Jersey Unreported Judgments

2001/236

ROYAL COURT

(Samedi Division)

 

28^th November 2001 

 

 

 

 

 

Appeal from an administrative decision, under Part XII of the Royal Court Rules 1992, against refusal by the Respondent Committee of development permission for 3 single storey bungalows.

 

Advocate M.M.G.Voisin for the Appellant

The Solicitor General for the Respondent Committee.

 

 

judgment

The Bailiff:

1.        This is an appeal by Token Limited ("the appellant"), pursuant to Article 21 of the Island Planning (Jersey) Law 1964, against a decision of the Planning and Environment Committee ("the Committee") to refuse permission for the development of three single storey bungalows in Field 248A, Mont Gras d'Eau, St. Brelade.  The reasons given in the formal notice of refusal dated 7^th February 2000 were that -

"1.       The proposal is contrary to the approved Island Plan policy for the Green Zone in which there is a presumption against all forms of new development for whatever purpose.

2.        The proposed development would adversely affect the established spacious character and appearance of the neighbouring residential area.

3.        Further residential development in this area, with the associated increased traffic generation onto the existing substandard private access road, would cause unacceptable loss of amenity to existing residents."

A notice of appeal was filed on 3^rd March 2000.

Background

2.        The appellant is the successor in title to Mr. Peter Higgins ("Mr. Higgins"), now deceased, from whom the appellant acquired Field 248A by deed of gift dated 18^th August 1995.  Mr. Higgins had in turn acquired the field and the adjacent Field 303A from Mrs. J. Oxenden.  Mrs. Oxenden had applied for development permission in 1974 to construct housing on both Fields 248A and 303A.  That application had been refused on the ground that:

"the proposed works would represent an extension of estate development on land not zoned for that purpose and would be contrary to the provision of the Development Plan". 

3.        That development plan was superseded by the Island Plan which was lodged au Greffe on 30^th June 1987 and approved by the States on 10^th November 1987.  The Island Plan designated Field 303A as part of the "Built-Up Area" while Field 248A was placed in the Green Zone.  In anticipation of those designations, Mr. Higgins had written to the Planning Department protesting about the proposal to place Field 248A in the Green Zone and asking that this be re-considered.  On 7^th September 1987 a delegation of the Committee visited the site and on 14^th September 1987, according to the minutes of the meeting, the Committee "agreed that it could not give a decision at this time but expressed the view that it would recommend that the fields be included in the Built-Up Area when the first amendments to the Island Plan were formulated, possibly in 1989".  That was followed by a letter dated 17^th September 1987 (to which we shall refer as "the 1987 letter")  from the Assistant Director - Planning to Mr. Higgins in the following terms -

"Fields 248 and 303A, St. Brelade

Further to your recent correspondence with this Department, I write to advise you that the Island Development Committee, having visited the site, would not oppose in principle the development for housing purposes of Field 303A and the southern part of Field 248 as shown on the drawing appended to your letter of 5^th June 1987.

Clearly at this stage it is not possible to include the site as part of the "built-up area" on the Island Map, which hopefully will be approved later this month.  However, the Committee would be prepared to recommend the re-zoning of the land to the States at a later date as intimated in Mr. Paton's letter to you of 24^th July".

4.        Mr. Paton's letter of 24^th July 1987 had regretted the delay in making a site visit and continued -

"The delay in making the visit does not prejudice the Committee's decision as it happens because if members agree to amend the Island Plan it will require the approval of the States which can only be obtained, at the earliest, towards the end of the year".

Despite the advice contained in the 1987 letter, no recommendation to the States for a re-zoning of Field 248A was in fact made "at a later date" or at all.

5.        In January 1992, Mr. Higgins applied to the Committee for permission to build three bungalows on Field 303A.  Neighbours lodged objections to the proposed development on the grounds of loss of open space and the restricted access to the site;  development permission was nonetheless granted in September 1994 and the bungalows were subsequently built.

