Royal Court
(Samedi Division)
25 November 1998
Before B I Le Marquand Greffier Substitute
Between The Planning & Environment Committee Plaintiff
(formerly the Island Development Committee) of the States of Jersey
And Lesquende Limited Defendant
Application by the plaintiff for summary judgment in respect of a sum of money paid pursuant to the registration of the award of the Board of Arbitrators.
Advocate M St.J O’Connell for the plaintiff.
Advocate S J Habin for the defendant.
JUDGMENT
THE GREFFIER SUBSTITUTE: I heard this summons seeking summary judgment on 5th and 6th November, 1998.
By an act of the Royal Court dated 11th December, 1992, the plaintiff was granted an Order vesting certain land which belonged to the defendant (hereinafter referred to as "the Land") in the Public of the Island under the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure)(Jersey) Law, 1961, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law"). In accordance with the Law a board of arbitrators (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") was appointed on 11th December, 1992, although the appointment was amended by an Order of the Royal Court dated 12th November, 1993. Also in accordance with the Law, the sum of £2,512,500 was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on 11th December, 1992, being 75% of the sum offered by the plaintiff to the defendant for the Land less bank charges. The hearing before the Board took place between 11th April, 1994, and 30th September, 1994, and the Board made its Award on 5th February, 1995. The Award stated that the compensation payable to the defendant was £4.9 million and the Award was registered in the Royal Court on 7th February, 1995. In accordance with the terms of Article 9A(4) of the Law the plaintiff, on 7th February, 1995, paid to the defendant the sum of £2,697,645.52 representing the balance of the capital value of the land of £2,387,500 together with interest thereon, in accordance with the Law, in the sum of £310,145.52. This sum was accepted by the defendant without any reservation in relation to the decision of the Board being attacked.
On 16th March, 1995, the defendant commenced proceedings by Order of Justice seeking a Judicial Review of the Award of the Board. The plaintiff filed an answer to the Order of Justice in which it admitted that the Award should be set aside, but on different grounds. The hearing of the Judicial Review Proceedings took place in the Royal Court in November and December 1996 before Mr Commissioner Kempster and before two Jurats and judgment was given on 17th February, 1997, which stated inter alia that, "an order must be made quashing the Award as being ultra vires and remitting the task of evaluation to the Board with directions". The present Order of Justice is dated 23rd June, 1997, and was served upon the defendant on 25th June, 1997. The present action first came before the Royal Court on 4th July, 1997, when it was placed on the pending list. In the original Order of Justice in this action the plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant pay to it the sum of £2,697,645.52 together with interest thereon from 23rd June, 1997, to the date of judgment. The Order of Justice has subsequently been amended by consent and by order dated 1st September, 1998, and the current claim for interest is, "An order that interest be paid on the sum of £2,697,645.52 from 7th February, 1995, pursuant to the Interest on Debts and Damages (Jersey) Law 1996 as aforesaid".
The circumstances of this action are, to say the least, very unusual. Once the Award had been made and registered in the Royal Court and once payment of the amount due according to the Law had been tendered and accepted by the defendant, one would have expected that that would have been the end of the matter. When the action for Judicial Review was launched on 16th March, 1995, I would have expected that the plaintiff, which had not itself sought to challenge the Award of the Board in any way and which had tendered payment of the amount of the Award, would have pleaded that the defendant, by accepting the balance of the amount of the Award and interest thereon in accordance with the Law, had brought the arbitration proceedings to an end. As I have said before, the defendant had accepted the sum without any reservation. However, that is not what occurred because once an attack was made by the defendant on the Award, the plaintiff chose to launch their own independent attack on the Award. This was not a circumstance which was anticipated by the Law and, indeed, from the complete lack of authority on this kind of situation in England, I have deduced that this is not a situation which would ever be expected to arise in relation to an Arbitration Award.
Both parties agreed that the matter before me was a matter solely of law and that there was no relevant factual dispute. In my view, this is a matter which would have been better dealt with under the terms of Rule 7/8 of the Royal Court Rules 1992, as amended. In England, in a similar situation to this, I would have expected that a Master would have exercised his jurisdiction under Order 14A, the equivalent to our Rule 7/8. However, I could not do this because, under the Royal Court Rules, the Judicial Greffier does not have the power to deal with an application under Rule 7/8. This is procedurally unfortunate because it means that, rather than being able to determine the point of law, subject to appeal to the Royal Court, I am having to apply the summary judgment test in relation to this matter.
