COURT OF APPEAL
Judgment reserved: 26 September 1997
Reserved judgment handed down: 5 January 1998
Before: The Rt Hon The Lord Carlisle QC, (President)
Miss E Gloster QC and The Hon MJ Beloff QC
Between: Lesquende Limited Plaintiff/Respondent
And: The Planning and Environment Committee of the States of Jersey Defendant/Appellant
Appeal by the Defendant/Appellant against so much of the Order of the Royal Court of 17 February 1997 as held that the decision of the Board of Arbitrators should have taken into account the zoning of the Plaintiff/Respondent’s land for use for Category A housing.
Preliminary Issue: whether the Royal Court enjoys jurisdiction to set aside the original award, made by the Board of Arbitrators.
Advocate WJ Bailhache for the Defendant/Appellant.
Advocate MMG Voisin for the Plaintiff/Respondent.
JUDGMENT
BELOFF, JA:
INTRODUCTION
[1]The judgment I am giving is the judgment of the Court. The substantive issue in this appeal concerns a point arising out of the Judgment of the Royal Court delivered on 17 February 1997 setting aside an Arbitration Award and giving directions to the Board of Arbitrators ("the Board") constituted under the Compulsory Purchase of Land (Procedure) (Jersey) Law 1961 (amended) (hereinafter called "the Law") as to the law which should be applied. The objection raised in the Notice of Appeal, is not as to the setting aside of the Award, but as to one particular direction as to the law which the Royal Court has given. This judgment is, however, concerned only with a procedural issue, namely whether the Royal Courts (or this Court) enjoys jurisdiction to set aside the original arbitration award which had been made by the Board on 5 February 1995 and registered in the Rolls of the Royal Court on 6 February 1995. It raises important questions as to the availability and ambit of judicial review in Jersey.
[2]Following delivery of the award, the Respondent commenced proceedings by order of justice (subsequently amended) dated the 16 March 1995, seeking orders that it be set aside, the matter remitted to the Board, and that directions be given to the Board on such remission. By its answer the Appellant admitted that the award should be set aside but on different grounds. Thereafter the Respondent filed a reply. It is not necessary for the purpose of this judgment to detail either the admitted error of law of the Board, or the substantive issues which divided the parties before the Royal Court.
JURISDICTION
[3]The Respondents by their amended Order of Justice referred to the "inherent jurisdiction" of the Court to set aside the award; but this was interpreted by both parties and the Court as an application for judicial review.
[4]Article 12 of the Compulsory Purchase Law provides:
"(1) The decision of the Board on any question of fact shall be final and binding on the parties and the persons claiming under them respectively, but the Board may, and if the inferior number of the Royal Court directs shall, state at any stage of the proceedings in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings and may state its award as to the whole or part thereof in the form of the special case in the opinion of the Court.
(2) The decision of the inferior number of the Royal Court on any case so stated shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to appeal to any other court."
At no time during the hearing before the Board, did either party request the form of special case in the opinion of the Court, nor did the Board do so on its own motion.
[5]In the light of
(1)the existence of a statutory procedure for appeal from the Board by way of case stated
and
(2)the absence of Royal Court rules for judicial review (see Lewis. Judicial Review in Jersey. Jersey Law Review 1997 p.371),
the Royal Court of its own motion raised a jurisdictional issue, namely whether, neither party having asked for a case to be stated, it was competent for the Respondent to proceed by way of an application for judicial review.
[6]Three consequential questions arose before the Royal Court:
(1)Does the supervisory jurisdiction by way of judicial review exist in Jersey?
(2)If so, in the exercise of discretion, should the Royal Court decline to exercise it on the grounds of the existence of an effective alternative remedy ie the statutory case stated procedure?
(3)On what grounds should judicial review in Jersey, if it existed, lie?
[7]The Royal Court answered question (1) 'yes' - and referred to a "jurisdiction at least analogous to judicial review" (p.6]. The Royal Court answered question (2) 'no' (pp.6-7]. The Royal Court answered question (3) by identifying as grounds the classic trilogy of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service 1985 AC 374 ("GCHQ") "illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety" (p.10].
