ROYAL COURT
(Samedi Division)
15 June 1998
Before: Sir Philip Bailhache, QC, Bailiff and Jurats
Rumfitt, Le Breton
Magistrates Court Appeal
Roy Wild
-v-
AG
Appeal against conviction on 17 February 1998, on:
1 count of contravening Article 13 A (1)(a) of the Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956, as amended by exceeding the speed limit (44 mph in a 30 mph maximum speed zone).
Appeal against a sentence of a £70 fine or 7 days imprisonment in default of payment imposed on 17 February 1998 in respect of the said conviction.
On 17 February 1998, the Magistrates Court also discharged a 6 month Binding Over Order, imposed by that Court on 14 October 1997, for failing to notify a change of address in respect of a driving licence, and substituted a £100 fine or 10 days’ imprisonment in default of payment]
The Crown did not oppose the appeals against conviction and sentence and invited the Court to quash the fine imposed in respect of the breach of the Binding Over Order, but to direct that the Order remain in force for the remainder of its term.
The Court did not reimpose Binding Over Order.
Advocate AJ Belhomme
on behalf of the Attorney General
Advocate CJ Scholfield for the Appellant
JUDGMENT
THE BAILIFF: This is an appeal against conviction and sentence on an offence of speeding at a hearing before the Magistrate on 17 February 1998. For reasons which it is unnecessary to set out the Crown has conceded that appeal and we therefore formally allow the appeal and quash the conviction.
The only question which remains to consider relates to a Binding Over Order which was imposed by the Magistrate on 14 October 1997, for a different offence of failing to notify a change of address in respect of a driving licence. For that offence the Appellant was bound over for six months. When the Appellant appeared before the Magistrate on 17 February that binding over order was discharged and a fine of £100 or 10 days imprisonment in default was imposed. Clearly the fine of £100 and the default sentence as an alternative fall away as a result of the quashing of the conviction for speeding. The only question for us is whether the Binding Over Order should be reinstated and whether, as a result of the quashing of the conviction, it is right that the Binding Over Order be reimposed. For at least one reason set out by Mr Scholefield - that is to say that in matters of penal law where there is an ambiguity, that ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused - we think that it would not be right to reimpose the binding over order. In any event the Appellant in fact was of good behaviour for the remaining period of six months and we can see no reason in justice either why the binding over order should be reimposed.
No Authorities