Jersey Unreported Judgments

[2011]JRC060A

Royal Court

(Samedi)

18 March 2011

Before     :		Sir Christopher Pitchers, Commissioner, sitting alone.
Between	Stuart Syvret		Applicant
And	Her Majesty's Attorney General		First Respondent
	Connétable of Grouville		Second Respondent

APPLICATION HEARING REGARDING DISCLOSURE UNDER THE ABUSE OF PROCESS.

Stuart Syvret appeared in person.

Advocate S. M. Baker for the Respondents.

judgment

the commissioner:

1.        Now a couple of preliminary matters, Mr Syvret I have looked at the two versions of the Warwickshire report, redacted and un-redacted, and I have seen the letter from Ms Labey which was received yesterday both in electronic and hard copy.  The redactions are very minor and in my judgment are justified so I am not ordering any further disclosure in respect of the Warwickshire report.  I also received from you, a response from Mr Redgrave and the response to his response from you, an email about what you say was the improper curtailing of your cross examination of witnesses.  I am not going to deal with that because that is for the substantive hearing of the appeal.  You can raise that as one of your grounds of appeal that you were improperly prevented from cross-examining, so I shall not mention it.  It is not because I have not read it, it is because it is a substantive matter rather than disclosure or anything like that. 

2.        I make clear at the outset what these rulings do deal with and what they do not deal with.  I am dealing with a series of preliminary matters, I am not dealing with the merits of the appeal.  There are a number of matters which have been raised in argument which goes to the substance of the appeal, they will be dealt with at the full hearing.  Equally there are a number of issues which Mr Syvret, the appellant, has raised which I have ruled to be irrelevant to these proceedings.  I am not dealing with those either.  If there are matters amongst them that are capable of further proceedings that will of course be a matter for Mr Syvret to decide whether to bring them or not.  

3.        Turning now to what I am dealing with and starting with disclosure.  The appellant did receive substantial disclosure in this case before the trial, but he argues that he should have had more and that I should order more now and I have therefore considered the question of disclosure afresh.  There are rules as to disclosure following, though not identical with, the rules in England and Wales, and they are set out in the Attorney General's guidelines issued in this jurisdiction on 1^st August, 2006.  The later case of Warren & Others [2010] JLR 200 confirms that the test there is the correct one.  There is an obligation on the Prosecution to gather all the material and to disclose to the appellant/defendant all statements, exhibits or other material which either undermine or contradict the Prosecution case, or which in any way assist or might assist the Defence. 

4.        The Attorney General's guidelines also deal with third party disclosure.  In relation to third party disclosure the guidelines say this (and for the assistance of Mr Syvret these guidelines appear on the Attorney General's website and are publicly available):-

"Third Party Disclosure

It is NOT the prosecutor's duty to consider whether material may exist in the possession of the third parties which may afford some support to the defence.  Whilst it is correct that the prosecutor is a minister of justice, it is not for him to do defence counsel's job.

In any case where the defence considers that a third party may be in possession of relevant material, (e.g. child welfare reports, or medical records), it is a matter for the defence to request it from the third party, or, if refused, make an application to the Court upon notice to the prosecution and the third party concerned to seek an order for disclosure.  It is then a matter for the Court to determine the question of disclosure by considering the material in the light of the issues in the case and for the third party to make any representations it wishes to make. 

However, as a matter of professional prudence, the prosecutor who has a reason to suspect that reliable third party material exists which may have a potentially negative bearing on the prosecution case would be wise to enquire whether such material does exist, and what in broad terms the nature of it is.  If it has, or may have, an adverse effect on the merits of his case, the prosecution counsel would doubtless be well advised to consider its contents carefully at an early stage. 

The prosecutor who, for any reason, knows of the existence of such third party material does, if the prosecution should proceed, have a duty to alert the defence to its existence if they are not aware of it."

5.        That duty set out in the Attorney General's guidelines should, in my judgment, be interpreted in accordance with the recent English case of R-v-Flook [2010] 1 Cr App R 30 which held that there is also an obligation to 'pursue reasonable lines of enquiry in relation to material held by third parties', and if there is material which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the Prosecution case or assisting the Defence case, take reasonable steps to obtain it.  Reasonable in those words means both reasonable in terms of the line of enquiry, that is to say not fanciful, and also reasonable in terms of the logistics of obtaining documents.  That particular case concerned documents in a different country. 