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN JERSEY
[8]We, for our part, endorse the existence of the remedy by way of judicial review in Jersey. The inherent jurisdiction of the Courts to control excess or abuse of power by executive bodies seems to us to be intrinsic to the very judicial process, and vital to the rule of law. To confer upon an administrative authority limited powers only, but to provide no means for confining it within those limits would be paradoxical. There is nothing in the traditions of Norman French law, as developed in Jersey, which appears incompatible, and much appears consistent with our conclusion. It would be, in principle, regrettable to deny to a citizen of Jersey a form of relief available to citizens in other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions. (See generally: Louis Blom-Cooper QC and Charles Blake. Judicial Review in Jersey: Public Law 1997 p.371.]
[9]Precedent points in the same direction or principle. In Le Gros v The Housing Committee (1974) JJ 77 at 86 ("Le Gros"), the Bailiff of Jersey, Sir Robert Le Masurier, also in the context of a challenge to the decision of the Board of Arbitrators under the 1961 law stated
"The first issue raised before us of whether the court has a power to interfere with an arbitration award has, in our opinion, it undoubtedly has such a power, if, for example, the arbitrators exceed their authority, are wrong in law, deny the parties justice, and reach a conclusion devoid of reason. In all such cases, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to have put right that which is wrong. What the court cannot do is to interfere with an award which has been regularly made. The power of discretion properly exercised by a body or person or body who have a legal authority to exercise it is generally unassailable".
The case was remitted by the Court to the Board with the direction as to the approach which it should adopt in relation to valuation.
[10]In the present case the Royal Court approved Le Gros and noted that the Bailiffs description of supervisory jurisdiction of the Royal Court was supported by earlier authority. (Le Masurier v Natural Beauties Committee 1958 13 CR 139; Scott v. Island Development Committee 1966 JJ 631.] Further, as the Royal Court noted Les Gros had never been challenged in a series of judicial review decisions which followed.
[11]We note also that, on at least one previous occasions, Housing Committee v Phantasie Investments Limited (1985-86 JLR 96), no issue was raised before this Court as to the availability of the supervisory jurisdiction.
[12]The fact that the procedural machinery in Jersey is not developed to the extent in England and Wales is no argument against the existence of the remedy, although an obstacle to its efficient exercise. We are pleased to note that work is in progress to introduce in the Island a specific regulatory regime for the remedy (Idocare Properties Ltd v Planning Committee of the States: June 5 1997 unreported.) (Lewis: op.cit.).
Grounds for Judicial Review
[13]There is no reason to dispute that the grounds for judicial review are, in broad terms, those identified by the Royal Court i.e. the GCHQ trilogy. These would certainly include error of law on the face of the Board's award. It is not necessary to explore further whether Jersey law follows from that main route every by-way down which judges in common law jurisdictions have travelled.
Doléance
[14]The Royal Court also referred to an alternative remedy to judicial review - namely that of Doléance - which had been available since the 17th century at the latest, at least to the superior number of the Royal Courts (pp.5-6).
[15]In Re Doléance of the Harbour and Airport Committee of the States of Jersey and in Re Kenneth Foster t/a Airport Business Centre (1991) JLR 316, the Deputy Bailiff stated that
"Before allowing a doléance the Court has to be satisfied that there has been an excess of jurisdiction or a breach of natural justice which needs to remedied as a doleance is a remedy of last resort when all other doors are closed and a grave injustice will remain unless remedied ... we agree that the doleance is analogous to the writ of certiorari but the analogy is not complete because the Queens Bench does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunals a court of appeal would do; but exercising its control by means of power to quash a decision, leaving it to the inferior tribunal to hear the case again and in a proper case commanding it to do so. In the case of the doleance, the Privy Council or a superior number, does decide the issue between the parties. The doléance provides an appeal where there is none".
[16]Doléance was not, however, prayed in aid in the present case and we need not refer further to it.
The Procedural Issue in the Court of Appeal
[17]Neither party sought to resurrect the jurisdiction issue before us. However, it is axiomatic that judicial (as distinct from arbitral) jurisdiction, if otherwise absent, cannot be created by consent of parties. We have no doubt that we would be entitled if we held that the inferior court had no jurisdiction, so to state and to set the order aside (see in Re A Company 1981 AC 374).
