Jersey Unreported Judgments

[2011]JCA146

Court of Appeal

28 July 2011

	Before     :		The Hon. Michael Beloff, Q.C., President; Miss Clare Montgomery, Q.C., and; Christopher G. Nugee Q.C..
Between		Stuart Syvret		Applicant
And		Her Majesty's Attorney General		First Respondent
		Connétable of Grouville		Second Respondent

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.

The Applicant represented himself.

Advocate W. Redgrave for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

THE president:

Introduction

1.        This is the judgment of the Court.

2.        This is before us a renewed application made pursuant to the Court of Appeal (Civil) Judicial Review Rules 2000 by Mr Syvret for leave to appeal a refusal of an application for leave to apply for judicial review of certain acts or decisions of the then Attorney-General and Connetable of Grouville (subject to an application to adjourn the application itself which we deal with later).  Both leaves were refused by Commissioner Pitchers on 17^th June 2011.  At the start of proceedings we were courteously asked by Mr Syvret, who has conducted his case with clarity and moderation, as to whether there was any reason why, according to tests too well established to require repetition, we should recuse ourselves because of connection with the two putative respondents.  The relationship of each of us with the then Attorney General has been a purely professional one of different duration reflecting our respective memberships of the Court.  None of us are aware of ever having encountered the Connetable of Grouville on any occasion at all.  We are therefore entirely confident that it is appropriate for us to sit on this matter.

3.        There is also an application for leave to appeal to this Court from a separate but related decision of Commissioner Pitchers refusing on 7^th July 2011 to adjourn the forthcoming appeal set down for 1^st August 2011 against Mr Syvret's conviction for offences against the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005 ("DPJL"), and domestic motoring law, as well as findings of contempt of court.  There are other ancillary applications for adjournments to which we will refer in due course.

Background

4.        The background to these applications is involved. We set out only those necessary to understand their thrust.

5.        Mr Syvret is a well known political figure in Jersey having previously been both a senator and a minister, and is a determined campaigner, especially in the field of child abuse.  In this latter capacity he has made several and serious allegations of cover up of the scale of the problem in Jersey.  He asserts that it is for this, among other reasons, that he has incurred the hostility of the Jersey establishment who have been the motive force behind both his dismissal as a minister in 2007 (the subject of separate proceedings upon which Commissioner Sumption recently adjudicated ([2011] JRC 116)) and covert surveillance as well as his arrest, detention and prosecution for the data protection offences, and his prosecution for certain motoring offences all of which is designed to punish him for his past and to frustrate him in his future campaigning activities.  He holds the Attorney-General responsible for all these matters and the Connetable of Grouville responsible for the surveillance, arrest and detention and for his prosecution for the motoring offences.

6.        In 19^th March 2009 Mr Syvret, who ran a weblog on the internet (a blog) published, inter alia, a confidential States of Jersey Police report written in May 1999 by the then Detective Inspector Barry Faudemer ("the Faudemer Report") which related to an investigation into the conduct of a named nurse at the Jersey General Hospital.  Mr Syvret identified the nurse whom we will call X.  He described Nurse X so identified, inter alia, as a mass murderer and a psychopath, and identified another nurse whom we will call Y who had, he claimed, failed to reveal significant information about X.

7.        In early April 2009 Mr Syvret was arrested by a substantial number of policemen at his then home, the house of his then partner, Deputy Labey and detained in custody at the police station for over 7 hours, while his home was thoroughly searched.

8.        On 16^th July 2009 Mr Syvret was charged with offences against the data protection legislation (and on 18^th June 2010 with the motoring offences (driving without a licence and failing to notify the authorities of a change of address).)

9.        On 27^th September 2010 Mr Syvret lodged with the Royal Court an application for judicial review of certain decisions relating to the prosecutions.

10.      On 27^th September 2010 Commissioner Clyde-Smith refused to recuse himself, refused the application (reasons being given on 6^th October 2010) and refused an application for leave to appeal his decisions.

11.      On 14^th October 2010 the Magistrate refused an application for the stay of the criminal proceedings against Mr Syvret for the data protection and motoring offences, both said by Mr Syvret to be an abuse of process.

12.      On 14^th October 2010 Mr Syvret was convicted of the motoring offences.

13.      On 17^th November 2010 Mr Syvret was convicted of the data protection offences.

14.      Mr Syvret was also found guilty of contempt of court by the Magistrate on account of acts of non attendance and words of disrespect.

15.      On 18^th March 2011 Commissioner Pitchers gave directions in relation to Mr Syvret's appeal against all these convictions.

