Jersey Unreported Judgments

Magistrate's Court Appeal - reasons for dismissal of appeals against conviction and sentence.

[2013]JRC030

Royal Court

(Samedi)

7 February 2013

Before     :

Sir Michael Birt, Kt., Bailiff, and Jurats Morgan and Fisher.

Cyril John Vibert

-v-

HM Attorney General

Mr Vibert appeared in person.

Ms E. L. Hollywood, Crown Advocate for the Attorney General.

JUDGMENT

THE BAILIFF:

1.        On 1st November and 5th November, 2012, respectively, the Magistrate's Court (the Assistant Magistrate) convicted the appellant on two charges of contempt of court.  On 5th November the appellant was sentenced to 7 days' imprisonment, consecutive on each charge. 

2.        On 29th November this Court dismissed appeals against conviction and sentence in respect of the two charges.  We now give our reasons. 

Factual background

3.        In view of the nature of the appellant's submissions, it is necessary to record the history of these proceedings in a little detail. 

4.        On 27th April, 2012, the appellant was charged with five parking offences committed on five different days in January and February.  Not guilty pleas were entered.  The cases were adjourned periodically because the appellant had appealed to the Royal Court on a point of law against an earlier parking charge of which he had been convicted and it was thought that the decision of the Royal Court would be relevant to the outstanding charges.  

5.        One of the occasions on which the case was adjourned was 14th May, 2012, and a flavour of the appellant's approach to the Magistrate's Court can be ascertained from the transcript of that hearing.  The appellant began by demanding to know whether the Assistant Magistrate was operating under her oath of office.  When the Assistant Magistrate said that she was not prepared to respond to this, the appellant announced that he was arresting the Assistant Magistrate for misconduct in public office.  He repeated this on several occasions.  He refused to enter the well of the court and was then arrested for failing to surrender to his bail. 

6.        The appellant was brought back into Court later in the sitting and asserted that the Magistrate's Court was not a court, only a tribunal and that the Assistant Magistrate was not "on your oath of office".  In due course the case was adjourned to 5th July but the appellant made it clear that he did not consent to that.  When the Assistant Magistrate referred to him as "Mr Vibert"' he asserted that he was not a "Mr".  

7.        The case was further adjourned pending receipt of the reasoned judgment of the Royal Court and in due course it was listed for trial before the Magistrate's Court on 12th October.  Nine prosecution witnesses were summoned to deal with the five parking offences.  The judgment of the Royal Court [2012] JRC 181 dismissing the appeal against the earlier parking charge, was made available that morning. 

8.        At that hearing, the appellant said that he had not been made aware of the details of the "nature and cause" of the charges against him and referred to Article 6.3(a) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") which provides:-

"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:-

(a)       to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him ..."

9.        The Assistant Magistrate established that the appellant had received the charge sheets and had also received disclosure from the prosecution of all the witness statements.  She held that that amounted to supplying the appellant with the nature and cause of the charges.  The appellant disagreed and said that he wanted to ask some specific questions.  The first one was whether the charges were for quasi-criminal offences.  After initially declining to enter into the question, the Assistant Magistrate expressed the view that they were criminal offences because they had criminal penalties.  The appellant disagreed and said that if they were criminal offences, there would be a victim.  The Assistant Magistrate said that she felt that this conversation had been taken as far as it would go, whereupon the appellant said that he was not prepared to proceed any more and proposed to leave because he had not been told the "nature and cause" of the charges.  The Assistant Magistrate made it clear that, if he did, she was going to continue to hear the witnesses who had been summoned and to proceed with the case.  Before the appellant left he was told by the Assistant Magistrate to come back for sentencing, should the case be proved, on 9th November.  

10.      The Assistant Magistrate then proceeded to hear the witnesses and she convicted the appellant in his absence of the five parking charges.  Sentence was then fixed for 25th October rather than 9th November.  

