Court of Appeal
24 June 1998
Before: RD Harman Esq., QC, (President)
RC Southwell Esq., QC, and JG Nutting Esq., QC
Between The Greffier of the States Applicant
And Les Pas Holdings, Ltd The Landowner
And The Waterfront Enterprise Board The Intervener
In the matter of the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure)(Jersey) Law, 1961.
And in the matter of the application to the Royal Court by the Applicant for a vesting order of part of the foreshore West of Albert Pier, St. Helier.
Applications by the Landowner for leave to appeal against:
Advocate N M Santos Costa for the Applicant;
Advocate J D Kelleher for the Landowner;
Advocate W J Bailhache for the Intervener
JUDGMENT
SOUTHWELL JA: In December 1983, January 1989 and January 1995 the Crown sold to the public of Jersey the foreshore relevant for the purposes of these appeals adjacent to St. Helier. In about December 1986 Advocate Richard Falle wrote to HM Receiver General, informing the Receiver General that Mr Falle had bought the Fief de la Fosse, and that through this Fief he claimed title to a substantial part of the foreshore. On 27 January 1989 Mr Falle conveyed to Les Pas Holdings Limited (Les Pas) such rights as he as Seigneur had in the foreshore. Les Pas is a company in which shares are held by Ann Street Brewery Company Limited (Ann Street), a Mr Carter and family trusts of Mr Falle. In December 1989 Les Pas commenced an action pour exhiber titre against the Crown and the States of Jersey. This action was by agreement of all parties not tabled, the action having been commenced to preserve the position as regards prescription. The action was tabled in January 1995. Since then it has proceeded at a slow pace, and now in June 1998 it has only reached the stage of discovery. It is a matter of some concern that legal proceedings arising out of matters in 1983 and subsequently, commenced in December 1989, tabled in January 1995 and of clear importance to the public of Jersey (as well as to Les Pas themselves) should have been carried forward with so little expedition. It is to be hoped that the Royal Court will soon (if necessary of its own volition) lay down a firm timetable for this action leading to an early trial.
Part of the relevant foreshore has been developed by the States, despite Mr Falles and now Les Pass claim. It is contended that the States wish to redevelop and modernise the existing developments. Part is presently undergoing development by the States. Part is intended to be developed by the States. These are the three areas with which the present appeals are concerned.
In March 1993 the States approved the establishment of Waterfront Enterprise Board Limited ("WEB") to be responsible for the implementation of the St. Helier Waterfront Plan. On 9 November 1993 the States approved in principle that WEB should be confirmed as a development agency of the States for an initial ten year period, and should be given full responsibility for the co-ordination and promotion of development in the St. Helier Waterfront area.
It is the case put forward by the States and WEB that because of the long outstanding litigation which Les Pas has not yet brought to trial, the effective development and redevelopment of the St. Helier Waterfront is being hampered and frustrated. For this and other reasons it was in 1997 proposed to embark on the compulsory purchase of whatever interest (if any) Les Pas has in certain parts of the foreshore. On 25 November 1997 Proposition P171 of 1997 was lodged with the States. It was proposed to purchase compulsorily the three parts of the foreshore I have referred to and an additional area. After a warning letter dated 28 November 1997 had been sent by Mr Falle on Les Pas's behalf, Proposition P171 of 1997 was withdrawn. On 20 January 1998 Proposition P2 of 1998 was lodged with the States, also proposing a compulsory purchase, but this time confined to the three parts without the additional area. Proposition P2 of 1998 was adopted by the States on 3rd February 1998 by 45 votes to 2. From that moment it was clear to Les Pas (as indeed it had been for some months before) that the States intended to purchase compulsorily whatever interest (if any) Les Pas might have in the three parts of the foreshore. It was recorded in Proposition P2 of 1998 that the Crown and the Public had received legal advice that Les Pas’s claim was without merit.
If Les Pas wanted to attack, by fresh legal proceedings, the States decision to proceed with compulsory purchase, that should have happened as soon as possible after 3 February 1998, because challenges to decisions of this kind (here, by the States acting in an administrative and executive capacity, and not as a legislature) must be made within a reasonably short time, and if they are not, the Courts of Jersey may decline to grant relief on the ground that the complainant has failed to move with due expedition.