16.      On 17^th June 2011 Mr Syvret made a fresh application for judicial review - the subject of the matter before this Court.

17.      On 17^th June 2011, as noted above, Commissioner Pitchers refused the application.

18.      On 5^th July 2011 Jones JA refused Mr Syvret's application for leave to appeal, the refusal of leave to appeal for judicial review of Commissioner Clyde-Smith (including the latter's refusal to recuse himself). As the learned JA noted, Mr Syvret had failed to pursue that application with any due regard to appropriate rules and orders.

19.      On 5^th July 2011 Mr Syvret also applied for an adjournment of his forthcoming criminal appeal.

20.      On 7^th July 2011, as noted above Commissioner Pitchers refused to adjourn the criminal appeal.

21.      It is not and has not ever been in issue that Mr Syvret disclosed the name of Nurse X which had been included in the Faudemer report, and that Mr Syvret was accordingly guilty of an offence unless he could justify the disclosure.  Section 55 DPJL which creates the offence permits such disclosure where it is "necessary for the purposing preventing crime" section 55(3)(a) or is "justified as being in the public interest" section 55(3)(d).  Mr Syvret seeks to rely on both those defences.  It has not been suggested that he has any substantive defence to the motoring charges.

22.      Mr Syvret has, however, a threshold point namely that the prosecutions themselves were abusive being motivated, as we have said, by dislike of his campaigning activities and - for good measure - of the actions of his former partner Deputy Labey who has alleged corruption in a planning matter. Hence he argued it was an example of that form of abuse of process where it would offend the Court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the particular circumstances of the case (Warren v AG Jersey 2011 UKPC 10 at para 22).  He has sought disclosure of various documentation which he claims to be relevant to his substantive defences to the Data Protection charges and to his assertion of abuse of process, as well as orders to compel the attendance of certain witnesses.  He has had only limited success in these applications, the Magistrate and Commissioner Pitchers having ruled that they were irrelevant to the issues before them, the latter in his judgment of 18^th March 2011. 

Judicial Review in Jersey

23.      Mr Syvret is correct in his assertion that no officer excising public powers, be he of the status of Attorney-General or Connetable, is immune from judicial review: the seniority of the putative respondent is no bar to an application well founded upon the familiar ultra vires principles, which include, in his catalogue (para 27) decisions or actions taken "in bad faith, not for the purposes for which they were given, excessively and unfairly".

24.      Judicial review has authoritatively been recognised as part of the machinery of justice in this jurisdiction since the seminal case of Planning Committee v Lesquende [1998] JLR 1 ("Lesquende") pp6-7:-

"Judicial review in Jersey 

For our part, we endorse the existence of a remedy by way of judicial review in Jersey. The inherent jurisdiction of the courts to control excess or abuse of power by executive bodies seems to us to be intrinsic to the very judicial process and vital to the rule of law. To confer upon an administrative authority limited powers only, but to provide no means for confining them within those limits, would be paradoxical. There is nothing in the traditions of Norman French law, as developed in Jersey, which appears incompatible and much appears consistent with our conclusion. It would in principle be regrettable to deny to a citizen of Jersey a form of relief available to citizens in other parts of Her Majesty's dominions (see generally Blom-Cooper & Blake, Judicial Review in Jersey, Public Law 371 (1997)). "

25.      However Judicial Review also has its own fundamental principles, some but not all of which are reflected in its specific procedural rules (see Jersey Royal Court Rules (RCR) Part 16) of which those germane to Mr Syvret's application are these:-

(i)        An application has to be made, absent cogent reasons, within the specified time limits i.e. three months (Rules 16/3(17); for reasons articulated by Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman 1983 2 AC 273 at 280-281 as to the public interest in officials knowing as early as possible whether their decisions were said to be susceptible to challenge (We shall abstain from consideration of whether the application has to be made promptly i.e. within less than 3 months because of doubts raised in R v Burkett ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham LBC 2002 3 All ER 97 as to its compatibility with the requirements of legal certainty.) 

(ii)       "Sufficient interest" in the subject matter of the application is required (Royal Court Rules (RCR 16/2(ii)).

(iii)      It is a remedy of last resort, only to be deployed when other available remedies have been exhausted.  R v IRC ex p Preston 1985 AC 835 at p.852 per Lord Scarman.  Lesquende at p.13.