6.        In November 1995, Mr. V.A.Tomes, on behalf of Mr. Higgins, wrote to the Committee requesting that a recommendation be made to the States that Field 248A be removed from the Green Zone.  In January 1996, the Committee visited the site, and recalled that there had been opposition to the development of the adjacent Field 303A.   The Committee took legal advice as to the implications of the indication given in 1987 and, having considered that advice, decided not to recommend the re-zoning of the land.  Mr. Higgins' legal adviser was told of that decision by letter of 12^th December 1996.

7.        In September 1997 an application was made by the appellant (by then the owner of the land) for development permission for Field 248A.  By notice dated 16^th October 1997 the Committee refused the application for the same reasons given above in relation to the current application.  Following that refusal, the appellant applied, pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 1982, for a review of the decision.  A Board was constituted and reported on 15^th December, 1998.  It recommended that the Committee "should honour the undertaking to take the Green Zone proposal to the States of Jersey", although it made "no recommendation at this stage with regard to an actual development on the site as to whether any building or what amount of building should take place thereon".  For reasons which counsel have agreed are irrelevant to this appeal, this recommendation was not acted upon.

8.        On 21^st October 1999 a further application was made for development permission.  A number of objections were received by the Committee, including a letter from the National Trust for Jersey.  A petition signed by 23 neighbours also objected to the application.  On 3^rd February 2000 the Committee considered the matter and, for the reasons which we have set out above, refused the application.

The legal test

 

9.        The test to be applied by this court in determining appeals under the Island Planning (Jersey) Law 1964 was settled by the Court of Appeal in Island Development Committee v. Fairview Farms Ltd. (1996) JLR 306.  At page 317 Le Quesne JA stated -

"The Royal Court, as an appellate body, must consider not merely whether the inferior body has followed the correct procedure, but also whether its own view is that the decision was unreasonable.  It may allow whatever weight it thinks proper to the experience and knowledge of the inferior body, but it cannot escape the responsibility of forming its own view ...

...The duty of the court on an appeal under art. 21 is not merely to consider whether any reasonable body could have reached the decision which the Committee did reach, but to decide whether the court considers that that decision was, in its view, unreasonable".

The Solicitor General submitted that the decision in Fairview Farm did not entitle the Court to find that the Committee's decision was reasonable but quash it because the Court had reached an equally reasonable but different decision.  We agree.  The Court might think that a Committee's decision is mistaken, but that does not of itself entitle the Court to substitute its own decision.  The Court must form its own view of the merits, but it must reach the conclusion that the Committee's decision is not only mistaken but also unreasonable before it can intervene.  There is an element of semantics here but there is, nonetheless, a qualitative difference between finding that a decision is unreasonable, rather than simply mistaken.  To put it another way, there is a margin of appreciation before a  decision which the Court thinks to be mistaken becomes so wrong that it is, in the view of the Court, unreasonable.

The appellant's contentions

 

10.      Mr. Voisin, for the appellant, submitted that the Committee's decision was unreasonable on several grounds.  He accepted that Field 248A was situated in the Green Zone.  At one stage, he appeared to be submitting that the change of zoning in 1987 from White Land under the earlier Development Plan to Green Zone under the Island Plan was an error, but this submission was not seriously pursued and seems to us to be untenable, having regard to the evidence of Mr. Roy Webster, Principal Planner in the Planning Department, which we accept. In as much as Mr. Peter Grainger, who testified for the appellant, gave evidence to the contrary, we reject it.  We think it more probable than not that a deliberate decision was made to include Field 303A but not field 248A in the "built-up area".   Policy CO1, adopted by the States in 1987 under the aegis of the Island Plan, states unequivocally that -

"In the Green Zone there will be a presumption against all forms of new development for whatever purpose".

A presumption is, of course, not a straitjacket, and the Committee retains a discretion to override a presumption.  Policy CO1 makes it clear, however, that the Committee is expected, in circumstances where it is minded to make an exception to the Green Zone Policy, to refer the matter to the States Assembly.  The Committee is not bound as a matter of law to refer proposed exceptions to Green Zone Policy to the States, but there is an expectation that it will proceed in that way.  As we have stated, the Committee has not done so, the principal reason being that it is not in fact minded to make an exception and to grant development permission for the construction of bungalows in this field.