11.      We should add that at the hearing on 12th October, the appellant filed a document in the following terms:-

"

cyril:vibert

c/o 10 haut de la rue farm,

St.Martin,

Jersey.

FILE ON DEMAND

Magistrate

Magistrates Court,

Union Street

St.Helier,

Jersey.

 

NOTICE OF WAIVER OF RIGHT TO RECOGNITION EVERYWHERE AS A PERSON BEFORE THE LAW

Pursuant to Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I hereby waive my Right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Also, I hereby notify the Magistrate that I will be making a special visit only and not a general appearance on the 12th October 2012.

Furthermore I hereby notify the Magistrate that I act as a third party representative of MR. CYRIL JOHN VIBERT and not as surety for MR. CYRIL JOHN VIBERT.

Take note that should there be any matter relating to trust law, I act as beneficiary and executor of the CYRIL JOHN VIBERT trust and do not act as trustee of the CYRIL JOHN VIBERT trust.

[signature]     12th October 2012

the man commonly called cyril:Vibert."

12.      The appellant was given two notifications of the amended hearing date of 25th October for sentencing.  PC Bisson attended the appellant's home address on 15th October and told a person matching the appellant's description that he was to attend the Magistrate's Court at 2:30pm on 25th October.  On 16th October Mr Hamon of the Viscount's Department attended at the appellant's home and served a summons upon him.  The summons said "You are required to appear before the Magistrate's Court, Union Street, St Helier on Thursday 25th of October 2012 at 2.30pm for sentencing in accordance with the attached Act of Court".  The attached Act of Court was signed by the Greffier of the Magistrate's Court and recorded that the Magistrate's Court had on 12th October convicted the appellant of five parking charges, had remanded the case to 25th October at 2:30pm for sentencing and had ordered that the appellant be served personally with a summons to appear before the Magistrate's Court on that date. 

13.      The appellant failed to appear on 25th October and his arrest was therefore ordered.  He was arrested and brought before the Assistant Magistrate on 26th October.  In reply to the question as to whether he was Cyril Vibert he replied "I am the man called Cyril".  He denied that his home address was 10 Haut de la Rue Farm, St Martin.  When asked where he lived, he replied "I live everywhere I go".  He then asked the Assistant Magistrate whether she was operating in her capacity as a Magistrate at that time.  A charge of contempt of court by failing to appear on 25th October was then put to him.  He said that he had not received any court order to come to court.  When told that the Viscount had served him, he replied that the Viscount was a "body corporate" and he had nothing to do with the Viscount's Department.  Later in the hearing he said that all he had received was a couple of commercial pieces of paper and he was not in contract with any of those "body corporates".  When the Assistant Magistrate asked him whether he was pleading not guilty, he said that he was not pleading in any Star Chamber.  The Assistant Magistrate said that she would therefore record a plea of not guilty, whereupon the appellant said he objected to that.  He said that it was up to him or his representative to make a plea and he asked the Assistant Magistrate whether she was claiming to be his representation that day.  The Assistant Magistrate emphasised that she was not but that she was entering a not guilty plea in the absence of his entering a plea.  The appellant said that he did not consent to entering a plea.  He said that he waived his right to recognition as a person everywhere before the law.  He also refused to plead to two new parking offences (alleged to have been committed on 26th September and 24th October) which were put to him, on the basis that he did not plead in the Star Chamber and he again objected to a not guilty plea being entered on his behalf by the Assistant Magistrate. 

14.      After a short adjournment, the court reconvened and the Assistant Magistrate fixed 1st November for dealing with the contempt charge and the two new parking charges.  The appellant said that he would be happy to come on that date if the Assistant Magistrate would sign an order for him to come.  There was then a lengthy discussion.  The Assistant Magistrate said that she was telling him that he must attend court on 1st November at 2:30 and that she was directing him to come but she declined to use the actual word "order".  The Assistant Magistrate said in effect that there was no difference between a court order and a court direction.  After further discussion the Assistant Magistrate decided to remand the appellant on bail for 1st November.  She made it clear that a condition of bail was that he come to court on 1st November, to which the appellant replied that he would be there under duress and protest.  