The process of compulsory purchase under the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961 ("the 1961 Law") involves a number of steps after the proposals (including the relevant plan and the necessary finances) have been approved by the States. On 11 March 1998 the Greffier of the States ("the Greffier") gave notice to Les Pas under Article 4(1) of the 1961 Law requiring Les Pas to notify the Greffier in writing, within 28 days of the service of the notice, of Les Pas’s interest in the three parts of the foreshore and of the amount of compensation which Les Pas was prepared to accept for such interest.
On 6 April 1998 Mr Falle on behalf of Les Pas wrote to the Greffier indicating that Les Pas claimed the property or ownership of such parts of the foreshore by virtue of its purchase from Mr Falle, that the States decision to proceed with compulsory purchase was ultra vires the powers conferred by Article 4 of the Island Planning (Jersey) Law 1964, that the Greffiers notice of 11 March, 1998, was defective, and that if the States proceeded, Les Pas would oppose by judicial review or otherwise any further steps taken to divest Les Pas of its interest in the land.
On 5 May 1998 the Greffier gave a second notice to Las Pas, to the effect that, without prejudice to the contention that Les Pas had no interest in the land, the Planning and Environment Committee of the States was prepared to pay the sum of £100 by way of compensation for any interest Les Pas might have in the land. If this was not accepted within 8 days after service, any interest Les Pas might have in the land would be acquired and compensation assessed in the manner provided by the 1961 Law.
Mr Falle replied indicating (inter alia) that his instructions were to bring a representation before the Royal Court seeking judicial review of the relevant acts of the States and a declaration on the legality of the process.
On 14 May 1998 Mr Falle for Les Pas sent to the Royal Court a representation seeking judicial review of the States’ decision, but this representation was not in the event pursued.
On 18 May 1998 the Greffier gave a further notice to Les Pas that on Friday 29 May 1998 application would be made to the Royal Court for an order that Les Pas’s interest, if any, in the land be vested in the public. This was acknowledged by Mr Falle on the same day by a letter in which he again indicated that Les Pas would be filing a representation seeking a judicial review. On 21 May 1998 Mr Falle for Les Pas made, but did not pursue, a revised representation.
On 29 May 1998 the States application for a vesting order came on for hearing before the Deputy Bailiff sitting with Jurats in the Royal Court, the Solicitor General appearing for the States and Mr Falle for Les Pas. At Mr Falles request the hearing was adjourned to 3 pm.
In the early afternoon of 29 May 1998 Mr Falle for Les Pas presented to the Deputy Bailiff an Order of Justice seeking an injunction against the States restraining the States from taking steps to advance their application for a vesting order pending consideration of the matters raised in the representation dated 28 May 1998 annexed to the Order of Justice, which was similar to, but amended from, the two earlier representations not proceeded with. The application for an injunction lapsed because Les Pas was unwilling to give the necessary undertaking in damages.
It is somewhat surprising that Les Pas through its Advocate Mr Falle should have delayed launching its representation until the Royal Court was already engaged in considering the States application for a vesting order. In view of (inter alia) Les Pas’s knowledge since November 1997 that the States intended to proceed to compulsory purchase, the subsequent events I have described, the long involvement of Mr Falle and Les Pas in the foreshore dispute, and the reasonable resources available to Les Pas and its shareholders, it seems to me that the delay by Les Pas in launching its representation creates the suspicion that this was a manoeuvre designed to try to gain time and to create procedural difficulties for the States.
At the resumed hearing at 3 pm on 29 May 1998 the Royal Court considered this representation in the context of the vesting order application. By this time WEB had been joined in the proceedings, and on that day the States were represented by the Solicitor General and WEB by Advocate Bailhache. In the course of the hearing both the Solicitor General and Mr. Bailhache made clear that any objections properly raised by Les Pas’s representation by way of an application for judicial review could equally well be raised by Les Pas on the hearing of the States application for a vesting order.
