Jersey Unreported Judgments

[2008]JRC057

ROYAL COURT

(Samedi Division)

9^th April 2008

Before     :

M. C. St. J. Birt, Esq., Deputy Bailiff, and Jurats de Veulle, Le Brocq, Clapham, King, Le Cornu and Morgan.

The Attorney General

-v-

Lee Anthony Knowles

Jolyon Garrick Picot

Sentencing by the Superior Number of the Royal Court, following guilty pleas to:

Lee Anthony Knowles

3 counts of:	Larceny. (Counts 1, 2 and 3).
1 count of:	Receiving, or hiding or withholding stolen property (Count 4).
1 count of:	Illegal entry and larceny (Count 5).
1 count of:	Taking and driving away a motor vehicle without having the consent of the owner or other lawful authority, contrary to Article 53 (1) Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956, as amended.  (Count 6).
1 count of:	Using a motor vehicle uninsured against third party risks, contrary to Article 2 (1) of the Motor Traffic (Third Party Insurance) (Jersey) Law 1948.  (Count 7).
1 count of:	Having in a public place an offensive weapon, contrary to Article 43 (1) of the Firearms (Jersey) Law 2000.  (Count 8).
1 count of:	Grave and criminal assault.  (Count 10).

Age:  35.

Plea: Guilty (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10).  Not guilty (Counts 3, 6, 7 and 8).  Pleas accepted.

Details of Offence:

On 19^th August, 2007, the victim was in the Parade Park with acquaintances.  The defendants, who he had known for around a year, approached him.  Both defendants and the victim, had been drinking prior to the assault.  Witnesses report some animosity between the defendants and the victim which quickly escalated into an argument.  It was alleged that the victim had told the defendants that they were "smack heads" and should leave the park.  Picot was heard to say that he had "caustic soda" in his pocket.  As the argument continued Picot punched the victim in the face.  Knowles was then heard to say to Picot words to the effect of "Give me that", and "I'll do it", before taking from Picot a bottle of caustic solution which Picot had removed from his jacket.  Picot was then heard to say "Go for it".  Knowles then sprayed the caustic solution directly at the victim's face (Count 10).  As a result the victim suffered severe facial burns which have caused permanent scarring and will require a course of skin grafts.  The caustic solution also came into contact with the victim's eyes causing significant damage to his eyesight.  At the time of sentencing the victim's right eye only just met the statutory visual standard for driving, whist the visual acuity in the left eye was very poor indeed.

The defendants were sentenced on the basis of a joint enterprise.  Picot admitted having taken the bottle of caustic solution out with him for protection.  Both defendants indicated that although they were unaware of the exact nature of the bottle's contents, they did know that it was a dangerous substance.

Knowles was also sentenced for stealing a mobile phone worth approximately £400 from a town shop (Count 1), and for stealing bottles of perfume valued at £267.69 (Count 2) from Boots the Chemist.  He also admitted receiving a stolen mobile phone worth £65 (Count 4), and breaking into the Pomme D'Or Hotel and stealing a large amount of audio and lighting equipments.  Although some of the equipments was later retrieved, the total costs of replacing the missing items and fixing the retrieved equipment came to £1,294.88 (Count 5).

Picot reserved his pleas until indictment when he admitted the assault.  Knowles entered guilty pleas in relation to Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 on indictment but reserved his plea in relation to Count 10 until shortly before trial.

Details of Mitigation:

Guilty pleas, remorse.

Previous Convictions:

9 previous convictions for 15 offences including 4 offences against the person, and 3 dishonesty offences.

Conclusions:

Count 1:	4 months' imprisonment.
Count 2:	6 months' imprisonment, concurrent.
Count 4:	3 months' imprisonment, concurrent.
Count 5:	18 months' imprisonment, concurrent.
Count 10:	6½ years' imprisonment, concurrent.

Total: 6½ years' imprisonment.

Sentence and Observations of Court:

Conclusions granted.

Given the horrific nature of the attack and the very serious consequences for the victim, the Court granted the Crown's conclusions.

Following the dicta of Southwell, J in Gill -v- Attorney General [1999] JRC 160 the sentence was also intended to have a deterrent effect.

Jolyon Garrick Picot

1 count of:	Obstructing a police officer.  (Count 9)
1 count of:	Grave and criminal assault.  (Count 10).

Age:  28

Plea: Guilty (Count 10).  Not guilty (Count 9).  Pleas accepted.

Details of Offence:

See Knowles above.

Details of Mitigation:

Guilty pleas, remorse.

Previous Convictions:

24 previous convictions for 64 offences, none of which involved violence.

Conclusions:

Count 10:

4½ years' imprisonment, concurrent.

Sentence and Observations of Court:

Conclusions granted.

Given the horrific nature of the attack and the very serious consequences for the victim, the Court granted the Crown's conclusions.

Following the dicta of Southwell, J in Gill -v- Attorney General [1999] JRC 160 the sentence was also intended to have a deterrent effect.

C. M. M. Yates, Esq., Crown Advocate.

Advocate S. A. Pearmain for Knowles.

Advocate J. M. Grace for Picot.