Rules 7/1 to 7/6 of the Royal Court Rules as amended, follow very closely, although with some differences, the terms of Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965, as amended. Accordingly, judgments and authoritative commentaries in relation to Order 14 are, in general, authoritative in relation to summary judgment applications in Jersey.
Section 14/1/8 of the 1999 White Book reads as follows:-
"(c) Affidavit to support application- An application under O.14 must be supported by an affidavit which complies with the requirements of Rule 2, i.e. (1) it must verify the facts; and (2)it must contain a statement of the deponent’s belief that there is no defence to the claim or part thereof in respect of which the application is made, except as to the amount of damages claimed. See notes to Rule 2.
This Rule does not confer a right upon a plaintiff to proceed under O.14 in every case in which this procedure may be appropriate, but only "on the ground that the defendant has no defence" to a particular claim or part of a claim. This summary process, therefore, should be used only in proper cases, and should not be employed for tactical purposes (per Scott L.J. in Dott v Brown [1936] 1 All E.R. 545, and see "Dismissal where plaintiff knows of arguable defence", para. 14/7/4). This is all the more important, now that the affidavit of the plaintiff can be made on statements of information and belief. Thus, if a defendant serves his defence, as he is entitled to do, before the issue of the summons under O.14, the plaintiff may well find himself unable to swear an affidavit stating a belief that there is no defence to the action.
Where a defendant served his defence with the notice of intention to defend, and the plaintiff subsequently applied to disallow the costs of the defence on the ground that it was premature and served for the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from proceeding under this Order, the Court of Appeal held that the defence was properly served and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal with costs (Raymond v Manders, January 13th, 1913, CA (unrep.)).
On the other hand, the mere fact that a defendant has served a defence will not, in a proper case, necessarily prevent the plaintiff from making the requisite affidavit swearing to the belief that there is no defence and proceeding under O.14 (McLardy v Slateum (1890) 24 QBD 504).
If any defence, however demonstrably false it may be, has been served, it is essential that the affidavit in support adverts to this and then goes on to depose that notwithstanding such defence the deponent believes that there is no defence and explains why this is so. Not to do so is inconsistent with the duty of candour to the court in interlocutory matters. It follows that a pro forma affidavit should not be used in such circumstances".
In this particular case, Advocate Habin objected to the affidavit of the plaintiff upon two grounds. Firstly, he objected that the affidavit did not contain the necessary statement of the deponent’s belief that there is no defence to the claim. That submission was correct but, as it was an obvious oversight, I allowed the plaintiff to file an amended affidavit which covered this point on the second day of the hearing before me.
The second objection of the defendant was that the plaintiff had failed, in the affidavit filed on its behalf, to deal specifically with the lines of defence contained in the defendant’s amended answer. It is interesting to note that the defendant itself had not filed an affidavit in answer and this upon the basis that the matters in dispute were purely matters of law. That also was the reason given by Advocate O’Connell, on behalf of the plaintiff, as to why the affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff did not deal with specific lines of defence. In my view, in a case such as this where there are no disputes as to the facts, it is not necessary for the affidavit of the plaintiff to deal with each of the points of law being raised by way of defence by the defendant. Indeed, if the plaintiff were so to do, then it would be doing precisely that which the Court of Appeal has, on a number of occasions, said that deponents should not do, namely, it would be including legal submissions in an affidavit.
I was, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff’s affidavit met the preliminary considerations required under the summary judgment procedure.