The Royal Court came to three conclusions:- (1) that Les Pas were not to be permitted to proceed with their representation; (2) that Les Pas were at liberty to challenge the making of a vesting order at the adjourned hearing of the application for such an order; and (3) that a timetable be laid down as follows:
- affidavits by noon on 2 June 1998
- skeleton arguments by noon on 3 June 1998
- the adjourned hearing to commence on 4 June 1998.
At that stage no application was made by Advocate Falle for leave to appeal from any part of this order.
Between 2 and 4 June 1998 affidavits were filed as follows:
(1)for the States, by Mr Peter Thorne, Director of Planning and Building Services.
(2)for WEB, by Mr John Scally, the Managing Director of WEB.
(3)for Les Pas, by Mr Yetman, the Financial Director of Ann Street, and two affidavits by Mr Robert Steven, the Chairman of Les Pas and Managing Director of Ann Street.
On 3 June 1998 skeleton arguments were served by all three parties.
On 4 June 1998 the States application for a vesting order came on again for hearing in the Royal Court. This Court has been shown an official transcript of the hearing. At the outset Mr Falle for Les Pas asked "for an adjournment to another day to give Les Pas reasonable time to assemble the factual evidence needed to support its challenge": page 2 of the transcript. The Deputy Bailiff asked Mr Falle what was this "factual evidence", and did not receive any clear answer. Mr Falle (at page 8 of the transcript) returned to the question of the length of the adjournment, and said:
"I am literally looking for a matter of two weeks to enable these matters to be elucidated".
It seems to me clear that Mr Falle was simply asking for a two week adjournment. That was the understanding also of the Solicitor General and Mr Bailhache. Dr Kelleher for Les Pas has submitted to this Court, relying on later pages of the transcript (pages 37-40), that Mr Falle was asking for an adjournment until two weeks after discovery and interrogatories requests addressed to the States and WEB had been resolved and complied with. I do not so read the transcript when read as a whole.
The Deputy Bailiff asked Mr Falle on several further occasions what further factual evidence, whether documents or information, Les Pas required. Mr Falle on each occasion failed to provide any clear answer.
At about 11 am the Royal Court adjourned (page 17 of the transcript), and returned after about 20 minutes expecting to receive an answer. Mr Falle tried to give some examples of the factual evidence said to be required, but his case remained unclear. Finally the Royal Court adjourned to 2.30 pm to give Mr Falle time to file an affidavit.
Mr Falle filed an affidavit, but, in so far as it is possible to decipher the typing errors, this affidavit did not provide any clear answer as to what factual evidence Les Pas wished to assemble.
Mr Falle pursued his application for an adjournment. When asked what he would do during the period of any adjournment, he moved away from the assembling of evidence by Les Pas to the obtaining of discovery from the States. At the end of the transcript (pages 39 and 40) he was asked whether he would be ready for trial within 14 days. His answer was that provided discovery had been made and answers given to interrogatories by the States, he would be ready within two weeks.
The Court rejected the application and decided to start the hearing on 5 June 1998 at 9 am, indicating that a reasoned decision would be given later. Leave to appeal was apparently asked for and refused.
At about 6.30 pm on 4 June 1998 Mr Falle applied to the Bailiff sitting as a single judge of the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the Royal Court decision on 29 May 1998 not to take forward Les Pas’ representation dated 28 May 1998 and for a stay of the hearing until a reasoned judgment on the refusal of the adjournment had been given. The Bailiff granted both applications. Since leave to appeal from the decision on 29 May 1998 had not been sought from the Royal Court, it is doubtful whether the application for leave to the Court of Appeal was appropriate, but no point has been taken in this regard by the States or WEB.
On 5 June 1998 the Deputy Bailiff at 9 am delivered judgment giving reasons for refusing an adjournment. At about 4 pm Dr Kelleher (appearing in place of Mr Falle for Les Pas) applied to the Royal Court for récusation in respect of the Deputy Bailiff and one Jurat. This Court has seen the three affidavits of Mr Steven, Mr Yetman and Mrs Falle in support of this application. Apparently also Mr Falle gave oral evidence. Judgment was reserved, and delivered on 17 June 1998. In the judgment the suggestion of bias was rejected, but the Deputy Bailiff said that a Commissioner with two fresh Jurats would sit at the hearing.