15.      Despite that assertion the appellant did not appear on 1st November.  The Assistant Magistrate proceeded to hear evidence concerning the two additional parking charges and also evidence from PC Bisson and Mr Hamon of the Viscount's Department as to service of the warnings to attend court on 25th October.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Assistant Magistrate gave a short judgment finding the appellant guilty of the two parking offences and also of the charge of contempt by failing to appear on 25th October. 

16.      An arrest order was issued and the appellant was presented on 5th November.  On this occasion a second charge of contempt was presented, namely that the appellant had failed to appear before the Magistrate's Court on 1st November.  The appellant then again refused to plead guilty or not guilty saying that he did not plead in Star Chamber.  The Assistant Magistrate said she would treat that as a not guilty plea to which the appellant again objected, asserting that the job of the Magistrate was a judicial role only; it was the job of the appellant or his representative to enter a plea.  The Assistant Magistrate duly convicted the appellant of contempt of court in respect of his non-appearance on 1st November, rejecting the appellant's defence that he was under no obligation to attend because there was no lawful order for him to attend and that the Assistant Magistrate had specifically refused to give such an "order" on 26th October.  The Assistant Magistrate then imposed fines for the seven parking offences and seven days imprisonment consecutive on the two counts of contempt. 

The appellant's contentions

17.      Although the notice of appeal was expressed to be in relation to both the parking offences and the two contempt charges, the appellant confirmed at the beginning of the appeal before this Court on 29th November that he was only pursing the appeal against conviction and sentence in respect of the two contempt charges.  He raised a number of points in his written and oral submissions and we proposed to take them in turn. 

(i) Failure to give nature and cause of charges against him

18.      The appellant contended before the Magistrate's Court on 12th October that the Assistant Magistrate was acting in breach of her oath and in breach of Article 6 of ECHR by failing to give him the "nature and cause" of the charges against him.  At the time this related only to the parking charges (as the contempt charges had not yet been brought) but the point made by the appellant before us appeared to be a general one.  He referred also to Article 14.3(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR ") which is in similar terms. 

19.      We are quite satisfied that this submission is not well founded.  Supply of the charge sheet and the required disclosure by the prosecution (i.e. supply of the witness statements and any other relevant material in accordance with the prosecution's well established duty of disclosure) is sufficient to establish the nature and cause of any charges brought and to comply with the obligations under Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR.  Indeed, it is hard to think what else could be supplied to make the position any clearer.  

20.      The appellant did not make clear exactly what further information he wanted except that he wished to know whether the parking charges against him were quasi-criminal.  After some discussion, the Assistant Magistrate correctly informed him that the offences were criminal.  It is trite law that prosecution of any offence (whether at customary law or created by statute) is a criminal matter.  The appellant seems to have thought that a parking offence could not be a criminal offence because there is no victim.  That is wrong in law.  Although a criminal offence will very often have a victim (e.g. assault, rape etc) it is not a requirement of the criminal law that it should do so.  An offence where there is no victim still constitutes a criminal offence. 

(ii) No published rules of criminal procedure for statutory offences in the Magistrate's Court

21.      The appellant contended that the rules governing the procedure to be followed in the prosecution of statutory offences in the Magistrate's Court were not available.  Initially he was referred in the Magistrate's Court to the Loi (1864) Reglant la Procedure Criminelle which was in French rather than English.  He had since established that this Law governed procedure before the Royal Court rather than the Magistrate's Court.  

