Jersey Unreported Judgments

Application by the Attorney General in relation to the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010.

[2011]JRC246

Royal Court

(Samedi)

28 December 2011

The Attorney General

-v-

C

Application by the Attorney General in relation to the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010.

R. C. P. Pedley, Esq., Crown Advocate.

Advocate M. L. Preston for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

THE DEPUTY BAILIFF:

1.        C was convicted before the coming into force of the Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010 ("the Law"), having pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and one count of attempting to procure an act of gross indecency.  The victims in both cases were members of his own family.  He remains an untreated sex offender.  At sentence, he failed to co-operate with the Probation Service in the preparation of a report.  The Attorney General brings this application to the Court under Article 13(2) of the Law for an order that C should be subject to the notification requirements under the Law and that the Court should set a minimum period of five years before any application can be made to dis-apply the notification requirements.  The Attorney General also seeks restrictive orders pursuant to Article 10 of the Law. 

2.        On 5^th October I sat as a single judge in Chambers to authorise service of the Attorney General's representation on C with a return date on Friday 7^th October at 3.30 pm.  The hearing on 5^th October was in private, and in accordance with the usual practice, it was ordered that the hearing should continue in private only for as long as an application could be made for the whole hearing to take place in private.  On 7^th October, Advocate Preston, for C, indicated that his client would prefer the matter to be held in private, but no substantive grounds for doing so were advanced.  In the circumstances the Court sat in public, but the judgment is anonymised to protect the identities of those family members whom C admitted assaulting indecently. 

3.        It became apparent during the course of argument that the Crown were prepared to concede the matters which Advocate Preston raised on behalf of C.  In the circumstances, this being a civil matter and the Attorney General and C consenting to the order which was proposed, the Court did not conduct any detailed examination of the evidence but we noted the report of the probation officer that C is assessed at being at medium risk of sexual and or violent recidivism, using the RM 2000 Risk Assessment, and similarly of medium risk of sexual recidivism using the Stable and Acute (SA 07) Risk Assessment. 

4.        By consent therefore we order that C be subject to the notification requirements under the Law and that at least five years must expire before he is able to apply to the Court for an order that he no longer be subject to those requirements.  Pursuant to Article 10 of the Law we also order by consent: 

(i)        That he be prohibited from contacting, directly or indirectly, any of A, B, D, or E, other than any contact which is inadvertent or unavoidable. 

(ii)       That he be prohibited from contacting, directly or indirectly, F or G, other than any contact which is inadvertent or unavoidable, unless such contact is approved and supervised by the Children's Service. 

(iii)      But in circumstances where he finds himself in contact with any of A, B, D, E F or G, that he had a positive duty to remove himself from that situation as soon as reasonably possible.     

5.        We close by saying this.  One of the orders which was sought by the Attorney General and which was resisted by Advocate Preston was that C be prohibited from being alone with any female under the age of 18 years, the person being considered to be alone if there was no third person present who was over the age of 21.  We have not made that order, not least because Advocate Preston did not consent to it being made on C's behalf, but in addition because we note that there is nothing in the evidence which has been placed before us which suggested that this order would be proportionate or appropriate.  First of all an order which prohibits a person over the age of 16, who is legally entitled to consent to sexual activity, from being present with C, could not be justified.  Secondly the convictions which C has, and the information which is before us, do not suggest that C presents a risk of serious sexual harm to any persons other than female members of his own family.  Of course, if other evidence were to be presented, the Court could make a reassessment of the conclusion which has been reached on the evidence so far, and in that event it would be open indeed to the Attorney General to come back to Court seeking further or different restraining orders under Article 10 of the Law.    

Authorities

Sex Offenders (Jersey) Law 2010.