(iv)      It is a discretionary remedy. Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 10^th ed ("Wade") p.599

(v)       While the doctrine of res judicata may not be engaged, the Court can refuse to entertain questions which have been litigated in earlier proceedings when this would itself be an abuse of legal process.  (Wade p.210.)  The reasons why repeated applications of the same kind are to be resisted in public as well as in private law, mutatis mutandis, are set out with characteristic luminosity by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Johnson v Gore Wood 2002 2 AC 1 at p31:-

''The underlying public interest is that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be vexed twice in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole''.

To all this we would add that the machinery of judicial review is not designed to cope with the resolution of complex or controversial issues of fact (see discussions in De Smith: Judicial Review 6^th Edition pp880-881).

The Approach to the Application

26.      Commissioner Pitchers rejected Mr Syvret's application on the grounds of alternative remedy (i.e. abuse of process which was raised in the Magistrates Court and could be raised on appeal) (para 17) and the civil remedies in relation to arrest, detention and search and seizure (trespass) (para 10): as well as futility (para 11).  He became conscious - but only after closure of the hearing - of the overlap between the application before him and that before Commissioner Clyde-Smith, so deliberately eschewed that potential basis for refusal of leave (para 4).  He also eschewed delay as a ground for refusal, given that two affidavits sought to be relied upon by Mr Syvret, those of Graham Power and of Lenny Harper - both former police officers - were of recent origin (para 9).

27.      On this renewed application we have considered the application de novo it being just and convenient to do so, and no contrary provision of law or rules having been drawn to our attention (Court of Appeal (Jersey) Law 1961 Article 15, Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 1962, Article 2(1) Court of Appeal (Civil) Judicial Review Rules 2000). (Cf: R (Werner) v IRC 2002 EWCA Cir at [31]-[32]

The Analysis

28.      The following matters appear to us to be critical.

29.      First Mr Syvret's application was well out of time in so far as he attacks the decisions of the two officers specific to his case.  This is a fortiori in so far as he suggests that the "present prosecution and charging arrangements in Jersey are structurally conflicted". (para 16).  No reason for the delay other than his involvement in the criminal proceedings and the asserted importance of the issues raised was advanced to us by way of explanation, and we do not consider this sufficient in the present context to overcome the objection.

30.      Second - and in any event - insofar as Mr Syvret asserts that the decisions to charge and prosecute are themselves abusive, these are matters which should ratione materiae be raised in the context of the criminal proceedings.  In Sharma v Browne-Antoine (2007) 1 WLR 780 (applied by this Court in Trant v AG [2007] JCA 073), Lord Bingham said:-

"The Board is not aware of any English case in which leave to challenge a decision to prosecute has been granted... In Wayte v United States  (1985) 470 US 598, 607, Powell J described the decision to prosecute as "particularly ill-suited to judicial review". The courts have given a number of reasons for their extreme reluctance to disturb decisions to prosecute by way of judicial review. They include (i)

"the great width of the DPP's discretion and the polycentric character of official decision-making in such matters including policy and public interest considerations which are not susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional function nor the practical competence of the courts to assess their merits" ( Matalulu  [2003] 4 LRC 712, 735, cited in Mohit  [2006] 1 WLR 3343, para 17);

(ii) "the wide range of factors relating to available evidence, the public interest and perhaps other matters which [the prosecutor] may properly take into account" (counsel's argument in Mohit  , at para 18, accepting that the threshold of a successful challenge is "a high one"); (iii) the delay inevitably caused to the criminal trial if it proceeds ( Kebilene  [2000] 2 AC 326, 371; Pretty  [2002] 1 AC 800, para 77); (iv) "the desirability of all challenges taking place in the criminal trial or on appeal":  Kebilene  , at p 371; and see Pepushi  [2004] Imm AR 549, para 49. In addition to the safeguards afforded to the defendant in a criminal trial, the court has a well-established power to restrain proceedings which are an abuse of its process, even where such abuse does not compromise the fairness of the trial itself:  R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, Ex p Bennett  [1994] 1 AC 42. But, as Lord Lane CJ pointed out with reference to abuse applications in Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] QB 630, 642:

"We would like to add to that statement of principle by stressing a point which is sometimes overlooked, namely, that the trial process itself is equipped to deal with the bulk of complaints which have in recent Divisional Court cases founded applications for a stay."

(v) The blurring of the executive function of the prosecutor and the judicial function of the court, and of the distinct roles of the criminal and the civil courts:  R v Humphrys  [1977] AC 1, 24, 26, 46, 53,  Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Attorney General  [1981] AC 718, 733, 742,  R v Power  [1994] 1 SCR 601, 621-623,  Kostuch  128 DLR (4th) 440, 449-450 and  Pretty  [2002] 1 AC 800, para 121."

