Husband, although he has no beneficial interest in the property, are jointly and severally liable.  Until 1^st April, 2014, the Husband made the mortgage repayments on an interest only basis in the sum of £70,000 per annum.  From that date forward his liability in respect of the property has, because he is making capital in addition to interest repayments, increased to no less than £135,000 per annum. 

64.      This is a convenient stage at which to draw the threads together with regard to the various properties with which the Husband has been associated in the years since 2002.  The word "associated" is carefully chosen, because association is one thing, but ownership quite another.  The properties are five in number, and in chronological sequence of their acquisition are as follows:-

(i)        Property Y

The former matrimonial home, this property was purchased in 1994, as stated above, and has been the Wife's home for 18 - 19 years, and the children's for all their lives.  On the Husband's case it is the potential lynch-pin of the capital award to be made in the Wife's favour.  In her Affidavit of February 2014 she said that her principal capital need was a fund with which to put Property Y into good order, as to the cost of which she was awaiting a surveyor's report.  In the box requiring her to state what order she was asking the Court to make she stated: "I would either like [Property Y] to be put into good repair and then transferred to me, alternatively I would be content to be provided with a lump sum that enables me to buy a new home to house myself and the children".  In her Section 25 Statement of July, however, she stated a clear preference for moving from Property Y and starting afresh in another property, the projected purchase price of which she suggested should be £550,000 - 575,000.  Property Y is in a bad state of repair and has even been described by a professional surveyor, Mr U, as uninhabitable.  In common with many homes in the area it is vulnerable to suffer from extreme damp.  This was a feature mentioned in the 2000-2002 evidence: in her opening Statement in 2000 the Wife referred to both subsidence and considerable damp.  No-one, however, envisaged that the property would deteriorate to the poor condition in which it stands today.  The Court had a view during the course of the trial and was certainly concerned at the extent of repair and renovation required, though it is still a comfortable home in a very special location.  The home is not literally uninhabitable - the Wife and the children do continue to live there - but it does require very wide-ranging and expensive work, which Mr U has estimated will cost not less than £140,000.  At one point the Husband (many days into the trial and too late given that Mr U's principal contribution was dated April 2014) wanted to adduce evidence from an expert surveyor instructed by him.  Now, to judge from his current offer of settlement (see paragraph 73 below), he is prepared to work upon the basis of Mr U's figures. 

A point for consideration is the allegation by the Husband that, so far as Property Y's condition is concerned, the Wife is substantially the architect of her own misfortune.  We think that there is very limited merit in that suggestion.  She could have done better in terms of certain everyday repair and maintenance; but it was never going to be possible for her to keep on top of the radical problems that now prevail.  Moreover, her budget of expenditure demonstrates no ready surplus of income for the purpose of financing expensive works. 

There is, finally, an unfortunate history of relative enmity between the Wife and the person who owns the contiguous upper apartment.  The detail has not much engaged the Court's interest.  If the Wife is to stay in the property, she will need in all common sense to improve that relationship.  There will also have to be an ironing-out of certain complications as to the property's tenure.

(ii)       Property C

See paragraphs 18-19 above. 

(iii)      Property M

In 2006 the Husband's parents lived in and owned Property M.  They were then aged approximately 82 and 84.  It became necessary for the Husband to acquire the property from them, so as to replenish their liquid funds.  A completion statement dated 1^st August, 2006, prepared by his solicitors demonstrates that, to acquire the reversionary ownership, the Husband parted with a sum of £421,262 of which he borrowed £71,400 from the L Trust and raised £349,900 from the NatWest Bank on mortgage.  The Husband's mother died in December 2014 and only his father, aged 93, remains in the property now. 

(iv)      Property W

This property was purchased in January 2007 by N and her former husband with the assistance of a £625,000 mortgage.  In 2010 that mortgage was redeemed by N's mother, and the property became unencumbered.  More recently, £375,000 has been borrowed on the security of the property and injected towards the purchase price of Property R.  As in the case of Property R, the Husband, although we are satisfied that he has no beneficial interest in the property, is jointly and severally liable with N in respect of the Property W mortgage. 

(v)       Property R

The circumstances of its acquisition have just been described. 

65.      A lot of time was expended at the interlocutory hearings of 2014 centering upon the issue whether the Husband has any and, if so, what, beneficial interest in Property C and/or Property W and/or Property R (with the potential consequential question whether, if so, any such property should be sold).  To repeat, Property C is held in the name of C, and both Property W and Property R in the name of N.  Advocate Jones advanced argument (resisted by Advocate Dutôt) to the effect that, Flynn v Reid [2012] 1 JLR 730 is authority for the proposition that it is legally impossible in Jersey for a person to hold a beneficial interest in a property in which another holds the legal interest. 

66.      We need not decide that perhaps knotty issue, for two reasons.  First, in the ultimate event the Wife has not pursued the assertion of beneficial ownership.  To do so would have involved, as a mandatory requirement, the joinder of C and/or N as parties entitled to representation (see, e.g., Tebbutt v Haynes [1981] 2 All E.R. 238, TL v ML and others [2006] 1 FLR 1264) and Fisher Meredith LLP v JH, PH [2012] EWHC 408).  Secondly, on the facts of the case it has become clear to the Court that the Husband has no establishable beneficial interest in any of the properties, even if the argument advanced by Advocate Jones is misplaced.  Any such interest would in that event have to be based upon one of two premises: either actual injection of capital by the Husband or the existence of a resulting or constructive trust arising from an imputed intention of co-ownership based upon the Husband's making of mortgage repayments.  In the case of Property C there is an express written agreement going back to 2001 which negates the possibility of the Husband having any beneficial interest in the property.  In the cases of Property W and Property R there have been very substantial injections of capital by N/her mother.  Payment of mortgage instalments by the Husband over a limited period and without any evidence that any substantial part of the current equity in either of the properties is referable to such payments is insufficient to found any beneficial interest.  This is apart from whatever evidence N might have given as to her and the Husband's express intentions. 

July 2013 onwards

67.      At the end of July 2013 Advocate Dutôt informed the Husband that she had been instructed by the Wife and the case was restored before the Bailiff for yet further case management on 10^th October.  To an alarming extent the clock was rewound and over the following 10 months there were numerous further interlocutory hearings, with fresh affidavits of means, section 25 statements, many further questionnaires and schedules of deficiencies and all manner of disagreements on a wide range of directional issues including as to expert medical evidence, property ownership (or not) by the Husband and potential forensic accountancy evidence.  If an account is taken of actual "questionnaires", of any correspondence having the effective status of a questionnaire and of all schedules of deficiencies, we calculate that when the case stagnated in 2011, there had already been not less than four such requisitions.  In the period between November 2013 and final conclusion of the trial in 2015, at least a further half dozen questionnaire-type documents were served and answered, some of them, it is fair to record, necessitated by the poor quality of response with which previous enquiries had been met.  The total number, therefore, is in double figures.  By any standard this process of requisition, in terms of its depth, duration and the volume of documents generated, is unacceptable. 

68.      It is notable that in England and Wales such has been the concern at this type of scenario that there has been in existence since 2014 a Practice Direction "Family Proceedings Rules 2010, PD 27A", paragraph 5.1 of which provides that:-

"Unless the court has specifically directed otherwise, being satisfied that such direction is necessary to enable the proceedings to be disposed of justly, the bundle shall be contained in 1 A4 size ring binder or Lever Arch file limited to no more than 350 sheets of A4 paper and 350 sides of text."

