Royal Court
(Samedi Division)
Judgment reserved: 27 November 1997
Reserved Judgment delivered: 12 January 1998
Before Sir Godfray Le Quesne QC, Commissioner,
sitting alone
A G
-v-
Robert John Young;
Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (CI), Ltd
Peter Robert Stoneman; and
Alfred George Williams
ROBERT JOHN YOUNG
11 counts of inducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 6D, 7A, 8, 9, 10)
CANTRADE PRIVATE BANK SWITZERLAND (CI) LIMITED
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 6D, 7A)
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by the reckless making of misleading, false or deceptive statements, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 6E, 7B)
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by the dishonest concealment of material facts, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, 5C, 6C, 6F, 7C)
PETER ROBERT STONEMAN
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 6D, 7A)
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by the reckless making of misleading, false or deceptive statements, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 6E, 7B)
8 counts ofinducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by the dishonest concealment of material facts, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1C, 2C, 3C, 4C, 5C, 6C, 6F, 7C)
ALFRED GEORGE WILLIAMS
8 counts of inducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1A,, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 6D, 7A)
8 counts of inducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by the reckless making of misleading, false or deceptive statements, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud)(Jersey) Law, 1967: (counts 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 6E, 7B)
Preliminary points raised by the Defendants:
C E Whelan Esq, Crown Advocate
Advocate D F Le Quesne for R J Young
Advocate A R Binnington and Advocate D Wilson for Cantrade Private Bank
Advocate M M G Voisin for P R Stoneman
Advocate S Young for A G Williams
JUDGMENT
THE COMMISSIONER:
1 These Defendants face charges under Article 12 of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud) (Jersey) Law, 1967. (I shall refer to this statute as ‘the Investors Law’). Before pleading to the indictment, they have raised two preliminary points. The first is that most of the charges against them are barred by lapse of time, the second that the facts of the case cannot be brought within the terms of Article 12.
2 The time point arises under Article 2 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law, 1978 (to which I shall refer as ‘the Law Reform Law’). That Article reads:
"(2) Subject to the provisions of any other enactment, the period within which proceedings may be instituted in respect of an offence shall be three years from the date of commission of the offence:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall revive any proceedings which were barred by prescription before the commencement of this Law."
The opening words of para. (2) of this Article did at one time apply to the Investors Law, because Article 15(4) of the Investors Law made special provision for the time within which proceedings might be brought for an offence against that Law. Article 15 was repealed, however, by the Banking Business (Jersey) Law, 1981, Article 50(1) and schedule.
3. I have therefore to decide upon what date each of the offences charged in the indictment was committed, assuming it to have been committed, and upon what date proceedings for each offence were instituted. For most of the offences, both dates are disputed.
4. I must first summarise, sufficiently to make this judgment intelligible, the circumstances from which the prosecution arises. For this I rely on the Crowns Case Statement, which all parties agreed should be accepted for the purposes of the argument of these preliminary points.
5. Two companies, Troy Associates Limited (incorporated in Liberia) and Troy Management Limited (incorporated in Bermuda), invited people to deposit money to be used for trading in foreign exchange. Money deposited was placed in an account maintained in Jersey with the Second Defendants by TTSI, a Panamanian company owned by Mayo Associates, SA Mayo Associates, SA was a Swiss company controlled by an English Chartered Accountant in Geneva named Stott. Depositors were told that Mayo Associates held their money as trustee.
6. The Second Defendants are a wholly owned subsidiary of the Union Bank of Switzerland. They kept the deposited money in an account called a collateral account. On the security of that account, the Second Defendants (I shall call them ‘the Bank’) allowed Troy credit, in a sum equal to the deposited amount multiplied by a gearing factor which changed from time to time, for trading in foreign exchange. The trading was conducted for Troy by the First Defendant, Dr Young.
7. Various means were used to assure investors and people who might become investors that Dr Youngs trading was safe, successful and profitable. This was stated in Troys advertising material, at conferences which Troy organised and in interviews with individuals. Dr Young received regular and accurate statements from the Bank (Mr Stott instructed the Bank to send the statements to Dr Young, not to him) but then sent to Mr Stott valuations which differed from the Bank statements. On the basis of these false valuations Mr Stott sent quarterly reports to the investors, almost all of which were misleading and purported to show that the investments were increasing in value, when in fact they were shrinking.
8. From November, 1989 onward Dr Young in fact incurred losses. By the end of November 1993, when he fell out with Troy and was dismissed by them, he lost over $10,000,000. Some investors lost virtually the whole of their investment.
9. The Third Defendant, Mr Stoneman, was at the material times a senior manager of the bank. He knew the truth about the losses incurred by Dr Young. In spite of that, he attended the Troy conference held in June 1993. Much was said there of the safety and profitability of Dr Youngs trading. Mr Stoneman addressed the conference and said he monitored the accounts of the investors daily. This was untrue. He spoke to individuals both at the conference and in Jersey. He told them that Dr Young was a profitable trader, and under the Troy System of trading it was impossible for an investor to lose more than 10% of his investment.
10. The Fourth Defendant, Mr Williams, is a Chartered Accountant and was at the material times a partner in Touche Ross. From 1992 onward he produced a series of certificates for Troy purporting to show successful results of Dr Youngs trading since 1990. These certificates stated that Touche Ross had, by reference to trading records of Dr Young, together with independent confirmations from third parties, ascertained that the results shown were a true record. The certificates, including this statement, were untrue. At the Troy conference held in June 1993 Mr Williams said he was personally in charge of the auditing by Touche Ross of Dr Youngs trading; a formal audit took place quarterly and was verified with third parties. In fact, there was no audit.
11. In July 1990, Mr Morton, a senior manager of the bank, gave to Troy a reference for Dr Young to be used in Troys advertisements. It contained these words:
"His business dealings with the bank have always been conducted with honesty and integrity. In his capacity as a foreign exchange dealer he has shown a high standard of professionalism. I have found his trading advice to be both astute and beneficial."
This reference was shown by Troy to investors and potential investors and reproduced in every brochure. Mr Morton knew of Dr Youngs losses, which by July 1990 amounted to about $2,000,000.
12. Troy dismissed Dr Young in November 1993. Dr Young continued to assert that his trading had been profitable. Some investors still believed him, and left money in his hands for trading without the intervention of Troy.
