THE SUPREME COURT
Appeal No. 536/2013
Cross Appeal No. 32/2014
High Court Record No. 2011/184
Denham C.J.
O’Donnell J.
MacMenamin J.
Dunne J.
O’Malley J.
The Minister for Justice and Equality
Applicant/Appellant
and
Ferenc Horvath
Respondent
Judgment delivered on the 2nd day of March, 2017 by Denham C.J.
1. This is an appeal by the Minister for Justice and Equality, the applicant/appellant, who is referred to as “the Minister”, from the judgment of the High Court (Edwards J.) delivered on the 28th November, 2013, which refused to surrender Ferenc Horvath, the respondent, referred to as “the respondent”, to Hungary.
Certificate
2. On the application of the Minister, the learned High Court judge certified that the said judgment involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken from the said judgment on the following point:-
Whether the High Court was correct in law in its decision that the surrender of the respondent to Hungary for the purposes of a second instance prosecution fell within the scope of an application of s. 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act of 2003, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2003”).
Grounds of Appeal
3. The Minister raised the following grounds of appeal:-
(i) The learned trial judge erred in law in his conclusion that the surrender of the respondent was prohibited by s. 45 of the Act of 2003.
(ii) The learned trial judge accepted that the surrender of the respondent to Hungary was sought for the purposes of prosecution and that the respondent was presumed innocent. Notwithstanding these findings, the learned trial judge held that an undertaking was required by s. 45 of the Act of 2003.
(iii) The learned trial judge erred in fact in finding that the respondent was a convicted person, in Hungarian law, such that an undertaking was required by s. 45 of the Act of 2003.
(iv) The learned trial judge erred in law in finding that an undertaking was required by s. 45 of the Act of 2003.
(v) The findings of the learned trial judge was against the weight of the evidence.
4. The respondent took no issue on the relevant facts as set out in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.8 of the Minister’s submission. Thus, I gratefully adopt the said description, being as follows:-
“1.1 A European arrest warrant dated 27th May 2010 was transmitted to the State on 16th December 2010 and was endorsed on 18th May 2011 after the receipt of additional information dated 11th May 2011. The offences for which the respondent is sought involve corruption in the respondent’s capacity as a police officer. This warrant was executed on 20th October 2011 and is the subject of these proceedings.
1.2 The warrant the subject of the proceedings is the third warrant issued and transmitted to the State in respect of the respondent. The first warrant was issued on 12th June 2007 and endorsed by the High Court on 5th September 2007. Peart J. directed the surrender of the respondent in respect of 13 offences by Order dated 25th November 2008, and refused to direct the surrender of the respondent in respect of four offences by Order dated 19th December 2008.
1.3 After the hearing of the appeal against surrender on the first warrant, but before delivery of judgment by the Supreme Court, a second warrant was received in the State. Upon application on behalf of the Central Authority, the Supreme Court vacated the orders endorsing the first warrant and directing the surrender of the respondent. In those circumstances, judgment of the Supreme Court which had been reserved was not delivered. The second warrant was not endorsed by the High Court. The third warrant was endorsed on 18th May 2011, together with additional information dated 11th May 2011.
1.4 The issuing judicial authority issued the third warrant, which is described in the additional information dated 16th December 2010 as “a corrected warrant”. It is stated therein that the respondent is sought “for criminal proceedings and not for enforcement of a sentence”. It is further explained that he is sought for the purposes of an appeal or “second instance” criminal proceeding. This was reiterated in the additional information dated 11th May 2011, which states :
“ - the named person was convicted at first instance and that a sentence of 3 years and 6 months was imposed on him;
- the named person is now sought for the purposes of prosecution and not to serve the above sentence imposed on him at first instance;
- the named person is now sought for the purposes of an appeal hearing and this appeal is a full hearing of the case.”
1.5 It is common case that there was a first instance trial and that the respondent was found guilty and a sentence imposed and that he was not present at that time. It is also common case that the respondent did not have actual notice of the first instance trial in advance thereof. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent (but not appointed by him) appealed against the first instance decision. The issuing judicial authority clearly states that the first instance decision is not final or executable and that the respondent is sought for criminal proceedings or prosecution at second instance. In the additional information dated 8th August 2013, it is stated that the respondent is regarded as a defendant and that he has the benefit of the presumption of innocence. While the affidavit of Magyar Gabor, of 12th July 2012, states that the third warrant purports to be for the purposes of prosecution, the statement of the issuing judicial authority to that effect is not disputed on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Gabor.