The opening paragraph of Section 14/1/2 on p163 of the 1999 White Book reads as follows:-
"Application of Order 14 - The scope of O.14 proceedings is determined by the rules and the Court has no wider powers than those conferred by the rules nor any additional statutory power to act outside and beyond the rules or any residual or inherent jurisdiction to grant relief where it is just to do so (see per Neill L.J. in C.E. Health Plc. V Ceram Holding Co. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1219 at 1228; [1989] 1 All E.R. 203 at 210. Parker L.J. made clear in Home and Overseas Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mentor Insurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd (In Liquidation) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 153,158, that the purpose of O.14 is to enable a plaintiff to obtain a quick judgment where there is plainly no defence to the claim. If the defendant’s only suggested defence is a point of law and the court can see at once that the point is misconceived (or, if arguable, can be shown shortly to be plainly unsustainable) the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. O.14 proceedings should not be allowed to become a means for obtaining, in effect, an immediate trial of the action, which will be the case if the court lends itself to determining points of law or construction that may take hours or even days and the citation of many authorities before the court is in a position to arrive at a final decision. It is only if an arguable question of law or construction is short and depends on few documents that O.14 procedure is apposite (Balli Trading v. Afalona Shipping, The Coral [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, CA). See also Crown House Engineering Ltd v. Amec Products Ltd (1989) 48 B.L.R. 32. On the other hand, if a suitable question of law or construction arises which can finally determine the whole action, an application under O.14A should be made, preferably in the same summons, or where appropriate, orally in the course of hearing the Order 14 summons."
The test to be applied in relation to an application for summary judgment where a question of law arises is set out in Section 14/4/12 on p176 of Volume 1 of the 1999 White Book. I quote now, without case references, the opening sentences thereof which are as follows:-
"Question of law- Where an issue of law is raised the Court may decide of its own motion if it is susceptible to summary determination under O.14A. Subject thereto leave to defend should be given where a difficult question of law is raised; e.g. whether the claim is in respect of a gambling transaction; or depends on foreign law.
Nevertheless, if the point is clear and the Court is satisfied that it is really unarguable, leave to defend will be refused."
Both parties agreed that the last section encapsulated the test which I should be applying.
Advocate Habin, for the defendant, also drew my attention to section 14/4/10 on p.175 of the 1999 White Book which commences as follows:-
"Some other reason for trial (rr.3&4)-The former O.14, r.1, provided that the defendant should have leave to defend if he "shall disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend the action generally." These words were replaced in r.3(1) by the words that the defendant should have leave to defend if he satisfies the court "that there ought for some other reason to be a trial" of the claim or part to which the summons for judgment relates. These words, if anything, are wider in their scope than the former. It sometimes happens that the defendant may not be able to pin-point any precise "issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried," nevertheless it is apparent that for some other reason there ought to be a trial."
The core of the defendant’s case is set out in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of its amended answer. In Paragraph 4 thereof it avers that the amount of compensation ultimately determined by the Board to be due by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for the Land will exceed the sum of £4.9 million stated in the Award. In Paragraph 5 of the amended answer the Defendant denies that it received the said sum of £2,697,645.52 for or to the use of the Plaintiff or under any circumstances such as would entitle the Plaintiff to recover the said sum from the Defendant as alleged in Paragraph 14 of the amended Order of Justice or at all. The defendant then proceeds to give particulars consisting of five sub-paragraphs which are as follows:-
"(a) It is denied that the Award is void and of no effect as the meaning of the orders of the Royal Court, as constituted on 17th February, 1997, were merely to partially remit the Award to the originally constituted Board of Arbitrators not to set the Award aside.
(b) The Law makes no provision for the payment of any part of the Award.
(c) The Award is binding until it is superseded by a new Award on remission.
(d) No order was made by the Royal Court for the repayment of any part of the Award.
(e) The said sum was paid to the Defendant pursuant to an error of law."
In paragraph 6 of the amended answer the defendant pleads as follows:-
"That if, which is not admitted, the doctrine of unjust enrichment exists under the law of Jersey, the Defendant denies that such doctrine is capable of having any application to the facts of the present case."
In England, matters relating to an arbitration are dealt with under various Arbitration Acts and it was clear to me from various sections from Mustill & Boyd: The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (1989 Ed’n) which were placed before me that there is a distinction within the English Statutes between an order to set aside an arbitration award and an order to remit an arbitration award. The sections which were placed before me contained lengthy discussion as to the effect of those two different types of order and the discussion revolved around the questions as to whether the arbitrators were removed from their duties and around what was the effect, in the meanwhile, on the original order.
The following sections which are taken from pages 565 and 566 of Mustill & Boyd are helpful:-
"As regards setting aside, it is clear that the effect of an order is to deprive the award of all legal effect, so that the position is the same as if the award had never been made."