6.        Accordingly, disclosure is confined to issues that arise in the case.  I have already set out in an earlier ruling that the appellant's view is that all prosecution decisions in Jersey, and indeed many other decisions as well, are tainted by a conspiracy between leading members of the legal and political community, and their determination to stifle dissent and victimise dissenters.  The fact that that is his view does not mean that any document relating to any decisions which he believes are a product of this corruption, become disclosable in a prosecution of him nor that a search has to be conducted for documents which he believes ought to exist. 

7.        The present case concerns primarily, charges contrary to the Data Protection Law, arising out of the publication of the name of the nurse who had been the subject of a criminal enquiry in 1999.  The name having appeared in a report from a police officer, the Faudemer report, which the appellant published on his blog site in 2009.  The factual issues in the prosecution are reasonably limited.  It was accepted by the appellant that the name had been published and it was not disputed that publication was prima facie covered by the data protection legislation.  The issues before the court below were whether the Prosecution had disproved what, for convenience, I refer to as the defences that the law provides, namely in short form, that the publication was necessary to prevent crime or was necessary in the public interest. 

8.        Turning now to disclosure in this case, I will deal with it under several headings; first of all abuse of process.  It is convenient to start with the ambit of this doctrine which is set out conveniently in the English case of R-v-Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94 at page 100.  In that case the Court of Appeal Criminal Division reviewed all the authorities and discerned two strands of grounds upon which these applications might be made.  Firstly, cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot get a fair trial and secondly, cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.  These two strands overlap but it is clear that the second strand includes cases where a trial would be an abuse even though a fair trial would in fact be possible.  It is really the second strand upon which the appellant relies.  A stay under the first ground will not operate where any potential unfairness can be dealt with in the trial process, whether by exclusion of evidence or direction by the judge to the jury or jurats, in this jurisdiction.  So far as the law of this jurisdiction is concerned with one exception the law in the United Kingdom has been applied here. 

9.        So far as the second strand is concerned, that is to say being unfair for the accused to be tried, very importantly this has been considered in detail in this jurisdiction in the recent case of Warren and Others v AG [2008] JCA 135, to which I have already referred.  The facts were very different from the present case and do not need to be recited but in the course of the judgment the Court of Appeal for Jersey said this:-

"We agree with the views expressed by Lord Lowry in Bennett in these terms:-

"(t)he discretion to stay is not a disciplinary jurisdiction and ought not to be exercised in order to express the court's disapproval of official conduct.  (Bennett, page 74H)

"... ...the court ought not to stay the proceedings merely "pour encourager les autres."" (Bennett, page 75A)

And then later in the judgment at paragraph 43 the court says:-

"In our judgment, what underlies the court's jurisdiction to stay proceedings as an abuse of process is the court's inescapable duty to secure fair treatment for those who come or are brought before it.  The court has jurisdiction to stay proceedings in circumstances in which a fair trial is not possible.  It has jurisdiction to stay, also, where the proceedings have only been made possible by executive action done in breach of the rule of law and where, as a result of such action, it would be unfair to try the accused at all."

10.      Against that background I consider whether the further disclosure sought by the appellant should be made here.  I reiterate that the issue of abuse of process is one that the appellant can raise at the appeal; I am not ruling on that issue today, I am simply ruling on the question of disclosure in relation to it.  I have already dealt with the appellant's very broad application. I merely add this; it is based on the proposition that the prosecuting authorities are so biased against him that no fair decisions to prosecute him can ever be made.  Logically, this means, as I pointed out to him in argument, that he is effectively immune from prosecution in Jersey for any offence.  The question for me though is whether this prosecution with which we are concerned was an abuse of process.  If he was properly charged and lawfully dealt with, any animosity which the authorities may bear him is neither here nor there.  In the court below if one strips away the matters that I have ruled are outside the ambit of this case, what remains is the appellant's argument that this prosecution was an abuse of process because of the nature of his arrest and the search of the house where he and his then partner lived.  At the hearing of the appeal the quality of the decisions of the magistrate on this issue would be examined, I am only concerned, as I say, with the issues of disclosure in relation to it. 

