Jersey Unreported Judgments

Care Order - post adoption contact.

[2013]JRC064

Royal Court

(Family)

2 April 2013

Before     :

J. A. Clyde-Smith, Esq., Commissioner, and Jurats Le Breton and Milner.

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF F (CARE ORDER)

Advocate C. R. G. Davies for the Representor.

Advocate C. Hall for the Mother.

Advocate H. Heath for the Child.

judgment

the commissioner:

1.        This judgment is concerned with the issue of post adoption contact.

2.        The child, who is now nearing his third birthday, was made the subject of a final care order on 10^th July, 2012, on the basis of a care plan that provided for his permanent placement with an adoptive family.  The facts are set out in the judgment of the Court of 3^rd October, 2012, (In the matter of F (Care Order) [2012] JRC 173).  His parents are of Portuguese origin. The mother has autism and learning difficulties and the Court found that she did not have the capacity to parent the child and no capacity to change within the child's timescales.  There was no possibility of the father caring for the child as he had not demonstrated any consistent commitment to him.  No one from either of their families had come forward for consideration as a carer.

3.        The child had been taken into care on 8^th June, 2011, when he was just over one year old and following a number of foster placements has now been with his current foster carers (who are of British/Jersey origin) for a year, where all the evidence indicates that he is thriving.

4.        The foster carers put themselves forward for consideration as the child's potential prospective adopters.  Following the usual assessment, the Adoption and Permanency Panel recommended that the child would be best placed with the foster carers and this decision was endorsed by the agency decision maker on 18^th October, 2012.  We will refer to them as "the prospective adopters".  On 7^th November, 2012, the Court freed the child for adoption. 

5.        The Minister's proposals for contact between the mother and the child following the freeing for adoption order were that it should reduce to one direct supervised contact session every month for three months, reducing to one direct supervised contact session every six weeks for a further three months, by which time it was expected that the formal adoption would have taken place.

6.        The statutory regime in relation to contact following a freeing for adoption order is succinctly summarised in the JLR Note for In re F and G (No. 2) [2010] JLR Note 12:-

"When a child is freed for adoption under art. 12(5) of the Adoption (Jersey) Law 1961, the court has no power to make an order for contact with the child under art. 27(2) of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 (In re TS (No. 2), [2005] JLR N [50], not followed; In re T Children, [2009] JLR N [57] referred to). Article 27(1), which contains a presumption of reasonable contact between children in care and their parents, applies only to children who are in the care of the Minister for Health and Social Services (by virtue of a care order under art. 24(1)(a) of the Children Law or an interim care order under art. 30).  Article 20(2) of the Adoption Law provides that an order freeing a child for adoption extinguishes any order under the Children Law unless the court directs otherwise.  Thus, unless the court directs otherwise, a freeing order extinguishes a previous care order and, as the child is no longer in care, any jurisdiction to make a contact order under art. 27(2).

The court does, however, have power under art. 10(1) of the Children Law to make a contact order in respect of a child freed for adoption.  That article provides that a contact order may be made in any family proceedings.  "Family proceedings" are defined in art. 1(1) of that Law as meaning proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Family Division of the Royal Court and specified in r.3/1(2) of the Royal Court Rules 2004, and applications under the Adoption Law are specifically referred to in r.3(1(2)(d)(i).  There is no presumption of reasonable contact under art. 10 and contact with a child freed for adoption might undermine the adoption process.

Although the mother or father of a child freed for adoption does not, in general, have a right to make an application for contact under art. 10, the court may grant leave to any person under art.10(2)(a)(ii).  It is almost axiomatic that a mother or father should be granted leave to apply for contact when a freeing order is made, so they can at least be heard on the matter."

7.        At the time of the freeing order both the mother and the father had applied for leave to make an application for post adoption contact with the child under Article 10(2)(a)(ii) of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 ("the Children Law").  Their applications were heard over the three days commencing the 26^th January, 2013, following which the Court declined to make any order. We now set out our reasons.

8.        The mother was granted leave to make her application, but although F and G described it as almost axiomatic that the father would be granted leave, it was refused in his case, because despite the father being fully informed as to the hearing of his application (with translations into Portuguese where appropriate and to the extent that was proportionate) he did not attend the hearing.  He had not engaged in any way with the Children's Service and his record of attendance at contact sessions with the child was abysmal.  He had last seen the child on 17^th February, 2012. 

9.        The mother was seeking an increase in her contact pending the child's adoption (or at least its maintenance at the same level) accepting that the level of contact pending the adoption would be dependent upon whether the Court would at the relevant time consider ordering on-going direct contact following the adoption. 

10.      Whilst the prospective adopters were not parties to the mother's application (they had not yet filed their application under Article 10 of the Adoption (Jersey) Law 1961 ("the Adoption Law") to adopt the child), their detailed views on post adoption contact were communicated to the Court through a report by Mrs Jane King, a supervising social worker at the Fostering and Adoption Service, and through the guardian.  Accepting that the Court could not at this stage and in the absence of the prospective adopters make post adoption contact orders binding upon them, the parties indicated that it would be helpful to have an indication from the Court as to whether it would at the time of the adoption be likely to order that the mother have post adoption direct contact with the child; indeed, the prospective adopters were holding back their formal application to adopt the child pending the outcome of the mother's application.

11.      It would have been open to the Court to have adjourned the mother's application pending the prospective adopters filing their application to adopt the child and then convening them as parties to the mother's application.  We did not explore this partly because the very existence of the mother's application was holding them back from filing their application and partly because we did not want to embroil them in a contested hearing at the very outset of their new relationship with the child being established.  The experts were clear that it was in the child's overriding interests for this adoption to proceed as soon as possible.

12.      We were very conscious that we were being asked to consider these issues in the absence of the prospective adopters upon whom any orders (if they applied to adopt the child) would be imposed at the relevant time.  But we had been asked to give an indication of the Court's approach in this case and it was in the interests of the child that we did so.  We were comforted by the fact that their views had been explored in detail and communicated to us.

