Jersey Unreported Judgments

---

You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> 1999/156 - Mayo Associates and Ors v Anagram and Young [1999] UR 156 (16 September 1999)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/1999/156.html
Cite as: [1999] UR 156

---

[New search] [Contents list] [Help]

---

Royal Court

(Samedi Division)

Reasoned Judgment reserved: 8 July 1999

Reasoned Judgment handed down: 16 September 1999

Before: Sir Godfray Le Quesne QC, Commissioner

Action 94/6

Between:Mayo Associates SA

Troy Associates Ltd.

TTS International SAPlaintiffs

And:Anagram (Bermuda) Limited

Robert Young

Maureen YoungDefendants

And:Lionrock Limited

Edgefield Properties Limited

Box Limited

Starshield Limited

Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (CI) Limited

TSB Bank Channel Islands LimitedParties Cited

Action 94/254.

Between:Mayo Associates SA

Troy Associates Limited

TTS International SAPlaintiffs

And:Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (C.I.) Limited

Touche Ross & Co.

(Being the person listed in Exhibit A to the Order of Justice)Defendants

And:Robert John Young

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Anagram (Bermuda) Limited

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Myles Tweedale Stott

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Michael Gordon Marsh

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Monica Gabrielli

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Touche Ross & Co

(joined at the instance of the First Defendant)

Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (C.I.) Limited

(joined at the instance of the Second Defendant)

The Attorney General

(joined at the instance of the Plaintiffs)Third Parties

Application by the Plaintiffs in Action 94/06 for a default judgment against the first and third Defendants, in consequence of their respective answers having been struck out;

Application by the Plaintiffs in Action 94/254 for leave to amend their re-re-amended Order of Justice in the terms of their draft Summons dated 23^rd June, 1999;

Application by the Plaintiffs and the third, fourth, and fifth Third Parties in Action 94/254 for leave to appeal against so much of the Order of the Royal Court of 5^th May, 1999, as refused the application to further amend the Plaintiffs’ re-re-amended Order of Justice by the addition of paragraph 84(2)(a);

Application by the First Defendant in Action 94/254 for leave to file its re-amended Answer;

Application by the first Defendant and the seventh Third Party in Action 94/254, and by the Fifth Party Cited in Action 94/06 for directions as to the identification of issues and the bringing of matters to trial;

Applications by the 2^nd Defendant in Action 94/254 for leave to file its re-amended Answer;

Application by the second Defendant and the sixth Third Party in Action 94/254 for an Order specifying preliminary issues;

Application by the second Defendant in Action 94/06 for a declaration that the second and third Defendants have complied with the Court’s Order of 5^th May, 1999, for discovery.

Judgment setting out the Court’s reasons for the following decisions made at the hearing on 8 July 1999:

1 refusing to allow the Plaintiffs to enter Judgment against the first and third defendants in Action 94/06; and

2 allowing the second Defendant to address the Court on behalf of the first and third defendants in Action 94/06.

 

Advocate P C Sinel for the Plaintiffs in both actions and for the 3^rd, 4^th, and 5^th Third Parties in Action 94/254;

Advocate A R Binnington and/or Advocate D R Wilson for the 5^th Party Cited in Action 94/6, the 1^st Defendants and 7^th Third Party in Action 94/254

Advocate A J D Winchester for the 2^nd Defendant in Action 94/6, the 1^st Third Party in Action 94/254;

Advocate N F Journeaux for the 2^nd Defendant and for the 6^th Third Party in Action 94/254;

Advocate D F Le Quesne for the 1^st Defendant and the 3^rd Defendant in Action 94/6, and the 2^nd Third Party in Action 94/254 did not appear.

The 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 4^th Parties Cited in Action 94/6 have been released from the proceedings

JUDGMENT

THE COMMISSIONER:

1.The Plaintiffs have asked for a written judgment stating my reasons for two decisions which I gave at the hearing on 8 July 1999, viz:

(a)refusing to allow the Plaintiffs to enter judgment against the first and third Defendants;

(b)allowing Dr. Young (the second Defendant) to address me on behalf of the first and third Defendants.

2.The first Defendants are (or were) a company incorporated in Bermuda, owned and controlled by the second and third Defendants. There was evidence before me that the company was dissolved in Bermuda in 1996. The second Defendant is the husband of the third Defendant.

3.In earlier stages of the proceedings all three Defendants were legally represented. The firm which then represented them no longer does so. The second Defendant is now represented by another firm. The first and third Defendants are unrepresented, as they have been for some time.

4.By 5 May 1999, none of the Defendants had complied with an earlier order (contained in the Act of Court of the 17 September 1998) requiring them to furnish affidavits of documents. Accordingly, on 5 May 1999 I ordered, on the applications of the Plaintiffs,

5.The second Defendants subsequently furnished an affidavit of documents. The first and third Defendants did not. On the 24^th June, 1999, the Plaintiffs issued a summons calling upon the first and third Defendants to shew cause (inter alia) why the Plaintiffs should not enter default judgment against them, since they had failed to furnish affidavits as required by Act of the Court of the 5^th May, 1999.

6.This summons came before me on the 8^th July, 1999. The first and third Defendants were not represented. Counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that the Answers of the first and third Defendants had already been automatically struck out by virtue of my order of the 5^th May, 1999. I accepted this submission.

7.Counsel then went on to ask for final judgment in default against the first and third Defendants. In my view, this did not necessarily follow. The considerations I had in mind are set out in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Samuels -v- Linzi Dresses, Ltd [1981] QB 115. (O.3, r.5 of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, under which that case was decided, was practically identical with rule 1/5 of the Royal Court Rules). The first and third Defendants had put in Answers, but subsequently had ceased to be represented in the proceedings. Dr. Young told me that the third Defendant was about to apply for legal aid. I did not form any view of the likelihood that she would be able to make out a case for relief, but I was reluctant to order final judgment without allowing her an opportunity to argue the point.

8.There was another point relevant to the position of the first Defendants. As I have said, it appeared that the company had been dissolved. I wanted to be satisfied that it was proper to order judgment against a dissolved corporation. Counsel for the Plaintiffs was not prepared to deal with this.

9.I therefore adjourned the applications for judgment to 7 October.

10.At the beginning of the hearing, Dr. Young said he wished to appear for the other Defendants. Mr. Sinel objected to this, and relied on rule 8/3. I told Dr. Young that I would, as an indulgence, hear what he had to say for the other Defendants on that occasion, but he should not expect me to do the same thing again. I granted the indulgence to avoid any possibility of injustice to parties who were not represented. I considered that my discretion in the control of the proceedings was wide enough to cover such an exceptional arrangement for a single occasion.

 

Authorities

Samuels -v- Linzi Dresses, Ltd. [1981] QB 115.