22.      It is correct that there is no statute or published rules setting out the procedure to be followed in the Magistrate's Court.  However, we do not accept that this caused the appellant any prejudice.  In the first place he has appeared before the Magistrate's Court on at least one previous occasion, namely on the original parking charge which he subsequently appealed to the Royal Court.  Secondly, the presiding Magistrate will always explain the position to a defendant who is not legally represented.  Thirdly, the defendant absented himself from the Magistrate's Court on 12th October and 1st November when all the parking charges and the first contempt charge were dealt with.  He was fully aware that, if he did not attend court, the Assistant Magistrate was likely to proceed in his absence.  In relation to 5th November, when he was convicted of the second charge of contempt, there was no request on his part seeking guidance as to the rules to be followed.  In short, we do not accept that the lack of published rules of procedure give any ground for quashing the convictions in this case. 

(iii) Conflict of interest

23.      The case for the prosecution before the Magistrate's Court was presented by Mr Laurence O'Donnell of the Law Officers' Department.  The appellant submitted that there was apparent bias on the part of the Assistant Magistrate because of a conflict of interest which rose in the following two respects:-

(i)        She and Mr O'Donnell are paid by the same organisation i.e. the States of Jersey. 

(ii)       Before her appointment as Assistant Magistrate, she had been employed in the Law Officers' Department and had indeed worked in the same office as Mr O'Donnell responsible for prosecutions before the Magistrate's Court.  

24.      The test for apparent bias is well established.  It is whether a fair minded and informed observer, knowing all the relevant facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased.  See for example Michel-v-AG [2006] JCA 152. 

25.      In our judgment the first point relied upon by the appellant is unarguable.  It was raised by him before this Court in his appeal against the original parking charge [2012] JRC 181 and summarily rejected at paragraph 38 of the judgment of the Deputy Bailiff in that case.  In the United Kingdom and, we suspect, most democratic countries, judges are paid by the state and prosecutors are usually similarly so paid.  On the appellant's argument, no judge could sit in a case where the prosecutor is also paid by the government.  

26.      As to the second submission, we also reject that.  In Locabail (UK) Limited-v-Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] 1 All ER 65 at para 25, the English Court of Appeal stated that an objection to a judge cannot ordinarily be based on the fact that an advocate appearing before him is a member of the same chambers.  That principle applies even more strongly where the judge is a full time judge and the concern relates only to an advocate who is a member of the judge's former chambers.  The same principle applies, in our judgment, in a case such as this where a person who is appointed a judge has previously been employed with a person who now appears before him as an advocate.  It is often the case that counsel appearing before a judge may be well known to that judge and may even indeed be friends with him.  This is frequently the case in the United Kingdom and other countries as well as in Jersey.  That is a wholly insufficient ground to consider that the judge may be biased.  A fair minded and informed observer will take into account that a judge takes an oath to administer justice impartially and, on appointment, is separated completely from any department or chambers in which he may previously have worked.  The mere fact that he may know, be friends with or have previously worked with an advocate who appears before him is no ground of itself for giving rise to a fear that he will not try the case impartially. 

(iv) No order to appear and therefore no contempt

27.      The appellant submitted that he could not be in contempt of court because the Assistant Magistrate had never "ordered" him to appear in court on either 26th October or 1st November (being the two dates in respect of which the contempt charges had been brought).  In relation to the failure to appear on 25th October, he had only been notified to attend by a police officer and subsequently by an officer of the Viscount's Department.  This was not an order from the Assistant Magistrate.  Furthermore, the only summons referred to in the Magistrate's Court (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Jersey) Law 1949 ("the 1949 Law") was that in Article 9, which referred to a summons at the instance of the Connétable summonsing a person suspected of having committed an offence to appear before the Magistrate's Court.  He had never received any order from the Assistant Magistrate nor had he received a summons from the Connétable to attend on 25th October and he could not therefore be in contempt of court by failing to attend on that date. 

28.      Similarly, in relation to the second charge of contempt (concerning his failure to appear on 1st November) he had at the hearing on 26th October repeatedly asked the Assistant Magistrate to "order" him to appear on 1st November.  She would not do so and restricted herself to telling him that he must attend on 1st November and directing him to come on that date.  That did not amount to an order and in the absence of an order, he was under no obligation to attend.  