In the case of Re L (A child) [2015] EWFC 15 the President of the Family Division, having concluded that the Practice Direction had been honoured more in the breach than in the observance, delivered a scalding disapproval of that situation and made it crystal clear that paragraph 5.1 must be followed to the letter on pain of severe costs sanctions.  It is recognised on all sides that in an appropriate case the total number of documents before the Court must exceed 350 pages.  But this is the inception of a new regime: the Court will hereafter be vigilant and icily focussed in determining whether a given document or category of documents is "necessary" to enable proceedings to be disposed of justly.  It is a matter for the Royal Court to decide whether some similar regime should be introduced in Jersey; but the rationale behind the said Practice Direction is plain.  Certainly, the volume of documentation in the current case (in the region of 9,000 sheets) could never have survived the Practice Direction's application. 

69.      The case took on another dimension as the trial approached, because the Wife, even after so many years, began, in the words of Advocate Dutôt, to act as a financial ferret and, by searching through documents downloaded or commissioned from the public domain, to try to establish that, to an extent exceeding the finding of malfeasance made in May 2009, the portrayal by the Husband over the years of his business interests going as far back as 2002 and earlier has been false.  This has involved the asking of questions different from or supplemental to those posed back in 2010 and 2011.  Many of them have met with reasonably detailed response from the Husband; some could have been answered more fully and helpfully; and some have provoked, inevitably, a weary protest that after so many years either he, the Husband, simply cannot recall the particular information requested or the document sought is no longer available.  In all, the Commissioner presided over five interlocutory hearings between March and July 2014, the detail of which need not be recited.  In some areas restraint was achievable; but to an extent regrettable in hindsight the matter proliferated. 

Settlement proposals (and the lack of them)

70.      Any bystander acquainted with the history thus far would be anxious to ascertain, first, what has been the cost of the litigation and, secondly, the scope in financial terms of the parties' disagreement.  To put it another way, (s)he would want to focus on proportionality.  As to costs, the figures are shocking.  The Wife's costs total, up to and including the last day of trial, £460,000, which, however, includes her costs (£15,000) in respect of the L Trust litigation (and of course her application in the Family jurisdiction alleging sham).  The Husband incurred costs of £164,000 in respect of the trust litigation which, however, were recovered by him out of trust resources.  As to the ancillary relief proceedings, his costs total £474,000, of which there remains owing £220,000. 

71.      As to the history of the negotiation, there is a lamentable story to tell.  For a number of practical reasons the trial took place in four tranches, in August, October, December 2014 and February 2015.  It would have finished in December but for the unfortunate death of the Husband's mother.  On the first day of the October sitting (the fourth day of the trial) the Husband sought a half-day adjournment for the purpose, it was said, of formulating an open offer of settlement.  It was not until much later that it was confirmed to the Court that this had in fact been the first proposal of settlement made by either party: accordingly, there had not been any without prejudice proposal per the Calderbank procedure i.e. an offer of settlement made without prejudice save as to costs.  This is not the moment for judicial pronouncement upon that sorry state of affairs: that will happen when the parties, in the absence of agreement, argue about liability for costs. 

72.      The Husband's offer was, briefly, to the effect that:-

(i)        The Wife would transfer to the Husband her interest in Property Y (via her shares in the holding company). 

(ii)       The Husband would pay the Wife a lump sum of £100,000 "subject to financing" for use as a deposit on the acquisition of another property. 

(iii)      As to maintenance, for one year the Husband would continue to pay global maintenance at the rate of £63,000 per annum. 

(iv)      Spousal maintenance would reduce by £7,800 per annum for the following 5 years, and would cease after a total of 7 years. 

(v)       Maintenance would be paid in respect of the children, to continue at the rate of £10,500 per annum per child until completion of secondary education.  In the event of the children attending tertiary education, the Husband would pay the costs of such education, and maintenance, up to £25,000 per annum per child. 

(vi)      The offer, if accepted, would be in full and final settlement of all claims. 

This proposal evoked criticism from the Court, which made clear its view that it was insufficient.  Its shortcomings included, but were not limited to, (i) its total failure to provide an alternative home for the Wife, who plainly has no mortgage-raising capacity of substance at present and (ii) its silence on the matter of costs. 

73.      The Husband had second thoughts.  In the course of his evidence during the second (i.e. October) Court sitting he had come to accept that Property Y is in a dire state of repair and that there must be wide-ranging renovation.  He informed the Court of that recognition: the only question, he said, was how the sums required were to be found/paid by him.  On 10^th November, 2014, he made his second open offer.  It remained in place to the end of the trial.  In summary, and in headline terms:-

(i)        The Husband would increase the lending against Property Y by £140,000, being the sum required to finance its repair and renovation, thus to create, and thereafter be responsible for, a charge over the property in the sum of £210,000 (because he took the sum outstanding on mortgage now to be £70,000).  His intention apparently would be to secure this facility from the current mortgagees, Barclays, with whom he has been in some (only preliminary) discussion.  He recognised that the Wife would need to move to short-term alternative accommodation for the duration of the repair works, and would contribute the sum of £1,000 per month towards its rental. 

(ii)       Following final discharge of the mortgage (envisaged by him to require a period of 15 years) he would transfer to the Wife the Y Ltd shares so as to confer beneficial ownership of the property upon her. 

(iii)      Global maintenance would continue at £63,000 per annum for 2 years.  Advocate Jones made clear in his closing submissions that is was to be quite separate from and therefore supplemental to the Husband's financing of the said mortgage. 

(iv)      Thereafter spousal maintenance should reduce by £3,600 per annum for the following 5 years; and cease at the end of that period, that is 7 years after the date of settlement.  By way of further clarification, Advocate Jones, in answer to enquiry from the Court, conveyed that his client is not proposing that the Wife's claim for maintenance should at that point in time be irrevocably dismissed: in other words, she would have, as Advocate Jones put it, "Liberty to Apply" and it would be open to her to seek further income provision, although one well understands that at that stage the Husband would be virtually certain to mount very strong opposition to her application, given that he would by then have been maintaining her for a quarter of a century in the aftermath of a 4 year marriage. 

(v)       Child maintenance was as to quantum meant to coincide with the proposals advanced in the first open offer.  It follows that the opening figure by way of maintenance for the Wife would, Advocate Jones confirmed, be £42,000 per annum. 

74.      At the third (December) Court sitting, the Court found it necessary to order the Wife to respond to the Husband's proposals and make a counter-offer, with supporting rationale.  Previously she had not done so, although she should have done.  Her proposal was dated 19^th December, and was in the following (again, headline) terms:-

(i)        The Husband, by a lump sum payment to be made via the Wife, should discharge his loan with Mrs J, now standing at £250,000, and thereafter confer upon the Wife the sole and unencumbered beneficial ownership of Property M (worth, to repeat, £715,000, subject to the occupancy of his 93 year old father). 

(ii)       The Husband should pay to the Wife a lump sum of £200,000 (to be reduced by £50,000 to £150,000 if full payment of that lower figure is made by 31^st May, 2015). 

(iii)      Global maintenance for the Wife and the children at the rate of £75,000 per annum until the younger child reaches the age of 24, with certain terms as to Retail Price Index increase and protection by term assurance against the Husband's death. 

(iv)      Apparently and, wholly illogically, in addition, tertiary education maintenance for the children at the rate of £25,000 per annum for each child, with no reduction in the £75,000 figure upon each child finishing secondary education. 