13. Dr Young and his wife had an agreement with TTSI, under which they were entitled to 15% of the net profit on Dr Youngs trading. The investors were not told of this agreement. The percentage was calculated on the false figures given to Mr Stott by Dr Young. From this source Dr Young received about $1,800,000. The bank supplied the foreign currency needed for Dr Youngs deals, and shared with him the profit on the supply. The Bank and Dr Young thus made a profit, whether the deal for which the currency was supplied was profitable or not. From this source Dr Young received about £2,500,000.
14. I emphasise that the summary which I have given consists of allegations, not of established facts. The matters stated are matters which the Crown will attempt to prove if the case goes to trial. At present they have not been proved against anyone. I recite them only because it has been agreed that these preliminary points are to be argued and decided on the basis of these allegations. This agreement is not an admission by any of the Defendants that any of the allegations are true.
15. I now turn to the time point, and deal first with the charges in the indictment against the First Defendant, Dr Young. The first charge against him is in count 1A, which reads:
Statement of Offence
Inducement to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of property by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive, contrary to Article 12(c) of the Investors (Prevention of Fraud) (Jersey) Law 1967.
Particulars of Offence
Robert John Young, Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (C.I.) Limited, Peter Robert Stoneman and Alfred George Williams, by statements which they knew to be misleading, false or deceptive, induced Steven Frederick Cerny between about 22 Novembe, 1993, and 1 April 1994, to take part in arrangements with respect to the management of currency, the purpose or effect or pretended purpose or effect of which was to enable him to participate in or receive profits or income alleged to arise or be likely to arise from such management.
Particulars of Statements
1. Those numbered 1 to 7 in schedule A
8. A statement in about April 1990, by Peter Morton, then Treasury Manager of Cantrade, in a telephone conversation to the effect that Young was a successful trader and made large profits and small losses but far more profits than losses; Cantrade knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
9. Statements by Young and Peter Morton at a meeting on or about 2 December 1991, that Youngs trading was profitable; Young and Cantrade knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
Schedule A to the indictment reads:-
SCHEDULE A
Statements regarding Young’s trading at the Troy Forum 1993 to the following effect
1. That Young had successfully traded foreign exchange on behalf of Troy Trust Service programmes that the programmes had consistently increased in value, that the programmes were a safe and conservative investment and that any losses would be small and could be contained by stop losses; Young, Cantrade and Stoneman knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
2. That Peter Stoneman and Bank Cantrade were monitoring the accounts daily; Cantrade and Stoneman knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
Statements regarding Youngs trading to the following effect in Troy promotional literature.
3. That Young had successfully traded foreign exchange on behalf of Troy Trust Service programmes, that the programmes had consistently increased in value, that the programmes were a safe and conservative investment and that any losses would be small and could be contained by stop losses; Young knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
Statements regarding Touche Ross to the following effect at the Troy Forum 1993 and in Troy promotional literature
4. That Touche Ross had reviewed the Troy trading results and confirmed them with independent third parties; Young and Williams knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
5. That Touche Ross audited the Troy results; Young and Williams knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
Statements to the following effect made in Bank Cantrade references signed by Peter Morton.
6. That Young was a professional and successful trader of integrity; Young and Cantrade knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive.
Statements regarding Youngs trading to the following effect in Mayo quarterly statements.
7. That the investment was increasing in value; Young knew this to be misleading, false or deceptive."
16. In order to see when proceedings in respect of the offence thus charged were instituted against Dr Young, it is necessary to consider the steps taken against him. In June 1996 Dr Young was living in England. On 17 June 1996, Det Sgt Hairon swore an affidavit setting out allegations against Dr Young, on the strength of which he applied to the Deputy Bailiff on 20 June for a warrant for Dr Youngs arrest. The Deputy Bailiff issued the warrant, and Dr Young was arrested in England on 13 August 1996.
17. Mr Whelans first submission was that the application for the warrant on 17 June 1996, or its issue on 20 June, constituted the institution of the proceedings against Dr Young.
18. I now set out Det Sgt Hairons affidavit (omitting the formal parts):-
"I, Keith Bernard Hairon, a Detective Sergeant in the States of Jersey Police, make oath and say as follows:-
Myles Tweedale Stott is chief executive and beneficial owner of a company called Mayo Associates SA. He is also a director of TTS International SA, which is owned by Mayo.
Michael Gordon Marsh is a major shareholder of Troy Associates Ltd.
Stott was in the business of accepting funds from clients and setting up a system whereby these would be used as collateral so that trading could be undertaken in the foreign currency markets.
The clients’ funds were held by Mayo and managed by Troy.
Robert John Young is the owner of a company called Anagram (Bermuda) Ltd, which had formerly been known as Anagram Economics Ltd, and was based at 17 Bond Street, St. Helier.
The various clients signed an agreement (called the Troy Trust Service) with Stott on behalf of Mayo, and Marsh on behalf of Troy, in order for their money to be used for the foreign exchange trading.
The co-mingled clients’ funds were placed in an account at Cantrade Bank Switzerland (CI) Ltd., of Union Street, St Helier. An agreement was then set in place whereby by Robert Young was given authority to trade foreign exchange with Bank Cantrade, using the deposited funds as collateral. This was called the TTSI programme. The agreement then went on to state that the accounts would be valued at the end of the last working day of each month. The revaluations, to be done by Robert Young, would then be sent by Young to Stott on behalf of Mayo at his office at 7 Avenue de Pictet de Rochemont, 1207 Geneva.
Young would construct the revaluations on the accounts on receipt of the bank statements from Bank Cantrade which would give him the position of the underlying collateral accounts at the end of his monthly trading.
Each month from March 1988, when the programme started, a revaluation of the accounts was subsequently constructed by Young and sent to Stott as per the agreement between them.
Young drew fees according to the agreement based on the revaluations, of either 10% of the accumulated net profit, or one twelfth of one percent of the Trading Base Value, whichever was the greater. The Trading Base Value was the amount of the collateral deposit.
At the end of June 1993, Young sent a revaluation document to Stott stating that the US dollar equivalent of the accounts held by TTSI at Bank Cantrade was $20,576,649.18. The actual position of the accounts of TTSI at Bank Cantrade were $787,167.47.