29.      We do not accept the appellant's submissions.  It is the failure to attend Court without reasonable excuse that amounts to a contempt of court.  As Pitchers, Commissioner stated in Syvret-v-AG [2011] JRC 168 at para 68, when dismissing Mr Syvret's appeal against a conviction in the Magistrate's Court for contempt of court by failing to attend:-

"The first [conviction for contempt] was straightforward. Failing to answer to bail is, in Jersey, dealt with as a contempt of court. The appellant knew of his requirement to attend. He deliberately absented himself and has never put forward any explanation capable in law of being an excuse. ..."

30.      In relation to the failure to appear on 25th October, the appellant had been told on 12th October - just before he withdrew from the proceedings - that the case would be remanded for sentencing on 9th November should the charges be proved against him (as the Assistant Magistrate was planning to proceed in his absence if he left).  Following the conclusion of the hearing on that date (when the Assistant Magistrate had found the parking charges proved in the absence of the appellant), she said that she was changing the sentencing date from 9th November to 25th October at 2:30pm and recommended personal service of a warning for that date.  She referred to the Centenier but, quite correctly, the warning was in fact effected by the Viscount as the Executive Officer of the courts.  A summons to appear was duly served through the Viscount's Department (the appellant accepted before the Deputy Bailiff at the time of the bail hearing on 9th November that it was he who had been served on 16th October) and the wording of that summons could not have been clearer (see para 12 above).  The fact that the Assistant Magistrate did not personally sign an order is irrelevant.  Furthermore the reference to Article 9 of the 1949 Law is similarly incorrect.  That deals with a summons to commence criminal proceedings before a Magistrate's Court where it is not necessary to arrest a defendant.  The present appeal is concerned with proceedings which had already begun and adjourned for continuation on a date of which the defendant was made aware through the Viscount's Department. 

31.      If there is a reasonable excuse, there will be no contempt of court.  Thus if a person is ill or his car breaks down on the way to court, he will be able to explain this to the judge and there will be a reasonable excuse for his non-attendance.  The appellant's reason for non-attendance, namely that he did not accept the validity of the summons through the Viscount's Department, is not a valid excuse and therefore the Assistant Magistrate was correct to find him guilty of the first charge of contempt.  

32.      As to the second charge, the fact that, during the hearing of 26th October, the Assistant Magistrate did not use the actual word "order" despite being requested to do so by the appellant, is irrelevant.  She stated specifically that he "must attend" (page 10 of the transcript) and she said she was "directing" him to come on the 1st November (also at page 10).  Later on she said "Well I don't know what you think is a court order unless it is a court direction".  Later, when considering whether to bail the appellant for appearance on 1st November, she said (at page 15) "So, if you keep to that bail condition, that would be fine.  The second question is whether you will turn up to court on the 1st of November."  To which the defendant replied "I will be here under uhm special appearance under duress and protest, ma'am".  She then released him on bail with a return date for 1st November at 2:30pm. 

33.      For the reasons already given, the failure by the appellant to attend on 1st November was indeed a contempt of court and the Assistant Magistrate was correct to find him guilty.  The only excuse that he has put forward is that the Assistant Magistrate did not use the word "order".  That is irrelevant.  He was perfectly aware that the case had been adjourned to 1st November at 2:30pm and that he was bailed to appear at that time.  His failure to attend without reasonable excuse amounted to a contempt. 

(v) Assistant Magistrate wrong to enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf

34.      As recited above, the appellant refused to plead to the first contempt charge and to the two additional parking charges at the hearing on 26th October and objected when the Assistant Magistrate treated this as a not guilty plea.  He made a similar objection in relation to pleading to the second contempt charge on 5th November.  In our judgment, the Assistant Magistrate was entirely correct to enter a not guilty plea.  There is long standing practice both in the United Kingdom and in Jersey that, where a defendant refuses to enter a plea, a not guilty plea will be recorded, so that the prosecution is then put to proof of its case.  The Assistant Magistrate acted entirely correctly in so doing and did not step outside her judicial role as a result. 