(p.787-789)

[See too Jones JA cit supra para 20]

31.      Mr Syvret ingeniously argues that since both the Magistrate and- at the directions hearing Commissioner Pitchers - ruled out, as he puts it, "the broad and detailed questions of whether the conduct of the Attorney-General, the Connetable of Grouville and the prosecution generally has been lawful'' (para 57) and Commissioner Pitchers has refused to make orders as to prosecution disclosure which could assist him in his arguments, he is in a Catch 22 situation (para 70) and lacks therefore the remedy for his complaint to which Article 13 of the ECHR entitles him.

32.      This seems to us to be a not wholly accurate analysis of the ruling of Commissioner Pitchers. The Commissioner has opined - correctly - that arguments as to abuse of process can only properly be raised in the criminal proceedings. He has also set limits to what material he considers is admissible in this context. He has declined to allow a fishing expedition in uncharted seas. Mr Syvret confuses and conflates two separate matters: on the one hand whether he had an alternative remedy to his application for judicial review, which he did i.e. a claim of abuse of process within the framework of the criminal proceedings, and on the other hand whether such claim succeeded - a matter not yet finally determined.  Under the Magistrates Court (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law 1949 Article 26(2).  Mr Syvret could not advance his abuse of process claim to this Court; the Royal Court is the last port of call.  But if - and we stress we speak hypothetically - his convictions were upheld, but in violation of his Article 6 rights because of denial to him of access to relevant material, he could contemplate a Strasbourg petition.

33.      Thirdly, private law offers an arsenal of adequate remedies for malicious prosecution (if he were acquitted (Gregory v Portsmouth County Council [2000] AC 419 at page 426) misfeasance in public office (Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1) and, in particular, for the wrongful arrest and detention (R (WM) Congo v Home Secretary 2011 UKSC 12 para 55) [as well as Conventions based remedies] with procedures enabling contested issues of fact to be effectively explored and resolved.  It is fair to note that disquiet has been expressed by the Courts below as to the circumstances of Mr Syvret's arrest, detention and search which may appear to have been disproportionate, (see the statement of Graham Power QPM, former Chief Officer of Police) and even unlawful.   However, without hearing from both sides, we abstain from making further comments on this aspect of his complaint.

34.      Fourth, Mr Syvret is seeking, in our view, to resurrect matters already disposed of by Commissioner Clyde-Smith and Jones JA.  A comparative analysis shows that the present application for judicial review is more limited in scope than its predecessor, but there is nothing of significance raised in the new that was not in the old application.  Indeed Mr Syvret candidly admitted as much. 

35.      There is moreover nothing in any of the new material that Mr Syvret has gathered or claims he could gather which would entitle us to allow the new application to proceed on the basis of significant change of circumstance.  The objections on ground of alternative remedy are no less strong, and on grounds of delay are stronger than they were on the first occasion that Mr Syvret sought to ventilate his application.

36.      Fifth, as Commissioner Pitcher put it pithily, there is an element of futility in the application "Any decisions that were taken, were taken long ago and cannot be undone" (para 11).

37.      For all these alternate reasons we would refuse leave to appeal on the basis advanced in the formal application.

38.      We turn separately to the matter which achieved greatest salience in the oral submissions made to us by Mr Syvret and start by setting it in context.

39.      It is a hallowed precept of the common law that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done.  Partly but not exclusively under the influence of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights a position has been reached when appearance of justice enjoys parity with its actuality as a mandatory prerequisite.

40.      In consequence consideration has had to be given in diverse jurisdictions to the question of multiplicity of roles of those with responsibility for the administration of justice.  Examples include the position of the Bailiff of Guernsey, McGonnell v UK (2000) 30 ECHR 289, and the Lord Chancellor of England whose judicial function was initially suspended and then abolished as incompatible with his executive and legislative roles. 

41.      Mr Syvret wishes not only on his own behalf as an alleged victim of oppression, but as a concerned citizen or tribune of the people to bring before the Court a claim by way of judicial review that, as he puts it in his application "it is clear that the present prosecution and charging arrangements in Jersey are structurally conflicted and are inherently incapable making lawful decisions - for example decisions free of conflict and bias and of the appearance of bias." (Paragraph 16).  This is a point made separately from his further points that "the office of Attorney General has been actually specifically conflicted in the case of the applicant" (Paragraph 17) and that the then Attorney General acted vis-à-vis him in bad faith (Paragraph 19)

42.      Mr Syvret, however, is effectively inviting us to grant him leave to bring judicial review in a wholly novel guise.  His application and his contentions are all concerned with unlawfulness and abuse of power of actions taken by the two putative respondents against him (as was the application before Commissioner Clyde-Smith).