[18]Our concerns can be simply stated. The 1961 Law, whilst it does not on its face exclude judicial control of the Board; appears to create a self-contained code, attaching to the rights to a valuation the remedy by way of case stated. Furthermore, whereas Article 12(2) appears to suggest that the inferior number of the Royal Court was to be the last port of call to challenge such a decision, the parties in this matter have sought to engage the attention of the Court of Appeal - with potential resort thereafter to the Privy Council.
[19]It appeared to us that there were three possible analyses.
(1)Article 12 provided an exclusive code. Other remedies (at any rate by way of judicial review) were implicitly excluded.
(2)Article 12 provided a remedy concurrent with that of judicial review, but, in the exercise of discretion, a Court should ordinarily deny relief by way of judicial review on the ground of the existence of an effective alternative remedy.
(3)The remedies under Article 12 and under judicial review co-existed, it being a matter for the choice of the aggrieved party as to which he selected.
[20]Both advocates gave us conspicuous assistance. For the Appellants, Mr Bailhache pointed out that 1961 Law was modelled on the Acquisition of Land (Land Compensation) Act 1919 ("the 1919 Act"), rather than its replacement statute the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1948 ("the 1948 Act").
[21]The 1919 Act provides, so far as material
"(1) The decision of as an official arbitrator upon any question of fact shall be final and binding on the parties, and the persons claiming under them respectively, but the official arbitrator may, and shall, if the High Court so directs, state at any stage of the proceedings, in the form of a special case, for the opinion of the High Court, any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings, and may state his award as to the whole or part thereof in the form of a special case for the opinion of the High Court.
(2) The decision of the High Court upon any case so stated shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to appeal to any other court."
The 1961 Act clearly echoes its language.
[22]Mr Bailhache claimed that to be under English law there were various ways of challenging an award made under the 1919 Act, in particular an application to set aside for error of law on the face of the award, (see e.g. Bradshaw v. Air Council 1926 Ch.D.329; Horn v Sunderland Corporation 1941 1 All ER 166 and 481]. In those circumstances, he argued that it was impossible to contend that Article 12, if modelled on the 1919 Act, constituted an exclusive code.
[23]Mr Bailhache further drew our attention to the copious jurisprudence to the effect that it would require clear language to exclude judicial review.
[24]It seems clear that in England when submissions to arbitrators or awards of them were made rules of Court, the High Court had capacity to set them aside for errors of law on the face of the record. The same was so in respect of statutory tribunals which were expressly made arbitral in character. The better view may be that such was not so in the case of statutory tribunals which were not made arbitral in character. For these patent errors the remedy lay in the prerogative orders.
[25]In R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex p. Shaw 1952 KB 338 at p.351, Denning LJ said
"The Court of King's Bench never interfered by certiorari with the award of an arbitrator, because it was a private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the award was not made a rule of court, the only course available to an aggrieved party was to resist an action on the award or to file a bill in equity. If the award was made a rule of court, a motion could be made to the court to set aside for misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or other undue means: see 9 & 10 Will. 3, c.15. At one time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator, because that could not be said to be misconduct or undue means; but ultimately it was held in Kent v Elstob that an award could be set aside for error of law on the face of it. This was regretted by Williams J. in Hodgkinson v Fernie, but is now well established. This remedy by motion to set aside, is however, confined to arbitrators. It does not extend to statutory tribunals: see Racecourse Betting Control Board v Secretary for Air. I look upon that decision as merely a decision as to the scope of the remedy of setting aside on motion. It is not a decision on substantive law. It does not take away or diminish the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Kings Bench to interfere by certiorari."
[26]To like effect was Lord Green MR in Racecourses Betting Control Board v Secretary of State for Air 1944 1 Ch.114 at p.119. We accept the analyses of the Masters of the Rolls.
[27]It was for these reasons that in relation to the 1919 Act which provided for statutory arbitration, the powers of the Court to set aside for error of law were engaged, the jurisdiction was inherent (Hogg: The Law of Arbitration: p.147).
[28]However no English case was cited to or found by us in which the issues of whether this inherent jurisdiction subsisted in cases where the statute, under which the statutory arbitration procedure was established, contained discrete and limited machinery to challenge arbitral awards was discussed. The issue was not raised by the parties, nor determined by the Judges. The most that can be said is that it appeared to be assumed that it was not. (Equally we note that Article 12 was not alluded to in Le Gros.)