11.      Having heard the argument, in my judgment there is no evidence here of covert surveillance, which is one of the areas in respect of which disclosure is sought.  Material touching on the alleged illegality of the search has been disclosed already.  The independent examination of the circumstances which was carried out by the Jersey Police Complaints Authority, the investigation carried out on their behalf by Warwickshire Police, has been disclosed.  The fruits of that which is the report to the appellant's former partner, has been disclosed to the appellant, very lightly redacted, as I have indicated already. I have seen the full report, the redactions are very minor and the proper ones which do not affect the substance of the report.  In my judgment, there is nothing further to disclose under the heading of abuse of process. 

12.      Secondly, the details of the 1999 investigation.  It is very important to understand the issues in the present case.  The appellant is not being prosecuted for disclosure of the Faudemer report in itself; had that been done with names omitted he would not have been prosecuted.  The Prosecution rests and stands or falls upon his disclosure of the name of Nurse M.  For this reason the adequacy of the investigation in 1999 is not an issue.  Had the investigation been impeccable, and still concluded there was insufficient evidence to prosecute Nurse M, exactly the same issues would have arisen had the appellant disclosed Nurse M's name ten years later.  That is an essential point when it comes to relevance, which unhappily, the appellant does not grasp.  The consequence is that an examination of that enquiry is irrelevant to the appeal save in one very limited respect.  That very limited respect is in relation to whether any enquiry at all was carried out, adequate or inadequate.  The Prosecution assert and indeed the magistrate found, that the appellant had been deliberately misleading in the way that he represented the status of the Faudemer report in his blog.  Of course, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander; it was equally relevant for the Prosecution to seek the proof that the investigation was impeccable, save to the very limited extent that I have referred to.  If in fact they placed before the magistrate irrelevant evidence at the trial, that is something which the appellant can complain about when mounting his appeal on the merits, and he can seek to demonstrate, if he wishes, that the magistrate was influenced by irrelevant material but so far as disclosure is concerned, in my judgment it is not necessary for the Prosecution to disclose what remain of the records in relation to the 1999 investigation. 

13.      The third general heading relates to the Nursing and Midwifery Council.  A legitimate issue in this case, relevant to the public interest defence, is whether the naming of Nurse M was necessary to prevent him from practising as a nurse after 2009 when the disclosure of his name was made.  That further practice or the potential further practice by Nurse M as a nurse, depended in part upon whether he was registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council in the United Kingdom.  There was correspondence between the appellant and the Council and between the police and the council and it transpired that he had continued to be registered but that in an application form that he had submitted in support of his continued registration, he had told lies as to his experience.  He was not actually struck off at all, he ceased to be registered on the Nursing and Midwifery Council's register because his membership lapsed.  A number of documents relevant to this issue have been disclosed but the appellant argues that since this is a decision or a set of facts which involves a Jersey government department, it cannot simply be diatoriness by the Nursing and Midwifery Council but there must have been some skulduggery by the Jersey government in persuading the Nursing and Midwifery Council not to strike Nurse M off but simply to allow his membership to lapse.  And on that basis, argues the appellant, there must be other documents which have not been disclosed and to which he is entitled.  Crown Advocate Baker says there are no further documents in the possession of the Prosecution nor existing to their knowledge, that are relevant to this and I accept that.  To order any further disclosure would be to initiate a wholly speculative trawl.  That deals with the question of disclosure. 

14.      Related to it is the question of witnesses to be called at any appeal.  The appeal being a review, there is power for the Court to order that there be further evidence but this is not a re-hearing so it is necessary for an application to be made that evidence be called.  Most of the rulings that I make in relation to witnesses follow from the rulings I have already made as to relevance and disclosure.  The appellant applies for orders that a series of witnesses who may in general terms be said to be parties to the broader conspiracy that he alleges, such as former Attorney-Generals and the like, should be required to come to court to give evidence.  For the reasons I have given, any evidence they could give does not relate to the issues in this appeal and I refuse those orders.  There are two witnesses that the appellant seeks to call as his own witnesses as experts, they are Dr Blackwood and Professor Hill, they are witnesses who could give evidence which might impinge on the adequacy of the 1999 investigation.  Their evidence was ruled irrelevant in the court below; in my judgment that ruling was correct for the reasons that I have already said that the adequacy or otherwise of the 1999 investigation is not the issue in these proceedings and accordingly I do not order that they be allowed to give oral evidence in the appeal. 