43.      We do not consider that we should allow him to do so.  If and when he or any other individual wishes to bring such an application in which it is claimed that such alleged structural defect has had adverse consequences, it must be dealt with on its merits.  Issues will arise as to sufficiency of interest - since liberal though modern rules of standing are, there is no actio popularis - delay, the suitability of such a case for judicial review (as distinct, for example, from detailed enquiry such as that carried out by Lord Carswell 2010 Report Ch 6 Role of the Law Officers especially paras 6.2-6.12 whose conclusions as to the Attorney General's prosecutorial role are singularly at odds with Mr Syvret's analysis) and whether it would be appropriate to let such application go forward, absent an identified victim.  The matters, by reference, to which such alleged structural defect is said to exist would need to be described with greater precision and particularity than has so far been the case in Mr Syvret's application, and wholly segregated from any allegations of improper exercise of power by any holder of the office.

44.      So that there is no misunderstanding we have found ourselves able to dispose of this application without any consideration of the merits (or lack of merits) of Mr Syvret's factual allegations, couched as they occasionally have been in extreme language.  Our judgment assumes, but certainly does not decide, that some or all of them may have substance.

45.      We turn now to the sundry applications for an adjournment.

Adjournment

46.      Mr Syvret made three applications for adjournment. The first was made in the Royal Court to the Commissioner for an adjournment of Mr Syvret's criminal appeals set down for 1 August 2011. The application was said to be required in order to allow sufficient time for Mr Syvret to receive, read, assess, take advice upon and prepare his case in respect of the relevant criminal appeals. This application was refused by the Commissioner in his judgment of 17 June 2011 and the decision was confirmed by the Commission on 7 July 2011.  In the second also made to the Royal Court Mr Syvret sought an adjournment of his criminal appeals pending the determination of his judicial review application made against the Data Protection Commissioner. first and second Mr Syvret sought an adjournment of the hearing of this application for leave to appeal against the refusal of the application for leave to apply for judicial review in relation to the decisions of the then Attorney General and the Connétable of Grouville.

The applications made to the Commissioner

47.      So far as the applications made to the Commissioner to adjourn the criminal appeals are concerned, we first consider whether this court has any jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

48.      Part 5 of the Magistrate's Court (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Jersey) Law 1949 provides for appeals by person convicted by the Magistrate's Court to the Royal Court.

49.      Article 26(2) of the Magistrate's Court (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Jersey) Law 1949 provides that:-

"(2) Any judgment or order of the Royal Court under this Part shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to appeal to any other court."

50.      In the circumstances we are not persuaded that we would have jurisdiction to consider any appeal against the decision of the Commissioner refusing to adjourn appeals from the Magistrates' Court.

51.      In any event the decision whether to adjourn was a decision which was within the discretion of the Commissioner and an appeal court would only interfere if clear grounds were shown that the refusal to adjourn was irrational or would otherwise cause injustice. In our judgment no clear grounds have been established by Mr Syvret which show irrationality or injustice. 

52.      The ambit and nature of the materials on which the criminal appeals are to proceed was determined on 17 June 2011. Mr Syvret, although he appears in person, has accordingly had several weeks to prepare for the hearing in August.

53.      Although Mr Syvret states that he has recently been made aware of fresh defence materials in the form of statements from the former police officers, Messrs Power and Harper, there does not appear to be any need for delay in order for Mr Syvret to secure this evidence, insofar as it may be relevant to the criminal appeal, since both former officers are ostensibly willing witnesses for the defence.

54.      The applications for an adjournment were further made on the basis that Mr Syvret believed his criminal appeals would be advanced by arguments and material that Mr Syvret hoped might emerge to enhance his arguments that the criminal cases against him are an abuse of the process of the court and founded upon unlawful actions by, amongst others, the Data Protection Commissioner, the Attorney General and the Connétable of Grouville.

55.      We do not consider that there is any prospect of any such material emerging in the foreseeable future that would have a material impact on the arguments available to Mr Syvret; we could not sanction an adjournment of a criminal matter on a merely speculative basis.  Mr Syvret remains free to advance before the Commissioner, within the limits of relevance established by the Royal Court and the evidence available to him, all the legal arguments he possesses as to the illegality of the actions of the officers of the Bailiwick.