75.      This offer provoked a strong response from the Husband through Advocate Jones, who says that, whatever the Husband's means, it is excessive; and, if it be the case that he has no undisclosed resources, also impracticable and unrealistic. 

THE "SECTION 25" FACTORS

Financial resources

The Wife: capital assets

76.      The 2002 Order never having been implemented, and now being overturned, the Wife has a one-half beneficial interest in Property Y.  Its current value is difficult to define.  The simple calculation, upon which it is impossible to improve, is the value attributed to the property by the single joint expert, Mr Frank Luce, upon the premise of the property being in good condition, less the cost of achieving that objective less the sum currently outstanding on mortgage: a net figure in the bracket of £130,000 - £150,000.  The Wife may be treated as the effective owner of the Standard Life policy, which the Husband has at all material times conceded to her: surrender value £68,000.  It matures, incidentally, in April 2019. 

77.      Chattels apart, the Wife has no other assets, only liabilities:-

(i)        her liability to costs (paragraph 70 above);

(ii)       her indebtedness in terms of social security arrears.  We have seen a letter from the Jersey Department of Social Security which informs the Wife that the sum that needed to be paid to entitle her to a full State pension as of 2014 was £79,351. 

(iii)      P, the Husband's sister, in sympathy with the Wife did lend her a sum of £6,000.  There is no reason to treat that generosity as creating anything other than a hard rather than soft loan. 

The Husband: capital assets

78.      As a starting point we attach at Appendix B a summary of the Husband's presentations in, respectively, his 2009 and 2014 Affidavits of Means.  The following comment and explanation is apposite:-

(i)        To repeat, Property M is worth £715,000 subject only to the occupation of the Husband's father, whose life expectancy is 3 years.  Any discount is in the circumstances marginal and the Husband's suggestion of a value of £400,000 (uttered, to be fair to him, when his mother was still alive) is very much too low. 

(ii)       Credit card liabilities are inevitably owing at any given time; but they are funded from revenue, not capital. 

(iii)      The attribution by the Husband to himself of the very substantial mortgage liabilities cited in 2014 is (Property M apart) artificial.  It is true that the Husband has signed up to joint responsibility for these liabilities; but all of them are charged upon the properties concerned, each of which has, net of the borrowings, a substantial equity.  The Husband professes no beneficial interest in any of the properties - a position which we accept - and the reality is that the source of repayment to which, in each case, the lender would look in the event of default would be the property itself. 

(iv)      The tax liability of £223,000 (probably to some extent reduced now) is disquieting and, as already indicated, reflects upon the Husband's financial mismanagement.  In practice he has agreed that he will discharge the indebtedness by quarterly instalments of £20,000 out of his income. 

(v)       The Husband's costs liability is now much higher: he owes, as stated above, £220,000. 

79.      All that said, even if the Husband's liabilities for income tax and indeed legal costs are put to one side upon the basis that they are in substantial measure self-inflicted, the position remains that, unless the Husband is guilty of non-disclosure and concealment of assets, the excess of his capital resources over liabilities amounts to a modest six figure sum in £ sterling. 

80.      This brings us to a core issue: are the Husband's financial resources as he states them to be, or is he guilty of non-disclosure?  And, if the latter, are such resources as he has concealed even loosely identifiable; or is it simply the case that as a matter of legitimate inference the Court, whilst ignorant of their type and location, can and should deduce that hidden resources exist?  This is the territory covered by e.g. Al Khatib v Masry [2002] 1 FLR 1053 and related authorities, which we bear firmly in mind. 

81.      The Wife asserts both propositions, jointly and in the alternative.  Her case may be summarised thus, drawn largely from Advocate Dutôt's closing written submissions:-

(i)        The Husband's capacity to mislead and fail to make full, frank and clear disclosure is already established by virtue of the rationale underlying the 2009 set aside order.  This alone mandates scepticism and caution on the part of the Court in its analysis of his current presentation. 

(ii)       There are evidential indicia which justify the Court in concluding that, quite apart from the Husband's non-disclosure in 2002 of his true S partnership interests, he had, at the time of the January 2002 Order, other undisclosed assets.  The Wife trod many paths in seeking to establish this proposition, but the central points upon which she seeks to rely are -

(a)       the Husband's (alleged) failure to explain the ultimate fate of the 20% shareholding in the company S Investments;

(b)       an alleged misrepresentation of his income remuneration in January 2002;

(c)       his disguise of a capital injection into Property C which the Wife says he must surely have made in 2002;

(d)       the fact that he had a boat purchased for French Francs 25,000 during the course of the marriage;

(e)       [not pursued]

(f)        a defect in the Husband's identification of all companies in which he appears to have had an interest in 2000-2002;

(g)       suspicion arising from certain directorships and shareholdings held in the same period as to which the Husband says that he cannot recall detail and/or any shares were not held by him beneficially;

(h)       certain accounting discrepancies of many years ago to do e.g. with management charges;

(i)        the fact that the Husband traded in stocks and shares during the marriage, with the implication that any residual profits may be undisclosed;

(j)        his failure/inability to remember whether he received a remuneration bonus in 1995. 

(iii)      In any event, the Husband has derived financial resources for himself from the L Trust.  Advocate Dutôt confirmed that the Wife does not allege that the Trust is a sham, and she concedes that the vast majority of its corpus has passed by way of capital and income distributions to C.  The Trust was diminished by a substantial six figure sum paid in respect of the costs of the L Trust litigation.  However, there remained what was termed in argument a "tail-end pool" of capital investments, of which, Advocate Dutôt has to concede, very little remains.  The Wife suggests, however, that the Husband in the past had for himself the benefit of all or some of that residue. 

(iv)      The Court can and should infer, merely from the Husband's lifestyle, apart from any other consideration, that he has greater resources than he has disclosed.  Mention is made of the fact that in a given month, which happened to be February 2013, he financed £41,000 worth of expenditure on credit cards alone.  Reliance is also placed upon the Husband's capacity for high expenditure generally: Advocate Dutôt mentions £1,430 to Gucci (which, as it happens, does not seem to us at all remarkable). 

(v)       There was a credit application for a Foundation Mortgage with Barclays Bank that was made in November 2007.  In a related document entitled 'Sanction Summary Sheet', signed by the Husband, figures by way of the Applicant's (or Applicants') wealth appeared which in aggregate amounted to £3,250,000.  The Wife contends that this document alone should persuade the Court to find non-disclosure, because it contrasts so markedly with the affidavit of means produced by the Husband in March 2008.  

(vi)      Finally, the Wife highlights that, on the Husband's own case, in terms of overall financial success and security he has set himself up to fail, with no appreciable savings, no pension and therefore no long-term provision for his own future.  This, she suggests, is intrinsically unlikely. 

82.      We strongly emphasise that throughout the proceedings since at least March 2014 the Court (the Commissioner at many interlocutory hearings and the fully convened court at final trial) has, without forming any pre-conception, assessed the Husband's evidence of means with due suspicion and close scrutiny.  The level of his income is not problematic; but we have considered diligently and indeed critically the probability, or not, that he is telling the truth, given that:-

(i)        he has indeed misled the Court on one crucial previous occasion;

(ii)       he took the radical steps already described to alienate what may prove to be the sole capital windfall of an entire lifetime;

(iii)      he has omitted, with apparent equanimity, to make retirement provision;

(iv)      on the contrary, he has chosen to expend all of his very considerable income without making savings; and

(v)       he has felt able to accumulate substantial debts in the areas of tax and legal costs. 