13.      The issue of post adoption direct contact was first raised in the care proceedings by Dr Amitta Shah, an adult psychologist with particular experience in the field of autism.  Quoting from paragraph 19 of the judgment of 3^rd October, 2012:-

"Although it was not a matter for the hearing before the Court, in the longer term, Dr Shah advised that the child will have strong feelings about the mother's difficulties.  He will need to have a sympathetic understanding of those difficulties and be able to feel that everything had been done for her.  For these reasons, she recommended that the child should be able to continue his relationship with the mother post any adoption through more than indirect contact.  It was important that prospective adopters should understand her difficulties and should meet with her.  The child will have a lot of questions for them which they need to be in a position to answer.  This will minimise any psychological difficulties on his part in the long term.  She thought the child should continue to see the mother post adoption at least three or four times a year."

14.      The Fostering and Adoption Service were concerned that the frequency of such direct contact post adoption would be unsettling for the child, having the potential to place upon him considerable responsibility and anxiety for ensuring the mother's wellbeing as he matures.  They recommended that the child should have one direct contact with the mother per year and that in addition, indirect contact should be maintained on an annual basis, to allow him to maintain autobiographical completeness of his early history as well as to provide him with a knowledge and awareness of his mother's needs as he matures. 

15.      In his addendum report of 28^th September, 2012, Dr Bryn Williams, a child psychologist, who had also advised in the care proceedings, supported the recommendations of the Fostering and Adoption Service.  However, in her addendum report of 1^st November, 2012, Dr Shah expressed the view that a once a year direct contact was too infrequent to have any meaning or benefit to the child and would be more confusing, unsettling and meaningless than say three to four direct contacts a year:-

"In view of the longer term identity issues, needs and psychological well-being of [the child], I would argue that the purpose of contact is also to maintain biological bond at even a minimal level.  Once a year contact would not be conducive to this whereas 3 - 4 times a year would be.  This is important to maintain especially while [the child] is young and unable to express his wishes and feelings.

It has been suggested in the Care Plan document that more than annual contact would place responsibility on [the child] for ensuring his mother's well-being as he matures.  In my view, the difference in frequency of contact between once a year and 3 - 4 times a year is not likely to affect his sense of responsibility.  It could be argued that annual contact may leave room for [the child] to worry about his mother whereas 3 - 4 times contact may be more reassuring for him.

It is my view too that [the mother] will cope and be able to deal with contact better if it is at the higher frequency than once a year.  This in turn will have a positive benefit for [the child], especially in the longer term."

16.      In her statement of 8^th February, 2013, Mrs King reminded the Court that contact should only be put in place if it serves the interests of the child, and as Bond (2007 p.6) states "never as a sop to ease the pain of the birth family."  In evidence, both Dr Shah and Dr Williams agreed with this.  Mrs King referred to Neil and Howe (2004 page 237), who argued that direct contact is often better for younger children, due to the potential for secure attachments to their new adoptive parents and their having been less traumatised by the relationship with their birth parents.  This is likely where:-

"The child is placed at a young age, such as under two;

The child is not exhibiting behavioural or emotional problems;

The contact is with a relative who did not abuse the child;

The adopters or foster carers practise communicative openness. (Adams 2012 p 18)."

In Mrs King's view three of the above criteria were met in the case of the child, as he was placed with the prospective adopters prior to his second birthday, he has shown no behavioural or emotional problems (indeed he is thriving) and the prospective adopters had proved that they practise "communicative openness" (they have adopted previously).  However, the evidence indicated that the mother had subjected the child to neglect and emotional abuse and this she said could be viewed as an obstacle to the success of future direct contact.

17.      Mrs King then referred the Court to Baker (2006) who identified five criteria which needed to be considered when trying to formulate what might constitute reasonable contact post adoption as follows:-

"i)       That the birth parent could accept and support the plan for the child's life, namely that he or she will be placed permanently with other carers.

ii)        That the birth parent should accept and support the child's needs to develop a language within their new family context i.e. that this is now their 'home' and that they would be calling their carers 'Mummy and Daddy" etc.

iii)       The new carers and the relinquishing parents would be able to display courtesy and respect towards each other and for the sake of the child, be able to create an atmosphere of harmony around meetings.

iv)       That there is a common understanding between the new carers and the relinquishing parent as to the reasons why the child is not able to grow up within their family.

v)        Any contact with the birth parent should not undermine or diminish or eclipse the child's attachment to their new carers."

18.      There was some difficulty with elements of these "therapeutic goals" to which we will come in a moment but contact arrangements, Mrs King advised, can never be formulated into a policy that is applicable across the board to all children.  What is right for one child will not suffice for another and the Fostering and Adoption Service works closely with prospective adopters, adopters and birth families to ensure the specific needs of the individual child are at the heart of contact planning.

19.      The prospective adopters made it clear that they are prepared to go along with professional advice as to post adoption direct contact between the mother and the child once a year, provided it represented the child's best interests.  If they had a choice, they would choose indirect letterbox contact for the following reasons:-

(i)        They did not want the child subjected to a plan, which would undermine the stability he has in their family.

(ii)       They felt that direct contact once a year was for the benefit of the mother and not for the child.  In their view, the child got nothing out of the current contact and they did not feel that this would change over time.

20.      It was agreed by both Dr Shah and Dr Williams that the child had no attachment to the mother.  He had been taken from her care when just over a year old and related to her in the supervised contact sessions in the same way that he related to the supervising family social worker.  He had claimed the prospective adopters as his parents, referring to his prospective adoptive mother as "Mummy".

21.      The prospective adopters were very concerned at the idea of a contact order being imposed upon them.  This they felt would serve to benefit the mother only and would not be in the child's best interests.  As parents they would wish to be in control and if any direct contact that did take place became upsetting or meaningless for the child then as parents acting in the child's best interests, they would want to be in a position to stop the sessions.

22.      The mother filed a letter with the Court.  In it she talked touchingly of her love for the child, but made it clear that she did not agree with the decision to free the child for adoption.  She was critical of all those involved in the decision and asked for as much unsupervised direct contact as possible, ending with this:-

"It breaks my heart just to think [the child] is going to be adopted, he is the only reason I live and that was taken away from me, he is my dear son and I love him very much so please give the opportunity to have contact with the most precious thing in my life".

23.      The Baker criteria referred to above stresses the importance of the birth family accepting the adoption and the mother's letter made it clear that she was unable to accept the child's adoption.  Whilst mindful of the distress, pain and loss felt by the mother, Dr Williams in his further report of the 19^th February, 2013 advised that from the child's perspective, the mother's current position carried considerable risk:-

"The purpose of contact is to promote the psychological well-being of the child.  I am concerned that [the mother's] position has the potential to be destabilizing to [the child] and his adoptive family....