At the end of July 1993 he sent a revaluation stating that the position of the accounts was $20,843,252.01 when it was actually $483,744. Similarly, at the end of August he stated that figure as $21,316,335.63 whereas it was $630,744.12. At the end of September the figure was quoted as $21,620,373.08 whereby it was really $806,462.98 and the end of October figures were quoted by Young $21,791,660.91 when the statements showed $684,829.57.
As well as there being a TTSI programme which were co-mingled funds of clients who had deposited a minimum amount of $100,000 there was also a programme called the TTS "F" programme. These were agreements signed in the same way between clients and Stott and Marsh except that these clients known as the "F" clients had a minimum deposit of $1,000,000.
These accounts were to be revalued in the same way as the other co-mingled funds. At the end of June 1993 Young revalued the "F" accounts as $11,290,296.48 whereas the true position was $7,692,911. The end of July the picture was £12,462,176.86 compared to a true position of $8,081,805.09. The end of August his valuation showed $12,895,107.45 whereas the true position was $9,530,878.10. Similarly the end of September valuation showed $14,288,251.97 compared to the bank statements showing $9,987,247.33.
These figures have been confirmed by an audit of the accounts undertaken by Price Waterhouse, the Chartered Accountants. The figures were believed by Mr Stott because they were in line with similar month end valuations submitted by Young since the inception of the agreement in March, 1988, for the co-mingled funds and the first "F" account in November 1990.
Both Stott who was the administrator of the funds, and Marsh who was selling the programme, had believed the valuations received by Stott and acted upon them by both paying commission to Young and leaving the collateral in place over this period of time. Stott sent out documents to the individual clients based on the figures he received from Young and Marsh, and had continued to promote the programmes at conferences.
On 6th July, 1993, $390,000 was received into the F31 account and on 27th July, 1993, $303,000 was received into the F35 account. Also 28,328,234 Yen was received into F28 on 7 September 1993.
Enquiries have revealed that in the course of the protracted investigations to arrive at the facts, Young has left Jersey, vacating his office at Bond Street in July 1994 and his home in Edgefield, Le Vier Beaumont, St. Peter, in February 1995.
I therefore request that a warrant be issued for the arrest of the said Robert John Young so that he may be brought back to the Island to stand trial for the offences herein disclosed."
19. Mr Whelan cited English cases establishing that in England the laying of an information constitutes the institution of proceedings, and submitted that the same rule should be applied by analogy to an application for a warrant in Jersey. Mr Le Quesne submitted that there is no valid analogy. It is not necessary to consider this argument in connection with count 1A. I am satisfied that, even if the effect of the application for a warrant or its issue was to institute proceedings, the proceedings so instituted were not in respect of the offence charged by that count.
20. The story told in the affidavit is a story of deception of Mr Stott and Mr Marsh (described as ‘a major shareholder of Troy Associates Ltd’) by Dr Young. Consistently with this, it is Mayo Associates and Troy Associates that are alleged in the warrant to have been fraudulently induced to invest. The instruments of deception, according to the affidavit, were the false valuations sent regularly by Dr Young to Mr Stott. On both these points the allegations made in count 1A are quite different. The person there alleged to have been induced is Mr Cerny and the case for the Crown is that Troy Associates, far from being deceived, were in league with Dr Young. The instruments of deception alleged are numerous, but although they do include false statements in May quarterly reports, there is no mention of false valuations given by Dr Young to Mr Stott. Mr Whelan submitted that there need be no more than ‘broad correspondence’ (if, indeed, as much as that) between the narrative in this information and the indictment. However this may be, the narrative in this information does not in my judgment correspond even broadly with count 1A.
21. On 31 August 1996, having been escorted back to Jersey, Dr. Young was charged at Police Headquarters. The following were the charges:-
"1. The said Robert John Young with having between 17 June 1993, and 31 December 1993, by a statement which he knew to be false (namely a statement purporting to show true currency balances and account valuations in respect of funds placed in his control by Troy Associates Limited and under his management at Bank Cantrade Switzerland (CI) Limited, Jersey) induced persons to take part in arrangements with respect to currency, the purpose of which was to enable persons taking part therein to receive profits alleged to be likely to arise from the management of such currency.
2. The said Robert John Young with having between 17 June 1993 and 31 December 1993 dishonestly concealed material facts, namely that as a currency trader he had since the year 1990 traded at a loss with funds placed under his management by Troy Associates Limited, and in his control at Bank Cantrade Switzerland (CI) Limited, Jersey, and by the said concealment induced persons to take part in arrangements with respect to currency, the purpose of which was to enable persons taking part therein to receive profits alleged to be likely to arise from the management of such currency."
Later on the same day Dr Young appeared in the Magistrates Court and pleaded not guilty to those charges.
22. The Crown contends that, if the proceedings against Dr Young were not instituted by the issue or the execution of the warrant, they were instituted when Dr Young was charged on 13 August 1996. The second of the charges then put clearly has nothing to do with count 1A. In connection with count 1A the first charge needs a little more consideration. In one respect it is closer to this count than the information was, for in the charge the inducement is said to have been practised upon ‘persons’, which might be interpreted as including Mr Cerny. On the other hand, the instruments of deception alleged are confined to Dr Youngs false valuations ‘in respect of funds … under his management at (the Bank],’ so do not coincide at all with the numerous statements particularised in count 1A. It is also significant that the dates of the offence alleged in the charge (‘between 17 June 1993 and 31 December 1993’) are not related to the particular incident at which, according to the Case Statement, count 1A is aimed - Mr Cernys decision in November 1993 ‘to allow Young to trade his money outside the TTS programme’.
23. Mr Le Quesne has submitted that the charges put to Dr Young on 13 August 1996 were so defective that no proceedings were instituted on that day. I do not go into that point here because, even if proceedings were instituted by those charges, they were not, in my judgment, proceedings in respect of the offence charged by count 1A.