(vi) Failure by prosecution to inform him of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court in statutory offences

35.      The appellant complained that the prosecution had never informed him of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court in matters of statutory offences i.e. matters which are not offences at customary law. 

36.      This point is of course relevant only to the parking charges.  Nevertheless the answer is to be found in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the 1949 Law. Article 1(1) defines "offence" as meaning:-

"any crime or misdemeanour (délit), whether at customary law or by enactment, any contravention of an enactment and any other act or omission involving breach of a duty to which by law a sanction is attached by way of punishment;"

37.      Article 2 then provides as follows:-

"Notwithstanding anything in any enactment, the Magistrate, sitting as judge in the Magistrate's Court, shall have power and authority to hear and determine all cases for offences, other than those which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Her Majesty."

38.      These provisions could not be clearer.  The Magistrate's Court has jurisdiction to try offences created by statute as well as those under customary law.  This jurisdiction is, however, subject to the limit imposed by Article 3, namely that the maximum penalty which may be imposed by the Magistrate is a fine of £5,000 or imprisonment for a term of 12 months.  The fact, if it be the case, that the prosecution failed or refused to explain this to the appellant is not a ground for appeal as it does not alter the fact that the Magistrate's Court had the relevant jurisdiction to try all the offences with which the appellant was charged. 

(vii) Statutory law only applies to those who consent to it

39.      In his oral submissions to us, the appellant asserted that a statute only applies to those who consent to it.  He did not consent and therefore legislation passed by the States did not bind him.  He developed this by saying that members of the States were servants of the public and that a servant cannot bind his master.  

40.      This submission is of course completely nonsensical in law. In Jersey, as in the United Kingdom, law comes from two sources.  First there is the customary law developed over the years by the courts; and secondly there is legislation passed by the States.  Both types of law are binding upon everyone without exception.  Indeed, legislation is in one sense a higher form of law because the States may by legislation amend the customary law whereas the customary law may not amend legislation.  A statute passed by the States is binding upon everyone, including the appellant; questions of consent simply do not arise.  

(viii) Lack of impartiality and breach of oath of office by the Assistant Magistrate - unjustified reference to 'Freeman of the Land'

41.      The appellant submits that the Assistant Magistrate has shown a lack of impartiality towards him and has therefore breached her oath of office.  He referred to the following matters in support as showing that she was biased against him:-

(i)        The note made on the charge sheet in respect of the hearing on 2nd April, 2012, records the following:-

"'Freeman of the Land' outburst, contempt of court, arrest ordered, taken into custody ..."

The appellant submits that a reading of the transcript for that date shows that there was no "outburst"; he simply refused to stand up when asked to plead to the charge.  Nor was there any reference to "Freeman of the Land".  He was not a member of any such movement and had no intention of joining one.  In support he produced an exchange of e-mails dated 6th January, 2012, where he expressly rejected the idea that he wanted to be a "Freeman of the Land". 

(a)       Similarly, the entry on the charge sheet for the hearing on 14th May, 2012, includes the following:-

"'Freeman of the Land outburst'.  ..... Arrested, sent to cells - contempt of court. Brought back to court - refuses to purge himself. Contempt of court - failing to surrender to bail and shouting at Magistrate ..."

The appellant submitted that he did not shout, there was no "outburst" and again there was no reference to "Freeman of the Land". 

(b)       In a note prepared for the Royal Court which set out a history of the proceedings against the appellant, the Assistant Magistrate had said the following:-

"He has repeatedly refused to acknowledge his name and address.  He challenges the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the laws of Jersey.  He appears to try to claim immunity from the laws of Jersey by adopting the spurious arguments of a movement known as Freemen on the Land."

