[2004]JRC054
royal court
(Samedi Division)
19th March, 2004
Before: |
Sir Philip Bailhache, Bailiff, sitting alone |
Between |
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Petitioner |
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And |
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Respondent |
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Judgment on costs.
Advocate C M B Thacker for the petitioner
Advocate A.D. Hoy for the respondent
judgment
the bailiff:
1. The Court delivered judgment on 19th February 2004, [2004]JRC033, and indicated that it was not minded to make any order for costs but that it was prepared to hear submissions in that regard. Counsel for the respondent ('the wife') was content that no order for costs be made; counsel for the petitioner ('the husband') submitted that an order should be made in favour of his client.
2. Counsel for the husband submitted that costs should follow the event. He argued that the wife had in effect lost the argument in that she had opposed the setting aside of the orders made by the Registrar. He also submitted that it was unfair that the wife should not have to pay legal costs because she was employed by her legal representatives, whereas by contrast there was no such relationship between the husband and his legal representatives. I take each of these submissions in turn.
3. It is true that the wife opposed the setting aside of the Registrar's orders and furthermore was not prepared to negotiate with the husband. The husband suggested that he would have liked to meet around a table to resolve the disagreement. Ordinarily this would have been a powerful submission. It is incumbent upon every party to family proceedings to conduct himself or herself reasonably and to demonstrate a willingness to compromise. Unfortunately the intransigence of the wife was met by equal intransigence on the part of the husband. As the Court indicated in its judgment, both parties had adopted, by the time the case came to trial, entrenched and unsustainable positions. The husband's position, put to the Court through his counsel, was that the entire net proceeds of sale of the property should be paid to him leaving the wife with virtually nothing. This position appeared to pay no regard at all to the interests of the children who are living with their mother. As a stance, it was indeed more extreme than that adopted by the wife.
4. As to the alleged unfairness resulting form the accident of the wife's employment, it seems to me that this is not a material factor for me to take into account. First of all there is no certainty that fees will not be charged to the wife by her employer. Her counsel did indicate that he thought it unlikely that fees would be charged, but that would be an indulgence and not a matter of right. Secondly, both parties are now receiving legal representation under the legal aid scheme. Under that scheme advocates are obliged to represent the interests of poor and undefended persons. In the circumstances of this case where there is a capital asset which has been divided between the parties, it is open to the advocates to make a reasonable charge for their services. I can do no more than express the hope that any such charge will not disturb what counsel for the wife rightly described as the delicately balanced financial position of the parties.
5. In my judgment the justice of the case requires that no order for costs be made. The application of the husband is accordingly refused. So far as the costs of this application are concerned, the arguments were made crisply and within the compass of a very short period. Bearing in mind that both parties are, as described above, legally aided, I would make no order for costs in this respect.
No Authorities.