Jersey Unreported Judgments

[2004]JRC175

royal court

(Samedi Division)

29^th September 2004

Appeal, under Rule 15(2) of the Royal Court Rules 1992, as amended, from the Order of the Master of 8^th September 2004, granting Brenwal Ltd  an extension of time within which to file a Third Defendant's Answer in the first action and a Third Third Party's Answer in the Second.

Advocate A.J.D. Winchester for Brenwal Ltd.

Advocate D. Steenson for the Plaintiffs in both actions.

judgment

the bailiff:

1.        This is, in my judgment, an ill-advised appeal which is devoid of merit.  On 8^th September, 2004 the Master made a case management decision by which, in the exercise of his discretion, he extended the time within which a pleading was to be filed by three weeks.  That time expired today and the pleading has, in fact, been filed.

2.        Counsel for the Appellant applied, after the Master's decision, to the Deputy Bailiff for an abridgment of time for the hearing of this appeal and on 14^th September that application was refused.

3.        Counsel for the Appellant has made the point before me that that decision was not a decision on the merits of the appeal but only a decision on the merits of the application for an extension of time.  That may be so, but notwithstanding the decision of the Deputy Bailiff, the appeal has been pursued even though, if I may adopt the phraseology in the Appellant's counsel's own skeleton, the effect of a successful appeal would be nugatory.

4.        Counsel's complaint, in essence, is that the Master made a wrong decision and that a wrong precedent has been set.  The submission is that the Master correctly identified the legal principles involved but proceeded to apply them wrongly.

5.        In my judgment, the Master had a discretion which he exercised by granting a three weeks' extension of time, having clearly accepted the submission of the Respondent before him that no prejudice would be suffered by the Appellant.  A case management decision of this kind is not a precedent.  It is a decision within which the judge must be allowed a reasonable margin of discretion. 

6.        Counsel for the Appellant has very properly referred me to Rule 18 (2)(6) of the Rules of the Supreme Court which indicate that, when an application is made for an extension of time informally, it is normal practice for the Plaintiff to consent to a reasonable extension.  It seems clear to me that the Master reached the conclusion that the request for a three weeks' extension of time in the context of this case, where informal correspondence about the claim had been proceeding for over twelve months, was reasonable.

7.        So far as this Court is concerned, in considering the merits of the appeal, it is clear that there is no merit in it at all.  Indeed, one is almost driven to recite the legal maxim, de minimis non curat lex.  In the context of the proceedings before the Master the decision which he made was, in my judgment, well within the margins of his discretion.  The appeal is therefore dismissed.

8.        Now, I have to say, Mr Steenson, that I am minded to make an order for indemnity costs against the Appellant but I am clearly willing to hear whatever you have to say.

[The Court is addressed by Counsel]

9.        I have nothing to add to the comments that I have made in the judgment which has been delivered.  I order that the Appellant pay the costs of the Respondent on an indemnity basis.

[The Court was further addressed by Counsel]

10.      Leave to appeal is refused, Mr Steenson, and if the application is to be pursued, it must be made to a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

Authorities

Mortgage Corporation -v- Sanders & Ors (27^th December 1996) "The Times" Law Reports.

R.S.C: Rule 18(2)(6).