There is no appeal from this decision. But, having regard to the written evidence which this Court has seen, I think it right to make these observations of general import on the developing habit of making récusation applications:
(1)Those who live and work in Jersey have to accept that the administration of justice depends to a great extent on the two senior Judges, the Bailiff and the Deputy Bailiff.
(2)No application for récusation should be made without strong grounds to support it, and no such application should be granted unless such strong grounds are clearly established.
(3)Included in the affidavits filed on behalf of Les Pas were allegations that members of the Court shook their heads in disagreement with things said by Advocate Falle, and nodded their heads in agreement with things said by the Solicitor General. It is entirely normal, particularly for a non-lawyer Jurat, to indicate by movements of the head whether a point is or is not considered to be a good one. That the application for récusation was in part based on such a frivolous ground is to be regretted.
(4)In future, if applications based on such grounds are made, they should be refused, and if the circumstances are appropriate, indemnity costs should be ordered against the applicant.
Returning to the hearings on 5 June 1998 the Royal Court (1) directed that any application by Les Pas for discovery or interrogatories or to adduce further evidence was to be made by noon on 10 June 1998, with liberty to apply to extend that deadline; and (2) fixed the hearing for 8 and 9 July 1998.
It follows that, in the event, Les Pas secured an adjournment of over a month, and that if the direction as to applications for discovery and other matters had been complied with, there was sufficient time to deal with discovery, interrogatories and the assembly of evidence so as to be ready for the hearing on 8 July 1998, for which the services of Sir Godfray Le Quesne QC as Commissioner were secured.
On 10 June 1998 notice was given that Dr Kelleher was thereafter to represent Les Pas in place of Mr Falle.
No application was made by Les Pas to extend the date of 10 June 1998 for discovery and other applications. On 11 June 1998 Mr Falle (acting for Les Pas despite the notice of the previous day) delivered three draft summonses for discovery and for interrogatories, addressed to Mr Scally and Mr Thorne. These have not been pursued by Les Pas. As will appear later, Les Pas are now towards the end of June 1998 seeking a further adjournment based on (inter alia) their wish to secure discovery and answers to interrogatories. This sits ill with their failure to pursue such applications at the time laid down on 5 June 1998, and not made the subject of an application to extend that time.
On 16 June 1998 Dr Kelleher for Les Pas applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal from the Orders of the Royal Court of 29 May and 4 and 5 June 1998, seeking
(1)a judicial review of the resolution of the States of 3rd February 1998, and directions as to its future progress;
(2)further or in the alternative, an adjournment of the hearing of the application for a vesting order to allow Les Pas a reasonable time within which to prepare its case, with directions as to its future progress.
As to the Order of 29 May 1998 leave to appeal had already been granted by the Bailiff as I have stated. As to the Orders of 4 and 5 June 1998 leave to appeal had to be sought from this Court.
On 17 June 1998 the States and WEB applied for these applications for leave to appeal and the appeal or appeals to be heard on 22 June 1998. Accordingly a Court of Appeal was speedily constituted, and we sat to hear these matters on 22 June 1998.
We first heard these applications by the States and WEB. These were opposed by Dr Kelleher on behalf of Les Pas primarily on the grounds set out in two letters dated 17 and 18 June 1998 sent by him to the Court. It soon became apparent to me that the opposition by Les Pas to their appeal and applications being heard on 22 June 1998 was founded rather on a desire to gain the time which would have been gained if the appeal and applications had been allowed to come on in the ordinary way some months from now. We accepted the submissions by Mr Bailhache for WEB and Mr Santos Costa for the States that these matters needed to be decided speedily in the interests of those parties, and of the public for whom they act, and also in the interests of Les Pas, so that all parties know exactly where they stand. The applications by the States and WEB were accordingly granted by this Court, which proceeded to hear the appeals and applications.