24. The individual Defendants appeared in the Magistrates Court again on 6 November 1996. What then occurred I gather from what I was told at the hearing and from two letters written by Mr Le Quesne to Mr Whelan respectively on 6th November and 7 November 1996. It was known, at least by Mr Le Quesne, before the appearance that new charges were to be produced. At the Court, the Centenier handed to each Defendant, or to the advocate representing each of them, a copy of 29 new charges. These charges were not read out. Because counsel had no opportunity to study them, the Magistrate suggested that pleas should not be entered. The Defendants were then remanded. They next appeared in Court on 11 December 1996. The Centenier then presented 40 charges, consisting of the 29 charges of 6 November (presented on 11 December in different form) and 11 additional charges. All counsel agreed that the charges should be taken as read, pleas were reserved and the Defendants were again remanded.
25. Mr Le Quesne concedes that Dr Young was properly charged on 11 December but submits that there was no charging, and so no institution of proceedings, on 6 November. What happened on 6 November, he says, would have amounted to charging if the charges had been read out, or counsel had been given time to read them, and pleas had then been expressly reserved.
26. Mr Whelan submits that proceedings in respect of an offence are instituted when the first step is taken in a process which will culminate in the appearance of the defendant in court for trial for that offence. In my judgment, that is right. It is agreed that such a first step is taken when the charge of having committed the offence is put to the defendant. Clearly the charge must be put to the defendant with a degree of formality. Mr Le Quesnes submission is that the charge must be put viva voce, or if it is put to him in writing he or his counsel must be given time to read it. It was a formal statement of charges which was presented to the Defendants on 6 November. Whether this was done actually in the presence of the Magistrate is not clear, but it is clear that it was done at the Court and the Magistrate must have been informed that it had been done, because otherwise he would have had no occasion to suggest that pleas should not be entered. What is essential to the institution of proceedings is that the Defendant should be formally told what charge is made against him, and I see no reason why this should not be just as effective if done in writing as it is if done by speech. It makes no difference, in my judgment, if counsel is not given the opportunity then and there to read the charge. What is essential at that stage is that the charge should be put, not that the defendant’s answer should be given.
27.It follows that Dr Young was charged on 6 November 1996. The first of the charges put that day is the same in substance as the charge made by count 1A of the indictment, except only the alleged dates of the offence. These dates are ‘between 1 January 1988 and 1 April 1994’ in the charge of 6 November, in count 1A ‘between about 22 November 1993 and 1 April 1994’. The two periods overlap. As to the dates, the count is in effect a particularisation of the earlier charge. Proceedings against Dr Young in respect of the offence charged by count 1A were therefore instituted on 6 November 1996.
28. I now pass to the other charges against Dr Young in the indictment. It follows from what I have said that proceedings against him in respect of the offences charged by counts 2A (Mr Kawasaki), 3A (Mr Lee), 4A (Mr Bradley), 8 (Mr McGuire), 9 (Mr Attwood) and 10 (Mr Stott), were instituted on 6 November, 1996. In relation to count 10, I must refer again to the charges put to Dr Young at Police Headquarters on 13 August 1996. The first of those charges refers to false statements, namely ‘currency balances and account valuations’, by which Dr Young is charged with having induced ‘persons’ to take part in certain arrangements. This was apparently intended to be a reference to the falsified bank statements sent by Dr Young to Mr Stott, which are the foundation of count 10. Mr Whelan has argued that the word ‘persons’ should be treated as containing a reference to Mr Stott, and proceedings in respect of the charge in count 10 were therefore instituted on 13 August 1996. I do not accept this. The charge of 13 August does not say to whom the false statements are alleged to have been sent, nor is the word ‘persons’ qualified by any description or limitation of any kind. I do not think it would be fair to treat that charge as instituting proceedings in respect of the precise offence formulated in count 10.
29. Count 5A concerns Mr Weedon. No charge naming him was put either on 6 November or on 11 December 1996. However, No. 13 of the charges put on each of those days alleged inducement by Dr Young of ‘Troy Trust Services Investors’. These investors formed a limited class, and Mr Weedon was one of them. Count 5A can, in my judgment, properly be regarded as particularising charge No. 13. Proceedings in respect of the offence stated in count 5A were therefore instituted on 6 November 1996.
30. Counts 6A and 6D concern Mr Gudgeon. No charge naming him was put on 6 November 1996. He cannot be brought within the language of charge No 13, because he was not a TTS investor but an FXDL investor. However, Nos. 32 and 35 of the charges put on 11th December, 1996, do relate specifically to him, and are in substance the same as counts 6A and 6D respectively. (There is a difference of dates between the charges and the counts similar to that which I have considered when dealing with count 1A). Proceedings in respect of the charges in counts 6A and 6D were therefore instituted on 11 December 1996.
31. I need say nothing here about count 7A, because Mr Le Quesne concedes that it is not time barred.
32. I turn to the other individual Defendants, and first to Mr Stoneman. The counts against him which Mr Voisin, on his behalf, submits are time barred are counts 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 2C, 5A, 5B, 5C, 6A, 6B and 6C.
33. There is no dispute that proceedings in respect of the offences alleged in counts 2A, 2B, 2C, 5A, 5B and 5C were instituted against Mr Stoneman on 4 October, 1996, when he was charged at Police Headquarters. There is likewise no dispute that proceedings in respect of the offences alleged in counts 6A, 6B and 6C were instituted against him on 11 December 1996 when he was charged at the Magistrates Court.
34. There remains counts 1A and 1B. These counts charge respectively inducement of Mr. Cerny by statements known to be misleading, false or deceptive and inducement by the reckless making of misleading, false or deceptive statements. It is agreed that charges in these terms were put to Mr Stoneman for the first time at the Magistrates Court on 25 June 1997, when the committal proceedings began. However, Mr Stoneman had been charged on 6 November 1996 with inducement of Mr Cerny by dishonest concealment of material facts, between the same dates as those stated in counts 1A and 1B. This charge now appears in count 1C. Mr Whelan argued that the three counts all charge the one offence of inducement and differ only by alleging the employment of different means. He submits, therefore, that each of these three counts charges an offence in respect of which proceedings were instituted against Mr Stoneman on 6 November 1996.
35. For this argument Mr Whelan relied on the English case of R -v- Linnell (1969) 1 WLR 1514. That case was decided under s.13(1) of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, which is similar to Article 12 of the Investors Law. What, in my judgment, it decided was that a count charging fraudulent inducement by certain promises and (the court emphasised that this conjunctive language had been used) by certain statements was not bad for duplicity, because the offence charged was that of inducing and the particulars simply included a proper conjunctive statement of the two means of inducement employed. It has nothing to do with a case like this, in which there are alternative charges, and separate counts alleging respectively false statements knowingly made, false statements recklessly made and dishonest concealment.
