[2004]JCA102
COURT OF APPEAL
Judgment reserved: 12th May, 2004; delivered: 9th June, 2004.
Before: |
R.C .Southwell, Esq., Q.C., President; P.D. Smith, Esq., Q.C.; and D.A.J. Vaughan, Esq., C.B.E., Q.C. |
David Jarman Lloyd;
Carol Ann Lloyd
-v-
The Attorney General
Application of David Jarman Lloyd, deceased, for leave to appeal against conviction on 5th June, 2003, by the Inferior Number of the Royal Court, en police correctionnelle, on a not guilty plea to:
1 count of: |
assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking, contrary to Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 (count 4) |
1 count of: |
assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking, by using the proceeds to acquire property by way of investment, contrary to Article 17(1)(b)(ii) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 (count 6) |
The application for leave to appeal against conviction, which was adjourned by the Court of Appeal on 12th November, 2003, when the Court heard appeals from co-appellants, is to be placed directly before the plenary Court without first being submitted to a Single Judge for consideration and determination. There is no appeal against a total sentence of 2 years' imprisonment, suspended, passed on 17th February, 2004, by the Superior Number of the Royal Court.
Application of Carol Ann Lloyd for leave to appeal against conviction on 5th June, 2003, by the Inferior Number of the Royal Court, en police correctionnelle, on a not guilty plea to:
1 count of: |
assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking, contrary to Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 (count 3) |
1 count of: |
assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking, by using the proceeds to acquire property by way of investment, contrary to Article 17(1)(b)(ii) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 (count 6) |
The application for leave to appeal against conviction, which was adjourned by the Court of Appeal on 12th November, 2003, when the Court heard appeals from co-appellants, is to be placed directly before the plenary Court without first being submitted to a Single Judge for consideration and determination. There is no appeal against a total sentence of 2 years' imprisonment, suspended, passed on 17th February, 2004, by the Superior Number of the Royal Court
S.M. Baker, Esq., Crown Advocate;
Advocate R. Juste for David Jarman Lloyd, deceased, and Carol Ann Lloyd
JUDGMENT
THE PRESIDENT:
1. The Court has heard applications for leave to appeal against conviction by Mr David Lloyd and Mrs Carol Lloyd. They were convicted, with other defendants, on 5th June, 2003. The applications and appeals of the other defendants (Mr Michael O'Brien, Mrs Yvonne Katrina Edmond-O'Brien and Mr Michael Joseph Dunne) were the subject of a judgment of this Court on 10th November, 2003. The applications of Mr and Mrs Lloyd were adjourned, because of Mr Lloyd's serious ill-health. Sadly Mr Lloyd has since died, and the Court extends its sympathies to Mrs Lloyd in her loss.
2. The background to these applications appears from the judgment of 10th November, 2003 which, for convenience, is treated as incorporated in this judgment and is referred to as "the first judgment".
3. The counts on which Mr and Mrs Lloyd were convicted were as follows:
"Carol Ann Lloyd is charged with the following offence:
COUNT 3
Statement of Offence
Assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking contrary to Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988.
Particulars of Offence
Carol Ann Lloyd between the 1st day of January, 1997 and the 20th day of September, 1998 acted in contravention of Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 by entering into or being otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on behalf of Michael O'Brien of the said Michael O'Brien's proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated, knowing or suspecting that Michael O'Brien was a person who was carrying on drug trafficking or was benefiting from drug trafficking.
David Jarman Lloyd is charged with the following offence:
COUNT 4
Statement of Offence
Assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking contrary to Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988.
Particulars of Offence
David Jarman Lloyd between the 1st day of January, 1997 and the 20th day of September, 1998 acted in contravention of Article 17(1)(a) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 by entering into or being otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on behalf of Michael O'Brien of the said Michael O'Brien's proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated, knowing or suspecting that Michael O'Brien was a person who was carrying on drug trafficking or was benefiting from drug trafficking."
"Michael Joseph Dunne, Carol Ann Lloyd, David Jarman Lloyd are charged with the following offence:
COUNT 6
Statement of Offence
Assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking by using the proceeds to acquire property by way of investment contrary to Article 17(1)(b)(ii) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988.