83.      We are bound to say, however, that without much hesitation we find ourselves unable to uphold the Wife's assertion of concealed assets, either generally or by reference to the arguments just identified, as to none of which do we conclude that the forensic arrow has found its target. 

84.      Reverting to paragraph 81(ii) above, we have already dealt with allegedly misstated remuneration and Property C.  The allegation about the Husband's trading on the stock market during the marriage, in a time span between 15 and 20 years ago, and about his failure to remember the receipt or not of an income bonus, are flimsy, to put it kindly: similarly as to the boat, which cost modest and in any event borrowed money.  The asserted accountancy discrepancies are make-weight - we decline to descend to detail - given the undisputed narrative given by the Husband in answer to questionnaire now 5 years ago (2^nd February, 2010,) to the effect that he was responsible only for business development, client relationship and management matters, and played no role in the firm's management, accounting or administration.  He said then, and told us, that Mr Q (the Chief Financial Officer) and Mr E were responsible for running the day to day operation and finances of the business. 

85.      Given the nature of the business, the Husband's directorships and (sometimes nominee) shareholdings take the Wife's case no further.  As long ago as March 2000 the Husband, asked to state whether he had any interest in any shares or investments personally or in a limited company, replied "none beneficially held ......", with the clear implication that - which is normal in his line of business - he might hold shares as a nominee for a client.  There may also be discrepancies in the precise identification of corporate entities as presented years ago and then much later; but nothing in this area that was actually presented by the Wife was sufficient to lead to a finding or inference of concealed resources now. 

86.      As to S Investments, a topic upon which the Wife's suspicions gathered increasing momentum in the latter part of 2014 (when Mr Rabet was clearly behind the scenes in an advisory capacity), the Wife came nowhere near persuading the Court that S Investments, into which the S partners went each with 20% shareholdings, made any winning investment, still less that there is any asset now in the Husband's hands which reflects its (postulated) success.  The detail can be avoided; but for good order we mention:-

(i)        The fact that as long ago as 18^th December, 2007, in the L Trust proceedings, the Husband stated his understanding that S Investments was worthless, as had been mentioned in an email to a lawyer, Advocate Benest, a few days previously;

(ii)       There is a document presenting a year on year sequence of profit and loss figures, ending with the year 2008, from which it is apparent that in the year 2006 there was a substantial write-down of an unquoted investment in the sum of "(£466,714)", which seems obviously to have related to one of the S Investments ventures (there were two, one in a company named H Co and the other (a 0.3% total stake) in a business by the name of NG, later MF.  None of the accounting information we have seen suggests any success for S Investments. 

(iii)      In an email dated 25^th July, 2011, to the Husband, Mr Q explained the position in some detail: "almost no worth in S Investments".  Earlier that year (3^rd February) Mr Q had sent a letter to the Comptroller of Taxes stating that S Investment's only asset was a fund of £32,000. 

This documentation is only by way of example: there is more.  Far from the opposite conclusion, we regard the evidence such as it is as establishing on the firm balance of probabilities that latterly there has been no wealth in S Investments (which no longer exists).  The Wife's refusal to accept this proposition is unfortunate.  All this, moreover, ignores an additional problem for the Wife.  As it happens, we are satisfied that S Investments is a 'dead duck'; but, even it were not so, the shares were, as described, settled into the L Trust. 

87.      It is also important to mention that, as we perceive the Husband's business model and practice over the years, he is not an entrepreneur or a businessman habitually investing in commercial enterprises that may, if they prosper, land their stakeholders a substantial windfall.  He is a high earning, hard-working and very successful fee-earner in his capacity as a qualified accountant well versed in the intricacies of corporate and related structures and the regulations which govern them.  In deciding whether he has generated concealed capital assets this analysis is plainly relevant. 

88.      As to the Sanction Summary Sheet and the figure of £3,250,000, it is obvious to the Court that the property referred to in the document was Property C and the deposits, investments and fine wines mentioned were the corpus of the assets in the L Trust.  The document is also tolerably consistent with the negotiating figures presented by the Husband to C, as we have described. 

89.      As to the L Trust, the point, on the Wife's case, goes essentially to credibility, as Advocate Dutôt confirmed: it is not suggested that the Husband has any access now to any substantial resource within the Trust.  It is known from Appendix A that by the end of 2013 a sum of approaching (at least) £2 million had been distributed out of the L Trust.  There was evidence too that the Husband, whilst he gave assurance that he never charged professional fees as a trustee, even though the Settlement Deed permitted such payments, did recover over a period of years substantial sums by way of 'expenses'.  The figures put forward support payments of a sum in excess of £300,000.  Through 2014 into 2015 C continues to have been maintained out of trust funds at a rate in excess of £5,000 per month.  The Husband did have to concede that his accounting practices left much to be desired, and that there had on the face of it been some intermingling of funds, with at the same time a long-standing history of reimbursements and contra-entries evidenced by various figures appearing in both his and the Trust's bank accounts.  It may be that (apart from an Aston Martin car which C conceded to the Husband in 2006) the Husband has derived some personal benefit from what were strictly trust funds, although in percentage terms (as related to the overall worth of the trust assets) not to any great extent.  As stated above, however, it is well established that the Trust has almost run out of funds now. 

90.      That leaves the line of reasoning which centres upon the Husband's extravagance in combination with his lack of provision for his later years.  We have considered it very carefully, but are satisfied that the Husband, who stated that, subject to ill-health, he has no intention ever to retire, lives for the current day.  He says that his financial strength is in his income and that he has little by way of capital, as is described in this judgment.  Registrar Obbard, many years ago, found that difficult to believe; and we have applied cutting scepticism to what the Husband says.  On the balance of probabilities, however, we find that it is true. 

91.      It has to be added that the Wife's heavy reliance upon the Husband's profligacy cuts both ways.  It might be taken to suggest that he must have other resources; but it also drives towards the conclusion that no savings are made from his large income.  To close the circle, there is no cogent or logical explanation as to how, if not from his income, the Husband could have accumulated the concealed capital assets for which the Wife contends. 

INCOME

92.      Below is a tabular summary of the Husband's income for the last 3 (known) years. 

Year of Assessment	Net fee income earned (before tax)
	Husband	N
2010	£489,832	?
2011	£540,648	£98,976
2012	£645,194	££37,304
2013	£508,884	£60,000

 

Note: it is needless to say that it is not for N, directly or indirectly, to make the slightest contribution to maintenance for the Wife.  We include reference to her earned income simply as part of the overall picture and to show that she is able substantially to maintain her own children.

93.      The figures derive from a number of sources, including the Husband's tax returns and short (redacted) extracts from accounting material relating to the Governance Partners business.  No full accounts have, to our understanding, been produced.  In his early 2014 Affidavit of Means the Husband said that the 2012 accounts for Governance would be forthcoming by February 2014.  Now, a year later, even they remain unproduced.  We have no good reason to take any other view than that, broadly, an average of the figures for the years 2011-2013 fairly reflects the Husband's earned income position.  Net of income tax, he may be taken to be earning not less than £400,000 per annum. 

The Wife's income: her earning capacity and, which is closely connected, her health

94.      That brings us to one of the most vexed areas of evidential conflict and indeed uncertainty.  The evidence, argument and judicial analysis in this area have taken a great deal of time, and much expense.  The following questions arise:-

(i)        The Wife's health: how bad is it and from what conditions does she suffer?