36. Proceedings in respect of the offences stated in counts 1A and 1B were therefore instituted against Mr Stoneman on 25 June 1997.
37. I come now to the charges against Mr Williams. Mr Young concedes that Mr Williams was charged with the offences stated in counts 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B and 2C on 24 October 1996, when he was charged at Police Headquarters. Proceedings against Mr Williams in respect of those offences were therefore instituted on that day.
38. Counts 3A, 3B and 3C allege inducement of Mr Lee. Mr Williams was charged with these offences at the Magistrates Court on 6 November 1996. No charge simply of inducing Mr Lee had been made against him on 24 October. He had, however, been charged on 24 October with inducing Mr Lee ‘and thereby Mrs. Hodgson’ by false statements knowingly made and by false statements recklessly made. These charges, in my judgment, were charges of inducing both Mr Lee and Mrs Hodgson. They therefore comprehended a charge of inducing Mr Lee alone. It follows that proceedings against Mr Williams in respect of the offences stated in counts 3A and 3B were instituted on 24 October 1996.
39. I do not overlook the differences of dates between these successive charges. The dates alleged in October were ‘in or about the month of June 1993’, in November, ‘between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1993’ in the indictment, ‘between about 3 November 1993 and 1 April 1994’. These differences do not, in my judgment, mean that different offences were charged on each occasion. Different particulars were being given of the one offence.
40. Count 3C charges inducement of Mr Lee by dishonest concealment. No such charge was made on 24 October 1996. I have already held, when dealing with the case of Mr Stoneman, that the offence of inducing by dishonest concealment is not the same as an offence of inducing by false statements made either knowingly or recklessly. It follows in Mr. Williams’ case that proceedings in respect of the offence stated in count 3C were instituted on 6 November 1996.
41. Counts 4A, 4B and 4C allege inducement of Mr Bradley to offer to take part in arrangements. Mr Williams was charged precisely in these terms for the first time at the beginning of the committal proceedings on 25 June, 1997. He had, however, been charged on 6 October, 1996, with inducing Mr Lee ‘and thereby Peter Bradley’ to offer to take part in arrangements. For reasons which I have already given, it follows that in my judgment proceedings in respect of the offences stated in counts 4A, 4B and 4C were instituted against Mr Williams on 6 October, 1996.
42. Counts 5A, 5B and 5C charge inducement of Mr Weedon to take part in arrangements. Counts 7A, 7B and 7C charge inducement of Mr Wallace to offer to take part. Mr Weedon was first named in charges against Mr Williams on 25 June, 1997, Mr. Wallace on 11 December 1996. However, Mr Williams had been charged on 24 October 1996 with inducing TTS investors by false statements knowingly or recklessly made to take part in arrangements, and on 6 November 1996, charges had been added of inducing TTS investors by dishonest concealment to take part, and of inducing TTS investors by false statements knowingly or recklessly made and by dishonest concealment to offer to take part. Mr Weedon and Mr Wallace were TTS investors. As I have already held when dealing with Dr Youngs case, it follows, in my judgment, that proceedings were instituted against Mr Williams in respect of the offences stated in counts 5A and 5B on 24 October 1996 and in respect of counts 5C, 7A, 7B and 7C on 6 November 1996.
43. Counts 6A to 6F allege inducement of Mr Gudgeon. He was not a TTS investor but an FXDL investor, so cannot be brought within the TTS investor charges. He was first named in charges against Mr Williams on 11 December 1996. It was therefore on that day that proceedings against Mr Williams in respect of the charges stated in counts 6A to 6F were instituted.
44. Mr Young raised two additional points. First, he submitted that the proceedings of 11 December 1996 were irregular, because the new charges should have been put to Mr Williams not in court but outside. There is, in my judgment, nothing in this point. I was informed by Mr Whelan that it is a regular practice in the Magistrates Court for new charges to be put to the defendants in court by the Centenier, and this statement was not contradicted. Secondly, Mr Young submitted that the TTS investor charges did not comply with the Police Court (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law, 1949, Article 8. It is sufficient answer to this that Article 8 applies to summonses, not to charges.
45. The Second Defendants, being a limited liability company, have not been brought before this Court by the same procedure as the individual Defendants. The Second Defendants were summoned by the Attorney General to appear in this Court to answer the charges set out in the summons. Having appeared, they were indicted in due course. Mr Binnington does not at this stage contend that a company cannot be brought to trial by this procedure of summons and indictment. What he submits is that there were irregularities in the application of the procedure.
46. The Second Defendants in fact received four summonses, dated respectively 17 October, 13 November, 28 November and 29 November 1996. As far as the identity of the persons allegedly induced is concerned, it follows from what I have said in considering the cases of the other Defendants that the charges in the summons of 17 October correspond to counts 1A-1C, 2A-2C, 3A-3C and 5A-5C of the indictment (treating inducement of Mr. Lee as included in inducement of ‘Arthur G Lee and thereby Mrs Hodgson’, and Mr Weedon as included in ‘TTS Investors’). On the same reasoning, the charges in the summons of 13 November correspond to counts 4A-4C and 7A-7C, and charges in that of 29 November to counts 6A-6F.
47. Mr Binnington submits that no variance whatever between the summons and the indictment is permissible. If the indictment does not follow the summons precisely, the Crown must apply to this Court for leave to amend the summons so as to bring the two into line. In the absence of amendment, he says, the summons and the indictment, including the particulars, must be verbally identical, otherwise the indictment is invalid.
48. If this is right, the charges in the indictment against the Second Defendants are certainly invalid, for they are not verbally identical with the corresponding charges in the summonses. I see no reason, however, why the law should be so exacting. The purpose of attaching the charges to the summons is to give the company notice of the offence alleged. For this purpose it is not necessary to state every detail with precise accuracy. What is necessary is that the company should be told enough to be able to understand what conduct is impugned and what offence alleged. This may be done, even if dates are inaccurately stated or individuals involved are indicated by description rather than identified by name. If, in spite of such matters, the conduct described in the indictment is substantially the conduct described in the charge attached to the summons, the indictment is valid. This works no injustice to the company, which ex hypothesi knows in substance what the matters are for which it has been summoned, and can if necessary get further particulars after the indictment has been presented.