I was mindful that the recent contact records suggested that [the child's] relationship with his mother was problematic.  There has been concern that [the child] does not gain from the contact sessions, and although this might not be entirely necessary, it is evident that the problems witnessed in my initial assessment continue.  I do not agree with Dr Shah's observation that the contacts have improved.  Fundamentally, [the mother's] needs made it very difficult for her to provide her son with an attuned relationship.  The most recent contact record provided evidence of the difficulties in [the child's] relationship with his mother.  I am concerned that with maturity that [the child] may feel responsible for his vulnerable mother, and yet be powerless to help her.

I am very firmly of the opinion that from a psychological perspective I could not support a Contact Order being attached to any future adoption.  I am concerned that doing so would carry a risk of undermining the adoption proceeding and given this has been deemed to be in [the child's] best interests, this would be most unfortunate. Of greater concern however is that [the mother] has been unable to let her son go. Whilst I understand her loss, it would be wholly inappropriate to undermine [the child's] psychological well-being.  From the perspective of the child the sole function of contact is to promote their psychological development.  It is my opinion that for [the child] this can be achieved, and only achieved, through indirect contact.  I am happy to be guided by my social work colleagues about frequency, but I would not have thought more than twice a year was necessary in order for [the child] to be able to gain a narrative about his birth family as he matures (Schofield and Beek, 2010).  I would however be reluctant to see this placed in a Court Order, and would prefer [the child's] adoptive family to make the right decisions for their son". (his emphasis)

The Fostering and Adoption Service accepted his revised advice, but Dr Shah maintained her advice that there should be post adoption direct contact three or four times a year. There was a conflict therefore in the advice of the experts on this issue.

24.      Some time was spent examining the contact logs and the difficulties to which Dr Williams referred, but Dr Shah conceded that the child derived very little benefit from the current direct contact sessions.  In her view, it was not about short-term benefit.  The current contact did not harm the child and she was concerned with the long-term benefit to the child as he grows up in knowing his mother; a physical knowledge of her that will help him come to terms with the history and her special difficulties.

25.      Dr Shah advised that Letterbox contact was not a good means by which to understand autism.  There are things she said which cannot be spoken - a connection or biological link that cannot be verbalised and which had often been ignored in considering contact post adoption in the past.  The child might find the mother's behaviour odd or even frightening but this is what he needs to learn about. The risk that he would feel responsible for her was, she felt, exaggerated. Indeed, seeing the mother might reduce the burden upon him.  He may learn to respect autism and to see beyond it. 

26.      It was clear to Dr Shah that the child's placement with the prospective adopters was secure and that he would not be damaged by three supervised contacts of an hour each per year- which in her view could be properly managed to mitigate any risks - a fraction of the hours spent with the prospective adopters.  The child would be able to cope with the emotions generated by such meetings.  She felt there was still a lack of understanding on the part of the Fostering and Adoption Services and the prospective adopters of autism.

27.      In terms of the Baker criteria, the mother would, in her view, over time come to accept the adoption, a concept that she presently found difficult to understand.  Autistic people have difficulty with imagination and taking into account her cognitive difficulties, it was not the case that she was deliberately not accepting the adoption.  Over time she will slowly come to terms with it.  Dr Shah advised that direct contact should continue throughout the child's childhood at least to a point where his wishes could be known and taken into account.

28.      When it came to whether the Court should order contact post adoption, Dr Shah was more diffident.  Having read the views of the parents, she thought there was a high chance that their preference for indirect contact would prevail and therefore she felt it would be necessary to have an order, but at the same time agreeing that any order would need to be flexible.  If the prospective adopters felt the contact was going badly, then she agreed they should be able to use their judgement to act in the child's interests.  An order should not go much beyond stipulating that there should be direct contact so many times a year. The prospective adopters and the Fostering and Adoption Service should be left to organise it.  Any contact would have to be subject to the mother's mental state permitting it.

29.      In evidence, Dr Williams' key concern was with the concept of the prospective adopters being ordered to make the child available for direct contact with the mother; he struggled to see how an order was in the child's best interests.  The mother was not accepting the adoption and it would be irresponsible in his view to order direct contact to happen.  What, he asked, was the point of the prospective adopters adopting the child if they were not to be given the responsibilities that go with parenthood?  They should be empowered as parents.  Parents had an unconditional right to parent as they wished and he would be reluctant to place any restraint on that.

30.      He used the analogy of two boxes, the first being contact for the purpose of imparting to the child knowledge of his birth family and heritage and the second for the purpose of sustaining a functional relationship.  In his view, we were concerned with the former but if the purpose was to establish a functional relationship between the child and the mother (which the freeing for adoption order was supposed to bring to an end) then what evidence was there, he asked, that three hourly direct contact sessions a year was enough?  It would need more than that to establish a functional relationship.

31.      The key, in his view, was flexibility.  If, in the coming years, the mother was supported through her loss and came to terms with the adoption, the prospective adopters, with the advice and guidance of the Fostering and Adoption Service, may decide that it is in the child's interests for him to have direct contact with the mother but they must be given the right to make that decision. 

32.      Miss Jade Allchin, the social worker, referred to the contact logs which she said show the child derived little benefit, if any, from the current contact with the mother.  The child's needs, she said, would change with time and the prospective adopters should be given flexibility to act in his interests; he had been with them a year now and it was very important to him that the adoption went ahead.  No order let the prospective parents make the decisions as parents. In time they would take into account the child's own views.

33.      Increasing the contact ahead of the adoption as requested by the mother would only confuse the child and undermine the placement; the prospective adopters would not support that.  There could be no question of unsupervised contact as the mother did not engage with the child and would not be able to keep him safe.

34.      The guardian concurred with the advice given by Dr Williams.  The mother did not fulfil the Baker criteria and direct contact should therefore end with a goodbye session, in which she recommended the prospective adopters played some part.  She recommended that no order be made for any contact between the child and the mother post adoption and that any indirect contact be at the discretion of the prospective adopters, supported and facilitated by the Fostering and Adoption Service.