(ii)       Has the Wife been neglectful of her health in the past, thus that she has to some extent caused her own misfortune?  The Husband so submits. 

(iii)      Whatever the past and current nature of the Wife's health problems, what steps can and need to be taken to diminish them?  No-one seriously suggests that they are likely to be wholly eliminated. 

(iv)      How successful will any programme of rehabilitation prove to be?  This is the greatest imponderable. 

(v)       What is the impact of the Wife's state of health upon her earning capacity?  Less relevantly and interestingly, has there been impact in the past? 

(vi)      What is the figure properly to be attributed to the Wife by way of attainable earnings in the future? 

95.      The Court has been shown many hundreds of pages of the Wife's medical records, deriving from her general practitioners' notes and hospital archives.  Conditions from which she has suffered in the last, say, decade and a half - all of these current according to expert medical evidence - include:-

(i)        Asthma;

(ii)       Obesity;

(iii)      Proximal muscle weakness;

(iv)      Gastroesophageal reflux;

(v)       General atopy and frequent nasal symptoms;

(vi)      Anxiety and depression; and

(vii)     Generalised pain, but with particular reference to the left upper arm and shoulder area. 

In the past certainly, the Wife suffered from endometriosis, which was, as it happens, the only malady of which she complained when she first swore an Affidavit in the original divorce proceedings in the late 1990's, although in answer to questionnaire soon thereafter she did mention stress-related asthma. 

96.      The above list is premised upon the Report of Dr Jarad, a Consultant respiratory physician.  He gave evidence at the Court's final sitting in February 2015, having taken the place of a previous expert in respiratory medicine, Dr Vellore, who contracted long-term illness.  Other expert evidence heard pertinent to the Wife's state of health and earning capacity came from Dr Adedokun, a Consultant in pain medicine, and Ms Hannah Giles, an expert in vocational rehabilitation. 

97.      There is linkage between some of these conditions; but we need not resort to a plethora of detail.  The two most significant problems are the asthma and the shoulder pain, although the atopy (allergies) and even obesity play a significant part in the overall problem.  Asthma has been with the Wife since at least the mid-1990s and there are in the medical notes/records countless references to attendances for, and treatment of, her asthma (and sometimes related coughing) in the general practice surgery, by consultants in respiratory medicine, at hospital Accident & Emergency departments and by way of in-patient hospital treatment.  At its worst, and subject to what improvement can be wrought in the future, asthma is for the Wife a substantial problem; and Dr Jarad's evidence supported that view.  However, both he and Dr Vellore, with whom Dr Jarad substantially agreed, made significant comment upon the fact that the Wife's asthma has in the past been poorly controlled.  By itself, the Wife's asthmatic condition would not prevent substantial gainful employment. 

98.      The comment about poor control was also articulated in relation to the pain syndrome suffered by the Wife in connection with her left upper arm/shoulder.   This condition began towards the end of the 2000/2010 decade and has also involved prolific medical attendance and treatment.  The expert evidence became cluttered by a somewhat technical debate as to whether or not the Wife suffers from a condition known as Complex Regional Pain Syndrome; but Dr Adedokun, who thought not, agreed that ultimately the label to be attached to what is a genuine condition does not really matter.  Dr Chad Taylor (who favours that diagnosis) began to advise and treat the Wife in 2013, with some success.  One step he recommended was physiotherapy, which the Wife has undergone but not, we suspect, to the required intensity (only 13 sessions from November 2013 to July 2014).  He is still on board and was in 2014 expressing a quite optimistic prognosis.  The Wife has confidence in him. 

99.      Our overall conclusion is that the Wife's state of health, currently, is probably to be described as poor, but capable of significant improvement.  All agree that she is not a malingerer: she has or has had all of the conditions referred to.  It is, however, notable that over the years several of her treating specialists and general practitioners have made rather despairing observations along the lines that she is "polysymptomatic" and that she has complained of symptoms which are "out of proportion to observed abnormalities".  We believe that often the Wife does perceive her symptoms to be worse than objective analysis would logically credit, and further that the continuation of the litigation and her general feeling of helplessness in a number of aspects of her life will over the years have had an exacerbating effect.  She herself states that she has suffered long-term stress, and at times depression, caused to a material extent by the litigation. 

100.   Ms Giles was an impressive witness whose evidence we found helpful.  We accept her conclusions to the effect that:-

(i)        The Wife's state of health, at least currently, is such that she cannot manage to hold down structured employment, for example in an office, unless and until her health is markedly improved.  All agree that any such employment would need to be sedentary; for there is no doubt that the Wife suffers a substantial degree of immobility.  But Ms. Giles opined that an employer would soon become disenchanted by the Wife's very probable absenteeism on health grounds. 

(ii)       An essential consideration is the co-morbidity which links the Wife's various maladies and militates so strongly in favour of multi-disciplinary advice as to how her health should be managed and, on the ground, multi-disciplinary treatment.  We were told that this is now available to the Wife.  There is a prognosis that it may require around 100 hours of commitment to bear fruit.  It would involve several areas of expertise, including certainly respiratory medicine, pain analysis and treatment (with Dr Taylor in charge) and physiotherapy, with each limb of the operation always knowing what the other limbs are doing, and why.  It is notable in this context that Doctors Adedokun and Taylor had little to say in their presentation on the subject of the Wife's asthma: similarly, Dr Jarad observed in an otherwise informative contribution: "I will not allude to pain, as this is being reported on by another expert, but will address the [other] 6 [conditions]".  He then expressed a view as to the Wife's capacity to take employment by reference to the six health conditions, but not the seventh, namely the pain.  This is just the sort of omission about which Miss Giles expressed her reservations. 

101.   So, a focussed and concentrated multi-disciplinary approach, starting now, is vital.  We record, with emphasis, our conclusion that the onus on the Wife to participate and to co-operate fully, to take and implement the advice that she is given and to make every possible attempt to improve her health and foster her earning capacity is very great.  She did express her complete willingness in this respect, and a strong aspiration to strive towards a substantial earned income (albeit in a field of self-employment: see immediately below).  More generally, she said that she felt frustrated and distressed by her failure thus far to stand on her own feet (these are our words, but capture her message) and badly wants to do so.  She can expect nothing other than to be taken at her word. 

102.   That the obligation upon her is as heavy as we have described it is the result, it need hardly be said, of the short duration of the marriage and the fact that it came to an end nearly 17 years ago.  Only time will tell how successful the future treatment of the Wife will be.  For our part, after hearing the positive suggestions put forward by the experts, we expect substantial improvement in her health; and we expect her to exploit her earning capacity to the maximum. 

103.   Since at any rate 2012 the Wife has been operating a small crafts business named Z, through which she designs and/or makes various products/home accessories such as, for example, cushions, lamp bases, lampshades and ceramics, with clearly considerable potential to expand her range so long as her health is not an unduly inhibitory factor and she can put in the necessary hours.  In this last respect she is in a much better position now than previously, given that the children now require little supervision (and certainly no paid child care).  She has made some good business contacts and tells us that she wants to create good quality products aimed at the higher end of the market.  Her products have in the past been on show/for sale at upper range retail outlets.  She says that she has many ideas to take the business forward. 

