[2004]JRC212
royal court
(Samedi Division)
6th December 2004
Before: |
Sir Philip Bailhache, Bailiff, and Jurats de Allo and King. |
Between |
Margaret Kathleen Crook (née Luce) |
Representors |
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Joy Elizabeth Renouf (née Luce) |
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And |
The Greffier of the States |
First Respondent |
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And |
Advocate Richard John Renouf |
Second Respondent |
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And |
Stewart Edgar Mourant |
Third Respondent |
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And |
Denys Huelin Le Vesconte |
Fourth Respondent |
Application by the Respondents, under Article 12 of the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961, for a direction to the Second, Third and Fourth respondents (the Arbitrators) to state a case for their decision.
Advocate C.M.B. Thacker for the Representors.
Advocate J. Hawgood for the First Respondent.
The Second to Fourth Respondents did not appear and were not represented.
judgmenT
the bailiff:
1. This is a representation by Margaret Kathleen Crook and Joy Elizabeth Renouf (to whom we shall refer as "the Claimants") following an award of arbitrators appointed to value fields 131 and 131A, La Rue du Pontliétaut, St Clement pursuant to the provisions of the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey Law 1961.
2. The history of this matter is that on 9th November, 2001 the Court ordered that those fields be vested in the public in accordance with the provisions of the 1961 Law. On the same day the Royal Court appointed, Advocate Richard Renouf, Mr Stewart Edgar Mourant and Mr Denys Huelin Le Vesconte as arbitrators pursuant to Article 8 of the Law to determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the Claimants.
3. The arbitrators gave their award on 17th September, 2003. The Claimants are dissatisfied with the award in that the arbitrators found that there was a possibility of a sale of the land to a neighbouring property owner at a premium value. Nonetheless, they made their award on the basis of the agricultural value of the land without attributing any premium value to it.
4. The arbitrators considered that they were bound to ignore the possibility (which they had found to exist) that in the no scheme world, the land might be sold to a neighbouring property owner at a premium value. The arbitrators made two findings of law.
5. First, they found that the open market value of the land was to be assessed on the value of the land to the claimants as willing sellers and not on the basis of its value to any potential purchaser.
6. Secondly, they found that Article 9 (c) of the Law operated so as to exclude from consideration the potential interest of neighbouring owners who might wish to acquire the land because such interest amounted to a "special need". The Claimants have submitted through their counsel that the arbitrators misdirected themselves in law in both respects.
7. On the 2nd February, 2004, the Claimants requested the arbitrators to state a case under Article 12 of the law. The request was in the following terms:
"(i) The Board found in paragraph 44 of its award of 17th September, 2003, that there was a possibility of a sale of the fields to a neighbouring property owner at a premium value. The Board in paragraphs 45 and 46 of its award found that the open market value of the land was based on the value to the Claimants as willing sellers and not on the value to potential purchasers. Should not the Board have taken into account that if there are potential purchasers who are prepared to pay over and above the normal value of the land for a particular use then as willing sellers the Claimants would sell to such persons and, therefore, that premium value is also the value to the sellers.
(ii) The arbitrators state at paragraph 45 that the case of Frank Boot Stores Limited -v- City of London Corporation (1971) 22 PCR 1124 is, in the instant case, merely authority for the proposition that the Board cannot exclude from consideration as potential purchasers those engaged in the agricultural industry. Should not the Board have taken the above cited case of Frank Boot Stores Ltd - v - City of London Corporation as authority that it is proper to take into account special suitability of land by virtue of physical proximity to the existing property of a class of purchasers as opposed to that of a simple purchaser in respect of whom special suitability of the land cannot be taken into account.
(iii) Should not the Board have taken into account that although physical proximity is a special suitability for the purposes of Article 9 (i)(c) of the Law, a special suitability is only to be disregarded if there is no market, apart from the special needs of a particular purchaser, but that if there is a class or type of purchaser special suitability is a factor in the ascertaining of the market price of the land."
8. On the 28th May, 2004, the arbitrators rejected the request and the Claimants accordingly made this representation to the Court seeking a direction under Article 12 of the law that the arbitrators state a case for the decision of the Court in the terms of the 3 paragraphs cited above, together with such order in respect of the costs of the representation as it deemed fit.
9. We do not think that it is appropriate for us to do any more at this stage than to state our conclusion that the claimants have an arguable case. We accordingly direct the arbitrators pursuant to Article 12 of the Law to state a case pursuant to the request made by the claimants.
10. We raised with both counsel during the course of oral submissions the possibility that this dispute might be suitable for resolution by mediation. Neither counsel dissented from that suggestion. We are accordingly going to exercise our power under Rule 6 (21) (b) of the Royal Court Rules to stay these proceedings for a period in order to enable the parties to try to settle the proceedings by alternative dispute resolution that is to say mediation.
11. We accordingly, stay the proceedings until Friday 11th February, 2005, and as a condition of that stay we direct the parties to report back to the Court on progress made to settle the proceedings; and that report must be made on 11th February unless the proceedings have in the meantime been settled. It follows from this order, of course, that the arbitrators are not at this stage required to take any steps until the stay of the proceedings has been lifted for one reason or another.
12. It seems to me that costs must follow the event and ought not to await the outcome of any mediation or further proceedings, and I therefore order the Committee to pay the costs of the plaintiffs in this representation on the standard basis.
Authorities
Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961 (as amended).
Planning and Environment Committee -v- Lesquende [1998]JLR95.
Frank Boot Stores, Ltd - v- City of London Corporation (1971)22 PCR 1124.
Blandrent Investment Developments Limited -v- British Gas Corporation (1979)2EGLR18.
Denyer-Gleen: "Compulsory Purchase and Acquisition" (4th Ed'n) (1994): pp138-142.