35.      She had met with the prospective adopters, who reiterated the views they had expressed through Mrs King.  She said at paragraph 10.3 of her report:-

"They love [the child] and have accepted him into their family. However, they cannot conceive of an order 'forcing' [the child] into a situation that could unsettle him and destabilise his position in their family which would have an effect on all of them."

Post Freeing and Pre-Adoption Contact Orders

36.      In deciding whether to grant the mother's Article 10 application for contact post the freeing order and pre the adoption, the primary consideration was the welfare of the child pursuant to Article 2 of the Children Law, which is in the following terms:-

"2.      Welfare of the child

(1)       When the court determines any question with respect to -

(a) the upbringing of a child; or

(b) the administration of a child's property, or the application of any income arising from it,

the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration.

(2)       In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.

(3)       In the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (4), the court shall have regard in particular to -

(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding);

(b) the child's physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c) the likely effect on the child of any change in his or her circumstances;

(d) the child's age, sex, background and any characteristics of the child which the court considers relevant;

(e) any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f) how capable each of the child's parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting the child's needs; and

(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Law in the proceedings in question

(4)       The circumstances are that -

(a) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge an Article 10 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings; or

(b) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge an order under Part 4.

(5)       Where the court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Law with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all."

37.      Miss Davies for the Minister submitted that Article 2(5) was of particular relevance as this was a case she said where the no order principle should apply.  Any order that was made would be extinguished on an adoption order being made pursuant to Article 20(2)(a)(ii) of the Adoption Law unless the Court directed otherwise.

Post Adoption Contact Orders

38.      Under Article 16(3) of the Adoption Law, the Court, when making an adoption order may impose such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and it has the power therefore to make orders as to post adoption contact.  A birth parent will not ordinarily be a party to any application by adopters for an adoption order, if, as here, the child has been freed for adoption and parental responsibility given to the Minister as if the Minister were the adopter (Article 12(5) of the Adoption Law).

39.      Under Article 18(6) of the Adoption Law, a guardian ad litem would be appointed for the purposes of any application for an adoption order by adopters with the duty of safeguarding the interests of the child. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Children (Jersey) Adoption Rules 1962 ("the Adoption Rules") it would ordinarily be the Minister who would be appointed a guardian ad litem and under Paragraph 10 of Schedule 2 to the Adoption Rules one of the duties of the guardian ad litem would be to inform the Court if he or she learns of any other person who ought, in his or her opinion, to be heard by the Court on the question of whether an adoption order should be made and, by necessary implication, on whether any terms and conditions should be imposed.  Absent the Court having previously addressed the issue of post adoption contact as we have been asked to do in this case, if the Minister or (if different) the guardian ad litem considered it to be in the interests of a child for orders for post adoption contact with a birth parent to be made by the Court, then one would expect the Court to be informed and the birth parent concerned to be convened to the adoption proceedings.

40.      In considering whether to make a contact order under Article 16(3) of the Adoption Law, the Court's first consideration, pursuant to Article 3 of the Adoption Law, will be the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child, akin we would suggest to the requirement under Article 2(1) of the Children Law for the welfare of the child to be the Court's paramount consideration whenever the Court is determining any question with respect to a child's upbringing.

41.      Quite independently of the operation of Article 16(3) of the Adoption Law and whether or not convened to the adoption application, it would seem that a birth parent could apply for leave under Article 10(2)(a)(ii) of the Children Law to make an application for post adoption contact in the context of any application by adopters for an adoption order (applications under the Adoption Law coming within the definition of "Family Proceedings" in Article 1(1) of the Children Law as per F and G).  The adopters would be a necessary party to any such application.  Article 2 of the Children Law (including the welfare checklist) would apply to any such application.

42.      Turning to the case law, in the case of Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Conditions) [1999] 1 FLR 348, the judge at first instance had failed to recognise that access could be maintained between siblings within the ambit of an adoption order by the imposition of terms and conditions through the equivalent of our Article 16(3) of the Adoption Law (Section 8(7) of the Children Act 1975). In the leading speech of the House of Lords, Lord Ackner said this at page 167:-

"Miss Ryan, on behalf of Mrs B, conceded that the terms of s. 8(7) of the Act of 1975 were unambiguous and on the face of the subsection there was jurisdiction to impose any terms or conditions that the court thought fit.  She, however, in essence, repeated the unsuccessful submission made in Re V (A Minor) (Adoption: Dispensing with Agreement) above, that the subsection only enabled the attachment of such terms and conditions as the court could see would be immediately fulfilled or met and not conditions which involved the intervention or supervision of the court in the future.  Thus, in her submission, the decisions of the Court of Appeal which, expressly or by necessary implication, decided the contrary were wrong.

I cannot agree.  It seems to me essential that, in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood, the court should retain the maximum flexibility given to it by the Act and that unnecessary fetters should not be placed upon the exercise of the discretion entrusted to it by Parliament.  The cases to which I have referred illustrate circumstances in which it was clearly in the best interests of the child to allow access to a member of the child's natural family.  The cases rightly stress that in normal circumstances it is desirable that there should be a complete break, but that each case has to be considered on its own particular facts.  No doubt the court will not, except in the most exceptional case, impose terms or conditions as to access to members of the child's natural family to which the adopting parents do not agree.  To do so would be to create a potentially frictional situation which would be hardly likely to safeguard or promote the welfare of the child.  Where no agreement is forthcoming the court will, with very rare exceptions, have to choose between making an adoption order without terms or conditions as to access, or to refuse to make such an order and seek to safeguard access through some other machinery, such as wardship.  To do otherwise would be merely inviting future and almost immediate litigation." (our emphasis)

43.      Wall L.J. reviewed the English jurisprudence in the case of Re R (Adoption: Contact) [2006] 1 FLR 483, a case which again involved contact post adoption between siblings, saying this at page 385:-

"[47]   It is, of course, the case that matters have moved on very substantially since Re C.  When Re C was decided, the Children Act 1989 was not in force and adoption proceedings were not designated as family proceedings.  Accordingly, if there was to be post-adoption contact between siblings or other members of the adopted child's family, the only way that could be enforced was by conditions being written into the adoption order under s 8 of the children Act 1989.  Equally, back in those days it was much more common, as Lord Ackner himself points out, for there to be no contact between family members and the adopted child after an adoption order had been made; although, of course, he recognises that there were exceptions to that rule.