Particulars of Offence
Michael Joseph Dunne, Carol Ann Lloyd and David Jarman Lloyd between the 1st day of January, 1997 and the 20th day of September, 1998 acted in contravention of Article 17(1)(b)(ii) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 by entering into or being otherwise concerned in an arrangement, whereby Michael O'Brien's proceeds of drug trafficking were used for the said Michael O'Brien's benefit to acquire by way of investment the Pelican Inn Public House, in the county of Wiltshire, the United Kingdom, knowing or suspecting that Michael O'Brien was a person who was carrying on drug trafficking or was benefiting from drug trafficking.
4. The Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988 will be referred to as "the 1988 Law". Under Counts 3 and 4 offences under Article 17(1)(a) of the 1988 Law were alleged, and under Count 6 offences under Article 17(1)(b)(ii). The relevant parts of Article 17 of the 1988 Law are set out in paragraph 35 of the first judgment. The ingredients of the Article 17(1)(a) offences are set out in paragraph 36 of the first judgment in relation to Mrs O'Brien and apply (mutatis mutandis) to Counts 3 and 4 against Mr and Mrs Lloyd. The ingredients of the Article 17(1)(b)(ii) offence are set out in paragraph 66 of the first judgment in relation to Mr Dunne and apply (mutatis mutandis) to Count 6 against Mr and Mrs Lloyd.
5. The essence of the prosecution case under these three counts against Mr and Mrs Lloyd was that
(i) Mr O'Brien made an "arrangement" with Mr and Mrs Lloyd;
(ii) Under this arrangement
(a) Mr O'Brien's retention or control of his proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated by Mr and Mrs Lloyd (Article 17(1)(a) offences);
(b) Mr O'Brien's proceeds of drug trafficking were used by Mr Dunne and Mr and Mrs Lloyd for Mr O'Brien's benefit to acquire the Pelican Inn in Wiltshire by way of investment (Article 17(1)(b)(ii) offences);
(iii) Mr and Mrs Lloyd knew or suspected that Mr O'Brien carried on or benefited from drug trafficking;
(iv) In so far as Mr and Mrs Lloyd relied on the defences in Article 17(4)(a) and (b) of the 1988 Law
(a) Mr and Mrs Lloyd did know or suspect that the arrangement related to the proceeds of drug trafficking;
(b) Mr and Mrs Lloyd did know or suspect that by the arrangement (1) Mr O'Brien's retention or control of his proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated, and (2) the proceeds of Mr O'Brien's drug trafficking were used for Mr O'Brien's benefit to acquire the Pelican Inn.
6. The prosecution adduced evidence (in addition to the extensive admissions by Mr and Mrs Lloyd) in an endeavour to establish these essential features of the offences under Counts 3, 4 and 6 against Mr and Mrs Lloyd, and that evidence can be summarised in this way:
(i) £1,078,000 in cheques was paid from Mr O'Brien's bank accounts to Mr Dunne's bank account in Andorra, and £32,500 to Mr Dunne's Allied Irish Bank account in Jersey, making a total of about £1,110,500, during 1997 and 1998 (up to Mr O'Brien's arrest in September 1998).
(ii) £97,295 went by cheques from Mr O'Brien's bank accounts into Mrs Lloyd's Allied Irish Bank account in Jersey.
(iii) £50,475.51 went from Mr O'Brien's bank accounts into Mr Lloyd's Andorra bank account.
(iv) Out of about 46 cheques issued by Mr O'Brien in favour of Mr Dunne or Mr or Mrs Lloyd, Mrs Lloyd filled in the name of the payee in the case of about 40 of these cheques. Further the cheque book stubs where available contain the word "Dave" of "DL" in the case of 12 cheques made out in favour of Mr Dunne, and the same words or "Dave L" in the case of 10 cheques made out in favour of Mrs Lloyd. There was no apparent reason why Mrs Lloyd should be filling in cheques paid by Mr O'Brien to Mr Dunne or to Mr or Mrs Lloyd.
(v) The total amount of money represented by the cheques on which Mrs Lloyd had filled in the payee and/or which were anyway payable to Mrs Lloyd was £1,225,770.
(vi) Of the payments credited to Mr O'Brien's personal accounts in 1997 and 1998, £1,408,117 was unexplained by reference to potential receipts of his legitimate businesses or other transactions such as the sale of the O'Brien's previous home.
(vii) Mr O'Brien was an admitted and convicted drug dealer (though he maintained that he had made only about £180,000 from drug dealing). But the total value of all the drugs found as a result of Mr O'Brien's arrest was between £387,500 and £428,500.