1.6 By Order made the 28th November 2013 Edwards J. refused to direct the surrender of the respondent to Hungary on the ground that section 45, European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, applied to the request for surrender and no undertaking for a retrial had been provided by the Hungarian Authorities.
1.7 It was held by Edwards J. that the respondent was sought for prosecution, and not to serve a custodial sentence or detention order which had been imposed on him.
1.8 A certificate of leave to appeal was granted on 5th December 2013.”
Chronology
5. A chronology of the events relevant to this appeal is set out in Appendix A attached to this judgment.
Law
6. Section 45 of the Act of 2003, as amended, but prior to the amendment of 2012, provided:-
45. - A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if -
(a) he or she was not present when he or she was tried for and convicted of the offence specified in the European arrest warrant, and
(b) (i) he or she was not notified of the time when, and place at which, he or she would be tried for the offence, or
(ii) he or she was not permitted to attend the trial in respect of the offence concerned, unless the issuing judicial authority gives an undertaking in writing that the person will, upon being surrendered -
(I) be retried for that offence or be given the opportunity of a retrial in respect of that offence.
(II) be notified of the time when, and place at which any retrial in respect of the offence concerned will take place and
(III) be permitted to be present when any such retrial takes place.
7. The above s. 45 is section 45 before it was amended in 2012. On the 24th July, 2012, the European Arrest Warrant (Application to Third Countries) and Extradition (Amendment) Act, 2012, came into force. Section 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, as amended, was substituted by s. 23 of the Act of 2012.
Section 23 of the European Arrest Warrant (Application to Third Countries and Amendment) and Extradition (Amendment) Act 2012 provides:-
“45.— A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if he or she did not appear in person at the proceedings resulting in the sentence or detention order in respect of which the European arrest warrant was issued, unless the European arrest warrant indicates the matters required by points 2, 3 and 4 of point (d) of the form of warrant in the Annex to the Framework Decision as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, as set out in the table to this section.
TABLE
(d)Indicate if the person appeared in person at the trial resulting in the decision:
1. □Yes, the person appeared in person at the trial resulting in the decision.
2. □No, the person did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision.
3. If you have ticked the box under point 2, please confirm the existence of one of the following:
□ 3.1a. the person was summoned in person on . . . (day/month/year) and thereby informed of the scheduled date and place of the trial which resulted in the decision and was informed that a decision may be handed down if he or she does not appear for the trial;
OR
□3.1b. the person was not summoned in person but by other means actually received official information of the scheduled date and place of the trial which resulted in the decision, in such a manner that it was unequivocally established that he or she was aware of the scheduled trial, and was informed that a decision may be handed down if he or she does not appear for the trial;
OR
□3.2. being aware of the scheduled trial, the person had given a mandate to a legal counsellor, who was either appointed by the person concerned or by the State, to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed defended by that counsellor at the trial;
OR
□3.3. the person was served with the decision on . . . (day/month/year) and was expressly informed about the right to a retrial or appeal, in which he or she has the right to participate and which allows the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, to be re-examined, and which may lead to the original decision being reversed, and
□the person expressly stated that he or she does not contest this decision,
OR
□the person did not request a retrial or appeal within the applicable time frame;
OR
□3.4. the person was not personally served with the decision, but
—the person will be personally served with this decision without delay after the surrender, and
—when served with the decision, the person will be expressly informed of his or her right to a retrial or appeal, in which he or she has the right to participate and which allows the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, to be re-examined, and which may lead to the original decision being reversed, and
—the person will be informed of the time frame within which he or she has to request a retrial or appeal, which will be . . . days.
4. If you have ticked the box under points 3.1b, 3.2 or 3.3 above, please provide information about how the relevant condition has been met:”
Framework decision
8. It is well established that the Act of 2003 should be read in light of Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 2002/584/JHA.
9. Article 5(1) of the said Framework Decision provides that the execution of a warrant may be subject to conditions, including:-
“where the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of executing a sentence or a detention order imposed by a decision rendered in absentia and if the person concerned has not been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered in absentia, surrender may be subject to the condition that the issuing judicial authority gives an assurance deemed adequate to guarantee the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant that he or she will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial of the case in the issuing Member State and to be present at the judgment”.