[48]     We were shown s 1 of the new Adoption and Children Act 2002, which is due in force later this year, which demonstrates the clear change of thinking there has been since 1976, when the Adoption Act was initially enacted, and which demonstrates that the court now will need to take into account and consider the relationship the child had with members of the natural family, and the likelihood of that relationship continuing and the value of the relationship to the child.

[49]     So contact is more common, but nonetheless the jurisprudence I think is clear.  The imposition on prospective adopters of orders for contact with which they are not in agreement is extremely, and remains extremely, unusual."

44.      Re T (A Minor) (Contact After Adoption) [1995] 2 FLR 251 was a case which had similarities to the case before us.  There, the adopters had agreed to direct contact once a year, but the mother sought contact two to three times a year, with an order to that effect.  The child was nine, and came to adoption with a considerable memory of her family, siblings and mother (in contrast to the case before us).  Butler-Sloss LJ said this at page 256:-

"It seems to me that that degree of security that she seeks has to be found in the trust that she must have in these adopters. That is a trust which is undoubtedly held by the local authority and the guardian ad litem, because those experts in this field all believe that at this stage of this child's life it is right for her sake that she should continue to see her mother once a year.  They have chosen this family on the basis that they also would recognise it was in the interests of this child that she should continue, certainly for the time being, to see her natural mother.  These adopters themselves accept that this is right.  This is all in the interests of the child, and, of course an order under s 8 for contact is made with the welfare of the child of the primary consideration.  Nobody is suggesting that if this order is not made then the welfare of this child would not continue to be the primary consideration of these adopters in relation to her continuing contact with her natural mother.

In this particular case, if for some reason the adopters decide that the child should not see her natural mother, that is a flexibility which was implicit in the recommendations of the social workers and the guardian ad litem that there should be no order.  As I understand it, for the foreseeable future it is said that there will be contact, but the adopters wish to be in control, responding, as they intend to do, to what the child says, what the child wants, and perhaps, much more importantly what the child needs, in their careful parental estimation.

If there is an order and in due course it looks as though the child does not want to see her mother, or there may be reasons why the child ought not to see her mother, there being a chequered history that the mother has, on the basis of the judge's order it will be the adopters who will have to go back to court and ask for the order to be varied, suspended or for there to be no future contact.  That would seem to me to impose upon a family who have chosen to take on the responsibility of this child, with all the burdens as well as all the pleasures that that imposes, an additional burden which is unjust to this adoptive family.  I do not see why they should have to go to court."

45.      The prospective adopters in the case before us are in precisely the same position, namely that they wish to be in control, responding to the wants and needs of the child "in their careful parental estimation".

46.      The Court was referred to the House of Lords decision in Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust v H [2006] UKHL 36, where the issue in the appeal was whether a judge could properly make a freeing order (which remained part of the law in Northern Ireland) on the basis that the parents' agreement was unreasonably being withheld because they did not yet know if post adoption contact was available.  The child was aged four, and had significant attachments to the parents (again unlike the case before us).  In the leading judgment of the majority, Lord Carswell referred to the changes in adoption undergone in the UK since the early 1970s:-

"[42]   Adoption in the UK has undergone a considerable change since the early 1970s.  The number of children adopted has suffered a sharp decline and the proportion of older children, as distinct from infants, adopted has increased markedly.  In many cases adopted children now have an attachment to their birth parents and it is generally recognised that there is a much stronger case for post-adoption contact than was thought when the permanency theory held sway."

47.      He referred to the shift in opinion towards what is termed "openness" favouring the continuation of contact between natural parents and the child following adoption, the reason being articulated in the White Paper, Adoption: the Future, Cm 2288 (1993), paras 4.14-4.16:-

"4.14   There has been an increasing tendency in recent years to favour maintaining some contact between an adopted child and his birth family where possible.  This may in part reflect the increased average age of children being adopted, and in suitable cases a degree of such contact may well be desirable.  However, the Government considers that once an adoption order is made, the most important objective is to support the new family relationship.

4.15    Where the birth parents wish to maintain direct contact, provided there is free consent by the child and the new family, this should generally be allowed.  If the adoptive parents oppose the prospect, their views should have the greater weight though where older children are adopted out of families with whom they have formed a bond the issues need particularly careful judgment and the child's view will be correspondingly significant.

4.16    Each case must be considered on its merits and there can be no central blueprint.  By regulation, the Government intends to ensure that the courts and adoption agencies will assess the most suitable arrangements for contact between the birth family and the child after his adoption."

48.      Lord Carswell then went on to say this in relation to the desirability of post adoption contact:-

"[44]   There have been some differences of opinion in the published literature about the desirability of contact, which is propounded by some as universally beneficial, while others are more cautious and urge a degree of flexibility of approach and avoidance of doctrinaire policies.  They point out that in the wrong case contact can lead to disturbance of the children and impose a significant burden on the adopting parents.  There is, however, general agreement that in appropriate cases contact can contribute to reassurance and security and a feeling of identity for adopted children and help to dispel feelings of rejection.  The courts have accepted the validity of this proposition: see, for example, the judgment of Simon Brown LJ in Re E (A Minor) (Care order: Contact) [1994] 1 FLR 146, at 154 - 155:

'I recognise of course that the threshold criteria for a care order under section 31 of the 1989 Act require the court to be satisfied that a child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to inadequate parenting and that that inadequacy would normally be attributable to the quality of the parent/child relationship.  Nevertheless, although the value of contact may be limited by the parents' inadequacy, it may still be of fundamental importance to the long-term welfare of the child, unless of course it can be seen that in a given case it will inevitably disturb the child's care.  In short, even when the section 31 criteria are satisfied, contact may well be of singular importance to the long-term welfare of the child: first, in giving the child the security of knowing that his parents love him and are interested in his welfare; secondly, by avoiding any damaging sense of loss to the child in seeing himself abandoned by his parents; thirdly, by enabling the child to commit himself to the substitute family with the seal of approval of the natural parents; and fourthly, by giving the child the necessary sense of family and personal identity.  Contact, if maintained, is capable of reinforcing and increasing the chances of success of a permanent placement, whether on a long-term fostering basis or by adoption.'

