Before : |
The Hon. Michael Beloff, Q.C. sitting as a single judge. |
John Tasker Lewis
Ian Michael Christmas
Russell Philip Foot
James Cameron
-v-
The Attorney General
Ruling by Senior Ordinary Appeal Judge Beloff, JA on the questions of time to appeal following conviction.
Crown Advocate M. T. Jowitt.
Advocate S. A. Pearmain for Lewis.
Advocate R. MacRae for Christmas.
Advocate R. Tremoceiro for Foot.
Advocate M. L. Preston for Cameron.
JUDGMENT
beloff ja:
1. In my Judgment of 22nd August 2012 (''the First judgement'') I made an order nisi extending the time for service of Notices of Appeal against conviction until 5th September 2012. The judgment was circulated to representatives of all parties, but has prompted only one set of submissions i.e. on behalf of Mr Cameron (''The Submission''). I shall assume that the other parties are content with the proposed extension although one of the matters relied on by Mr Cameron i.e. the legal aid factor and its consequences (see para 13 of The Submission) might resonate in their cases too.
2. I also note that the explanation for departure from the practice direction referred to in the first judgment (see the first Judgment para 11) is not particularly persuasive. The application was initiated by a non-compliant informal procedure; the response from the Greffier could not retrospectively cure that defect (see The Submission para 8). And while I naturally accept that Mr Boothman assumed that the Greffier's later email of the same day suggested Court approval for the extension, it would have been optimistic to infer that a single judge had been asked for his or her approval rather than that the Greffier was herself speaking for the Court (see The Submission para 7).
3. Despite that I recognize that the Appellants have, up to the date of the First Judgment assumed that they had until 1st November 2012 to give notice of appeal; and that the September 5th 2012 date would prevent Mr Cameron from making appropriate use of English Counsel for whom funding was approved on 23rd August 2012, and of later dialogue with his local Advocates -although I repeat that, given that what is in issue is an appeal against a criminal conviction, for which potential grounds are limited, and which does not equate to a rehearing, I do not consider that it would be disadvantage Mr Cameron unfairly if I were to extend the period for filing of a notice of appeal only for a further fortnight i.e. until September 19th 2012 - in effect Mr Cameron's alternative proposal (The Submission para 17). The statement ''it is not a case where the grounds of appeal were immediately apparent'' cuts both ways (The Submission para 12); and the public interest considerations to which I referred in the first Judgment para 11 remain lively. I am not prepared to revert to the Greffier's direction which was, in any event -issues of its validity apart-, made excusably without appreciation of all material facts.
4. The extension proposed applies to all putative appellants.
Authorities