Judicial Review
Dr Kelleher made lengthy submissions in support of Les Pas’s case that they should be permitted to pursue their application for judicial review as raised by their representation of 28 May 1998 separately from, or in addition to, the vesting application by the States and WEB, including the citation of English and Jersey authorities on judicial review and compulsory purchase.
This seemed to me from the outset to be a somewhat academic exercise, for these reasons:
(1)It was my understanding that the States and WEB had accepted and conceded that points which could properly be made by way of judicial review would be open to Les Pas to make on the hearing of the vesting order application.
(2)It was my understanding that this was the basis or a main basis on which the Royal Court had decided on 29th May 1998 not to allow the separate judicial review application to proceed.
(3)In any event, even if both applications proceeded, the Court would be bound to hear both applications together, in the interests of all three parties, to save costs, and to ensure that all matters in dispute between the parties were resolved efficiently.
In the course of Dr Kellehers submissions, Mr Bailhache rose to remind this Court of the concession which the Solicitor General and he had made on 29 May 1998, as I have already described. This may have occasioned Dr Kelleher some surprise, though it had been referred to in Mr Falles affidavit of 4 June 1998, and was also mentioned in Dr Kellehers written submissions for this Court on the question of adjournment. At all events Dr Kelleher did not accept the offered olive branch, and pursued his submissions.
Dr Kelleher drew to the Courts attention the wording of Article 4A(2) of the 1961 Law which reads:
"(2) The Inferior Number of the Royal Court, on an application made in pursuance of paragraph (1) of this Article (i.e. for a vesting order], shall, if satisfied that the provisions of this Law have been complied with, order that the land be vested in the public and that a record of the title of the public be registered in the Public Registry of Contracts."
The words which I have underlined were particularly in point. At one time Dr Kelleher argued that these words were wide enough in themselves to allow Les Pas to argue the points they wish to argue on the vesting order application without the need for a separate judicial review application. At another time Dr Kelleher argued that these words were of narrow ambit, and would prevent Les Pas arguing such points on the vesting order application. In the end he was submitting that the interpretation of these words is unclear, and that the Royal Court might hold that the narrow interpretation is the correct one.
In my judgment this is beside the point. Whatever may be the true interpretation of Article 4A(2) of the 1961 Law, clearly Les Pas will be able at the hearing of the vesting order application to argue any point, which it could properly have argued on a separate judicial review application,
(1)because of the concession to which I have referred;
(2)because it was on that footing that on 29 May 1998 the Royal Court declined to allow the separate application to proceed;
(3)because in my judgment that is to be the basis on which the vesting order application is to be heard by the Royal Court; and
(4)because if that were not so, Les Pas would have a strong case for being allowed to pursue the separate judicial review application.
Accordingly I would dismiss the appeal against the Order of 29 May 1998.
However, in view of the extensive submissions by Dr Kelleher in particular as to judicial review in Jersey, and the relatively few reported cases in Jersey, I would like to add some observations in this regard.
(1)The equivalent of what in England would be called judicial review applications and orders have been made in Jersey for many years.
(2)I do not entirely share the enthusiasm of some members of this Court, expressed in earlier cases, for the introduction in Jersey of a special body of rules dealing with judicial review applications, for (inter alia) these reasons: (a) the existence of a separate body of rules in England has on occasions caused serious injustice, when an applicant followed a path under the rules which was later held to have been a wrong path at a time when it was too late for him to embark on the right path. There is a large number of House of Lords and English Court of Appeal decisions concerning cases which straddle or appear to straddle the divide between judicial review and other applications. Even if injustice does not result, there is a risk in England of excessive costs and time being spent; (b) the procedure in Jersey by an ordinary representation or order of justice gives greater flexibility to the litigants and the Courts in dealing with the almost infinite variety of "judicial review" applications which may come before the Courts.
(3)In Jersey there is not a single procedure by which judicial review applications must be conducted, and in my judgment there is no need to have only one single procedure. In some cases it will be appropriate to order pleadings and discovery as in an ordinary action. In other cases affidavits and skeleton arguments will suffice. In yet other cases there will be no need even for affidavits, and only skeleton arguments will be necessary. Jersey jurisprudence is able to provide complete flexibility in dealing with different judicial review applications, and in my judgment this is most desirable.