It can be beneficial in many respects where the conditions are right, and a level of common agreement among the parties is strongly conducive to this. It does appear clear that the attitude of the birth parents, as well as that of the adopting parents, is of critical importance, and I would endorse the qualification expressed by Simon Brown LJ in the passage which I have just quoted.  When considering post-adoptive contact courts must exercise care in assessing the effect which contact is likely to have on the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the paramountcy of the welfare of the child, given statutory recognition in art 9 of the 1987 Order and art 3 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995."

49.      Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, was concerned with contact on the making of placement orders under the different regime now prevailing in England, pursuant to the Adoption and Children Act 2002.  Wall LJ reviewed the approach of the courts to post adoption contact to the effect that the imposition of prospective adopters of orders for contact of which they were not in agreement was extremely, and remains extremely, unusual, all of which fell to be revisited under the provisions of the 2002 Act.  The decision of the judge at first instance to order contact between two seriously damaged siblings on the making of a placement order into two separate families was upheld because of the fundamental importance of preserving their contact with each other.  The court did not know whether its views on contact on the facts of that case presaged a more general sea change in post adoption contact overall:-

"It seems to us, however, that the stakes in the present case are sufficiently high to make it appropriate for the court to retain control over the question of the children's welfare throughout their respective lives under ss 1, 26, 27 and 46(6) of the 2002 Act; and, if necessary, to make orders for contact post adoption in accordance with s 26 of the 2002 Act, under s 8 of the 1989 Act.  This is what Parliament has enacted.  In s 46(6) of the 2002 Act Parliament has specifically directed the court to consider post adoption contact, and in s 26(5) Parliament has specifically envisaged an application for contact being heard at the same time as an adoption order is applied for.  All this leads us to the view that the 2002 Act envisages the court exercising its powers to make contact orders post adoption, where such orders are in the interests of the child concerned."

50.      We were not referred to any subsequent English authority identifying any change in the jurisprudence to the proposition that the imposition on prospective adopters of orders for contact with which they were not in agreement is extremely unusual.  All counsel agreed that this remained the position in the English jurisdiction. Counsel for the Minister and the guardian submitted this Court should follow the English authorities whether considering post adoption contact orders under the provisions of the Adoption Law or the Children Law. We agreed for the following reasons:-

(i)        Adopters, who are all carefully assessed, take on the responsibility of the parenthood of the child, offering that child permanence as if he or she had been born to them. Like all parents, they should be in control of the welfare of what would be their child, responding to the child's needs as they in their careful parental estimation deem to be in the child's best interests.

(ii)       Imposing upon adopters by order terms and conditions as to contact would be to create from the outset potential friction, which would be hardly likely to safeguard or promote the welfare of the child.

(iii)      The imposition of orders upon adopters as to contact places an unjust burden upon them to go back to Court for those orders to be varied if they feel that they no longer serve the interests of their child.

(iv)      Without such a policy, potential adopters might be deterred from putting themselves forward as adopters and that would be contrary to the interests of children generally.

51.      It is important to stress that we are concerned in this section of the judgement with the imposition of orders upon adopters, not with whether direct contact in any case may be beneficial to the child.  We can appreciate that post adoption direct contact may well be beneficial where, as Lord Carswell said in Down Lisburn Health, the conditions are right and a level of agreement between the birth parents, the Fostering and Adoption Service and the prospective adopters is strongly conducive to this. As he said, of critical importance would be the attitude of the birth family who must be able to give the new family relationship their seal of approval.

52.      We were referred to Planning for Contact in Permanent Placements by Paul Adams (2012), a practical guide for social workers in the United Kingdom, from which Mrs King had in part drawn for the purposes of her report.  The work includes a useful explanation of what is meant by "openness" in adoption:-

"Openness

It is not possible to make sense of contact issues without a consideration and understanding of openness (Brodzinsky, 2005), a concept that is discussed throughout this guide. This term came to be used to describe situations that stressed a more inclusive and less secretive approach to contact issues in adoption.  Some practitioners have used the term to refer to situations involving direct contact, but openness does not necessarily need to involve direct contact, and can be seen in both psychological and structural terms.

Structural openness most commonly refers to direct or indirect contact but could also include working closely with birth family members in relation to identifying appropriate adopters, exchanging information prior to placement, and a one-off introductory meeting between birth family and adopters.

Psychological openness describes a state of mind, often of adopters, where this openness is reflected in how they communicate with their child about the fact that he or she is adopted, and their sensitivity as to how that may feel for the child at different stages in their life.  The term can apply equally to other permanence arrangements."

53.      Paul Adams (at page 15) states that the difficulty in relation to planning contact in permanence is that the research is both limited and inconclusive.  The overall position, as described by Quinton et al in 1997, is little changed, he said, today:-

"In our present stage of knowledge it is seriously misleading to think that what we know about contact is at a level of sophistication to allow us to make confident assertions about the benefits to be gained from it, regardless of circumstances and relationships." Quinton et al, 1997, p 411.

54.      He also refers to the following quotation from Loxterkamp, 2009, p 424:-

"Contact is a highly complex matter, especially difficult when the child continues to have a relationship with the birth parent guilty of abuse or neglect.  And it must be appreciated that to arrive at balanced, well-considered decisions on contact in such cases makes near impossible demands on childcare professionals and substitute parents."

55.      Paul Adams acknowledges (at page 26) that contact orders attached to adoption orders in the United Kingdom are rare, referring to the judgment of Wall LJ in Re R to the effect that the imposition on prospective orders of orders for contact with which they are not in agreement is extremely, and remains extremely, unusual.

56.      Paul Adams (at page 2) refers to the importance of flexibility in contact planning:-

"It is important to be clear about the limitations of contact planning in permanence, and to understand that any agreed plan is only an initial plan that must be viewed as flexible and subject to changing needs and circumstances.  It is impossible to accurately predict a child's contact needs for the long-term future because of all the potential variables that may arise over time, and so any identified plan must only be seen as a starting point and not a fixed arrangement for the duration of a child's minority."

57.      There is a tension between this need for flexibility, with which Dr Shah and Dr Williams agreed, and the imposition of an order by the Court, which must by definition contain an element which is compulsory and therefore inflexible, if it is to be an order at all.