104.   After the trial had commenced the Court conveyed to the Wife that her evidence on earning capacity was deficient in that the only figures which she was then presenting with regard to turnover, expenses and therefore profitability were so sparse and fragmented as to be of very limited value.  It was suggested that a business plan of some sort was what was required.  At the second (October) sitting the Wife did produce a document entitled "Memorandum re Business Projections" which had been compiled with the assistance of a Mr V, from whom she had taken financial advice in the past.  The figures presented were the subject of legitimate criticism by Advocate Jones, whose case on behalf of the Husband is that their various imperfections demonstrate that the Wife probably cannot achieve a worthwhile profit from her crafts business: ergo, he says, she should take conventional structured employment behind a desk in an office. 

105.   Some of the Wife's projections as to capital expenditure, including the suggestion of £30,000 to create a website, were, we concluded, unrealistic and evidentially unsubstantiated.  A much more modest outlay for the purpose of acquiring more sophisticated equipment, such as an upgraded sewing machine and a higher range printer, are another matter.  To repeat, we concur with Miss Giles that the crafts business is the way forward for the Wife.  Her underlying projection as to turnover, expenses and therefore gross profit is vulnerable to question in some areas; but the underlying profit figure is probably as good a prognosis as is available to us, although we would hope and expect that she will sooner rather than later be able to devote to the business more hours than she is forecasting.  In brief summary, when the projections were under discussion the Wife postulated for the calendar year 2015 422 hours' work, with a profit arising of £9,857, which she notionally apportioned as to £4,220 salary for herself (£10 per hour), with the balance of £5,637 to be retained in the business by way of working capital.  Corresponding figures for 2016 were 739 hours, £7,390 salary and £9,865 to be retained; and for 2017 1056 hours, £10,560 salary and £14,143 to be retained.  It is a truism that only time will tell how well the business develops.  We believe that, with her health under reasonable control and with the right mental approach, the Wife, who clearly has talent, is capable of not inconsiderable commercial success. 

Standard of Living

106.   It is the standard of living prior to the breakdown of the marriage that is specifically mentioned in the statute, although post-separation lifestyle, typically of a paying ex-husband, may be a relevant circumstance following a marriage of long duration.  It is not so, however, in the instance of a short marriage, even where there are children.  If the husband has prospered in a non-matrimonial setting to become a high earning individual, disparity in the lifestyle of the ex-spouses is usual and to be accepted. 

107.   The Husband, through Advocate Jones, has conceded a broad entitlement on the part of the Wife to have her needs assessed by reference to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, as to which, however, there is dispute.  The Wife describes the standard of living variously as "lavish" and "generous", saying e.g. that the parties ate out 4-5 times a week and holidayed 2-3 times a year, including in New York and the Maldives.  They owned, she says, a boat and yacht and bought designer clothes.  In challenging the Wife's account the Husband relied principally upon the proposition that, because in the years 1994-1998 he had an income in the region of £60,000 per annum, and certainly in 5 rather than 6 figures, by definition the family's standard of living must have been lower than that described by the Wife.  His word was "modest"; but it is to be noted that, until taken to task by the Court, he described his current lifestyle also as modest, which in light of his own Statement of current annual expenditure (totalling more than £500,000 p.a. excluding legal costs and tax) is clearly unsustainable. 

108.   What the Husband did not do, in cross-examination of the Wife, was question the detail of her evidence.  So, for example, it was not put to her that the parties had not eaten in good restaurants or had good holidays, and so on.  Quality of lifestyle is in one sense in the mind of the person enjoying it.  We perceive that the standard of living of the marriage was good but not, week by week, luxurious.  Certainly, it is probable that the Husband spent all his income, and perhaps more, on financing it: for that is his way.  He may well have enjoyed the fruits of certain share dealings; and in addition, on the Wife's case, he was not averse to increasing the parties' level of borrowings. 

Needs

109.   The Wife has seemed to acknowledge that she does not strictly need, by way of accommodation for herself and the children, more than Property Y, unencumbered and in good condition.  Her aspiration, however, is now the transfer to her of Property M, along with a £150,000 - £200,000 lump sum, with very substantial maintenance for a period of 8 years, all that upon the basis that she retains the Standard Life policy.  She says that she needs her indebtedness to the Department of Social Security discharged.  She also has furniture and curtains of long standing which require some replenishment. 

110.   In addition, she says that she needs an order that all her costs be paid by the Husband.  There have been times when she has seemed to assert that this is a sine qua non of a practicable settlement and that she is entitled to such an order as a component of her actual award, rather than the matter of costs being decided, on its overall merits, once the quantum of the Court's order, as capital and income, is determined.  There are, generally "small money", cases in which the costs are reasonably proportionate, where the Court will favour such an approach.  So it was in England and Wales before the regime came into force in April 2006 whereby the default position (rebuttable if circumstances so justify) directs the Court towards the making of no order for costs in matrimonial financial cases.  Such an approach is neither appropriate nor workable in a situation where not only does the Calderbank procedure survive, as it does in Jersey even if in many cases it is not deployed, but also the costs are of the magnitude described in this judgment. 

111.   We return shortly to our objective evaluation of the Wife's needs, based upon what is fair and practicable in the light of all Section 25 factors including the size and nature of the financial resources available. 

112.   According to the Husband, his needs accord with his schedule of current expenditure.  He would say that he has a reasonable need to continue residing at Property R, although he acknowledges that the ability to do so, certainly in terms of his continuing to finance mortgage repayments at the current very high level, is dependent upon the circumstances prevailing after judgment.  It is inescapable that there are various categories of expenditure (holidays, clothing and so-called "housekeeping", to name examples) the quantum of which has to be regarded as flexible.  The Husband may have to trim his sails considerably to facilitate discharge of his obligations towards the Wife.  To be fair to him, he was candid and realistic in conceding the point that, in his words, the numbers can be moved upwards, downwards or sideways: it is up to the Court to decide what is appropriate.  He also freely acknowledged his mortgage raising capacity on Property M. 

Age and Duration of Marriage

113.   Little needs to be added.  To use an adjective which has frequently appeared in judgments of the English Court of Appeal in recent years, the relative brevity of the marriage is one of the section 25 factors which in this case is "magnetic".  It is elementary that the sharing principle applies even in short marriage cases to matrimonial property.  In this case, however, the financial resources available for division are, as to capital, distinctly limited and barely sufficient to cater for fairly quantified needs.  In those circumstances sophisticated argument as to the extent to which the resources, or the proceeds of sale of the S Services shares, amount(ed) to matrimonial or non-matrimonial property is of very limited relevance.  The principle that, as it is often put, need trumps contribution is established by an abundance of judicial authority which has developed since White v White [2001] 1 AC; but the oft-cited dictum of Lord Nicholls in that case at page 610C remains a classic statement of principle and sufficient for the current purpose:-

"Plainly when present this factor [that an asset is non-matrimonial] is one of the circumstances of the case.  It represents a contribution made to the welfare of the family.  The judge should take it into account.  He should decide how important it is in the particular case.  The nature and value of the property, and the time when and circumstances in which the property was acquired, are among the relevant matters to be considered.  However, in the ordinary course, this factor can be expected to carry little weight, if any, in a case where the claimant's needs cannot be met without recourse to this property." [emphasis added]

114.   It follows that financial resources and needs are two other magnetic factors, whereas contribution is of far lesser significance than is normal in a medium to long marriage case.  In the sphere of contribution, however, it must be fully recognised that the Wife is entitled to pray in aid her role in single-handedly bringing up the boys throughout their childhoods.  This principle has just been reaffirmed in the decision of the Supreme Court in Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14. 