49. Mr Binnington drew my attention to a number of differences of detail between the counts of the indictment and the charges attached to the summonses. I do not propose to set them out, because they were all of the same character as differences which I have discussed when considering the cases of the other Defendants. In my judgment, none of them resulted in the Second Defendants being accused by the indictment of an offence which had not been included in the charges attached to the summonses.
50. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to consider what the rights of the Second Defendants would have been if the indictment had charged them with offences which they had never been summoned to answer. I will only say that I am not persuaded that the position could then have been regularised, as Mr Binnington suggested, by amendment of the summonses.
51. It follows that proceedings were instituted against the Second Defendants in respect of the offences stated in counts 1A-1C, 2A-2C, 3A-3C and 5A-5C on 17 October 1996 in respect of the offences stated in counts 4A-4C and 7A-7C on 13 November 1996 and in respect of the offences stated in counts 6A-6F on 29 November 1996.
52. Two other points were taken in relation to the institution of the proceedings. Mr Young submitted that it was an abuse of process to charge Mr Williams on 24 October 1996 with inducing ‘TTS Investors. These charges had subsequently been replaced by charges naming Messrs. Lee, Bradley, Weedon, Gudgeon and Wallace. The Crown had not taken statements from Mr Lee, Mr Bradley, Mr Gudgeon or Mr Wallace by 24 October 1996 and had put charges referring to ‘TTS Investors’ simply in order to avoid the possibility that charges against Mr Williams of inducing particular investors might become barred by prescription. This, Mr Young submitted, was an abuse of process.
53. There was nothing wrong in principle with charges alleging inducement of ‘TTS Investors. These words described a limited and definable class. The Crown would eventually be obliged to particularise individual investors, but if they were not in a position to do so at the time of charging it was open to them to use then the class description in the place of individual names. Mr Whelan told me that on 24 October 1996, the Crown had evidence of the fraud and what they alleged to be Mr Williams part in it. They knew the identity of all the five investors named in Dr Youngs argument except Mr Gudgeon, and knew that each of them had been deceived and lost money. What they did not know on that day was the date, and other details, of each individual’s investment.
54. In these circumstances, charges alleging inducements of ‘TTS Investors were in my judgment unobjectionable. Charges otherwise good did not become bad because they were made to avoid the expiration of the period of prescription (if this was indeed the reason).
55. Mr Le Quesne submitted that a charge institutes proceedings only if the police have evidence sufficient to justify the charge. In this case, he said, that meant evidence that the person charged had (a) made an inducement, which (b) had influenced a specified person, who (c) had consequently made an investment. If these matters were not stated in the charge, an inference arose that the police had not got evidence of them, and it was for the police to displace this inference if they could.
56. Even if this argument is right, it does not affect any of the charges made against any of the Defendants on or after 4 October 1996. All those charges satisfy Mr Le Quesnes requirements (on the view which I have expressed of the validity of the charges referring to ‘TTS Investors). Since I have held for other reasons that the charges made against Dr Young before 4 October 1996 were ineffective to institute these proceedings, it is therefore unnecessary for me to consider this argument. I wish to make it clear, however, in view of the great importance of the point, that in my judgment the argument is wrong.
57. In Jersey, as in England, it is the responsibility of the prosecuting authority to see that a charge is not made against anybody unless the available evidence gives a realistic prospect of conviction. Here that is the responsibility of the Attorney General; in England it is the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service, and in recent years has been expressed in a Code for Crown Prosecutors. To say this, however, is not by any means to say that a person against whom a charge is made can bring proceedings to challenge the amount of evidence in the possession of the police, and so transfer from the Attorney General to this Court the responsibility of deciding whether that evidence justifies the charge. I do not mean to attach any qualification to the duty of fairness to the accused in criminal procedure generally, and in particular in the making of a charge. At the same time, I do not overlook the interests of the public in bringing to trial persons suspected of breaking the law. The Crown cannot prosecute anyone in this Court without first satisfying the Magistrate that the evidence justifies committal for trail. It would in my judgment be contrary to the public interest to put upon the Crown the additional duty of satisfying this Court that at the outset of the proceedings the Attorney General was right in deciding that the evidence justified the making of a charge.
58. The exercise of the Attorney Generals discretion to decide whether to start a prosecution is not outside the control of the Court: see the observations of this Court in AG -v- Rouillé (1995) JLR 315, 320/1. The Court there acknowledged the existence of such a power of control, but emphasised that it is to be used only in a case in which the Courts process is being abused. I do not know of any case, either here or in England, in which a prosecuting authoritys bona fide decision on the sufficiency of evidence to justify a charge has been held to amount to an abuse of process. I express no opinion whether such a case is possible.
59. Having thus dealt with the terminus ante quem of the statutory period of prescription, I address myself now to its terminus a quo - ‘the date of commission of the offence’.
60. The Defendants are accused of an offence under Article 12(c) of the Investors Law. The words of the Article relevant for present purposes are these:-
"Any person who, by any statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive, or by any dishonest concealment of material facts, or by the reckless making (dishonestly or otherwise) of any statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive, induces or attempts to induce another person
(a)… or
(b)… or
(c)to take part or offer to take part in any arrangements …".
In Secretary of State for Trade -v- Markus (1976) AC 35, which was a case under the practically identical terms of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, s.13, Lord Diplock (at p.61) described this as a ‘result crime’. What this means was explained by Lord Widgery, LCJ in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the same case. He said (at p45):-
"(It] is well established, that this offence … is an offence with two distinct elements. In order to constitute it the accused must have done something, in this instance, made a fraudulent inducement; and secondly, the victim must have done something, in other words there must have been a consequence of the fraudulent inducement."