15.      The appellant also wishes to call the former Chief of Police, Mr Graham Power.  He would be a willing witness.  The appellant has no statement from him at the moment so I cannot judge whether he can give relevant evidence or not.  It would be open to the appellant to renew his application when such a statement is to hand so that I can consider whether his evidence is relevant to the issues in the case and he should be allowed to give oral evidence so I do not rule upon that particular issue at this stage. 

16.      There are two separate preliminary points which the appellant has raised which it is convenient to deal with as part of these preliminary proceedings. 

17.      Firstly, the appellant argues that the jurat system in Jersey is incompatible with his Article 6 rights to a fair trial because, he argues, a tribunal including jurats is not an independent and impartial tribunal as is required by the Convention.  He supports that by some detailed arguments; he says they are drawn from the ruling elite and not from the broad population of the Island; they will be either consciously or unconsciously biased against anyone who challenges the established regime in the Island; they will be specifically biased against him because he is well known as a vociferous opponent of the system in Jersey, and they will all know one jurat whom he has specifically targeted for criticism and will therefore be biased against him, the appellant, even though that jurat will not in fact sit on the appeal. 

18.      A general attack on the jurat system, very similar to that mounted by the appellant, was also mounted in the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Snooks and another v the United Kingdom [2002] JLR 475, in October 2002.  This case was cited with approval by the Privy Council in the case of AG-v-O'Brien [2006] JLR 133.  Since the issues are very similar to the issues that are raised by this appellant, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights bears quoting from at some length.  The facts are not pertinent to what followed.  At paragraph 26 the court said this:-

"26. Both applicants complain that under Article 6(1) that they were denied a fair and public hearing before the Inferior Number.  They contend that the Inferior Number did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal and that it did not give adequate reasons for its verdict.  They also submit that the failure of the Inferior Number to provide a fully public hearing as a right violated Article 6(1).  The first applicant also draws attention to prejudicial and inaccurate comments made by the Deputy Bailiff in the course of the trial and the Deputy Bailiff's failure to direct the jurats as to the standard of proof in relation to the statutory defence submitted on the applicant's behalf.  The second applicant highlights the Prosecution's failure to disclose material in full until shortly before the hearing of his appeal. 

27. Both applicants also complain under Article 13 that they were denied an effective remedy in this respect of the above alleged violations of Article 6(1)". 

The court then turns to the law:-

"28. The applicants complained first that having regard to the manner of the appointment of the jurats and their terms of office and the fact that the Deputy Bailiff and the jurats retired together, the Royal Court did not constitute an "independent and impartial" tribunal contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention which provides:-

"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

29. The Government submitted that the Royal Court was independent of the executive legislature and parties to the criminal proceedings as required by Article 6(1).  The jurats were appointed by an electoral college in which advocates and solicitors predominated and remained in office until retirement age; they could not be removed unless the Bailiff and at least seven other jurats petitioned the Queen in Counsel. 

30. The Government pointed out that no complaint had been made about the independence of the Deputy Bailiff who sat in each applicant's case.  The Deputy Bailiff and the jurats - retired together before passing verdict, just as the members of any tribunal may be expected to deliberate in private on the case for their decision.  Both elements - the Deputy Bailiff and the jurats - were independent and impartial and there was no reason to suppose that either would be rendered any less independent or impartial through retiring together.  In addition there was a right of appeal to the Jersey Court of Appeal from the decisions of the Inferior Number. 

31. The applicants submitted that the jurats were selected in part by the legislature and could not therefore be said to be independent of Parliament.  The retirement together of the judge and jurats was objectionable since the absence of disagreement between them, the jurats were the sole judges of fact, but in the circumstances the applicants could never be sure that the Deputy Bailiff had limited his contribution to questions of law, or that his legal directions had been correct and appropriate. 

32. The court recalls that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as "independent", regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and its terms of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question of whether the body presents an appearance of independence   (see Findlay -v- the United Kingdom judgment of 25^th February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, (73)).

