Interim care order-application by the minister pending a full care order.
[2009]JRC227A
Before : |
M. C. St. J. Birt, Esq., Bailiff, and Jurats Clapham and Kerley. |
IN THE MATTER OF Q
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN (JERSEY) LAW 2002
Advocate V. Myerson for the Minister.
Advocate D. Gilbert for the Child.
Advocate C. Hall for the Mother.
The Guardian ad litem in person.
judgment
the bailiff:
1. This is an application by the minister for a care order in respect of Q. The purpose of the hearing today is to consider whether to make an interim care order pending the application for a full care order.
2. We begin by reminding ourselves of the test. Article 24(2) of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 says this
"the court may only make a care order or a supervision order if it is satisfied a) that the child concerned is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm and b) that the harm or likelihood of harm is attributable to:-
(i) the care given to the child or likely to be given to the child if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give the child; or
(ii) the child's being beyond parental control.
3. Article 30(1) deals with the making of interim care orders and says this:-
"the court may make an interim care order or interim supervision order where in relation to the child concerned it:-
(i) adjourns any application for a care order or supervision order; or
(ii) gives a direction under Article 29 (1).
Provided that it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the circumstances with respect to that child are as mentioned in Article 24(2).
4. Putting those two together therefore, we must consider whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the criteria in Article 24(2) are satisfied.
5. Now the Court has received a very detailed report from Miss Laura Stark from the Children's Service detailing the history of this matter. The Children's Service has been involved with Q's family for many years. There have been periodic incidents throughout her life and since August 2006, Q has gone in and out of voluntarily care on various occasions, being placed there on the whole when Q's mother has become concerned as to whether Q is beyond her control. Eventually in February of this year Q was again placed voluntarily in the Minister's care by the mother and she has remained there since living at F apart from a short period in August. Now during that period Q has regularly gone missing from F. She often has absconded, sometimes just for a day, sometimes for longer. As we heard from her own advocate she quite frequently would only come back after midnight even though she is very young. When absconding she has fallen into bad company. She has been found drinking. On one occasion she fell into Havre Des Pas swimming pool, when under the influence. She managed to get herself out but on another occasion perhaps she might not. She has also begun to commit criminal offences in the company of others. This has lead to her on occasion being remanded to G by the Youth Court. She has been convicted on three separate occasions, but on each of those occasions there was more than one offence. These have included shoplifting, receiving stolen property, assaults, arson and affray, to name but some of them. She has also been truanting from school and it is quite clear that she is out of control.
6. Now this is not a full trial and the evidence has not been tested. But nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence before us, we are completely satisfied that the lower threshold for an interim care order is made out. In other words, there are reasonable grounds for believing that Q has suffered and is at risk of suffering significant harm. It only has to be asked whether it is safe for a twelve year old to be absconding in the company of others and drinking and committing criminal offences to satisfy one self that she is at risk of significant harm. We are satisfied that if no order is made that is a real risk and she is likely to continue to be out of control, to abscond, to commit further offences and generally to be at significant risk of physical harm as well as emotional harm.
7. The second matter on which we must be satisfied is that this harm or likelihood of harm is attributable, either to the care she has been given or to Q being beyond parental control. The minister places the case on that second ground, namely that Q is beyond parental control; and that is the one that we find to be satisfied. We note that the Guardian would prefer to place it on the first ground namely that the care given to Q or likely to given if the order were not made is not what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give the child and we note her reasons for that. We emphasise that finding Q beyond parental control is not a finding that this is her fault. The reasons for it are no doubt complex and no doubt probably do relate back to events that have happened in her childhood so far. The finding we make is simply a factual one; that at present she is beyond parental control and that is the ground upon which we make the order.
8. Now having found that the threshold for an interim care order is satisfied, we must then go on to consider whether we should make any order. In this respect the law requires us to treat Q's welfare as the paramount consideration and that of course is what we do. It also requires us to consider whether making an order would really be better than making no order at all. Now the mother has given evidence before us and Advocate Hall has spoken on her part. She rests on the wisdom of the Court but I think it is fair to say that her submissions in fact veered towards opposing the order. Her main ground was that the making of an interim care order would not really change anything. The Children's Service had had voluntary care of Q now for many months and the making of an order would not in fact change anything. What was needed was to put into effect the care plan which is attached to the application and that could be done, she said, without the need for an interim order. Q, represented by Advocate Gilbert, opposes the making of an order. She is only twelve but nevertheless we naturally pay close attention to that. Her main reason for doing so is that she does not wish to be at risk of being taken by the police back to F when she is in the company of friends, having absconded. Miss Gilbert also urges that the making of an order might emphasise feelings of rejection which she already has. We have of course considered carefully those points. The Guardian on the other hand, although emphasising that she has had very little time to consider this matter, believes that the making of an interim care order would be in Q's best interests.
9. We are satisfied that the making of an order is necessary and it is in Q's best interests. In effect we endorse the reasons given for that by Miss Stark during the course of her evidence. Doing our best to summarise it very briefly, we would say that there are two main grounds. The first one is that there is a need for structure and clarity in the arrangements for looking after Q. The present arrangements lead to confusion with Q being in the voluntary care of the minister but the minister having no legal powers and with uncertainty as to whether the care will continue or whether Q will go back to the mother. What is clear is that there is a need for security for Q. There has to be certainty as to who is in charge, who can take responsibility for trying to put some structure in her life and set boundaries so that Q knows where she is. The plans for the future are set out in the care plan and the mother fully supports that. Where we differ from her is that we think that an interim care order is necessary in order to lead to the best prospect of this being satisfactorily taken forward and Q beginning what will undoubtedly be the slow process of trying to turn away from the course upon which she appears to be set at present.
10. Secondly, we accept that the police will be in a better position if the interim care order is made. At present when Q absconds the police are unwilling to return her to F, save in the exceptional circumstances of her being in imminent danger or something of that nature. Because the minister does not have a care order they do not feel able to assist in returning her to F. As a result, although they try to persuade her to do so, she can remain out with her friends. If a care order is made, they will then, it would seem from the evidence, be likely to return her and we think that is undoubtedly an essential part of the process of setting boundaries and beginning to set limits that Q can work to.
11. So in summary, we are satisfied that the making of an interim care order is necessary to try and put some structure, clarity and security in place for Q. We emphasise for her benefit that this is not any form of punishment for her. This is something that we are doing because we genuinely believe it to be in her best interests. We wish her to develop. She is clearly a child of some ability, particularly in the educational field and we would wish to see her fulfil her potential. So we are making this order because we think that offers the best prospect of her fulfilling that potential.
12. We are not saying anything about contact on the basis the care plan is clear about that and everyone is agreed that of course that the mother will continue to have contact.
Authorities
Children (Jersey) Law 2002.