11.      Mr. Voisin argued that the Committee had acted unlawfully in failing to refer the question of zoning to the States and, irrespective of that failure, had acted equally unlawfully in refusing to grant permission for the proposed development.  Underpinning counsel's argument is what he described as the "undertaking" given in 1987 to support the re-zoning of the field and the sanctioning of residential development upon it.  That alleged undertaking gave rise, he submitted, both to an estoppel preventing the Committee from refusing development permission, and to a legitimate expectation on the part of the appellant that permission would be granted.  We examine those submissions in turn.

Estoppel

 

12.      Mr. Voisin submitted that the conduct of the Committee in sending the 1987 letter  was sufficient to give rise to an estoppel in favour of the appellant.  Counsel relied on dicta from two English cases.  In Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB222 Lord Denning MR stated at page 230 -

"If an officer, acting within the scope of his ostensible authority, makes a representation on which another acts, then a public authority may be bound by it, just as much as a private concern would be.  A good instance is the recent decision of this Court in Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1967] W.L.R. 1000.  It was proved in that case that it was the practice of planning authorities, acting through their officers, to tell applicants whether or not planning permission was necessary.  A letter was written by the council engineer telling the applicants that no permission was necessary.  The applicants acted on it.  It was held that the planning authority could not go back on it.  I would like to quote what I then said, at p.1007:

"It has been their practice to tell applicants that no planning permission is necessary.  Are they now to be allowed to say that this practice was all wrong and their letters were of no effect?  I do not think so.  I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity can be waived, even by a public authority, so as to render valid that which would otherwise be invalid".

So here it has been the practice of the local authority, and of many others, to allow their planning officers to tell applicants whether a variation is material or not.  Are they now to be allowed to say that that practice was all wrong?  I do not think so.  It was a matter within the ostensible authority of the planning officer;  and, being acted on, it is binding on the council".

The facts of that case were, however, very different.  A planning officer mistakenly informed an architect that proposed alterations to approved planning drawings were not material and did not require any further approval from the council.  In reliance on that mistaken assurance the developers went ahead and built a house.  After complaints from the neighbours the developers made an application for retrospective approval which was refused.  Subsequently the council issued an enforcement notice.  The trial judge held, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that the assurance of the council's officer estopped the council from denying that there was a valid planning permission for the building under construction.

13.      Counsel also relied on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Crabb v. Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179.   In that case the plaintiff had a right of access to his land at point A and  a right of way along the defendant council's road.  He negotiated with a representative of the council a further right of access and a right of way from point B.  He subsequently sold part of the land, including point A, without reserving any rights for the remainder of his land.  Having initially established a gate at point B the council subsequently closed it off, leaving the plaintiff landlocked.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was estopped from denying him a right of access at point B and a right of way along their road.  The judge dismissed the action, holding that in the absence of a definite assurance no question of estoppel could arise.  The plaintiff appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal.  Lord Denning MR stated at page 189 -

"The judge found that there was "no definite assurance" by the defendants' representative, and "no firm commitment," but only an "agreement in principle," meaning I suppose that, as Mr. Alford said, there were "some further processes" to be gone through before it would become binding.  But if there were any such processes in the mind of the parties, the subsequent conduct of the defendants was such as to dispense with them.  The defendants actually put up the gates at point B at considerable expense.  That certainly led the plaintiff to believe that they agreed that he should have the right of access through point B without more ado.

The judge also said that, to establish this equity or estoppel, the defendants must have known that the plaintiff was selling the front portion without reserving a right of access for the back portion.  I do not think this was necessary.  The defendants knew that the plaintiff intended to sell the two portions separately and that he would need an access at point B as well as point A.  Seeing that they knew of this intention - and they did nothing to disabuse him but rather confirmed it by erecting gates at point B - it was their conduct which led him to act as he did:  and this raises an equity in his favour against them".