JUDGMENT

THE DEPUTY BAILIFF:

1.        This was a horrific attack.  It had serious consequences for the victim.  You both got into a minor altercation with the victim.  You, Picot, handed the bottle of caustic soda to Knowles who then sprayed it into the victim's face.  The victim had to be flown to a specialist hospital in the United Kingdom because of the risk to his eyes and he remained there for several weeks.  The medical reports show that the sight in his right eye has been damaged so that it is only just sufficient to meet the standard of driving; but more significantly the sight in his left eye is very poor indeed.  Operations are likely and they may improve the position but this is by no means certain.  The victim has also received permanent facial scarring as a result of this incident which will require a number of skin grafts over the years.  We have seen the photographs of the injuries which your actions caused.

2.        We were referred to a number of English cases because, so far as counsel are aware, this is the first time an offence of this particular nature has occurred in Jersey.  We were referred in particular to the cases of Grant [1986] 8 Cr. App. R. (S) 4, Radford [1986] 8 Cr. App. R. (S). 60., AG's Reference No 119 (Jackson) [2005] Cr. App. R. (S) 313 and R v Makeid [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 97; the latter being the most recent and in many ways the most similar to the present case.  We have also been reminded of the various factors listed in the leading case of Harrison v AG [2004] JLR 111 and counsel have helpfully applied those factors to the facts of this case. 

3.        In relation to the element of deliberation we accept that the incident blew up over a verbal altercation, but we regard anything that was said as forming no justification whatsoever for what took place. 

4.        We accept that it blew up at short notice but the fact remains that both defendants left their flat with Picot carrying the caustic soda in his pocket.  We were told that this was for potential defence.  But we do not regard that as mitigation, because you both clearly envisaged the possibility of using such a dangerous substance.

5.        We were also referred by Advocate Pearmain to two cases AG v Swanston [1998/187] and Hillman.  We have to say we regard the facts of those cases as being very different.  They did not involve the use of caustic soda or any substance like it and therefore we have not found them particularly relevant.

6.        Dealing first with you Knowles, you have a bad record including a number of convictions for offences of violence.  These include grave and criminal assault which involved repeated kicks to the head in 1998 and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm in Manchester in 2003 for which you were sentenced to three years' imprisonment.  You have a serious problem with alcohol and drugs and you are assessed as being at high risk of re-offending and at high risk of causing harm to the public. 

7.        In mitigation Advocate Pearmain has pointed to the contents of the report which we have carefully considered and we have carefully listened to everything she has said.  We have also read your letter and your mother's letter and we accept that you are now remorseful and that you are determined to try and address your problems.  We have had particular regard to the fact that you pleaded guilty and we give credit for that, but the plea was comparatively late in the day and therefore you are not entitled to the full discount that you would have received if you had pleaded guilty from the outset.

8.        Even allowing for the mitigation the fact remains that this was a very serious offence, with very serious consequences for the victim.  In that regard we remind ourselves of the words of Southwell JA in the Court of Appeal in the case of Gill v AG [1999/160] when he said this:-

"In cases of violence, whether of assault or robbery or rape or other forms of violence, it is necessary that the punishment ordered by the Court should have an element of deterrence, not to deter the offender because it is too late to do that, but

(1)       to deter others who may be tempted to engage in similar violence, and to remind them that if they do so they will similarly face long sentences of imprisonment; and

(2)       to show to the community as a whole that violence of this kind is not to be tolerated and will never be tolerated by the Courts of Jersey."

9.        In our judgment, having regard to the facts of this case and the mitigation available, the Crown's conclusion on this particular count is correct.  In other words we think 6½ years' imprisonment is the correct sentence.  But you also fall to be dealt with for offences of dishonesty.

10.      The Court has considered very carefully whether these should be made consecutive.  Normally offences which are quite separate are made consecutive because otherwise there is no real punishment for those offences.  However, having listened to your advocate we have just been persuaded, on balance, that in view of the totality principle and the various matters she mentioned, we can agree with the Crown that these sentences should be made concurrent.

11.      The sentence in your case on Count 1; 4 months, on Count 2; 6 months, on Count 3; 3 months, on Count 4; 18 months and on Count 10; 6½ years' imprisonment, concurrent.  In other words a total of 6½ years' imprisonment.

12.      Picot, you were the first to resort to violence by punching the victim.  We accept that initially you sought to restrain Knowles from using the caustic soda, but you then encouraged him by saying "Go for it". 

13.      You played your part in the joint venture but we accept that it was a slightly lesser part than that of Knowles.  Furthermore, we accept that you have more by way of mitigation.  You have your guilty plea which in your case was entered on indictment and was therefore earlier than Knowles.  Importantly, although you have a bad record, you have no previous conviction for violence and that again distinguishes you from Knowles who has a number of previous convictions for violence.

14.      We have carefully considered what your advocate has said, the contents of the report and the letter you have written.  Again we note that you are remorseful and that you plan to take advantage of the various courses available to you in prison and we hope that you pursue that in order that they can assist.

15.      We note also your family in Court to support you, but nevertheless given the seriousness of this offence even allowing for the mitigation we think the Crown's conclusions are correct.

16.      The sentence in your case on the one count you face is one of 4½ years' imprisonment.

Authorities

Grant [1986] 8 Cr. App. R. (S) 4.

Radford [1986] 8 Cr. App. R. (S). 60.

AG's Reference No 119 (Jackson) [2005] Cr. App. R. (S) 313.

R -v- Makeid [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 97.

Harrison -v- AG [2004] JLR111.

AG v Swanston [1998/187].

Hilman.

Gill v AG [1999/160].