10. Section 45 was enacted to give effect to Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision. Of course, s. 45 cannot be read contra legem.
11. In Minister for Justice v. Altaravicius [2006] 3 IR 148 at 156, Murray C.J. stated:-
“When applying and interpreting national provisions giving effect to a Framework Decision the Courts “… must do so as far as possible in this light of the wording and purpose of the Framework Decision in order to attain the result which it pursues …” (see Criminal proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-05285). The principle of conforming interpretation is limited, as the Court of Justice has pointed out in Pupino and other cases, to the extent that it is possible to give such an interpretation. It does not require a national court to interpret national legislation contra legem. If national legislation, having been interpreted as far as possible in conformity with community legislation to which it purports to give effect, but still falls short of what is required by the latter, a national Court must, as a general principle, apply that legislation as interpreted although there may be other consequences for a Member State which has failed to fully implement a Directive or Framework Decision.”
12. In Minister for Justice v. Bailey [2012] IESC 16, [2012] 4 IR 1., Fennelly J. stated:-
“There does not seem to me to be any reason in principle to exclude the principle of conforming interpretation from a measure merely because it implements an “opt-out.” On the contrary, logic demands that the principle be applied equally to such a situation. Indeed, it might well be that a correct interpretation would lead to the exclusion of an individual from the benefit of a national measure, once it was correctly interpreted as a matter of European Union law. Accordingly, I am satisfied that section 44 must be interpreted in conformity with article 4.7(b) and not merely with the general objectives of the Framework Decision.”
Which Act Applies?
13. The High Court applied s. 45 of the Act of 2003, without including the amendment of 2012.
14. It was accepted in the High Court at that time that an amendment effected cases where the European arrest warrant was endorsed after the commencement of the amendment. Consequently, where a warrant was endorsed prior to the commencement of an amendment coming into force, the older version of the law applied.
15. That is what happened in this case. The pre 2012 version of s. 45 was applied in the High Court. The High Court judgment was not decided after any legal argument on the newer version of s. 45, rather it was decided on the basis of the pre 2012 law. The issue of the amendment of 2012 was not raised in the certified question. Nor may it be found in the grounds of appeal.
16. The appellant sought in this Court to argue a point not argued in, nor determined by, nor certified by, the High Court, i.e. the application of the amendment in the 2012 Act to this case.
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court
17. The Supreme Court is an appellate court. In general it does not hear issues which have not been argued before, and determined by, the High Court. There are a very few exceptions to this jurisprudence, none of which apply in this case.
18. This jurisprudence has been explained repeatedly by the Court. As I stated in Blehein v. Murphy [2000] 2 IR 231:-
“Parties, including the Attorney General, have the right to have the issues argued fully in the High Court. Issues may be reargued on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in Ireland and most of its jurisdiction is appellate. To this there are a few exceptions. In exceptional circumstances the Supreme Court will consider issues of constitutional law which have not been argued in the High Court.”
19. No exceptional circumstances arise in the case. Thus, I would not hear an appeal on a ground not argued in the High Court, not certified by the High Court, and not appearing on the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal by the Minister.
A Different View
20. The situation is that after this case was decided in the High Court, the High Court took a different view of the application of amending legislation.
21. In Minister for Justice and Equality v. Surma [2013] IEHC 618, the High Court (Edwards J.) held that the 2012 amendment to the law had retrospective effect. Up until that decision the general practice had been that amendments applied only from the date of the commencement of the amendment, i.e. prospectively.
22. In Surma Edwards J. stated, inter alia:
“In so far as the dicta referred to in Minister for Justice and Equality v Tokarski [2012] IESC 61 (unreported, Supreme Court, Murray J. 6th December 2012), and Minister for Justice and Equality v Gheorghe [2009] IESC 76 (unreported, Supreme Court, Fennelly J. 18th November 2011) are concerned, in neither case was the Supreme Court asked to consider whether or not the provisions in question had retrospective effect. It seems reasonable to interpret the dicta in question as reflecting the general position, acknowledged by both sides in the present case, that there is a general presumption against retrospective effect. However, in this Court’s view, when the provisions currently under consideration are considered in their proper legislative context, and are given a conforming interpretation in accordance with Criminal Proceedings against Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2005] E.C.R. 1-5285, they must be considered to be retrospective in effect, not least because, as counsel for the respondent has pointed out, article 8(2) of Framework Decision 2009/299 contains an express provision as to its temporal applicability.”