(4)There is in Jersey no formal requirement to obtain leave to proceed by way of judicial review application. But the flexibility of the Jersey procedure enables the Royal Court to bring to an early end a judicial review application which has been too long delayed or which is misconceived. I emphasise the importance of ensuring that judicial review applications which are, having regard to the particular circumstances, too long delayed are dismissed at an early stage, rather than allowed to proceed to a full hearing. Administrative decisions or actions may involve immediate effects and delay in bringing a judicial .review application may stultify the administrative process.
(5)The Courts of Jersey have ample power to order discovery, when and where appropriate, in judicial review applications. But as a matter of commonsense such orders for discovery are likely to be rare, and when ordered, related to limited and specific classes of documents or to individual documents. Except in the rarest cases there will be no room in judicial review applications for the kind of broad discovery available in ordinary actions. Furthermore, there will be no place for any discovery order except when (a) a clear prima facie case of error by the administrative body has been made out, and (b) the document or documents are necessary to enable the clear prima facie case to be fully established. What I have said about discovery applies with equal or perhaps greater force to interrogatories.
Adjournment
I turn to the question whether the hearing should be adjourned from 8th July 1998 to a later date.
As I have said, on 4 June 1998 Mr Falle was asking for a further 14 days. In fact, as a result of the various procedural steps taken by Les Pas they have gained already an adjournment of over a month to 8 July 1998. The question now is whether Les Pas should be granted a further adjournment, as sought by Dr Kelleher, to October 1998.
In deciding whether or not to grant such a further adjournment, this Court has to balance against each other (a) the interests of Les Pas, as the claimant to the relevant parts of the foreshore and the person which may ultimately be held to be the owner of such parts of the foreshore if Les Pas succeeds; and (b) the interests of the public represented by the States and WEB. The States and WEB contend that there is a material degree of urgency in securing the compulsory purchase of whatever interest (if any) Les Pas may have in these parts of the foreshore. This is a matter to which I will return after first considering the interests of Les Pas.
I begin with the clear recognition of the interest of every person, whether an individual or a company, in Jersey in (a) not having their property compulsorily purchased except where that is necessary in the public interest, and (b) being able to present their case, in answer to a compulsory purchase application, fully and without artificial limitations.
That is the interest which Les Pas has, and Les Pas contends that in order to present their case they need more time to assemble evidence.
This contention must be put in context. This is not a case in which, out of the blue, a householder finds a compulsory purchase application being made in respect of his house without prior warning. Mr Falle has been asserting title to the relevant foreshore since at least the mid 1980s. He transferred such title as he might have to Les Pas in January 1989. The action pour exhiber titre was begun by Les Pas in December 1989. It was held in abeyance for over 5 years, but it is plain that during that period both sides were actively involved in considering the present and future position regarding the foreshore. The action was made active by Les Pas in January 1995, and has been carried forward, though slowly, since that time. In November 1997 a proposition for compulsory purchase was put to the States. It was withdrawn in December 1997 as a result of observations by Mr Falle on behalf of Les Pas. A fresh proposition was put to the States in January 1998. It was approved by the States on 3 February 1998. The first notice was given by the Greffier on 11 March 1998, the second notice on 5 May 1998, and the third notice (of the hearing on 29 May 1998) on 18 May 1998.
In the context of that history it is submitted by Dr Kelleher that throughout the period down to 29 May 1998 Les Pas did virtually nothing to prepare for opposing the vesting order application, except the preparation of the three versions of the representation (dated 14, 21 and 28 May 1998). Les Pas were throughout the period from January 1989 advised by Advocate Falle, a distinguished and most experienced Jersey lawyer, who, through his family trusts, has an interest in Les Pas. Its resources and those of its shareholders, though not unlimited, were not insubstantial. If Dr Kelleher is right, then the lack of care in failing to start assembling the necessary evidence from (at the latest) 3 February 1998, and in failing to advise that such evidence be assembled speedily, would be surprising. It is not for this Court to decide on the truth or otherwise of what, on instructions from Les Pas, Dr Kelleher has submitted as to the failure of Les Pas to take necessary steps to assemble evidence. But the matters I have set out show that the submission cannot be taken simply at face value.