(viii) Haviland Foods Ltd was incorporated in August 1994 by Mr Lloyd's accountant, Mr Hammond, with Mr Lloyd as the sole director and Mrs Lloyd as the company secretary, and the shares divided as to 51% between Mr O'Brien, Mr Lloyd and Mr Dunne equally and 49% between three men named Kempson. In 1997 Mr Lloyd resigned as did Mrs Lloyd. Haviland Foods supplied one of Mr O'Brien's companies, Holly Ltd, with chicken products from 1995 to 1998. From 1997 on the invoices were settled by cash, and the money was always brought in by Mr Lloyd. (This appeared to be the only continuing business link between Mr and Mrs Lloyd and Mr O'Brien, and not one which could explain the large transfers of money from Mr O'Brien to Mr and Mrs Lloyd or Mr Dunne).
(ix) On 7th May, 1998 £400,000 was transferred from Mr Dunne's Andorra bank account to London solicitors. Of this sum £370,000 was used by the solicitors to buy the Pelican Inn at Froxfield in Wiltshire on behalf of companies owned by Mr Dunne and Mrs Lloyd, £365,000 being used to buy the freehold property, £4,999 to buy the fixtures and fittings, and £1 to buy the goodwill. The remaining £30,000 was used to pay solicitors' fees and expenses, and to provide working capital for the business at the Pelican Inn.
(x) On 24th July, 1997, there had been a meeting at the offices of HLB Jackson Fox between Mr O'Brien, Mr Gordon Angus (a partner in that firm and Mr O'Brien's accountant), Mr Lloyd and Mr Lloyd's accountant Mr Tony Hammond. The discussion was mainly in relation to providing further working capital to Haviland Foods. Mr Gordon Angus's evidence was that he was told that Mr Lloyd had funds amounting to £300,000 in Andorra (where Mr Lloyd lived) which could be provided by way of loan to a Jersey Company which was a part owner of Haviland Foods. The money was said to be Mr Lloyd's. The question was how the money could be transferred to the Jersey Company and then on to Haviland Foods. It was decided that this had to be by cheque or bank transfer. A light-hearted remark was made by Mr Angus in the course of a convivial discussion about taking cash to the bank, but Mr Angus also said that banks would not accept such an amount in cash. Subsequently on 23rd March, 1998, Mr Angus received a fax from Key Biscayne in Florida from Mr O'Brien (apparently drafted by Mrs Lloyd) asking whether Mr Angus had been in touch with Mr Hammond about what had been discussed the previous year. Mr Angus replied by fax and spoke to Mr Hammond about this. The admissions made by Mr and Mrs Lloyd (inter alia) show that by 24th July, 1997 Mr O'Brien had transferred to Mr Dunne and Mr and Mrs Lloyd together a total of just over £300,000.
7. The prosecution contended that the Jurats could infer from these and other pieces of evidence that
(i) The moneys going into Mr O'Brien's personal bank accounts during 1997 and 1988 up to £1,408,117 were the proceeds of his drug trafficking.
(ii) The reason why Mr Dunne and Mr and Mrs Lloyd were involved in dealing with a total of over £1.25 million emanating from Mr O'Brien's personal bank accounts was to assist him in laundering the proceeds of his drug trafficking and enabling him to retain control and the benefit of those proceeds.
(iii) There was no legitimate business or other reason why Mr Dunne and Mr and Mrs Lloyd should have been receiving such large sums from Mr O'Brien.
(iv) The story put forward in a voluntary statement by Mr Dunne, that he had accumulated these moneys through market trading over the years, and had handed them to Mr O'Brien in an attempt to conceal their existence from the British tax authorities and his wife, was unbelievable.
(v) Given the nature and size of the movements of moneys and the absence of any legitimate reason for them, Mr and Mrs Lloyd knew or at the least suspected that the moneys which they were moving for Mr O'Brien were the proceeds of drug trafficking in which he was involved, and that they were moving the moneys to enable him to retain control and the benefit of those proceeds.
(vi) The moneys used to buy the Pelican Inn came originally from Mr O'Brien's accounts (as the proceeds of drug trafficking) to Mr Dunne and were then used for the purchase in the names of companies owned by Mr Dunne and Mrs Lloyd.
(vii) There was no legitimate reason for Mr O'Brien or Mr Dunne to make money available to enable Mrs Lloyd to obtain an interest in the Pelican Inn.
(viii) The Pelican Inn was intended to be and was held by the companies owned by Mr Dunne and Mrs Lloyd for the benefit of Mr. O'Brien.