33. In the present case neither applicant has called into question the independence or impartiality of the Deputy Bailiff but they have raised doubts about the position of the jurats.  However, the court notes that the jurats are appointed by an electoral college made up of all existing members of the Royal Court, advocates and solicitors of the Royal Court, and members of Jersey's legislature.  The jurats hold office until retirement age in the absence of exceptional circumstances.  There are thus a number of guarantees of structural independence, and impartiality sufficient to satisfy Article 6(1). 

34. The court does not consider it incompatible with Article 6(1) in this case that two independent and impartial constituent parts of the single tribunal retired together to deliberate the decisions before them.

35. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35(3) and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35(4)."

19.      It is clear that although there are other issues as well in the case on which the applicants also failed, the general proposition was similar to the one raised by the appellant in this case, that is to say that the nature of the jurat system meant that they did not provide an independent impartial tribunal. 

20.      In my judgment, for the reasons given in that case, there is no incompatibility with Article 6(1) in the jurat system.  As for the applicant's objections on the basis of knowledge of him, I note first in parenthesis that if this is correct, this will be another reason that it would prevent him ever being prosecuted in Jersey for a whole series of potentially very serious offences.  But more relevant to the present argument, his argument ignores the obligation of a jurat to recuse him or herself in the event that there is a conflict of interest or a legitimate appearance of bias.  The jurats, although not legally qualified, are very experienced in trying criminal and other cases.  They are well aware, as judges are, of their obligation to declare any reason why, if they were to sit on the case, there would actually be a conflict of interest or bias or there would be the appearance of bias or a conflict of interest.  That, in my judgment, is sufficient safeguard for the appellant to be assured that when he faces his appeal, which would include two jurats deciding the facts, he would be facing an independent and impartial tribunal. 

21.      I therefore reject the application and rule the participation of the jurats in the appeal will not infringe his Article 6(1) rights. 

22.      The final issue concerns the appellant's representation.  He argues that again in breach of his Convention rights he has been denied proper representation.  Article 6(3) of the Convention provides that an accused person has the right at "c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require."  It should be noted that this last option, which of course is the relevant one here, is not a right to have at public expense, representation of your own choosing.  Since the appellant does not have the means to pay for his own representation, it is the last words of that sub-paragraph that apply.  I should stress at the outset that the appellant has been treated in this case, so far as legal assistance is concerned, exactly as would any other person accused before a Jersey Court. 

23.      In Jersey legal assistance for litigants without means is provided by members of the Bar who have a professional obligation enshrined in their oath to undertake such work pro bono for 15 years.  In practice large firms will subsidise the free legal aid work from other profitable departments.  Where the burden of the case would be too great, were it fully to be borne for nothing, application can be made to the Deputy Greffier for funding.  As far as rights of audience are concerned, for foreign lawyers, there are none.  A lawyer qualified in another jurisdiction, whether common law or not, cannot appear as an advocate in the Courts in Jersey.  Not surprisingly, the system in Jersey, as in any country with its own separate laws, is that a lawyer from another country cannot simply set up in practice in its jurisdiction without qualifying in some way; in Jersey it is to qualify fully as an advocate or solicitor.  The appellant does not argue that Article 6 requires anything different from that; he argues that a Jersey litigant should be able to employ counsel from England with permission of the Bailiff where it can be shown that there is not sufficient expertise in the local Bar for a particular case.  Some small jurisdictions have such a rule; the Isle of Man, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, for example.  In Jersey this is not possible.  However, what is possible in this jurisdiction is for an application for funding to be made for the defendant to have the assistance of an English lawyer.  And in complicated cases that is frequently applied for and often granted; that lawyer can advise and assist the Jersey practitioner but not appear as an advocate. 