[29]Lord Greene MR in In Re Racecourses Betting Control Board 1944 Ch.114 was, in our view, right in principle when he said (at p.121)
"It is competent to the legislation to set up any kind of Tribunal that it pleases. The questions to be determined in any particular case are: what is the true nature of the tribunal which the legislature has established? and what are the powers, if any, which have been conferred on the Courts with regard to its decisions? These questions must be decided upon a consideration of the statute and the true interpretation of its provisions."
[30]There were however instances, albeit not in the field of land compensation, where the Courts expressed a clear view that the legislature had intended the particular case stated procedure to be exclusive, but had used language incompetent to achieve that end.
[31]Particularly striking are the words of Lord Sterndale MR in Re Jones and Carters Arbitration 1922 2 Ch.D.599 ("Jones & Carter") at pp.604-605, where the Court of Appeal held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside an award under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908 or the ground of error appearing on the face of it when there has been no misconduct on the part of the arbitrator is not taken away by that Act, even though the County Court was given thereunder particular powers to deal with misconduct (in the broadest sense, by the arbitrator).
"But this, I think, is quite clear, that the provisions of the Arbitration Act do not exclude the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In cases under that Act the Court which deals with the award under its inherent jurisdiction and the Court which deals with it under the express provisions of the Act is the same, and therefore no difficulty arises as to the jurisdiction under which it is acting. But the case is different where the question arises under an Act by which express powers are given to the county court. I have not much doubt myself that it was intended by the Act of 1908 to lay down, as was contended by Mr Farwell in his admirable argument, a complete code, and one which confined the jurisdiction in these matters to the county court. But the question we have to determine is whether that intention has been carried out. In my opinion, it has not. As the express provisions of the Arbitration Act do not exclude the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, so, in my judgment, the express provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908, which are in substance the same, do not do so either. I am quite aware that this decision may in certain cases give rise to hopeless confusion; but I agree with Mr Farwell that I am not entitled to take that into consideration. I am inclined to think that a decision the other way would give rise perhaps to not quite such hopeless confusion, but to a good deal of confusion also. The fact is that the Legislature in framing this Act has unfortunately failed to see the difficulty which arises when part of the jurisdiction is given to one Court and the jurisdiction existing in another Court is not taken away. I am sorry to say therefore that I cannot agree with the decision of the learned judge that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court is excluded. I think therefore the preliminary point fails upon that ground, and the learned judges decision was erroneous. The result I am afraid is that the matter must go back to be dealt with by the learned judge."
[32]The old jurisdiction of setting aside arbitral awards for errors on their face has been subsumed in the case of private arbitrations by statutory developments e.g. the Arbitration Acts 1950 and 1979 and in the case of statutory arbitrations by the onward march of judicial review, see Jacob. The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court in Current Legal Problems 1970 p.23 at p.49. Mustill and Boyd: Commercial Arbitration: 2nd ed. p.439: Judicial Control: a historical survey ("JCHS").
[33]The prerogative orders also lay to statutory tribunals. (Russell: Arbitration: 19th ed., p.292-293). In R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians Ex p. Neate 1953 1 All ER 327 ("Neate"], Lord Goddard CJ said:
"Arbitration is a very old remedy in English law, but in all the centuries that have passed since the decisions of English courts first began there is no trace of an arbitrator being controlled by this court by writ of either prohibition or certiorari. The bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied are all statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties the exercise of which may lead to the detriment of subjects as, for instance, where a statute gives a certain body power for the compulsory acquisition of land and an arbitrator is set up by Parliament to assess the compensation, and it is essential that the courts should be able to control the exercise of the statutory jurisdiction within the limits imposed by Parliament. There is no instance of which I know in the books where certiorari or prohibition has gone to any arbitrator except a statutory arbitrator, and a statutory arbitrator is a person to whom, by statute, the parties must resort."
Lord Goddard CJ was not, however, considering any specific statutory regime, which might ground an argument that the prerogative orders, prima facie available, were excluded.