The other applications made to this Court

56.      The Court of Appeal undoubtedly has discretion to adjourn Mr Syvret's application for leave to appeal against the refusal of leave to make an application for judicial review. No proper basis for an adjournment to enable Mr Syvret to improve his case for leave was advanced as such: nor indeed could we envisage how that could be improved given the procedural grounds which we had held fatal to it. 

57.      The matters that appear to us to be relevant to the exercise of our discretion, in the context of an application that, Mr Syvret primarily contends, may affect the progress of his appeal against summary conviction are:-

(i)        the need for expedition in criminal proceedings; summary justice should normally to be speedy.

(ii)       where the interests of justice lie; weighing the interests of the public against the interests and possible innocence of defendant.

(iii)      whether the defence would be compromised were an adjournment to be refused.

(iv)      whether the prosecution had been at fault or has otherwise contributed to the need for an adjournment

58.      We consider that the Court of Appeal is also required to take appropriate account of the history of the case and whether there had been other adjournments or delays. Clearly everything depends upon the circumstances of each case and the court's assessment of it.

59.      In the instant case we do not consider that an adjournment would be warranted. The criminal proceedings relate back to events in March 2009 (in the case of the data protection charges) and still earlier events in the case of the motoring charges. The convictions in respect of allegations of contempt relate to the conduct of Mr. Syvret in the Magistrates court in 2009 and 2010.

60.      In the absence of any other considerations this chronology points to the need for the criminal appeals to heard and determined expeditiously.

61.      We do not consider that the outcome of this judicial review would have any impact on outcome of the criminal appeals. Mr. Syvret has not been able to explain to us how any argument that is legitimately open to him in the criminal appeal proceedings would be affected by this (or any) application for judicial review. Accordingly we do not consider that his defence would be compromised by a refusal to adjourn these proceedings.

62.      Nor are we persuaded that the prosecution has been at fault so as to contribute to the need for an adjournment. Although Mr. Syvret complained about the failure of Crown Counsel to review certain material for the purposes of disclosure we consider that this complaint, if well founded, may be raised before the Royal Court and would not justify us in adjourning these proceedings.

63.      Mr. Syvret has expressed concern that the refusal of an adjournment might mean that he is liable to be sentenced to up to a year's imprisonment if his criminal appeals fail and thus that any vindication of his constitutional and human rights based claims may not be effective to protect him from prison.

64.      We acknowledge that Mr. Syvret appears genuinely anxious about the outcome of his appeals, however we do not consider that we can make any assumptions as to their prospects of success. Mr. Syvret may succeed in his appeals against his convictions and sentences in whole or in part; it would not be right to proceed on the assumption that the appeals would reach conclusions that are wrong, unjust or procedurally flawed.

65.      We have also taken into account in refusing the adjournment sought the fact that the criminal appeals have already been adjourned at Mr Syvret's request from May 2011; the judicial review proceedings have not been brought promptly; and, as we have already observed, in large measure seek to repeat claims made and dismissed in an application for Judicial review refused in October 2010  (Syvret v AG [2010] JRC 179) in relation to which an application for an extension of time to appeal was refused by the  Court of Appeal in July 2011 (Syvret v AG [2011] JCA 130).

66.      Accordingly the application for adjournment made to this Court is refused.

Authorities

Court of Appeal (Civil) Judicial Review Rules 2000.

Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005.

Warren v AG Jersey 2011 UKPC 10.

Planning Committee v Lesquende [1998] JLR 1.

O'Reilly v Mackman 1983 2 AC.

R v Burkett ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham LBC 2002 3 All ER 97.

Royal Court Rules

R v IRC ex p Preston 1985 AC 835.

Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 10th ed.

Johnson v Gore Wood 2002 2 AC 1.

De Smith: Judicial Review 6th Edition.

Court of Appeal (Jersey) Law 1961.

Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 1962.

Sharma v Browne-Antoine (2007) 1 WLR 780.

Trant v AG [2007] JCA 073.

Syvret v AG and Connetable of Grouville [2011] JCA 130.

European Convention on Human Rights.

Magistrates Court (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Jersey) Law 1949.

Gregory v Portsmouth County Council [2000] AC 419.

Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1.

R (WM) Congo v Home Secretary 2011 UKSC 12.

McGonnell v UK (2000) 30 ECHR 289.

Lord Carswell 2010 Report Ch 6 Role of the Law Officers.

Syvret v AG and Connetable of Grouville [2010] JRC 179.