24.      The history of this appellant's application for legal aid is set out in an affidavit sworn for this appeal by Advocate Fitz.  In that affidavit she describes how, after an early exchange of emails, Mr Syvret, the appellant, made an application for legal aid on the 18^th May, 2009.  He was sent the forms to fill in.  Those forms include filling out details of his means, legal aid not being available to anybody who can pay for their own defence.  That date is almost exactly a month before the first of the many, many preliminary hearings that there were in this case.  The appellant replied immediately declining to complete the application forms and in particular, refusing to furnish details of the capital and income resources of his then partner.  He was told that this was a requirement before legal aid could be granted but he indicated that he was not prepared to fill the forms in.  On 18^th June there was the first of the many preliminary hearings.  In August an advocate wrote on behalf of the appellant saying that in his judgment the appellant was entitled to legal aid.  Similar communications followed until in October, on the 14^th, that firm of advocates submitted a legal aid form application on behalf of the appellant setting out his own financial situation but not including that of his then partner.  Although it was a requirement that such a form should be filled in before legal aid is granted, that was not insisted upon by the Bâtonnier who awarded the appellant legal aid on a discretionary basis despite the absence of one of the required forms.  In accordance with the absolutely usual practice an advocate was assigned to the case; that was Advocate Fogarty, an advocate employed by the firm of Ogiers, an advocate of 10 years experience in criminal proceedings.  Although several preliminary applications and hearings had taken place by the time of the 21^st October, when this offer of legal aid was made, it was clear that the magistrate would have reopened any issues for further argument by the appellant's advocate, and the substance of the trial had not begun at that stage.  However, the appellant indicated that he was not prepared to accept Advocate Fogarty as his duly appointed lawyer.  As I have indicated, she was an advocate of 10 years experience specialising in criminal law, who would have had the support of the personal law group of the firm for whom she worked, and would have dealt with the appellant's case in the normal way.  Thereafter, the appellant was unrepresented through his own choice.  He had, as I say, been given exactly the same opportunity of legal representation as any resident of this Island would have had had they been unable to pay for legal representation themselves. 

25.      Had Advocate Fogarty represented him she could, if she thought it appropriate, have applied for the assistance of an English barrister under the procedure that I have indicated.  I rather doubt that she would have made such an application because the truth is this is not a complicated case.  The issues with which an advocate would have to get to grips are the meat and drink of ordinary criminal practice.  Deciding what is relevant and what not relevant to particular criminal charges, dealing with issues of disclosure, considering the legality of searches, arguing abuse of process, challenging the evidence of witnesses, these are the things that a criminal lawyer will deal with very regularly.  Advocate Fogarty and the backup she would have received from her firm would have coped with those duties without difficulty.  Had it been possible to concentrate from the beginning on what was relevant to this particular case, the large number of hearings and the considerable paperwork would have been greatly reduced.  It is this lack of focus in the course of the proceedings which has caused the apparent complication and the generation of large amounts of paper.  There is in my judgment no doubt at all that the representation offered to the appellant fully complied with his Article 6 rights.  I do not accept the argument that any local advocate taking on the appellant's case would suffer harm in their career.  As is clear from the history of his legal aid application, Ogiers, who are well known and a well respected firm in this Island, were very ready to undertake his defence.  All lawyers and judges and indeed any thoughtful person on the Island understands the cab rank principle that operates here.  Lawyers take on cases and argue them fully and fearlessly without regard to whether it will help their careers or otherwise.  It is done, as I say on a cab rank principle, and no thoughtful person would think less of a lawyer because the cause they took up happened to be unpopular with a more general public. 

26.      For those reasons the appellant's argument that he was not offered proper representation is rejected. 

27.      That is all the rulings, now it is a matter of fixing a date.  I have had an email from you Mr Syvret about the availability of Dr Blackwood, you have heard what I said about him, I suppose it is possible that other issues might arise that would justify you renewing the application, can I tell you both what would suit me because I am conscious of the fact that it is very difficult to forecast exactly how long this appeal is going to take.  My present preferred date is Tuesday 3^rd May to start.  The Monday is a bank holiday as is the following Monday but that would give us what I hope would be ample time.  So I would propose to fix the appeal for Tuesday 3^rd May, 2011, and, if it goes past the end of the week we would not be sitting on the 9th because that is a bank holiday here in Jersey. 

28.      Concerning the late filing and relevance of documents, the appellant should file a statement as to submissions, an application as to new evidence and the Court would require a statement from Graham Power by Monday 18^th April, 2100. 

Authorities

Warren and Others v AG [2010] JLR 200.

R-v-Flook [2010] 1 Crim App (R) 30.

R-v-Beckford [1996] 1 Crim App (R) 94.

Warren and Others [2008] JCA 135.

Snooks and another v the United Kingdom [2002] JLR 475.

AG-v-O'Brien [2006] JLR 133.