14.      In our judgment neither of these English cases is of assistance to the appellant.  In both Lever Finance and Crabb the plaintiff had acted to his detriment as the result of assurances given by the defendant.  No such detrimental reliance can be shown here.  Even assuming for these purposes that there was an "undertaking" by the former committee, there is no evidence that the appellant's predecessor in title acted to his detriment on the strength of it.  On the contrary, he was already the owner of the land and he took, so far as we are aware, no steps of any consequence in relation to Field 248A until he instructed his legal adviser to write to the Committee in 1995.  In our judgment no estoppel arises in favour of the appellant as a result of the 1987 letter.

15.      Counsel for the appellant suggested that there might be an issue estoppel arising from the 1987 letter.  He drew our attention to Thrasyvoulou v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 2 AC 273.  In that case an inspector had found at a planning appeal that four properties were used as hotels.  In later proceedings a different inspector found that they were used as hostels notwithstanding that it was common ground that there had been no change of use since the earlier decision.  It was held that the doctrine of res judicata applied to adjudications in public law and that the second inspector had accordingly erred in failing to give effect to such an estoppel.  In our judgment this submission of counsel is hopeless. The Committee advised, through its official, that it "would not oppose in principle the development" of the field.  This was a long way short of a judicial or quasi-judicial finding. There was no "issue" decided by the Committee and no question of issue estoppel can therefore arise.

Legitimate expectation

 

16.      Mr. Voisin submitted that, following the 1987 letter, the appellant had a legitimate expectation that the Committee would take a re-zoning proposal to the States and grant permission for development in Field 248A.  The doctrine of legitimate expectation has not, so far as we are aware, yet been  considered by this Court.  According to the learned editors of De Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5^th edition 1995) the doctrine came into being in England in the early 1970's.  They define it in these terms -

"Such an expectation arises where a person responsible for taking a decision has induced in someone who may be affected by the decision a reasonable expectation that he will receive or retain a benefit or that he will be granted a hearing before the decision is taken.  In such cases the courts have held that the expectation ought not to be summarily disappointed".

In England the concept is still in the process of evolution.  Whereas it was originally confined to procedural fairness it has now been extended to the legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive.

17.      In R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2000] All ER 850 Lord Woolf MR summarized the current state of English law and the role of the Court in these terms -

"In considering the correctness of this part of the judge's decision it is necessary to begin by examining the court's role where what is in issue is a promise as to how it would behave in the future made by a public body when exercising a statutory function.  In the past it would have been argued that the promise was to be ignored since it could not have any effect on how the public body exercised its judgment in what it thought was the public interest.  Today such an argument would have no prospect of success, as Mr. Goudie and Mr. Gordon accept.

What is still the subject of some controversy is the court's role when a member of the public, as a result of a promise or other conduct, has a legitimate expectation that he will be treated in one way and the public body wishes to treat him or her in a different way.  Here the starting point has to be to ask what in the circumstances the member of the public could legitimately expect.  In the words of Lord Scarman in Findlay v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept [1984] 3 All ER 801 at 830, [1985] AC 318 at 338: 'But what was their legitimate expectation?'  Where there is a dispute as to this, the dispute has to be determined by the court, as happened in Findlay's case.  This can involve a detailed examination of the precise terms of the promise or representation made, the circumstances in which the promise was made and the nature of the statutory or other discretion.

There are at least three possible outcomes.  (a)  The court may decide that the public authority is only required to bear in mind its previous policy or other representation, giving it the weight it thinks right, but no more, before deciding whether to change course.  Here the court is confined to reviewing the decision on Wednesbury grounds (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680, [1948] 1 KB 223).  This has been held to be the effect of changes of policy in cases involving the early release of prisoners (see Findlay's case;  R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 All ER 397, [1997] 1 WLR 906).  (b) on the other hand the court may decide that the promise or practice induces a legitimate expectation of, for example, being consulted before a particular decision is taken.  Here it is uncontentious that the court itself will require the opportunity for consultation to be given unless there is an overriding reason to resile from it (see A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346, [1983] 2 AC 629) in which case the court will itself judge the adequacy of the reason advanced for the change of policy, taking into account what fairness requires.  (c)  Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power.  Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy.

