Jersey Unreported Judgments

 2001/125

ROYAL COURT

(Samedi Division)

 

30th May 2001

 

 

The Attorney General

-v-

Alfred Herbert George Renouf

 

Sentencing by the Superior Number of the Royal Court, to which the accused was remanded by the Inferior Number on 20th April, 2001, following a guilty plea to the following charges:

 

15 counts of:

fraudulent inducement to lend money, contrary to Article 12 (a)(i) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud) (Jersey) Law 1967: counts 1-15, inclusive.

 

 

Age:     62.

 

Details of Offence:

Renouf had worked as a baggage handler at the Airport.  He solicited loans from work colleagues and friends claiming that he was running a business trading in "select" cars and that out of the profits of that business he could pay astonishingly high rates of interest to his investors.  In reality, there was no underlying business at all.  Loans could only be repaid, and interest met, by using the money which others had lent.  It was a case of "robbing Peter to pay Paul".  Eventually the scheme collapsed when one lender could not be repaid and took judgment against Renouf.  The indictment referred to 15 named individuals as having lent a total capital sum of £179,000 spanning a period from January 1996 to February 1999.  The capital lost by the 15 individuals amounted to £133,840 taking account of payments received by them from Renouf.  It was a gross breach of trust.  The victims were friends and work colleagues who were not financially astute and who could ill afford to lose money.

 

Details of Mitigation:

Renouf had not personally gained from the scheme.  When it collapsed, he declared himself "en désastre".  There had been delay on the part of the prosecution.  Renouf had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity when the prosecution substituted a new indictment charging offences under the 1967 Law to replace the earlier indictment which had charged Renouf with 15 counts of common law fraud.  His advanced age; he had no relevant record of prior convictions; he was remorseful and he had co-operated with the police investigation; he was suffering from clinical depression; he was endeavouring to pay back as much as he could to the victims.

 

Conclusions:

 

Counts 1-15:

4 years' imprisonment, on each count, concurrent.

 

 

Sentence and Observations of Court:

 

Renouf had defrauded 15 people of £134,000 over three years.  These were friends and colleagues of his who were of modest means.  It was a serious breach of trust.  The Court adopted the Barrick guidelines whilst noting that that case is not of assistance with regard to the length of any sentence of imprisonment to be imposed.  Adopting the guidelines, the Court particularly noted that in this case the quality and degree of trust was high.  The offences had been committed over a three year period and the effects on the victims were significant as some of them had suffered losses they could ill afford.  The Court accepted the prosecution's invitation to state that the decision in Clark had turned on features peculiar to the English system and was of no assistance in Jersey.  The Court considered that there had been inexcusable delay by the prosecution which was to be taken into account.  Taking into account all available mitigation, including the guilty pleas, for which full credit would be given, the Court could nevertheless not avoid a custodial sentence.  There would be a small reduction in the conclusions; one Jurat had favoured a term of 3 years' imprisonment but the other Jurats were inclined to impose a 3½ year term.  Renouf was sentenced to 3½ years' imprisonment on each count concurrently.

 

A.D. Robinson, Esq., Crown Advocate.

Advocate W. Grace for the accused.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

THE DEPUTY BAILIFF:

1.        Renouf, you defrauded some 15 investors of approximately £134,000 over a period of 3 years, from January 1996 to February 1999.  Most of these were your friends and your colleagues from work, who knew you well and trusted you.  Indeed, they placed a total of £179,000 with you on the understanding that you would invest the funds in a business trading in select cars.  In fact, there never was such a business.  You promised them ludicrously high rates of return, which could never be achieved.  You repaid some investors with funds obtained from new investors, a classic case of "robbing Peter to pay Paul".  In February 1999, inevitably, the pack of cards came tumbling down and your deception was exposed.  Most of your victims were of modest means and could ill afford to lose the sums which they have lost.  It was, in our judgment, a serious breach of trust on your part. 