8. Advocate Rebecca Juste in her careful submissions on behalf of Mr and Mrs Lloyd relied on these two main grounds:-
(i) The submissions at the close of the prosecution case that there was no answer should have been accepted by the Trial Judge.
(ii) The verdict was not one which the Jurats could reasonably reach.
No case to answer.
9. The prosecution and the defence agreed that, if the submission of no case to answer had been wrongly rejected, the convictions were to be regarded as unsustainable, however compelling any evidence of guilt may have been which emerged during the defence case: see R -v- Patrick Joseph Smith et al [1999] 2 Cr App. R 238 and R -v- Davis, Rowe and Johnson [2001] 1 Cr App R8, both decided by the English Court of Appeal. In the judgment of this Court the agreement of counsel was a correct one, this being the approach to be applied in Jersey: see also Archbold 2003 Ed'n at para 7 -79.
10. Miss Juste put this part of Mr and Mrs Lloyd's case in this way:
(i) She accepted that the admissions were to be treated as part of the prosecution's case.
(ii) She accepted that Mr O'Brien was a trafficker in drugs, and that he had transferred the sums totalling over £1.2 million to Mr Dunne and Mr and Mrs Lloyd, with the payee having been filled in on about 40 of the cheques by Mrs Lloyd (totalling with other cheques payable to Mrs Lloyd over £1.2 million) as set out in the admissions.
(iii) She submitted that the prosecution evidence did not establish a prima facie case that Mr O'Brien had made more than £180,000 from his drug trafficking.
(iv) She submitted that there was not sufficient evidence before the Jurats from which they could conclude that either Mr or Mrs Lloyd knew or suspected that the moneys being transferred from Mr O'Brien were the proceeds of his drug trafficking.
(v) She accepted that the nature and amount of the cheques by which Mr O'Brien transferred the money gave rise to a reasonable inference that they were suspicious; but she submitted that for the prosecution to suggest on the evidence before the Jurats that the suspicions were linked to drug trafficking by Mr O'Brien was a step too far.
(vi) In relation to the Pelican Inn, she accepted that the whole £400,000 came from Mr O'Brien to Mr Dunne and then from Mr Dunne to the solicitors; but she submitted that there was not sufficient evidence either that the money was the proceeds of drug trafficking or that Mr or Mrs Lloyd knew or suspected that this was the source of the money. She pointed out that Mrs Lloyd had received £97,295, and Mr Lloyd £50,475.51 from Mr O'Brien; and that it was Mr and Mrs Lloyd's case that these sums formed part of the money owing to them by Mr O'Brien in connection with what was described as "the GATT Scheme".
(vii) Having regard to these matters, and in particular the absence of evidence that either Mr or Mrs Lloyd knew or suspected that the moneys transferred from Mr O'Brien were the proceeds of drug trafficking, she submitted that the Trial Judge ought to have accepted, and not rejected, her submission at trial that there was no case for Mr or Mrs Lloyd to answer.
11. We emphasise that though Miss Juste naturally presented her two clients' appeals with only limited distinction between them, it is the task of this Court to consider the case against each of them separately. This we have done. So we have recognised that some of the evidence would be evidence only against one of them and not against both. In setting out our reasons for dismissing their appeals, we have followed the way in which their appeals were presented by Miss Juste. But we have throughout kept squarely in mind the requirement to consider their appeals separately.
12. In our judgment, on the basis of the extensive admissions and the evidence called by the prosecution, there was clearly a case for Mr and Mrs Lloyd to answer on each of Counts 3, 4 and 6. The transfer to each of them by Mr O'Brien of large sums of money, Mrs Lloyd's involvement with about 40 of the 46 cheques and with the transfer to Mr Dunne of almost all the money transferred to him, and Mr Lloyd's involvement indicated by (for example) the meeting on 24th July, 1997, called strongly for an explanation. There was no suggestion that the payments by Mr O'Brien were intended as gifts. References in the course of the prosecution evidence to Mr and Mrs Lloyd's reliance on the GATT scheme (which we describe below) did not provide any sufficient answer at that stage of the trial to the prosecution case. The Jurats would have been entitled to infer from the prosecution evidence that Mr O'Brien, as an admitted large scale drug trafficker, was transferring his moneys to Mr and Mrs Lloyd as well as Mr Dunne in order to launder and retain control of those moneys. Furthermore, in the absence of any other rational or sufficient explanation of the transfer of so much money by Mr O'Brien to and with the assistance of Mr and Mrs Lloyd, the Jurats would have been entitled to infer that, at the very least, each of Mr and Mrs Lloyd suspected that the source of the money was drug trafficking. There was at the close of the prosecution case no other rational or sufficient explanation as to how Mr O'Brien had come into the possession of such large sums of money, or why Mr and Mrs Lloyd should have received or facilitated the receipt from Mr O'Brien of so much money.
