2002/47
ROYAL COURT
(Superior Number)
(exercising the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon it by
Article 22 of the Court of Appeal (Jersey) Law, 1961.)
28th February, 2002.
Before: |
M.C. St.J. Birt, Esq., Deputy Bailiff, and Jurats Rumfitt, Tibbo, Le Breton, Georgelin, and Herbert |
Colin Paul CORCORAN
-v-
The Attorney General
Application for leave to appeal against a sentence of 2½ years' youth detention, passed on 26th October, 2001, by the Inferior Number of the Royal Court, following a guilty plea to:
1 count of: |
Robbery
|
The application for leave to appeal placed directly before the plenary Court, without first being submitted to Single Judge for consideration and determination.
Advocate R. Tremoceiro for the appellant.
Advocate A.J .Belhomme on behalf of the Attorney General.
JUDGMENT
THE DEPUTY BAILIFF:
1. On 26th October 2001, the applicant appeared before the Inferior Number of this Court on one count of robbery and was sentenced to 2½ years' youth detention. He now applies for leave to appeal against that sentence.
2. The facts can be shortly summarised. The applicant came to Jersey from Ireland at the end of June, 2001. He came to Jersey to wean himself off his drug addiction. Unfortunately this was unsuccessful and he reverted to taking heroin. On the day in question it was found that there were traces in his urine of cannabis opiates and methadone.
3. On 23rd August, 2001, he took a kitchen knife from the home of his sister where he was staying. At about half past three in the afternoon the thirty nine year old female victim was walking along Brighton Lane, St. Helier when she was confronted by the applicant standing directly in front of her. He said "I don't want to do this, give me your money". He took the knife from his pocket and held it a few inches from the victim's stomach. He then returned the knife to his pocket. He grabbed the victim and put his right arm around her waist. He took the knife again from his pocket and pressed it against her left side repeating over and over again "I don't want to have to do this, give me your money". The victim was screaming and was very frightened. She said that she would give him her money. The applicant then grabbed the rucksack off her back and ran off. The victim thought to herself "Oh, my God, I'm alive" because she had thought that she was going to be stabbed. The rucksack contained some £25 in cash and a cheque for £55 drawn in the victim's favour.
4. The applicant was quickly caught by police officers who were called to the scene when he was trying to climb up some scaffolding. On arrest he was considered to be under the influence of drugs and urine tests confirmed this. He was not interviewed until the next day. When he was, he said that he had taken a pill and remembered sitting in a park and having some sort of hallucination. He said that he could not recall committing the offence but said that, if he had, he was truly sorry. He pleaded guilty at the first opportunity once the evidence against him was made known to him.
5. The victim suffered no injuries other than a sprained wrist but she was greatly distressed and visibly shaken when the police arrived and when they interviewed her subsequently at Police Headquarters.
6. In short this is what is colloquially known as a 'mugging' involving the use of a weapon to terrorise and rob an innocent victim going about her lawful business in the middle of the day in the streets of St. Helier.
7. The applicant had many points of mitigation available to him, namely his youth - he is only 18; his previous good character; his early guilty plea; his remorse; the fact that virtually all the stolen property was recovered; and the fact that there were no serious injuries. These were put to the Inferior Number by his counsel and were clearly considered by the Inferior Number in the judgment.
8. Mr. Tremoceiro's main submission on this application is that the Inferior Number did not address his primary submission before them, which was that a separate band of sentencing was appropriate for young offenders. The point arose in this way: the Crown Advocate referred before the Inferior Number to a sentencing band of some 18 months to 5½ years for offences of robbery. In support the Crown Advocate referred to the case of A.G.-v-Whiteley (18th June, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/126] and A.G.-v-Gill (3rd June, 1999) Jersey Unreported; [1999/98], both cases before the Superior Number.
9. Mr. Tremoceiro did not accept that this was the range for young offenders. In support he referred to a number of cases which concerned young offenders and these were the cases of A.G.-v-Corcoran (25th October, 1996) Jersey Unreported; A.G.-v-Marsh (22nd November, 1996) Jersey Unreported; A.G.-v-Turner (20th June, 1997) Jersey Unreported; A.G.-v-Carboulec and Cooper (20th March, 1998) Jersey Unreported; and A.G. -v-Monet and Le Feuvre (5th October, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/197]; although Mr. Tremoceiro did not articulate a particular range in his submissions before the Inferior Number he articulated that range in his skeleton argument to this Court as being a range of 1 to 3 years. Although it is to be noted that in one of the cases to which he referred the sentence was 3½ years.