"The courts have worked out the effect of a remission rather more fully. It appears that where the order embraces all the matters referred, the arbitrator resumes all his authority over the dispute, and the original award completely falls away. When the remission applies to only some of the matters referred, the arbitrator no longer has power to vary his award in respect of those matters which the Court has left untouched. He must, as a matter of form, make a fresh award covering the whole of the matters originally submitted to him; but as regards those not remitted he must simply repeat his original decision. Until this new award is published, there is no binding adjudication on any of the matters referred: so that, apparently, the successful party could not proceed to enforcement even on the parts of the original award which were irreproachable."
Advocate Habin, in line with paragraphs (5)(a) and (c) of the defendant’s amended answer, submitted that the original Award was not void, that the effect of the Order of the Royal Court dated 17th February, 1997, was merely to partially remit the Award to the originally constituted Board of Arbitrators and not to set the Award aside and that the Award is binding until it is superseded by a new Award on remission.
Each of those submissions is obviously unsustainable. Firstly, the Royal Court, in its Judgment dated February 17th, 1997, which is 1997 JLR 56 at page 76, clearly stated that an order must be made quashing the Award as ultra vires and remitting the task of evaluation to the Board with directions which were not so restrictive as to usurp the jurisdiction conferred on it by the 1961 Law. The Court then went on to say:-
"While the Board may well think it helpful to order fresh pleadings and written submissions based on this judgment, it is to be hoped that neither party will add to its burdens by producing yet more evidence."
From the text of that Judgment, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that any part of the original Order remained intact. Indeed, the use of the word "quashed" is, in my view, a strong word. In the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary the word "quash" is defined as "to crush: to subdue or extinguish suddenly and completely: to annul" and a linguistic link is made with the French word, "casser". It is inconceivable that in using such a word that the Royal Court intended that any part of the previous decision should remain intact. Indeed, there was nothing in the Judgment to indicate that any part was to remain intact. It appears to me to be likely, from the terms of the Judgment of the Royal Court, that the Royal Court was hoping that the Arbitration could be referred back to the Board as originally constituted.
However, the plaintiff lodged an appeal against the part of the Order of the Royal Court dated 17th February, 1997, which held that the decision of the Board should take into account the zoning of the defendant’s land for use for Category A Housing. The Court of Appeal granted that appeal as appears by its decision dated 13th February, 1998. At the hearing before the Court of Appeal, Advocate W.J. Bailhache, on behalf of the plaintiff, raised certain procedural points. The following sections commencing at the top of page 12 of the Unreported Judgment are helpful and read as follows:-
"Point (a) is, in my view, misconceived. It is clear that "the Board", as appointed under Articles 7 and 8 has an ad hoc existence for the purpose of deciding the particular question of compensation placed before it by the Inferior Number of the Royal Court on the application of the Greffier. Two members of the particular Board are appointed by the Inferior Number from a permanent panel created by the Superior Number. They sit with a chairman (an advocate or solicitor) appointed on each occasion to the particular Board by the Inferior Number. The only continuing body is the panel appointed by the Superior Number from which two members are appointed to each Board. The Board does not have any permanent existence. The first Board, having made its Award, became functus officio. Its Award has been quashed, and there is no appeal against the quashing by the Royal Court. The second Board once appointed by the Royal Court on the Greffier’s application will have to decide the compensation afresh, applying the relevant Regulations then in force.
Point (b) is similarly misconceived. Provided that the parties comply with the 1961 Law and the relevant Regulations, they will be free to run different cases from those cases they have previously run, and indeed they will probably have to, in the light of the rejection of some of the contentions previously made."
Advocate Habin submitted that this section was merely obiter and that the Court of Appeal had misunderstood the terms of the Order of the Royal Court. The defendant is clearly wrong on this point and the Court of Appeal has correctly understood the previous Order and merely given further guidance as to the working out of that Order.
It is clear to me, that the previous Award has been quashed and no longer exists. Accordingly, paragraphs (5)(a) and (5)(c) of the amended answer are clearly wrong and unsustainable.
Whilst paragraph (5)(b) of the amended answer is correct, it does not seem to me that that can possibly be the end of the matter as the present situation is not one which the legislature could reasonably have foreseen. In this connection, the case of Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue [1993] AC 70 is of some assistance. In that case the plaintiff had made a payment to the Inland Revenue upon the basis of an assessment made under certain Regulations and the payment was made upon a without prejudice basis. Subsequently, the regulations were found to be ultra vires and the building society was seeking to recover the moneys paid together with interest from a particular date. The House of Lords decided that, notwithstanding that the relevant statute did not deal with the matter, the repayments should be made together with interest from the original date of payment.