2.        We have been referred to the case of Barrick, an English case which sets out principles in relation to offences of fraud.  We are not dealing with the customary offence of fraud but, nevertheless, we think that the principles set out in Barrick are relevant, although this Court has repeatedly said that Barrick is useful for looking at factors which aggravate or mitigate an offence, but it is not of assistance to this Court in deciding on the right quantum of sentence, because we adopt our own policy for sentencing in cases of breach of trust and financial fraud.  But looking at the factors in Barrick, we consider the quality and degree of trust reposed in the offender to be high because of your relationship with the victims.  The offences were committed over a period of some 3 years and, as far as the effect on the victims is concerned, it is clear to us that some of them have suffered losses that they could ill afford.  We have also been referred to the case of Clark, where the courts in England have modified some of the tariffs set out in Barrick, but as we have said, we do not follow Barrick in relation to the quantum of sentence. It is clear that Clark turned on some features peculiar to the English jurisdiction and we do not consider it to be of assistance here.

3.        Mr Grace has put forward a powerful case in mitigation on your behalf and the Court would like to express its gratitude to him for the hard work that he has clearly put in and the eloquence with which he put forward the matters on your behalf.  He referred to the fact that you derived no profit from this scheme and indeed were never going to.  We accept that that is so, although that does not alter the fact that it caused loss to others and it must have been obvious to you from a very early stage that loss would be caused because there was not any hope at all of your being able to repay people.

4.        He has referred also to delay.  You were first seen in February 1999.  You were charged on 12th January 2000 and you were committed for trial from the Magistrate's Court on 9th March, 2000.  In our judgment no criticism can be made of that period of delay.  It does not lie in the mouth of a person who has committed offences of this nature to say that it has taken the Crown a long time to investigate it, when there are no records and the like.  It is inevitable, therefore, that the Crown has to try and reconstruct what happened and that inevitably takes time.  We do not consider that the period taken in this case was in any way open to criticism.

5.        That, however, does not apply to the period which followed committal in March.  The indictment was not ready until the end of October 2000.  Even when it was eventually produced it was then changed to its present form on 20th April.  We make no criticism of Crown Advocate Robinson as it is clear that he took over this prosecution at a late stage, but the prosecution - and in this case we mean the prosecution, not the police - must bear responsibility for this delay which cannot be justified.  If the case had been dealt with properly we would have expected to sentence within 2 to 3 months of committal, so that would have taken us to approximately June of last year. There has therefore been a delay -  which lies entirely at the door of the prosecution -  of approximately 1 year and we take that into account and in your favour.

6.        Mr Grace has also emphasised your good character.  You have no previous convictions, and indeed he goes further than that.  We have read the references which have been provided on your behalf and it is clear that you have hitherto led a blameless life.  Indeed, you have had much to offer.  It is a tragedy that you have thrown it all away.  He has referred to the fact that you have pleaded guilty and we accept his point that you are entitled to full credit for this as you pleaded guilty to the present indictment the moment it was presented.  It was hardly your fault that the Crown had hitherto proceeded on another indictment.

7.        He emphasised other factors such as your remorse, which we accept you feel; your health; your age at 62; and the fact that you have made attempts to repay into the désastre in order to assist your creditors.

8.        We have taken all these matters into account but the nature of these offences is such that we cannot proceed by way of a non-custodial sentence.  We think that there can be, in the light of all the mitigation that we have spelt out, a small reduction in the conclusions.  One of the Jurats would have imposed a sentence of 3 years but all the other Jurats consider that the right sentence is one of 3½ years' imprisonment, concurrent, on all the charges.  That is, therefore, the sentence of the Court.

 

Authorities

Barrick (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S) 142.

Clark [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 95.

A.G-v-Murphy (14th April 2000) Jersey Unreported; [2000/68].

A.G-v-Donnelly (13th October 2000) Jersey Unreported; [2000/199]

A.G-v-Blake (18th August 1995) Jersey Unreported;

A.G-v-Young & Ors (8th May 1998) Jersey Unreported; [1998/94]

A.G-v-Hamilton & Ors (3rd June 1999) Jersey Unreported; [1999/97]

A.G-v-Mahé & Ors (27th July 2000) Jersey Unreported; [2000/152]

A.G-v-Hébert & Rainbow (9th March 2001) Jersey Unreported; [2001/59]

A.G-v-Holmes & Parry (6th April 2001) Jersey Unreported; [2001/83]

A.G-v-de Freitas (20th April 2001) Jersey Unreported; [2001/86B].