Conduct

115.   Some of our observations are plainly relevant in the area of litigation misconduct, where, for example, the quality of disclosure and the substance, or lack, of negotiation will be material.  There may be further argument on the subject when the parties' liability for costs falls to be determined: for the moment we say no more on the subject. 

116.   The Wife cites alleged hiding of assets as "gross and obvious" misconduct, per Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72.  Also for consideration is the well-established principle that the dissipation of assets may be taken into account as comprising financial misconduct which it would be inequitable to disregard.  Every case is fact specific, and the categories of such misconduct could never be closed.  Gross extravagance is an obvious example, and in recent years has led to the Court effecting an "add-back" to the matrimonial resources of a notional sum equivalent to the sum held to have been improperly expended (see Norris v Norris [2003] 1 FLR 1142 and Vaughan v Vaughan [2008] 1 FLR 1108).  In this case the Husband, as between himself and the Wife, has wrongly decimated the size of his assets by alienating the impending S windfall when there was no necessity to do so, at least as to its virtual totality, and with the primary objective of preventing the Wife from obtaining further financial relief.  It is equitable in principle to have regard to that fact, but much less straightforward to alight upon the manner in which it can and should be reflected in practice. 

117.   The court must remind itself that the objective in taking conduct into account is never to be punitive.  In any event, in this case the existing capital resources are what they are; and their limited extent cannot be changed.  The Husband's wrongdoing could be reflected in the quantification (and possibly duration) of his spousal maintenance obligation.  That said, as it happens, we think that the Husband has finally, albeit far too late, arrived at a maintenance proposal which is broadly reasonable. 

Mr T

118.   The Wife announced in her Section 25 statement, for completeness as she put it, that she does have a boyfriend.  His name is Mr T; and they have had some sort of a relationship for about 4 years, apparently.  Indeed, the Wife conveyed that at one point Mr T proposed marriage to her: on Facebook, he announced that they were engaged.  This was in 2012; but the Wife maintained, and we are inclined to believe her, that she would not at present contemplate remarriage.  She also asserts, without challenge from the Husband, that the relationship is conducted, in terms of togetherness under the same roof, only at weekends.  Various social media material became the subject of cross-examination, but did not take the matter further. 

119.   Advocate Jones cited an extract from Mostyn J.'s Judgment in the case of AB v CB and Trustees of the X Trust [2014] EWHC 2998 (Fam) to the effect that such relationships are "always a significant fly in the ointment".  The Court cannot, he suggested, ignore the existence of the relationship.  But he did not go on to explain how, according to him, it should in arithmetical terms be taken into account.  Nor did he undertake the normal exercise in such situations of exploring in detail any financial nexus that exists between the Wife and Mr T (possibly coupled with consideration whether the absence of financial arrangements between them is to be regarded as in some measure artificial).  On the bottom line, we think that the position is simple.  The relationship has had no impact upon the sum in practice offered by the Husband (ultimately) for the maintenance of the Wife, which we regard as reasonable.  Whether the relationship will further develop to a stage where different considerations apply is impossible to say; but the Husband's and potentially the court's vigilance is only to be expected. 

Overall Conclusions

120.    We refer back to the Husband's proposal by way of capital provision.  As already described, time came in the middle of the trial when the Husband belatedly conceded in principle that the Wife should end with Property Y unencumbered and in suitable condition.  However, as to structure, practicability and indeed enforceability the Husband's offer remains poorly structured and not thought through properly:-

(i)        It is extremely unattractive to contemplate a substantially increased mortgage remaining charged on Property Y for the 15 year period envisaged by the Husband, with the responsibility for its repayment(s) not upon the Wife but her estranged ex-husband; and further that the property should in consequence remain held in joint names.  The uncertainties inherent in such an arrangement are manifest. 

(ii)       All manner of consequential questions arise.  They include:-

(a)       What happens if the Husband defaults on the mortgage instalments, out of change of financial circumstances, ill-health, mala fides or for whatever reason? 

(b)       What happens if the Husband dies prematurely?

(c)       How is the Husband's obligation to make the mortgage repayments to be expressed and imposed upon him?  Is it to be by an order of the Court?  If so, the Court has only one method of attempting to achieve that objective, namely an order for periodical payments.  Of course, one is mindful of the Court's power to order that such periodical payments be secured upon a specified property or other asset; but nothing that the Court can do will eliminate the susceptibility to variation of any such order that might be made. 

121.   When the Court posed these questions to Advocate Jones, he had no satisfactory answer.  He mooted the possibility that the Husband could enter into some collateral agreement with the Wife which would be binding upon him.  We doubt the efficacy of such an arrangement.  The Court finds it unacceptable that the Husband, if wanting to make a proposal along these lines, should not have accompanied his offer of settlement with, and produced to the Court, a careful and detailed draft of legal documentation which according to him would be viable and effective.  Advocate Jones had the point, and accepted it, but was reduced to conveying that he was bound by the limited scope of the instructions which he had.  Further, the Husband has not produced any evidence as to the formal reaction of Barclays Bank, the mortgagees.  One understands that, whatever indication Barclays may have given thus far, it is preliminary and informal. 

122.   As already signalled in this judgment, we find the Husband's ultimate proposal by way of capital provision broadly satisfactory as to quantum.  The Wife must indeed come out of the case with an appropriate property, Property Y, in good condition and free of encumbrance.  In light of the history which we have recounted the Husband certainly owes her that.  She has a fundamental need for that provision; and, indeed, we think that it would constitute financial hardship, and a grave injustice, if it were not achieved.  In our judgment both the Court and the Husband must grasp the nettle and ensure that the transfer of the property, with the ability to put it into good condition, is effected as soon and as conclusively as possible, to which end a lump sum must be paid by the Husband to the Wife outright, her claim to capital provision, on payment of the lump sum, to be dismissed.  The amount of the lump sum will be £200,000, being the sum required to discharge the current mortgage plus the sum postulated by Mr U as required to finance its renovation, rounded up to allow the Wife to replenish furnishings etc. 

123.   The lump sum will be expressed as payable within 3 months.  How the Husband raises the funds, whether through borrowing or resorting at least in part to revenue or otherwise is a matter for him.  He himself accepted, to repeat, that Property M is readily mortgageable.  Even if he had not made that concession, he would fall foul of the elementary principle that in such circumstances as prevail in this case it is not incumbent upon the Applicant Wife to establish that the Respondent Husband can raise the wherewithal to satisfy the Order which the Court deems fair: it is for the Husband to disprove that proposition (see Newton v Newton [1990] 1 FLR 33 and Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668).  We are satisfied that there is sufficient flexibility in the Husband's finances to enable him to implement the order we propose to make.  It should be borne in mind in this context that he is currently a party to mortgage arrangements (on Property R and Property W) to the overall tune of £1,600,000 liabilities in respect of properties in which he professes no beneficial interest and which are voluntarily self-imposed. 

124.   Any steps that may be necessary must be taken to ensure that ownership of the Standard Life policy resides with the Wife.  The same applies to a small Aviva pension policy, which it was discovered at a late stage is owned by the Husband, but of which (we entirely accept) he had for many years been unaware.  Its value is just more than £14,000.  It will be the Wife's decision whether to utilise monies remaining available from the Standard Life policy in reduction of the Social Security shortfall or, to take another example, to repay P. 