The appellant submitted that this showed bias against him.  He had never used the expression "Freeman on the Land" until the bail hearing before the Royal Court on 9th November and that was in response to the contentions of the prosecution.  

(c)       Later in the same note, the Assistant Magistrate had stated:-

"The offences themselves were relatively minor but they were persistent and against a background of repeated assertions from Mr Vibert and his ilk that they are not subject to the criminal law and therefore, presumably intend to continue to behave in such a manner."

The appellant said that he had never asserted that he was not subject to the criminal law and the use of the phrase "and his ilk" was a pejorative phrase which disclosed a lack of impartiality.  

(d)       Finally, the appellant asserted that, at a hearing in the spring of 2010, the Assistant Magistrate had bellowed "Are you mad" at the appellant and had then instructed the Probation Department to ascertain if he was fit to plead. 

42.      It appears that, in a number of jurisdictions, there has been a development whereby certain persons question the authority of courts and also submit that only certain types of laws are binding upon them.  In support, they tend to file meaningless documents and arguments.  In Meads-v-Meads [2012] ABQB 571, Associate Chief Justice Rook in the Queen's Bench Court of Alberta conducted a detailed review of this development.  He chose to refer to such litigants as "OPCA" litigants but at paragraphs 172 - 175, he included "Freemen on the Land" in such definition.  The judgment is extremely lengthy and we propose only to refer to certain paragraphs which suggest that Mr Vibert has indeed put forward arguments which are often put forward by OPCA litigants. 

(i)        At paragraphs 7 and 206 - 209, the Alberta court explains how OPCA litigants frequently adopt unusual variations on personal names; for example adding irrelevant punctuation, particularly inserting colons before the last name.  As can be seen from the document set out at paragraph 11, the appellant has done that in this case. 

(ii)       As explained at paragraph 243 and 287 of the Alberta judgment, OPCA litigants will often demand that a judge provides some indication of valid authority, such as a copy of his oath of office.  As set out in this judgment, on 14th May, the appellant demanded to know whether the Assistant Magistrate was operating under her oath of office and on 26th October he asked whether she was operating in her capacity as a Magistrate.  These were meaningless questions to which a judge has no need to reply. 

(iii)      At paragraph 245 of the Alberta judgment, it is said that an OPCA litigant may refuse to identify themselves by name, instead stating that they are an agent or representative of an entity identified by the litigant's name.  In the document set out at paragraph 11, the appellant describes himself as "the man commonly called cyril:Vibert" and also states that he acts as "third party representative of Mr Cyril John Vibert" and as "beneficiary and executor of the Cyril John Vibert trust". 

(iv)      There are repeated references in the Alberta judgment - see for example paragraphs 248, 318, 326 and 385 - to the fact that OPCA litigants frequently assert that they are subject to the common law but not to legislation because their consent is required for the latter.  That is the same argument as the appellant has put forward in this case as referred to at paragraphs 39 - 40 above.  

(v)       At paragraph 249 of the Alberta judgment, there is reference to stereotypic OPCA litigant conduct, including a refusal to enter or a premature departure from a courtroom.  The appellant refused to enter the well of the Magistrate's Court on 14th May and departed prematurely on 12th October. 

(vi)      At paragraphs 257 and 258 of the Alberta judgment there is reference to the fact that OPCA litigants will engage in disruptive and inappropriate court conduct and the examples given include the attempted arrest of a judge (although it is not clear that this was in court).  At the hearing on 14th May, as set out at paragraph 5 above, the appellant purported to arrest the Assistant Magistrate. 

(vii)     The Alberta judgment refers extensively to meaningless documents which are filed by OPCA litigants.  The document filed by the appellant in this case and set out at paragraph 11 is such a document.  In legal terms each of the four paragraphs in the document is nonsensical and has no legal effect whatsoever.  