There are two aspects of the material which, Dr Kelleher submitted, Les Pas needs further time to assemble.
The first is evidence obtained by Les Pas themselves. The Deputy Bailiff on 4 June 1998 asked several times what this evidence was, and received no satisfactory answer. The members of this Court repeatedly pressed Dr Kelleher to explain what this evidence is, and received by way of answer a few generalised examples:
(1)In relation to the area which has been developed, Les Pas wishes to investigate any planning applications for further development or modernisation.
(2)On the question whether development of the as yet undeveloped areas has been frustrated by the continuing doubt about the title to these areas, Les Pas wishes to investigate the position regarding a warehouse being built by a private developer.
(3)In relation to a proposition put to the States in 1996 for a leisure pool, Les Pas wishes to investigate further the position regarding planning consents, the availability of money, and the position as to private development.
(4)As regards a proposition put to the States in 1997 for housing development on part of the foreshore, Les Pas similarly wishes to investigate the planning consents (if any), the availability of money, and the viability of what is proposed.
(5)On 10tJune 1998 a consortium intending to develop a leisure centre on part of the foreshore withdrew. One of the reasons for its withdrawal was apparently the lack of certainty over title to the site. Les Pas wishes to investigate the reasons for the withdrawal, whether the likelihood of withdrawal was known before 3 February 1998, and if so, whether the States were told before they approved Proposition P2 of 1998.
The second aspect is that of discovery and interrogatories, that is, documents and information which the States and WEB would be required to supply. Dr Kelleher indicated, by reference to examples such as (1) - (5) above, that Les Pas would wish, first, to obtain evidence themselves to show the necessary prima facie case, and then secondly, to seek by discovery and interrogatories to turn the prima facie case into a firm case for the purposes of defeating the vesting order application. At one stage Dr Kelleher appeared to be suggesting that Les Pas needed to examine documents (and if necessary seek discovery and interrogatories) in relation to a period going as far back as 1983, a 15 year period. This suggestion seemed to me to be exaggerated, and did not reflect what Les Pas needed to do before the hearing.
This Court had before it the draft applications for discovery and interrogatories prepared by Mr Falle on 11 June 1998 but not pursued. In order to persuade this Court of Les Pas’s need for much more discovery Dr Kelleher handed up further drafts showing further classes of documents of which discovery might be sought. Examination of these further drafts showed that (i) not a few of the categories were so widely drawn that they would not be ordered to be disclosed in any ordinary action, and certainly not in a judicial review application; (ii) the author of these drafts (not Dr Kelleher) had not considered what properly could be asked for by way of discovery, having regard to the policy which I have referred to, or to the points made by Les Pas in their representation dated 28 May 1998, their skeleton and their affidavits.
Looking at all these suggested categories of documents and information to be sought by discovery and interrogatories, in the light of the points made in Les Pas’s representation, its skeleton of 3 June 1998 and its affidavits, I am not satisfied that any case has been made out by Les Pas for an order to be made for any of such discovery or interrogatories. In saying this I do not exclude the possibility that Les Pas may be able hereafter to make out a case for some limited discovery or interrogatories. An application on such basis, if it is to be made by Les Pas, will have to be made to Sir Godfray Le Quesne QC as soon as possible.
It seems to me that Les Pas and their advisers have lost sight of what would be involved in an attack, on a judicial review basis, on the relevant decision, that of the States on 3 February 1998. In considering whether or not that decision was a lawful one
(a) it is that decision alone which has to be considered, and not any previous decision whether of the States or of any Committee of the States or of WEB;
(b) the motivation of the members of the States is shown by the vote on 3 February 1998 of 45 to 2 in favour of compulsory purchase;
(c) it is not for the Court to consider the opinions of individual members;
(d) prima facie, the only documents to be considered are (i) the minutes of the States’ decision; (ii) Proposition P2 of 1998; (iii) other documents referred to in (i) and (ii); (iv) it may also be appropriate to examine the earlier proposition of November 1997 which was withdrawn.