13. In our judgment, therefore, the Trial Judge correctly ruled that both Mr and Mrs Lloyd had a case to answer.
Not a reasonable verdict
14. In her written submissions Miss Juste put the test under this head as being whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. But in her oral submissions she recognised that that would not be the appropriate test. Instead she relied on the test as stated by this Court in Harrison -v- Attorney General [2004]JCA006, unreported, at paragraph 46. There this Court put the test under Article 25 (1) of the Court of Appeal Jersey Law 1961 as being whether the verdict of the Jurats was one which the Jurats could reasonably reach. She also relied on HM Solicitor General -v- McGuffie [1968] JJ 955 where this Court stated:
"The Court is of the opinion that there was ample evidence that McGuffie could have committed the crime. However, we are also of the opinion and this is the important finding we have to make - that there was no evidence sufficient to satisfy the heavy burden which lies on a prosecution in a criminal case that he did, in fact, commit this crime. There was here suspicion - grave suspicion - but nothing more".
In McGuffie the Court went on to say that a submission of no case to answer, if one had been made, would have been allowed. In the present case, however, there was undoubtedly a case for Mr and Mrs Lloyd to answer, as we have already held.
15. Before leaving the test under Article 25(1), we note that once again reference has been made to the civil appeal in IDC -v- Fairview Farm Ltd [1996] JLR306 and to the Bailiff's judgment in Token Ltd -v - Planning and Environment Committee [2001] JLR698. Given the obvious difference between civil and criminal trials, and not least the major difference in the burden of proof, we deprecate the use of concepts of reasonableness in civil law decisions as a guide to the way in which Article 25(1) is to be applied in criminal appeals. We hope that such citation in criminal appeals will now cease.
16. Miss Juste faced two major problems in presenting this part of her case on appeal:-
(i) Mr O'Brien's story that he had made only about £180,000 from drug trafficking was clearly rejected by the Jurats in so far as it had been relied on in the defences of Mrs O'Brien and Mr Dunne, and in the sentencing of Mr O'Brien. It is plain that the Jurats and this Court took the view that Mr O'Brien had made much larger sums from his admitted drug trafficking.
(ii) Mr Dunne's story that the money he received from Mr O'Brien represented the return of money which Mr Dunne had placed in Mr O'Brien's hands in order to conceal the money from the British tax authorities and Mrs Dunne was equally clearly rejected by the Jurats and by this Court in the earlier appeals.
17. It follows that, in the absence of any suggestion or evidence that Mr O'Brien was making gifts of the moneys to the other defendants, this Court has to proceed on the same basis as in the earlier appeals, that the moneys transferred by Mr O'Brien were the proceeds of his drug trafficking. It therefore also follows that the scope for successfully defeating the prosecution case against Mr and Mrs Lloyd is greatly limited.
18. The main points relied on by Miss Juste on behalf of Mr and Mrs Lloyd were:
(i) It was submitted that Mr O'Brien owed Mr Lloyd £200,000, and that the payments made to Mr and Mrs Lloyd represented part payment of that debt. The case for the existence of this debt was not a credible one. The debt was said to have arisen in this way. Mr O'Brien and Mr Lloyd were involved together in a butchery business in Jersey. This succeeded in obtaining a licence to import meat under GATT rules from countries which were cheaper sources of meat. Mr Lloyd left the business in the early 1980s. Mr O'Brien continued to use the licence, but accepted (it was said) that he owed Mr Lloyd moneys in relation to the benefit of being able to continue to use the Licence. Mr Lloyd wanted the business to be sold in the early 1990s. Mr O'Brien and Mr Lloyd agreed that Mr Lloyd would receive £200,000 from Mr O'Brien. Despite Mr Lloyd having been in serious financial difficulties from the early 1990s and having become insolvent in 1995, it was said that Mr Lloyd did not ask for payment until 1997. The suggestion was that the payments to Mr Lloyd of over £50,000 and to Mrs Lloyd of over £97,000 represented part payment of the £200,000 GATT scheme debt. But the series of payments to Mr and Mrs Lloyd appeared not to be based on any rational calculation and not to be based on a total debt of £200,000. In our judgment the Jurats had good reason, on the evidence before them, for rejecting the story about this supposed debt alleged to have been owed to Mr Lloyd.