43.      Following this discussion, we turn to consider the specific points relied upon by the appellant as showing a lack of impartiality on the part of the Assistant Magistrate:-

(i)        The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it is the Greffier sitting in court who makes entries on the charge sheet recording what has occurred, not the sitting Magistrate.  Thus the entry in relation to 2nd April is not indicative of any attitude on the part of the Assistant Magistrate.  We accept that, on the basis of the transcript - although we have not heard the tape - reference to an "outburst" appears to have been putting it too strongly.  But, as we say, this was nothing to do with the Assistant Magistrate and displays no lack of impartiality on her part.  

(ii)       The same comment applies in respect of the entry on 14th May.  Even if it was incorrect to state that the appellant shouted at the Assistant Magistrate - and in the absence of listening to the tapes we are unable to determine the position - it was nothing to do with the Assistant Magistrate. 

(iii)      We accept the appellant's statement that he is not a member of the Freemen on the Land movement and has never referred to himself as belonging to it.  However, as set out at paragraph 42 above, he has used arguments similar to those which can reasonably be referred to (by way of shorthand) as Freemen on the Land arguments.  We do not read the comment of the Assistant Magistrate in her note as asserting that the appellant was a member of the Freemen of the Land movement.  She asserted merely that he was adopting the spurious arguments put forward by that movement.  For the reasons we have given, we do not think that that was an inaccurate statement.  It does not therefore disclose a lack of impartiality on her part.  Similarly the use of the expression in the charge sheets referred to at (i) and (ii) above was clearly a short-hand for the type of conduct which the appellant was displaying. 

(iv)      The appellant also complains of the Assistant Magistrate's use of the words "and his ilk" in the same note.  We agree that it would have been preferable not to have used that expression but it is clearly a reference to the sort of arguments put forward by others which the appellant has also put forward.  We think that the use of those words is wholly insufficient to suggest that the Assistant Magistrate was not approaching her task in an impartial manner.  

(v)       As to the alleged incident in the Spring of 2010, we have heard no evidence nor seen a transcript of what occurred and are therefore unable to consider the matter further. 

44.      In connection with the allegation by the appellant that the Assistant Magistrate is biased against him, we note that at the hearing on 12th October, despite his absence, the Assistant Magistrate acquitted him of a charge of failing to provide information contrary to Article 86(1)(a) of the Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956 because she was not satisfied that the prosecution had made out their case. 

Conclusion

45.      As can be seen, the arguments raised by the appellant have ranged far and wide and many of them have related more directly to the parking charges rather than the contempt charges.  Nevertheless, we have felt it appropriate to deal with them all.  

46.      For the reasons we have given, we do not find that any of the appellant's arguments give rise to any concern about the safety or propriety of the two convictions for contempt of court.  We are quite satisfied that the appellant was in each case aware that he was to attend court for the continuation of the case against him.  In relation to 25th October, he had been summoned to attend by personal service effected through the Viscount's Department.  In relation to 1st November, he had been told by the Assistant Magistrate that he must attend and had confirmed that he would.  None of the matters which he has put forward amounts to reasonable excuse and we therefore dismiss the appeals against conviction. 

47.      Turning to sentence, the Assistant Magistrate was entitled to take into account the appellant's previous conduct as described in this judgment.  We have no doubt that the sentence of seven days imprisonment for each count was entirely reasonable; indeed it could have been longer without risk of being overturned on appeal.  We therefore also dismiss the appeal against sentence. 

Authorities

Vibert-v-AG [2012] JRC 181.

European Convention on Human Rights.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Loi (1864) Reglant la Procedure Criminelle.

Michel-v-AG [2006] JCA 152.

Locabail (UK) Limited-v-Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] 1 All ER 65.

Magistrate's Court (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Jersey) Law 1949.

Syvret-v-AG [2011] JRC 168.

Meads-v-Meads [2012] ABQB 571.

Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956.