The court having decided which of the categories is appropriate, the court's role in the case of the second and third categories is different from that in the first.  In the case of the first, the court is restricted to reviewing the decision on conventional grounds.  The test will be rationality and whether the public body has given proper weight to the implications of not fulfilling the promise.  In the case of the second category the court's task is the conventional one of determining whether the decision was procedurally fair.  In the case of the third, the court has when necessary to determine whether there is a sufficient overriding interest to justify a departure from what has been previously promised".

As Lord Woolf went on to explain, the difficult task will be to decide into which category the decision should be allotted.  Counsel for the appellant submitted that this case fell into the third category and that the Court should find that there was no "overriding public interest" justifying a departure from the Committee's decision on 14^th September 1987.  He contended that there had been no change of policy since the 1987 letter other than the re-zoning effected by the Island Plan, of which the Committee was of course aware when the letter was written.

18.      We do not find it necessary to decide today whether the English doctrine of legitimate expectation should be adopted in Jersey, and if so, how it should be adapted for our purposes.  We have no doubt that the general principle enunciated in de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, which we have cited above, is part of the law of Jersey.  "Legitimate expectation" may be a convenient label but it appears to us essentially an expression of the requirement for consistency and fairness in relations between the individual and the state.  A number of decisions on planning appeals (e.g. Wightman v. Island Development Committee (1963) JJ 315 and Scott v. Island Development Committee (1966) JJ 631) could be explained in the context of the disappointment of a legitimate expectation although that terminology was not used.

19.       Furthermore, our jurisprudence and the impending coming into force of the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000 may point the Court more in the direction of a European model and a full review of administrative action against a test of fairness. Equity is a broader concept in Jersey than in England.   Page, Commissioner, in Macon v. Quérée (2001) JLR 80, summarized what Crill, Deputy Bailiff (as he then was) had stated in Lane v. Lane (1985) JLR 48 in these terms -

"...the court had considered at length the nature of equity in Jersey law and the availability of equitable remedies, observing in summary the following: that although the equitable jurisdiction of the Royal Court was not necessarily equivalent to the rules of equity as practised in England, that Court would wherever possible, provide a remedy for wrongs;  and that, although the word "equity" in Jersey corresponds mainly to the French "equité" - in other words, a question of fairness - what had offended the court's sense of fairness in Lane v. Lane "was what Lord Denning and other English judges would stigmatise as unconscionable, unjust or inequitable".

We prefer therefore to approach the matter more broadly.  This is not in any event an application for judicial review;  this is  a statutory appeal in a context where the Court of Appeal has clearly laid down what is the duty of this Court.

Board of Administrative Appeal

 

20.      As we have stated at paragraph 7 above, the appellant applied for a review of the Committee's decision to a Board of Administrative Review.  The Board upheld the appellant's submissions and found that the Committee's decision in 1997 had been unreasonable.  Mr. Voisin placed some reliance on this finding in making his submissions but it is unnecessary, and in our judgment inappropriate, for us to analyse the Board's findings.  Our duty, as we stated, is to reach our own view as to whether the decision appealed from was unreasonable.

Other contentions

21.      Although Mr. Voisin placed particular emphasis on his submissions relating to estoppel and legitimate expectation, he relied upon many of the same arguments to support his general contention that the Committee's decision was unreasonable. Central to these arguments was the weight which ought to be given to the 1987 letter.  Counsel argued that the 1987 letter was binding on the Committee although he was unable to produce any authority in support of that proposition.  As it is well established that a statutory body cannot lawfully fetter its discretion, it is difficult to see how that argument could be substantiated.  What, however, is the weight to be given to the 1987 letter?