61. In this case an offence was committed whenever one of the victims, as a result of an inducement offered by one of the Defendants, did whatever was necessary to take part in the arrangements, e.g. made his first investment in the TTS scheme. So much is common ground, but controversy follows. The Defendants contend that at that moment the offence was not only committed, it also came to an end. To take part in arrangements, they say, is an act, not a continuing process. Having made his investment, the victim on the next day left it in place, so might be said to be continuing to participate in the arrangements; but, the Defendants submit, such continuing participation was not a new act of taking part and did not constitute a new offence. The Crown contends that if a victim, having once made his investment, simply left his money in the scheme being traded, he was continuing to take part in the arrangements and the offence continued from day to day.
62. To decide between these rival contentions, I look first at the language of Article 12. In paragraphs (a)(ii), (b) and (d) it provides that it is an offence to induce anyone (by specified means) ‘to enter into or offer to enter into’ any agreement for certain purposes. Between paragraphs (b) and (d) comes (c), in which the offence is to induce anyone (by the same means) ‘to take part or offer to take part in any arrangements’ of certain kinds. The reason for the substitution of ‘arrangements’ for ‘agreement’ presumably was that the legislature wished paragraph (c) to be applicable to circumstances in which no contractual obligations might have arisen. It is not so easy to explain the change from ‘enter into’ to ‘take part in’. Mr Whelan submitted that the reason was that the legislature intended ‘to draw a distinction between offences directed at the initiation of investment and offences directed at continuing participation’. Mr Voisin (who delivered the leading argument for the Defendants on this point) submitted that paragraph (c) differed from the other paragraphs only in describing a different way in which an investor might part with his money or commit himself to do so, and the expression ‘take part in’ should be interpreted ejusdem generis with paragraphs (a)(ii), (b) and (d).
63. Paragraph (b)(ii) deals with the securing of profits from securities, paragraph (c) with participation in profits from management of property other than securities. Why should there have been an intention to draw between these two cases the distinction which Mr Whelan suggests? I can think of no reason why the legislature should have meant the inducer of the contract to commit an offence once for all when the contract was concluded, but the inducer of the arrangements to continue committing an offence as long as the victim continued to participate. Either intention might have been intelligible if applied to both situations, it is the intention to make a difference between the two that I find hard to believe.
64. It is important to remember that the offence is the offence of the inducer. If, as a result of his fraudulent inducement, his victim puts money into a scheme which is supposed in due course to yield profits, the inducer commits an offence under Article (c). It is hard to see in what sense he continues to commit the offence while the victim simply leaves his money in the scheme and waits for the profits.
65. I therefore return to the language of Article 12, to see whether it can bear Mr Voisins interpretation. In my judgment it can. The expression to be interpreted is not just ‘to take part in any arrangements’. It is ‘induces another person to take part in any arrangements’. The natural meaning of this expression is, in my view, to induce another person to do something which gives him a part in arrangements. If the intended meaning were to induce another person both to do something which gives him a part in arrangements and to maintain that part, I should expect some expression to be used, such as ‘induces any person to take part, and to continue taking part, in any arrangements’.
66. If, therefore, as a result of a fraudulent inducement, the victim does something which gives him a part in arrangements of a kind described in Article 12 (c), the inducers offence is complete and terminates. He does not continue to commit the offence from day to day all the time the victim maintains that part. However, this does not mean that in a case like this the victim can take part only by making his initial investment. He may make an additional investment, or he may agree to new conditions. In the former case he assumes a new and larger part, in the latter he takes part in new arrangements. In either case, if his action is the result of a fraudulent inducement, the inducer commits an offence under Article 12(c).
67. One other case must be considered. An investor in a scheme such as the TTS scheme may have resolved to withdraw his investment, or may be considering withdrawing it. He may then be persuaded by a fraudulent inducement to leave it in place. I find it impossible to suppose that in this case the legislature intended that the inducer would not commit an offence under Article 12(c). In my judgment, the victim’s change of mind and abandonment of an intention to withdraw must in these circumstances be regarded as an act sufficient to constitute the inducer’s offence.
68. Before leaving this point I must return to R -v- Markus, because Mr Whelan relied on a passage in the speech of Lord Diplock as supporting his submission that Article 12 (c) creates a continuing offence. It is this passage, at p.62:-
"To decide whether anything that the victims did in England amounted to taking part in the arrangements involves a further question of construction of the statute, viz. what is meant by "take part in any arrangements". Taking part in arrangements is not confined to a single act which can only be done at a single point of time. Depending upon the nature of the arrangements, it may include a whole variety of acts done over a period. The nature of the arrangements dealt with in section 13(1)(b) is that they should be arrangements with respect to property other than securities and that their pretended purpose or effect should be to enable persons taking part in them to participate in or receive profits or income alleged to arise or to be likely to arise from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of such property. Anything that a person does to enable him to participate in or receive such profits or income thus constitutes taking part in the arrangements".
69. The question in R -v- Markus was whether an offence under s.13(1)(b) of the English Act (the equivalent of Article 12(a) of the Investors Law) had been committed in England. The Crowns case was that the victims had taken part in arrangements by acquiring share units in a certain fund. Lord Diplocks reference to ‘a whole variety of acts done over a period’ was a reference to acts involved in the acquisition of the units. He describes them on p.63 as ‘steps in the processing of an investors application for share units’. The question whether the offence continued to be committed after the acquisition of the units had been completed did not arise. It is clear that Lord Diplock never had it in mind.
70. It is now necessary to see how the views which I have stated apply to the present case. For this purpose it is necessary to look not only at the indictment but also at the Crowns Case Statement. The Crown has there clarified the way in which it puts the case by setting out (subject to a reservation to which I shall refer presently) the particular transactions on which it relies in relation to each victim.
Cerny, counts 1A-1C:-
"In November, 1993, he allowed Young to manage his funds outside TTS. The charge concerning Cerny relates to the deception which led him to allow Young to trade his money outside the TTS programme."
Kawasaki, counts 2A-2C:-
"He made several payments into his three F accounts from 1990 to 1993. The charge reflects his having been deceived over that time, culminating in his final payment into TTS in June, 1993."
Lee, counts 3A-3C:-
"The charge … reflects Lee’s decision to allow Young to trade his funds outside TTS from November,1993."
Bradley, counts 4A-4C:-
"This charge reflects Bradley’s offer in November 1993, to take part in the TTS programme with new terms and conditions which were to take effect in January 1994."
Weedon, counts 5A-5C:-
"His continued participation in TTS after the Troy Forum in June, 1993."