The plaintiff based its claim in this case upon the equitable jurisdiction of the Royal Court under the category of case which in England would be categorised as "unjust enrichment".
In England, the Law in this area has become very complicated but the general principle is defined in the following section from page 39 of Goff & Jones: "Law of Restitution", (4th Ed’n) which reads as follows:-
"It is not in every case where a defendant has gained a benefit at the plaintiff’s expense that restitution will be granted. It is only when a court concludes it would be unjust for him to retain the benefit that he must make restitution to the plaintiff."
The plaintiff’s case in relation to unjust enrichment is as follows:-
(7)that if the defendant were to be permitted to keep the said sum then, upon a new Award being registered, the defendant would be entitled to interest, by virtue of the Law, on moneys which had already been in their hands for a lengthy period of time.
The response of the defendant to those lines of argument is set out in the said paragraphs (4) and (5)(b), (d) and (e) of its amended answer. The validity of the argument under paragraph (4), that the eventual amount of compensation will be at least the sum stated in the Award will not be clear until a final award is made. In particular, if the plaintiff is successful in relation to their argument that the rezoning was part of the compulsory purchase scheme then it is possible that there could be a reduction in the final award. Allied to the argument under paragraph (4) is a further argument that as the plaintiff has the Land vested in it by virtue of the Vesting Order, it is not unjust for the defendant to be able to keep the said moneys which represent the best current valuation of the land. That argument was countered by the plaintiff by the argument that the provision for compensation for loss of the land is that which is set out in the Law and that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to obtain greater compensation than that which the Law provides. I have already dealt with the limitations of the defendant’s argument under the said paragraph (5)(b). The defendant’s argument under 5(d) that no order was made by the Royal Court for the repayment of any part of the Award, when the Award was first quashed, does not appear to me to have any merit as the Court was not then asked to order any such repayment and that is the purpose of the current action.
Paragraph 5(e) sets out an argument that repayment should not be ordered pursuant to the principle of unjust enrichment because the defendant had been paid pursuant to an error of law. I asked Advocate Habin to explain to me what was the relevant error of law and he replied that it was that the plaintiff had wrongly paid out the moneys upon the basis that the Award was not ultra vires and therefore void. I immediately dismissed this line of argument. At the time when the payment was made, the Award had been registered and when payment was made, it was accepted without any reservation. That would normally have brought the matter to an end. It cannot possibly be argued that an award which has been registered in the Royal Court can be void ab initio. At the most it is capable of being set aside by action. At the time when the payment was made there was no such action in existence.
In relation to the argument about the statutory right of the defendant to claim interest on a sum which the defendant would have held for some time, Advocate Habin submitted that when the final Award were registered then the Royal Court could make some provision, in the interests of justice, for the interest sum due to be varied. It is hard to see how the defendant can simultaneously argue that such an equitable power exists in relation to a variation of the amount of interest due in direct contradiction of the Law without an equitable power also existing to require the repayment of the capital and interest now.
The defendant also drew to my attention the oddity of the situation which had arisen, in which the plaintiff had co-operated with the attack on the Award, and asked me to find that this had created a situation whose effect was uncertain and which, in addition to providing an arguable defence, also provided some other reason why there ought to be a trial.
It is clear to me that the original payment, the return of which is now being sought, was made correctly pursuant to the Law upon the basis of the Award. It was the defendant, who had received the benefit of the Award, who chose to launch an attack upon it, although the plaintiff then joined in that attack. The Award itself has been quashed and has ceased to exist. If the defendant is allowed to keep the additional sum then a problem will arise in relation to interest which will require the intervention of the Royal Court applying equitable principles to correct and the Royal Court might feel unable so to do in the light of the clear wording of the Law.
In these circumstances it is clearly unjust for the defendant to be permitted to keep the fruits of the Award (i.e. the sum whose return is now being sought) and at the same time to be able to continue to argue for a larger sum, having participated in setting aside the Award. Apart from the interest question, if the eventual final award were to be less than the amount of the Award and the assets of the defendant were to have decreased, then there could be a further injustice in that the defendant might not be in a position to make a full repayment of any reduction in the Award together with interest thereon.