58.      A further interesting factor raised by Paul Adams (at page 9) is the implication to contact planning of the growth of social media:-

"....but with the emergence of social networking it is even more vital that the issues are not ignored.  All parties need to be prepared for the fact that children have an option to utilise technology to locate birth family if they decide to do so.  In cases where it is absolutely necessary to prevent any direct contact for reasons of safety, it is imperative that children are clear about this, and have a shared understanding of the dangers.  They will need to agree to play their part in keeping the family safe, and to achieve this will require a communicative openness between the child and the adopters or foster carers from the outset, so that where a child might be considering using social media, they feel able to discuss the implication of this with trusted and knowledgeable adults.  They will also need to have been provided with honest and truthful information about the risk their birth family might pose.

In other less dangerous cases, social workers might need to recognise that efforts to prevent direct contact will in many cases be futile, and that many children will choose to make contact with birth family through social networking sites.  There is no point in pretending that this won't happen, and the potential benefits of allowing managed and planned direct contact will need to be considered against the risks of ending up with unmediated contact initiated by the child."

59.      As Miss King said in her report, the Fostering and Adoption Service works closely with prospective adopters, adopters and birth families to consider these complex issues which are dealt with consensually and not, we suggest, by compulsion.  It would only be in extremely unusual cases that the Court would seek to impose orders upon adopters.  It is very fact specific but it would seem that an order might be justified, for example, whereas in Re P, two seriously damaged siblings had to be adopted into separate families and it was accepted that it was "fundamental" that their relationship be preserved.

The submissions

60.      There were essentially two issues for the Court to address, firstly, whether post adoption direct contact between the child and the mother served the interests of the child and, if so, whether (at the relevant time) the Court would be minded to impose orders for such contact on the prospective adopters.

61.      The mother recognised that the level of contact between now and the adoption order would depend upon whether the Court was prepared to consider direct contact post adoption.  If it was, then the mother submitted that there was no basis for her current contact being reduced, particularly in the light of the evidence of that the present contact was not harmful to the child.  The mother wanted as much post adoption direct contact as possible. Even if she could only see the child once a year, that was better than no contact at all.

62.      Miss Hall relied on the case of Re E (A Minor) (Care Order:Contact) [1994] 1 FLR 146, where the court ordered direct contact to continue until it was clear that a closed adoption was the only option.  That case seemed of limited assistance to the mother, in our view, as it was concerned with contact at the stage a care order was made when the local authority was under a statutory duty to allow reasonable contact with the parents, pursuant to s 34 of the Children Act 1989 (the equivalent of Article 27(1) of the Children Law).  In the case before us, the child has been made the subject of a freeing order and as made clear in F and G, the Minister is no longer under a duty to allow reasonable contact with the parents.

63.      Miss Hall, in closing, presented a carefully prepared written submission, which had been translated for the mother, in which she addressed the four criteria by Neil and Howe and the five criteria by Baker, in the light of the evidence before the Court.

64.      Of the four criteria by Neil and Howe, all were, in Miss Hall's submission met.  In relation to the third criteria, namely the abuse of the child, it was attributable in this case, she said, to the disability of the mother, which was undiagnosed at the time and this criterion should therefore be relaxed.

65.      In relation to the Baker criteria, the mother had not used contact to jeopardise the placement of the child with the prospective adopters and Dr Shah's evidence was that she could accept the placement, given time.  The mother had not prevented the child calling the prospective adopting mother "Mummy".  There was nothing to indicate that the mother could not treat the prospective adopters in a courteous manner, or be unable to create an atmosphere of harmony at meetings and whilst the mother did not at present understand the reasons for the adoption, Dr Shah's evidence was that this was likely to change. In any event this would not affect any contact sessions.  The child was thriving in his new placement, having developed a strong attachment to the prospective adopters and therefore contact was unlikely to undermine or diminish or eclipse the child's attachment to the prospective adopters. 

66.      In terms of whether direct contact would be beneficial to the child and any risks arising from that contact, Miss Hall relied essentially on the evidence of Dr Shah as summarised above, which she submitted should be preferred to that of Dr Williams.

67.      The position of the other parties on the first issue was that the expert evidence of Dr Williams should be preferred.  There was no attachment between the child and the mother.  The child was deriving no benefit from the current contact and would derive no benefit post adoption, certainly in the short to medium term.  The prospective adopters felt that post adoption contact was for the benefit of the mother not the child. Furthermore, there was an appreciable risk that given the mother's current attitude to the adoption, the contact could undermine the placement.

68.      As to the second issue namely whether the Court should order post adoption direct contact, that would only apply if it had first been concluded that it was in the interests of the child to have direct contact with the mother. On the assumption that it had been so concluded, Miss Hall submitted that the prospective adopters had not been party to the proceedings and had not heard the evidence of Dr Shah, in particular in relation to what she regarded as a serious lack of understanding of the mother's condition.  If they were given the chance of reading that evidence, they might be more flexible in their approach to direct contact.  It would be dangerous for the Court to assume that they would no longer wish to adopt the child if such an order was made.

69.      If the Court was persuaded that the prospective adopters were completely against direct contact then, as recommended by Dr Shah, the Court should make an order which would allow flexibility and also allow the prospective adopters to make their own decision as to how much contact should actually take place.  This would leave the door open to the mother, who would be able to come back to Court if she felt that they were not exercising the direct contact appropriately.  Such a flexible order could be framed on the basis that the mother should have "at least one direct contact with the child a year".

70.      If the issue of direct contact was left to the parents, that she argued would be to place too much responsibility upon them.  Furthermore, it would make it very difficult for the mother to come back to the Court, as she would have had no contact in the interim.  An order would make it easier for the mother to seek leave to make an application. This is one of those exceptionally unusual cases, she said, where an order would be justified.

71.      The other parties submitted that even if direct contact was considered to be in the child's interests no order should be made.  The prospective adopters were opposed to any orders being imposed upon them and Dr Williams had advised that he could not support an order from a psychological perspective.  This was not one of those exceptionally unusual cases where the Court needed to impose its will upon the prospective adopters and to remain in control post adoption. 

Decision

72.      We take first the issue of whether post adoption direct contact was in the interests of the child. Dr Shah, whose task had been to assess the mother, has very great experience in autism in adults and children and we accepted her assurance that her recommendation for direct contact was child centred advice; it was not "a sop to ease the pain" of the mother.  However, Dr Williams was the child psychologist whose task had been to assess the child and this case was about the child.  On balance and in what is clearly a complex area where two highly respected experts had differing opinions, we concluded that we should prefer the advice of the child psychologist.