[34]We entertain considerable doubts as to whether the States in adopting the 1919 Act model were conscious of the existence of what was in 1961 the obsolescent remedy of setting aside on motion) for error of law: (Mustill and Boyd consider that it should have been held obsolete p.448: but the Courts in England while not so persuaded clearly found it unsatisfactory compared with the maturing case stated procedure: Mustill and Boyd JCHS passim. Giacono Costa Fr. Andrea v. British Italian Trading Co. Ltd 1963 QB 201 at p.211-2), or what was in 1961 the embryonic remedy of judicial review. To hold that they did may be to attribute to them unrealistically an awareness of history or a power of prophecy.
[35]The key issue, however we accept, is not what the States intended, but what they achieved, see Jones v. Carter at para.42 above.
[36]It is elementary that it "is only in the case of the clearest statutory provision" (De Smith op.cit. para.20-018 at 813) that the Courts will conclude that judicial review is ousted. (See in particular Leach v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison 1988 AC 533 per Lord Bridge at p.562.) On the basis of this stringent approach we cannot sensibly construe the language of Article 12 as sufficient to exclude judicial review. It does not expressly purport to do so. It is the Boards conclusions on questions of fact that are ring-fenced: it is the decision of the Royal Court on a case stated (as distinct from on some other from of relief) that is immune from appeal.
[37]Furthermore, the approach of Pasmore v Oswaldwhistle UDC (1898) AC 387 no longer represents the current approach of the courts to alternative remedies. The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the court to grant judicial review. We hold that the Court had jurisdiction.
[38]The existence of such a statutory remedy is however highly relevant to the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse relief by way of judicial review. Judicial review is a remedy of last resort. De Smith op.cit. 18-03 p.753; R. v. Home Secretary ex p. Swales 1986 1 WLR 477; R. v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex p. Calverley 1986 QB 424. The principles set out by Sir John Donaldson MR in ex p. Goldstraw; R. v. Epping and Harlow General Commissioners (1983 3 All ER 257 at p.262), appears to us to be applicable in Jersey.
"It is a cardinal principle that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, that jurisdiction will not be exercised where other remedies are available and have not been used."
[39]We have, accordingly, no doubt that prima facie the Royal Court should decline to entertain a remedy by way of judicial review in the light of the provisions of Article 12 of the 1961 law on the basis of the existence of an effective alternative remedy.
[40]We do not share the doubts as to the efficacy of the remedy, which appeared to trouble the Royal Court (pp.6-7) and its perceived imperfections analysed as follows in the Encyclopaedia of Land Compensation 1956 (ed. Harold Brown).
"76. Appeals. An official arbitrator's decision could be reviewed in the High Court either on a case stated under the repealed s.6 of the Act of 1919, or on a motion to set aside the award for an error of law appearing on its face. There were several disadvantages in both types of proceeding. So far as a case stated was concerned, a party was compelled to ask for a case or an award in the form of a case, before the arbitrators decision was known. An application to set aside the award might be taken to the House of Lords and the dispute would then have been argued four times."
[41]The ability to state a special case for any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings is a useful procedure unavailable under the supervisory jurisdiction. Moreover, the Royal Court can control the Boards exercise of discretion where such an application is made.
[42]Further, and contrary to the views in the Encyclopaedia, we do not for our part understand why an application to the Board to state its award as to the whole or part thereof in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court cannot be made after the award is handed down, rather than before it. This is, after all, the conventional procedure in relation to the decisions of Magistrates Courts in Jersey, and in England and Wales (Magistrates Courts Act 1980 Section 111).
[43]As a matter of literal construction the existence of an award might be thought to constitute a condition precedent to an application to state it in the form of a special case. As a matter of purposive construction, it is manifestly sensible that the application should only be made after the award is handed down, at which time the parties can determined whether or not there is a point of law which ought to be identified for the opinion of the Court.
[44]We are not persuaded by the Royal Courts observation (pp.6-7) that the Board may decline to state a case, thereby nullifying the utility of the remedy. If the Board were to refuse to state a case in circumstances where it can only reasonably do so e.g if there was a clear and significant error of law on the face of its award it would certainly be amenable to judicial review in relation to that misexercise of discretion.