In my view, any court of equity would be bound to come to the conclusion that it is unjust for the defendant to be able to retain the sum and that the defendant must make restitution to the plaintiff.
In my view the point of law is very clear in this case and sufficiently clear for me to grant summary judgment for the capital sum being sought.
However, it is not clear to me as to what I should do in relation to the matter of interest.
The question arises as to whether interest should be payable on this sum from 7th February, 1995, onwards or from a later date onwards. The plaintiff took the view that it could not seek the return of the sum until after the Award had been quashed and yet by the actions which both parties took they both sought to undermine the Award. If I were free to make my own decision on this point then I would award interest from 7th February, 1995, onwards but applying the summary judgment test there is uncertainty here.
There is even more uncertainty as to what rate of interest ought to be granted from whatever date is appropriate. Should interest be granted at the normal court rate pursuant to Practice Direction 93/1 or should it be granted at the statutory rate set out in Article 9A(4), which is lower. If a final award were to be made for 4.9 million or more then, pursuant to Article 9A(4), interest would run on the difference between the 75% and the final award at the rate set out therein. If the defendant were now ordered to pay interest at a higher rate then there would be an injustice to the defendant. If I were determining this issue at a trial then I would order interest at the rate set out in Article 9A(4) but on summary judgment the position is not sufficiently clear for me to make a decision.
Accordingly, I am condemning the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of £2,697,645.52 and granting to the defendant unconditional leave to defend the claim of the plaintiff for interest thereon. Interest will also run pursuant to statute on the said sum in relation to which I have given judgment and upon any order for costs which I may make after having been addressed thereon by both parties, from today until the date of payment thereof.
Finally, if the defendant were to lodge an appeal against this decision then it is clear to me that the plaintiff ought to issue a summons before the Royal Court pursuant to Rule 7/8 of the Royal Court Rules, 1992, as amended, so that the Royal Court, upon first considering this matter, will not face the same difficulties as I have faced in relation to not being able to apply Rule 7/8.
Authorities
Royal Court Rules 1992: Rule 7/1 - 7/9.
RSC (1999 Ed’n): Order 14.
Interest on Debts an Damages (Jersey) Law 1996.
Clapham & Others -v- Pinson (30th April, 1992) Jersey Unreported.
Lydon Developments Limited -v- Medens (Jersey) Limited (11th May, 1992) Jersey Unreported.
Hambros Bank (Jersey) Limited -v- Jasper (13th July, 1994) Jersey Unreported.
Kemp & Others -v- Meditco Limited (23rd August, 1995) Jersey Unreported.
The Official Solicitor -v- Clore (1984) JJ81.
Alsford -v- Alsford (1991) JLR 100.
Lesquende Limited -v- The Planning and Environment Committee (31st March, 1998) Jersey Unreported. [1998.066]
Mustill & Boyd: The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (2nd Ed’n) (1989), pp 404-5, 565-567.
Shield Properties & Investments Ltd. -v- Anglo Overseas Transport Co. Ltd. (No.2) [1986] 2 EGLR 112.
The Ironclad (Australia) Gold Mining Company -v- Gardner (1892) 4 TLR 18.
Bowes et al -v- The Caustic Soda and Chlorine Syndicate (1893) 9 TLR 328.
Lindsay -v- Martin (1889) 5 TLR 322.
Burrows: The Law of Restitution (1993), pp 109-120.
Lesquende Limited -v- Planning and Environment Committee (17th February, 1997) Jersey Unreported
Lesquende Limited -v- Planning and Environment Committee (5th January, 1998) Jersey Unreported CofA. [1998.001]
Lesquende Limited -v- Planning and Environment Committee (13th February, 1998) Jersey Unreported CofA. [1998.033]
RSC (1997 Ed’n) Order 14.
Goff & Jones: The Law of Restitution (4th Ed’n) pp. 12-18, 39-54, 142-154, 545-53.
Bilbie -v- Lumley 2 East 469.
Auckland Harbour Board -v- R. [1924] AC 318.
Commonwealth -v- Burns [1971] VR 825.
-v- Tower Hamlets Borough Council [1988] AC 858.
Woolwich Equitable Building Society -v- Commissioners of the Inland Revenue [1993] AC 70.
West Deutsche Landesbank Girozentrale -v- Islington London Borough Council [1994] WLR.
Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961, as amended.