(ii) Mrs Lloyd's case in relation to the cheques was that she was used to acting in a secretarial capacity and filled in the cheques at the request of her husband, without any suspicions, and assuming that money was due to her husband under the GATT scheme of which she had learned in the mid-1990s. In our judgment the Jurats had evidence before them of sufficient strength to justify them in concluding, contrary to Mrs Lloyd's case, that Mrs Lloyd must, at the least, have had suspicions that the large sums with which Mr O'Brien was dealing had no legitimate origin, and also that these sums were the proceeds of drug trafficking.
(iii) In relation to the Pelican Inn, the case put forward for Mr and Mrs Lloyd was that of the total cost of purchase (£400,000) half was owed by Mr O'Brien to Mr Lloyd and half to Mr Dunne, and therefore whatever the source of the money the contribution of £200,000 to Mrs Lloyd's half share was money legitimately paid for her and her husband's benefit, and not for Mr O'Brien's benefit. This case ignored the fact that a similar point had been made in relation to the payments to Mr and Mrs Lloyd totalling £147,770, namely, that those payments also represented part repayment of the alleged debt of £200,000. In our judgment the defence case in relation to the purchase of the Pelican Inn was not credible, and the Jurats were entitled to infer from the totality of the evidence before them, including the prosecution evidence already summarised, that each of Mr and Mrs Lloyd suspected that the money paid for the pub was money derived from drug dealing.
(iv) Miss Juste also dealt with the question of knowledge or suspicion as a discrete point. She conceded that in all the circumstances the inference that Mr and Mrs Lloyd must have suspected the source of the moneys could not be resisted. But she submitted that mere suspicion as to the source of moneys was not sufficient to convict Mr and Mrs Lloyd. The prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each of Mr and Mrs Lloyd knew or suspected that the moneys came from Mr O'Brien's drug trafficking. But the problems facing Mr and Mrs Lloyd, in the submission that they did not suspect the moneys to be proceeds of drug trafficking, are that despite the suspicious nature of the moneys they did not suggest that they had enquired of Mr O'Brien as to the source of the moneys, and they had taken a major role in the movement of moneys, including (on their own story) receiving a total benefit of £345,000 (£200,000 towards the Pelican Inn purchase and £145,000 in cash). Being suspicious of the source of the moneys, they must have asked questions of Mr O'Brien unless (as the prosecution alleged) their suspicion (or knowledge) was that the moneys were drugs proceeds, and therefore the fewer questions asked the better. In our judgment there was ample evidence from which the Jurats could infer that, at the least, each of Mr and Mrs Lloyd suspected that the moneys were drug proceeds.
(v) Miss Juste further submitted that there was insufficient evidence before the Jurats on the basis of which they were entitled to conclude that the moneys received by Mr and Mrs Lloyd and the half share in the Pelican Inn were held by them for the benefit of Mr O'Brien, or that they knew or suspected that in this way his retention or control of his proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated. But in our judgment, once the supposed GATT scheme debt had been rejected as a reason for the payments being made to or for the benefit of Mr and Mrs Lloyd, and once it was concluded that at the least each of them suspected that the moneys each received, and the half-share in the Pelican Inn received by Mrs Lloyd, represented the proceeds of drug trafficking, and in the absence of any suggestion that these might be gifts by Mr O'Brien, the Jurats were entitled on the evidence to conclude that both the moneys and the Pelican Inn half share were held for the benefit of Mr O'Brien.
19. In the light of the above, this Court concludes that the verdict on each of Courts 3, 4 and 6 was a reasonable verdict which the Jurats were fully entitled to reach.
20. It is unnecessary for us to consider in addition the other telling points made by Crown Advocate Baker on behalf of the Crown.
21. The applications of Mr and Mrs Lloyd for leave to appeal are allowed. Indeed we doubt whether even an application could be pursued on behalf of a deceased defendant without leave of the court. We dismiss both appeals for the reasons already set out.
Authorities.
R-v-Smith et al [1999] 2 Cr. App. R. 238.
R-v-Davis, Rowe and Johnson [2001] 1 Cr App R 8.
Harrison-v-AG [2004]JCA006.
Solicitor General-v-McGuffie (1968) JJ 955.
IDC-v-Fairview Farm Ltd. [1996] JLR 306.
Token, Ltd-v-Planning and Environment Committee [2001] JLR 698.