[45]It seems to us that under Article 12 of the 1961 Law, the Court is not being asked for a mere academic opinion, but would upon the special case be entitled to give directions such as would nullify the effect of the award. For this reason in particular, we are not persuaded by the argument that the provisions for registration of the award make it impossible for the case stated procedure to be used after the award is handed down.
[46]By Amendment No.3 1981, the 1961 Law provides:
"ARTICLE 13
REGISTRATION OF AWARD OF BOARD
(1) The award of the Board shall specify the amount awarded in respect of each matter the subject of the award and, insofar as the award relates to the acquisition of land on which there are charges which the States are bound under Article 6 of this Law to discharge, the amount specified shall be the balance after deduction of the charges.
(2) The Inferior Number of the Royal Court shall, on the application of the Greffier of the States, order the registration of the award of the Board in the Rolls of the Royal Court."
[47]Any award, even if registered, would be vulnerable to deregistration if the opinion of the Court were adverse to it. Moreover, if it appeared on the face of the award, that a party wished to challenge it, an application could be made to the Greffier not to apply for the award to be registered, which he could not, in the proper exercise of his discretion, refuse.
[48]Finally, inasmuch the significance of the registration appears to be for the parties, not the world at large, objections grounded on a (defeasible) registration appear to us particularly insubstantial.
[49]However, we are faced in the instant case, with this difficult problem. The forensic procedure in Jersey is adversarial: neither party has appealed the exercise of the Royal Courts discretion. Moreover, even though, had such an appeal been made, we might have been minded to say that the discretion was flawed by reason of an imperfect analysis of the reach of Article 12 of the 1961 Act, in this instance where the parties have engaged an available procedure, and a Court with jurisdiction has not declined to exercise it, we consider that we would be trespassing beyond the boundaries of what is permissible, to decline to order that the matter be heard merely because we for our part might have declined to do so. This is not a question of public policy on which this Court can act of its own motion.
[50]Although, we would be surprised to find any future challenge to a decision of the Board reaching this level of the hierarchy of Courts, it is our view that the Court of Appeal should continue to hear the substantive issues in the appeal.
Authorities
Compulsory Purchase (Jersey) Law 1961 with Amendments
Cedars Rapids Manufacturing & Power Co -v- Lacoste [1914] AC 569
South Eastern Railway -v- London County Council [1915] 2 Ch. 252
Lewis: Judicial Review in Jersey (1997) Jersey Law Review, p.371
Council of Civil Service Unions -v- Minister for Civil Service (1985) AC 374
Blom-Cooper & Blake: Judicial Review in Jersey. Public Law 1997: p.371
Le Gros -v- Housing Committee (1974) JJ 86
Le Masurier -v- Natural Beauties Committee (1958) 13 CR 139
Scott -v- IDC (1966) JJ 631
Housing Committee -v- Phantasie Investments Ltd (1985-86) JLR 96
Idocare Properties -v- Planning Committee of the States (5 June 1997) Jersey Unreported
Re Doléance of Harbours and Airport Committee and In re Foster t/a Airport Business Centre (1991) JLR 316
In re a Company (1981) AC 374
Acquisition of Land (Land Compensation) Act 1919
Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1948
Bradshaw -v- Air Council (1926) Ch. D. 329
Horn -v- Sunderland Corporation (1941) 1 All ER 166 and 481
R -v- Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shaw (1952) KB 338
Racecourses Betting Control Board -v- Secretary of State for Air (1944) 1 Ch. 114
Hogg: Law of Arbitration: p.147
Re Jones and Carters Arbitration (1922) Ch. D. 599
Jacob: The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court in Current Legal Problems (1970) p.23
Mustill and Boyd: Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed’n): p.439: Judicial Control: a historical survey
R -v- Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians ex parte Neate (1953) 1 All ER 327
Giacomo Costa Fr. Andrea -v- British Italian Trading Co Ltd (1963) QB 201
Leach -v- Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison (1988) AC 533
Pasmore -v- Oswaldwhistle UDC (1898) AC 387
R -v- Home Secretary ex parte Swales (1986) 1 WLR 477
R -v- Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex parte Calverley (1986) QB 424
R -v- Epping and Harlow General Commissioners (1983) 3 All ER 257
Encyclopaedia of Land Compensation 1956 (ed. Harold Brown): 76: Appeals
Magistrates Court Act 1980, s.111