For my part I was not persuaded by Dr Kelleher that there is any substantial number of other documents relevant to the decision which require to be examined, but I recognise that this is a matter which may have to be considered further by Sir Godfray Le Quesne.
(e) The grounds on which the States’ decision of 3 February 1998 may be open to attack are those to be found stated in the English cases, conveniently referred to as "Wednesbury", Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 CA, and "G.C.H.Q" The Council of Civil Service Unions -v- Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 HL.
(f) The basis for the attack will be that set out in the representation, skeleton argument and affidavits. Many of the points there raised by Les Pas can be argued without the need for any further evidence. Some of them may require further elaboration in affidavit evidence.
Dr Kelleher founded his arguments for a further adjournment squarely on Les Pas’s lack of preparedness. He sought to persuade this Court that there could not have been any obligation on Les Pas to do more than prepare a representation, and then anticipate a process of interlocutory stages leading to a trial months if not years later. As I made clear during the argument, that approach seems to me to be unsustainable. Les Pas and Mr Falle knew that they would be, and subsequently were, faced with an application for a vesting order under Article 4A of the 1961 Law. They knew that this was to be heard on 29 May 1998. To do nothing as regards the assembling of any relevant evidence in anticipation that the hearing on 29 May 1998 would be merely a first step in a process likely to last months or years would, as I have already said, have shown a surprising lack of care, or interest in the future disposal of the vesting order application.
Nevertheless this Court must give due weight, in the light of the past history I have described, to Les Pas’s professed lack of readiness.
On the other side, it is necessary for this Court to weigh the need for an early determination of the vesting order application. The relevant considerations were clearly set out in the skeleton arguments of the Solicitor General and Mr Santos Costa for the States and of Mr Bailhache for WEB. I do not lengthen this judgment further by setting them out. On the material before this Court, including in particular the two affidavits of Mr Scally, the Managing Director of WEB, there is a real public interest in having this application decided by the Royal Court and on appeal (if any) as soon as possible, and in my judgment it is equally in Les Pas’s interests to have it decided at an early date.
So the question for this Court is where the balance lies is between the insistence of Les Pas that they need until October 1998 to prepare, and the other interests which point to retention of the hearing date of 8 July 1998. In the end I have found it not possible to accept at face value the submission for Les Pas that little or nothing has so far been done, and that a further adjournment of three months is necessary. I take into account:
In the light of all these factors, I reach the conclusion that Dr Kelleher has not shown a sufficiently strong case for a further adjournment. Accordingly, I would not give leave to appeal from the Royal Courts orders of 4 and 5 June 1998. In reaching this conclusion, I must make it clear that this matter will now return to the Royal Court and to the experienced hands of Sir Godfray Le Quesne. He will be able to take the matter forward to the hearing on 8 July 1998, and to make any further interlocutory orders which he may consider appropriate.
This does not give Les Pas any encouragement to make a further application for an adjournment to Sir Godfray, all that I am saying is that from now on he and the Jurats will have the control of the matter and will be able to make any further orders to ensure an efficient hearing of this matter during July 1998.
It was suggested by Dr Kelleher that pleadings should now be ordered. In my judgment this is a case in which pleadings are not necessary or desirable. The issues already appear quite clearly from Les Pas’s representation, the skeleton argument served on 3 June 1998, and Les Pas’s affidavit.
I would add, that if there are to be any interlocutory applications, for example, any application for limited discovery of the kind I have indicated, such an application will have to be made very soon, and arrangements made for an early hearing date convenient to Sir Godfray Le Quesne and the Jurats.
In summary:
HARMAN JA: I agree with the judgment which has been delivered by Mr Southwell. I do not wish to add anything.
NUTTING JA: I, too, agree and have nothing to add
Authorities
F. Burt and H.I. Burt -v- States (1994) JLR 376 (CA)
F. Burt and H.I. Burt -v- States (1996) JLR 1 (CA)
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