Gudgeon, counts 6A-6C:-
"The charges … reflect his investment in the FXDL programme in July, 1993."
Counts 6D-6F:-
"The charges … reflect his decision on 23 December 1993, to allow Young to trade the $10 million account personally, outside TTS."
Wallace, counts 7A-7C:-
"His ‘decision in December 1993, to agree to the new terms and conditions of the Troy programmes which were to begin on 1 January 1994’."
McGuire, count 8:-
"The ‘charge reflects his offer to take part in the new arrangements from January, 1994’. The particulars of count 8 place this offer ‘between about 12 September 1993, and 31 December 1993’."
Attwood, count 9:-
"The charge reflects his decision in early December, 1993, to offer to take part in a new High Performance programme which was to begin in January, 1994."
Stott, count 10:-
"The Case Statement does not identify any particular action or decision of Mr Stott. The case under count 10 therefore remains as stated in the count, viz. that Dr Young induced Mr Stott ‘between about the 1st June, 1993, and 31 December 1993, to take part in arrangements …"
71. On the case thus put in the Crowns Case Statement, the following are the dates of commission of the alleged offences:-
Counts 1A-1C: November, 1993
Counts 2A-2C: June 1993
Counts 3A-3C: November 1993
Counts 4A-4C: November 1993
Counts 5A-5C: June 1993, (though it is uncertain whether the words of the Case Statement describe an offence at all)
Counts 6A-6C: July 1993
Counts 6D-6F: 23 December 1993
Counts 7A-7C: December 1993
Count 8: September-December 1993
Count 9 : December 1993
Count 10: June-December 1993
72. If these dates are compared with the dates on which I have found that proceedings for the different offences were instituted against the different Defendants, it appears that counts are time barred against the different Defendants as follows, on the case as put at present in the Crown’s Case Statement:-
Dr Young: counts 2A, 5A and 6A
The Bank: Counts 2A-2C
5A-5C;
6A-6C;
Mr Stoneman: Counts 1A-1B
2A-2C
5A-5C
6A-6C
Mr Williams: Counts 2A-2C
5A-5C
6A-6C
73.It is possible that counts 8 and 10 may also turn out to be time barred against Dr Young. It is impossible to judge this at present, because the Crown has not put a date on Mr McGuires offer mentioned in the Case Statement, nor has it identified any particular transactions of Mr Stott under count 10.
74.If one follows the Crowns Case Statement, a number of the offences cannot be dated more precisely than November, 1993. I have found that in several cases of these offences, proceedings were instituted on 6 November 1996, (and in one case on 13 November). I have not at present regarded any of these cases as time barred, because the evidence may eventually show that the offences were committed within three years of the institution of proceedings.
75.By finding that, on the case as put in the Crowns Case Statement, certain counts are time barred against certain Defendants serves as notice to the Crown that, if these counts are pursued at the trial against those Defendants in the way set out in the Case Statement, they will fail. At this stage it is important to take account of the reservation at the end of the Case Statement. It reads:-
"This Case Statement is not exhaustive. It is intended as no more than a summary to assist the parties and the Court. The Prosecution does not bind itself irrevocably to the summary."
76.The Crown thus reserves the right to depart, on due notice, from the Case Statement. It is free to present the case in a way different from that appearing at present in the Case Statement, provided that the new way is compatible with the terms of the indictment. If I were satisfied that under any count the case against any Defendant could not be put in a way which would avoid the operation of prescription, I should be prepared to strike out that count against that Defendant. Short of that, I must allow the case to continue on the existing indictment, leaving the parties on both sides to reconsider their respective positions in the light of my conclusions of law.
77. Iam not at present satisfied that under any count the case against any Defendant cannot be put in a way which would avoid the operation of prescription. I am, however, prepared to hear submissions on this point, should any party wish to make them. I will sit for that purpose on Wednesday at a time to be settled with counsel. At the same time I will consider any application relevant to the future course of this prosecution.
78. The second preliminary point taken by the Defendants is that the facts of the case cannot be brought within Article 12(c) of the Investors Law. The argument on this point consisted of analysis of the very complicated language of Article 12 and submissions that the precise details of the transactions in the case made that language applicable or inapplicable.
79. As I have said, the preliminary objections were argued on the basis of the Crowns Case Statement. That Statement gives an outline of the transactions into which the victims entered, but does not give precise details. I therefore find myself in a difficulty. I am trying to consider arguments requiring a degree of knowledge of the facts which I do not yet possess.
80. I have come to the conclusion that the objection that the facts cannot be brought within Article 12 (c) cannot properly or fairly be considered at this stage. I shall therefore say nothing about it, but leave it to be taken, if any Defendant so wishes, at an appropriate stage of the trial. An appropriate stage will be a stage at which the Crown’s evidence has been given.
81. One contention put forward during the argument of this point was that the word ‘property’ in Article 12(c) does not include money. At the conclusion of the argument I thought it might be possible to decide this one question at this stage; but I have ultimately decided that the sensible course is to leave all questions of the interpretation and relevance of Article 12 to be considered when the Crowns evidence of the transactions has been received.
AUTHORITIES
Investors (Prevention of Fraud) (Jersey) Law, 1967
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law, 1978: Article 2
Depositors and Investors (Prevention of Fraud) (Jersey) Law, 1967
Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act 1958, s.13 and as amended by Protection of Depositors Act 1963
R -v- Mackinnon & Ors. (1959) 1 QBD 150
R -v- Wimbledon Justices ex parte Derwent (1953) 1 All ER 390
R -v- Enfield Magistrates ex parte Caldwell QBD Trans. CO/4003/95
AG -v- Ahier (1981) JJ 29
AG -v- Lapidus (24 September 1987) Jersey Unreported
Chiltern District Council -v- Hodgetts (1983) 1 All ER 1057
Hughes -v- Trapnell (1963) 1 QB 737
AG -v- Pennington (1970) JJ 1349
Brooks -v- Bagshaw (1904) 2 KB 798
Thorpe -v- Priestnall (1897) 1 QB 159
Halsbury 22 (1970) (3rd E’dn) p.980
R -v- Linnell (1969) 1 WLR 1514
AG -v- Rouillé (1995) JLR 315. 320/1
Secretary of State for Trade -v- Markus (1976) AC 35