22.      The 1987 letter gave two indications.  First, it indicated that the Committee "would not oppose in principle the development for housing purposes of ..... the southern part of Field 248" [i.e. Field 248A].  Secondly, it indicated that "the Committee would be prepared to recommend the re-zoning of the land to the States at a later date as intimated in Mr. Paton's letter to you of 24^th July".    It is true that Mr. Paton's letter had stated that "if members agree to amend the Island Plan it will require the approval of the States".  Nonetheless, on any view, this correspondence was an indication that development permission might well be forthcoming in due course.  Equally clearly, the correspondence did not confer development permission.  One might ask whether the Committee should have given this indication.  It is well established that the Committee must, when considering an application, take into account all material circumstances, including, as appropriate, the views of the parochial and statutory authorities and any objections which might be made by neighbours or other interested parties.   At the time when the indication was given, none of those circumstances could have been taken into consideration.  On the other hand, it seems to us that sensible administration would be paralysed if the Committee were to be precluded from giving any indication as to the likelihood of development permission being forthcoming by the fear that it would be held strictly to the last letter of its indication.  Equally, it would be very unfair upon neighbours and others with a legitimate interest in the application if an indication were to be construed as decisive of a subsequent formal application.  An indication of this kind is merely a preliminary view or an amber light.  If the Committee sends a signal of this kind in the knowledge that the applicant is likely to act upon it in some way which is detrimental to him, then other considerations of course come into play.  But that was not the case here.  The appellant and its predecessor in title did not act to their detriment nor did they take any steps between 1987 and 1995 to press the case for a re-zoning of Field 248A.  The indication given in the 1987 letter was a factor to be considered by the Committee in determining the application, but no more.

23.      What were the other planning considerations?  As we have stated, the Committee received a number of objections principally on the grounds of loss of amenity and open space and inadequate access.  The Court attended on site and examined for itself the access road.  Although it would be possible for the appellant in the immediate vicinity of Field 248A to widen the private road, it has no means available to it of ameliorating the bottleneck where the private road joins the public road.  The evidence was that considerable congestion takes place during the summer months.  Counsel for the appellant argued that the construction of three bungalows would not add significantly to the congestion in that the access road was already used by two hotels and twenty-six houses.  We did not find this argument persuasive.  There comes a time when the straw breaks the camel's back.  Even three additional houses would undoubtedly aggravate the existing congestion.

24.      The site visit enabled the Court better to appreciate the arguments on loss of amenity and open space.  Whereas on the map the development of Field 248A might appear to be a logical extension, it is possible on the ground to appreciate that the loss of open space would, from the perspective of neighbouring properties, be significant.  It is true, as contended by counsel for the appellant, that Field 248A has no viable agricultural value, but that argument is of less significance in the context of land in the Green Zone.  If the land were in the Agricultural Priority Zone, the contention might have been of more weight.

25.      Did the Committee reach a decision which was unreasonable in all the circumstances?  It is clear that the Committee did pay careful regard to the indication given in 1987.  The evidence of Mr. Webster established to our satisfaction that the Committee was "embarrassed" by the indication which had been given and "in a quandary" as to whether it should be given greater weight than the other planning considerations to which we have referred.  We are satisfied that the Committee fairly balanced the competing arguments and eventually decided to refuse permission.  In our judgment, they were entitled to do so.  Fairness is a coin with two sides.  It would be a strange state of affairs if the Committee were to be held to an indication given in principle in 1987 when no opportunity had been given at that time to neighbours nor other interested parties to express their views on the proposed development. 

26.      We have examined carefully the competing arguments and have reached the conclusion that the Committee's decision could not in any way be described as unreasonable.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

 

Authorities

I.D.C. -v- Fairview Farm, Ltd (1996) JLR 306 CofA.

Lever Finance Ltd -v- Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB 222.

Crabb -v- Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179.

Thrasyvoulu -v- Secretary of State for the Environment [1990] 2 AC 273.

De Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5^th Ed'n) (1995): paras. 8 - 046 to 8 - 066; 13 - 029 to 13 - 035.

R -v- North & East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2000] All ER 850.

Wightman -v- IDC (1963) JJ 315.

Scott -v- IDC (1966) JJ 631.

Maçon -v- Quérée (2001) JLR 80.

Lane -v- Lane (1985) JLR 48.

Island Planning (Jersey) Law 1964 : Article 1-7 & 21.

Binet -v- IDC [1987-88] JLR 514.

Coopers and Lybrand -v- I.D.C. [1992] JLR 70.

R -v- Newham L.B.C. ex parte (1) Manik Bibi (2) Ataya Al Nashed (2001) EWCA.                  

Western Fish Products, Ltd -v- Penwith District Council [1981] 2 All ER 204.

Arbaugh -v- I.D.C. [1966] JJ 593.