125.   For completeness, in the straitened financial circumstances in which the parties find themselves as to their capital worth, it would to the Court's mind have been a sterile exercise to consider much further the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property or to speculate in detail as to what would or might have happened on the hypotheses either:-

(i)        that the Husband had made full disclosure in 2002 or

(ii)       that the Husband had not alienated the S windfall in 2005 and the case had been re-opened and decided in the period 2006-2007. 

Such an analysis would be of very limited relevance in the circumstances which now prevail, but we think that there was, when the S Services sale happened, a very strong element of non-matrimonial property.  The parties had separated 7 years previously and, even if the Wife can argue that, the Husband having joined S in 1996, the seeds of his success had been sown, the fact remains that the partnership agreement was executed in 2000 and, importantly, the value of the Husband's stake in the business will have increased greatly up to the year 2005.  We concur with the court sitting in May 2009 that, if Registrar Obbard had known the full facts in 2002, the Wife's application for lump sum provision would likely have been adjourned.  If the case had been determined in 2006-7, with the windfall un-alienated, the court would have been looking searchingly for a clean break solution.  If deemed achievable, some further capital provision by way of lump sum in lieu of further maintenance would have been an inevitability.  That is of course in addition to what we are sure would have been the transfer to the Wife of the Property Y free of encumbrance. 

126.   It is inherent in our conclusion that we unhesitatingly reject the Wife's plea for transfer of what on the Husband's father's death will be an unencumbered property worth £715,000 or with the passage of time perhaps more.  The resources are simply not available to facilitate such a solution, let alone the additional lump sum of £150,000- 200,000 which the Wife seeks (even if such provision were appropriate on the merits, which is highly debatable). 

127.   As to spousal maintenance, we refer back to the Husband's closing proposal (paragraph 73 above).  Whilst it is extremely unfortunate that what is at last a realistic proposal should have been so delayed in its arrival, we think that it is basically reasonable.  Making due allowance for the Wife's health problems, as to which, however, all are counting upon a real prospect of material improvement, no-one could reasonably expect other than that the Husband would press for a tapering of maintenance, with reductions year on year over a sensibly framed period of time.  We deem the structure suggested by the Husband to be appropriate in all the circumstances described in this judgment.  Two years at the rate, for herself, of £42,000 per annum will enable the Wife to embark with real commitment upon her health rehabilitation programme, and to make and implement a well-considered plan for the creation of better practices and financial systems which will enable her business to make good progress.  She will be better off than previously during this period and should be able to set some money aside to purchase materials for her business.  A reduction of £3,600 per annum starting in year 3 seems well pitched.  Whether after the 7 year period it will be appropriate for a termination of maintenance to be confirmed/imposed, or alternatively the Wife can apply with merit for further maintenance, are on the facts of this case matters, the Husband himself recognises, for later consideration. 

128.   The Husband will also pay the £1,000 per month offered by way of contribution towards the cost of rental of alternative accommodation for the Wife and children whilst Property Y is being renovated.  We will hear argument as to duration, if necessary.  The balance required must be financed by the Wife ex maintenance. 

129.   We refer to a recently published judicial authority decided in December 2014 by Mostyn J. in the High Court in England and Wales: SS v NS [2015] FLR, which understandably was not cited by counsel.  The decision does not create new law: rather, the judgment seeks to draw together the threads of previously decided authorities and contains a useful collation of the principles which the Judge felt had been established:-

"i)       A spousal maintenance award is properly made where the evidence shows that choices made during the marriage have generated hard future needs on the part of the claimant. Here the duration of the marriage and the presence of children are pivotal factors.

ii)        An award should only be made by reference to needs, save in a most exceptional case where it can be said that the sharing or compensation principle applies.

iii)       Where the needs in question are not causally connected to the marriage, the award should generally be aimed at alleviating significant hardship.

iv)       In every case the court must consider a termination of spousal maintenance with a transition to independence as soon as it is just and reasonable. A term should be considered unless the payee would be unable to adjust without undue hardship to the ending of payments. A degree of (not undue) hardship in making the transition to independence is acceptable.

v)        If the choice between an extendable term and a joint lives order is finely balanced, the statutory steer should militate in favour of the former.

vi)       The marital standard of living is relevant to the quantum of spousal maintenance but is not decisive. That standard should be carefully weighed against the desired objective of eventual independence.

vii)      The essential task of the judge is not merely to examine the individual items in the claimant's income budget but also to stand back and to look at the global total and to ask if it represents a fair proportion of the respondent's available income that should go to the support of the claimant.

Viii     [Not relevant to the instant case]

ix)       There is no criterion of exceptionality on an application to extend a term order. On such an application an examination should to be made of whether the implicit premise of the original order of the ability of the payee to achieve independence had been impossible to achieve and,  if so, why.

x)        On an application to discharge a joint lives order an examination should be made of the original assumption that it was just too difficult to predict eventual independence.

xi)       If the choice between an extendable and a non-extendable term is finely balanced the decision should normally be in favour of the economically weaker party."

130.   It is our view that the approach that has been adopted to the Wife's claim for spousal maintenance, by the Husband at the eleventh hour and now by the Court, is consonant with these principles. 

131.   As to child maintenance, provision will be ordered in accordance with the figures already mentioned: £10,500 per child per annum whilst in secondary education, and £25,000 per annum in tertiary education.  If the parents cannot agree the resulting minutiae, the Court will make any necessary decision.  We give a strong indication that we sympathise with the plea made on behalf of the Wife that, once the children reach the stage of tertiary education, a proportion of the £25,000 maintenance should in practice be paid direct to her, upon the premise, however, that there is a clear understanding as to the categories of expenditure on behalf of the children for which she will, and will not, be responsible. 

132.   Finally, and at the risk of stating the obvious, it will be readily apparent from what has been said in this judgment that there has been between the parties a myriad of innumerable allegations and cross-allegations on a wide range of subject-matter.  Counsel too have, whether via cross-examination or in oral argument, made a host of points and submissions.  The Court has considered all the material carefully and taken it into full account.  To the extent that any allegation or submission is not expressly referred to in this judgment, the reason for the omission is simply that the evidential material is regarded as peripheral or of no relevance and/or the submission of Counsel has been regarded, with due respect, as falling into the same category.  The same observation applies pari passu to a significant number of judicial authorities cited by counsel. 

Note: the first draft of this judgment was handed down on 11^th May, 2015.  On 2^nd June the judgment was finalised and various consequential matters, including the terms of the order reflecting the judgment and issues as to costs, were determined by the Court. 

Authorities

Tinker v Tinker [1970] P. 136.

In the Matter of S [2011] JRC 119.

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Kemmis v Kemmis [1988] 2 FLR 223.

V v V [2009] EWHC 2901.

Flynn v Reid [2012] (1) JLR 730.

Tebbutt v Haynes [1981] 2 All E.R. 238.

TL v ML and others [2006] 1 FLR 1264.

Fisher Meredith LLP v JH, PH [2012] EWHC 408.

Family Proceedings Rules 2010.

Re L (A child) [2015] EWFC 15.

Al Khatib v Masry [2002] 1 FLR 1053.

White v White [2001] 1 AC.

Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14.

Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72.

Norris v Norris [2003] 1 FLR 1142.

Vaughan v Vaughan [2008] 1 FLR 1108.

AB v CB and Trustees of the X Trust [2014] EWHC 2998.

Newton v Newton [1990] 1 FLR 33.

SS v NS [2015] FLR.