73.      We bore in mind that there are severe limitations to any planning for a child this young.  His circumstances and needs will change with time and as he grows and matures his own views will become more and more important.  In reality, we could only look at this as a starting point.  In our view, the starting point post adoption, having considered all of the advice and the evidence received by the Court, is that contact should be indirect for two reasons:-

(i)        On an adoption, the most important objective is the support of the new family relationship.  If contact between the child and the birth parents is to take place, then as the Baker criteria makes clear, it is essential that the birth parents accept and support that new relationship; without that acceptance and support, there is a real risk that the contact might undermine or diminish or eclipse that new relationship.  The mother fails to meet the criteria in this important respect and we agreed with Dr Williams that this presented an obstacle to on-going direct contact, certainly in the short term.  That may change, but at this stage, there is no benefit to the child from direct contact whilst the risks are real.

(ii)       The child has claimed the prospective adopters as his mother and father, and it is they who know him best; he has been living with them for a year.  He is thriving under their parenting and their views, as prospective parents, were to be accorded great weight. In their view, the child derived no benefit from direct contact with the mother.

74.      If we were wrong in reaching that conclusion, then we turned to the second issue of whether the court (at the relevant time) should seek to impose orders upon the prospective adopters for direct contact to take place.  Our view was this.  The prospective adopters had been assessed as suitable adopters for the child and assuming the adoption takes place, which for the child's sake we hope will be soon, they will become his parents as if he had been born to them.  It will be for them to make decisions about his welfare thereafter.  Putting themselves forward in this way, they are agreeing to give the child a permanent home with all the responsibilities that go with parenthood.  They must be allowed to get on and parent the child without the Court seeking to retain control through the imposition of terms of the kind sought here.  We endorsed the views expressed by Dr Williams in paragraph 29 above. 

75.      This is not a case where "the stakes are sufficiently high" and the issue of such "fundamental importance" that the Court should take the extremely unusual step of retaining control over this part of the child's welfare.  The issue of contact must be left to the prospective adopters and we had every confidence that they will act in the child's interests.  As one would expect of any responsible parent, they have indicated that they would be guided by the views of the professionals, but there is a conflict of expert advice in this case and as with the Court they could quite properly and responsibly prefer the advice of Dr Williams (accepted by both the Fostering and Adoption Service and the guardian) that, certainly as a starting point, there should be no direct contact. 

76.      Although we decided to accept the advice of Dr Williams in what is a complex area, as we said when announcing our decision, we think that there is much value in the advice of Dr Shah and very careful thought and planning needs to be given as to how the child is to learn and understand about his mother's special difficulties.  Autism was diagnosed very late and there certainly was a lack of understanding of her condition in the past, which may to some extent continue today.  It may well be that the process of the child's learning and understanding about his mother might be assisted at some stage in the future by direct contact with her but that will be a matter for the prospective adopters, with the advice and guidance of the Fostering and Adoption Service, to decide.

77.      We reject the suggestion that it would be right to impose conditions on the adoption in order to facilitate a future application by the mother for leave under Article 10(2)(a)(ii) of the Children Law to apply for a contact order; if such an application was possible - a matter upon which we were not addressed.  That approach was criticised in Re T, where the judge at first instance thought that the need for leave to apply "and all sorts of problems like that" could be met by an order under the equivalent of Article 16(3) of the Adoption Law.  Quoting from the judgment of Butler-Sloss LJ at page 256:-

"It seems to me that the requirement of leave is a valuable protection, both for the adopters and for the child, and it is one that is very properly in place for that protection in the case of a former parent."

78.      As we said earlier, the most important objective is the support of the new family relationship and that objective is not assisted by eroding the valuable protection given to that new relationship by the requirement for leave. Whilst leave might be axiomatic at the stage of freeing the child for adoption, it would not we suggest be axiomatic thereafter.

79.      Having given the mother leave to make the application under Article 10(2)(a)(ii), the only order we could properly make at this stage was as to contact between the date of the hearing and the adoption and, having applied the welfare checklist, we agreed with Miss Davies that pursuant to Article 2(5) of the Children Law this was a case where it was better for no order to be made at all. We had no reason to interfere with the Minister's proposals as to contact with the mother which we had approved when freeing the child for adoption.

80.      As to post adoption contact, we had been asked to give an indication both as to whether it was in the child's interest to have direct contact with the mother post adoption and if so, whether the prospective adopters should be ordered by the Court to procure such direct contact.  As set out above, we reached the view that post adoption direct contact was not in the child's interests, certainly in the short term, but if we were wrong in so concluding, we have given what we hope is a very firm indication that this is not one of those extremely unusual cases where orders for post adoption direct contact should be made either under the provisions of the Adoption Law or the Children Law. 

81.      Once the child is adopted, then the prospective adopters must be allowed to continue with his parenting (as they have done to date so successfully) without interference and there is nothing to suggest that this Court or any future court will not have the fullest confidence in their ability to do so.

Authorities

In the matter of F (Care Order) [2012] JRC 173.

In re F and G (No. 2) [2010] JLR Note 12.

Children (Jersey) Law 2002.

Adoption (Jersey) Law 1961.

Family Law 2007, Tina Bond.

Contact in Adoption and Permanent Foster Care: Research, Theory and Practice, Elsbeth Neil and David Howe 2004.

Planning for Contact in Permanent Placements, Paul Adams 2012.

Baker, Family Law (2006).

Children (Jersey) Adoption Rules 1962.

Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Conditions) [1999] 1 FLR 348.

Children Act 1975.

Re R (Adoption: Contact) [2006] 1 FLR 483.

Re T (Adoption: Contact) [1995] 2 FLR 251.

Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust v H [2006] UKHL 36.

White Paper, Adoption: the Future, Cm 2288 (1993).

Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535.

Adoption and Children Act 2002.

Contact between children placed away from home and their birth parents: research issues and evidence, Quinton D., Rushton A., Dance C. and Mayes D. (1997).

Contact and Truth: The Unfolding Predicament in Adoption and Fostering, Lorne Loxterkamp 2009.

Re E (a Minor) (Care Order: Contact) [1994] 1 FLR 146.