10. We do not think that the cases referred to show any different band to that set out by the Crown Advocate. One case, Marsh, was less than 18 months, namely 12 months, although that was part of a larger sentence for a number of other offences and it is always difficult to draw conclusions where there are a number of offences and the totality principle applies. There was one individualised sentence, in Turner, where probation was granted but an individualised sentence is, of course, something outside any band and does not constitute a departure from that band - it is what it says: an individualised sentence. In the case of Turner the Court said that the conclusions of 3 years youth detention were otherwise correct. A band is not a straightjacket. The fact that there may be one or two sentences outside a band does not mean that the band does not exist.
11. But in any event we reject Mr. Tremoceiro's whole approach. In our judgment it is not appropriate for the Court to articulate one band of sentences for adults and another band for young offenders. We are not aware of any area of sentencing in which this has been done. Youth is a powerful mitigating factor and will, therefore, often lead to a lower sentence being imposed than would have been the case for an adult in similar circumstances. But it is merely one aspect of the mitigation and it falls to be dealt with in the round along with all the other mitigating factors. It is clear from the judgment of the Inferior Number that this is the approach which they adopted and we find no fault in that approach. Mr. Tremoceiro says that this submission of his took up approximately half of his time in mitigation before the Inferior Number and the Court should specifically have dealt with the argument which he was putting forward. We agree that it would have been preferable for the Court to have dealt specifically with the submission made by Mr. Tremoceiro but, as we have already said, we have rejected it and in the circumstances do not think that anything turns on the failure of the Inferior Number to deal specifically with its rejection of the submission.
12. We must, therefore, consider whether, having regard to all the available mitigation, the sentence in this case was manifestly excessive. The Court has repeatedly said that it is not helpful to take the facts of other cases and try to compare them in detail with the facts of the instant case, not least because the facts and considerations which were relevant in the other cases do not appear fully from the reports.
13. It occurred to us at one stage that this was what Mr. Tremoceiro was seeking to do in referring to the cases which we have listed earlier; but he has made clear to us in his submissions that that was not and is not his purpose in referring to them; it was simply to try and show the range of sentences which had been imposed on young offenders. In the circumstances it is not necessary to consider the individual facts of those cases in detail.
14. We must return to first principles. In Gill-v-AG (29th September, 1999) Jersey Unreported CofA; [1999/98], the defendant, who was aged 41, with no previous convictions, robbed a shop by holding a knife to the neck of the cashier and threatening to kill him if he did not open the till. Gill then punched the cashier in the face and eventually took £63 from the till before escaping. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of four years' imprisonment and said that it was doubtful whether leave to appeal would have been granted if the sentence had been five years. More importantly, the Court of Appeal had this to say on page three of the judgment:
"No community can tolerate violent robberies of this kind, and any person who commits such a violent robbery in Jersey, whatever may be the circumstances of the robber, must expect to receive severe punishment by a long prison sentence."
Later, at the conclusion of the judgment, on page five, the Court of Appeal said this:
"Before leaving this case we add these general observations. In cases of violence, whether of assault or robbery or rape or other forms of violence, it is necessary that the punishment ordered by the Court should have an element of deterrence, not to deter the offender because it is too late to do that, but
(1) to deter others who may be tempted to engage in similar violence, and to remind them that if they do so they will similarly face long sentences of imprisonment; and
(2) to show to the community as a whole that violence of this kind is not to be tolerated and will never be tolerated by the Courts of Jersey."
15. The robbery in this case was a frightening assault carried out in broad daylight in the streets of St. Helier on a defenceless woman going about her daily business. This Court fully endorses everything that was said by the Court of Appeal in Gill. We are determined that those who carry out attacks of this nature will receive condign punishment.
16. We have carefully considered the mitigation put forward by Mr. Tremoceiro to which we have referred earlier but far from this sentence being manifestly excessive we are satisfied that a longer sentence could have been justified. The application is dismissed.
Authorities
AG-v-Ashford (27th September, 1991) Jersey Unreported.
AG-v-Whiteley (18th June, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/126].
AG-v-Gill (3rd June, 1999) Jersey Unreported; [1999/98].
Gill-v-AG (29th September, 1999) Jersey Unreported CofA; [1999/160].
AG-v-Corcoran (25th October, 1996) Jersey Unreported.
AG-v-Marsh (22nd November, 1996) Jersey Unreported.
AG-v-Turner (20th June, 1997) Jersey Unreported.
AG-v-Carboulec & Cooper (20th March, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/56].
AG-v-Monet & Le Feuvre (5th October, 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/197].
Rimmer & Ors-v- AG (19th July, 2001) Jersey Unreported; [2001/148].