23. Prior to Surma it appears to have been the practice that amendments applied from the date of the commencement of the amendment, i.e. prospectively, and not retrospectively.
24. Thus, for example, counsel for the respondent drew the Court’s attention to Minister for Justice v. R.P.G. [2013] IEHC 54, where Edwards J. stated:-
“It is agreed by all concerned that as this warrant pre-dates the coming into force of the amendments to s. 10 of the Act of 2003 effected by the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009, it is necessary for the applicant to satisfy the Court that the respondent fled from the issuing State to evade justice (i.e. flight in the Tobin sense spoken of by Fennelly J. in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Tobin (No. 1) [2008] 4 IR 42.”
Submissions on behalf of Minister on the 2012 amendment
25. Counsel for the Minister made forceful arguments as to the application of the 2012 amendment on this appeal. It was submitted that having regard to the Surma judgment and the judgment of Peart J. in Minister for Justice v. Lipinski [2016] IECA 145, that s. 45 should apply, as substituted by s. 23 of the European arrest warrant (Application to Third Countries) and Extradition (Amendment) Act, 2012. Reference was made to Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal [2013] 2 CMLR 43, and to the Framework Decision.
Jurisprudence of this Court
26. I ground my decision on this issue on the long established jurisprudence of this Court that parties have the right to have issues fully argued in the High Court before they are reargued on appeal in this appellate Court. This principle applies except in the very exceptional circumstances. I am satisfied that no such exceptional circumstances apply in this case.
27. Thus, it is not open to the Minister to argue on this appeal the application of the terms of s. 45 as amended by the Act of 2012.
28. In addition, this appeal came to the Court, not by way of a general right of appeal, but pursuant to a specific process by which the High Court certified a point of law of exceptional public importance.
29. The point of law of exceptional public importance, upon which the Minister applied successfully to the High Court to certify to this Court, is set out in paragraph 2 above in this judgment. It does not include the issue of the application of s. 45 as amended by the Act of 2012. Thus, while the High Court gave leave for a point of law of exceptional public importance to be argued in this Court, the point which the Minister now raises was not certified by the High Court.
30. On this point, I would dismiss the appeal.
Section 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003
31. The terms of s. 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, prior to 2012, have been set out previously in this judgment. In interpreting the words of the section I would give them their plain and ordinary meaning.
32. The Minister referred to Article 5 of the Framework Decision and argued, inter alia, that the section should apply only where the stated purpose of the European arrest warrant was for the surrender of a person post conviction. It was argued, applying the principle of conforming interpretation, that as the trial in absentia provisions of the Framework Decision are prefaced by the words “where the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of executing a sentence or detention order”, these words should be read into s. 45.
33. I have referred to the principle of conforming interpretation earlier in this judgment.
34. The principle of conforming legislation has been followed in this Court on many occasions, applying the decision in Pupino (Case C - 105/03) [2005] E.C.R. 1 - 05285.
35. However, while applying the principle it has also been recognised that the principle cannot be a basis for interpreting national law contra legem.
36. The learned High Court judge took great care in coming to a conclusion on this issue.
He held:-
“Counsel for the respondent makes a very simple point in relation to section 45, and it is this. He contends that there is nothing in the wording of s. 45 (i.e. s. 45 in the form that it was enacted prior to the 2012 amendment) to confine its application to cases where surrender is being sought for the execution of a sentence. The Court was not initially persuaded by this argument, and was inclined to accept the submission of counsel for the applicant that s. 45 has simply no application where a respondent is wanted for prosecution. If that had remained the position it would have been the intention of the Court to surrender the respondent. Indeed, conscious that Mr. Horváth was waiting a long time to know his fate the Court indicated late last week that it had decided to surrender him and stated that it would furnish its reasons in the written judgment that it was then finalising on Tuesday of this week. However, while the matter was “in the breast of the Court” to quote from the jurisprudence, the Court has had a change of mind as a result of further reviewing the evidence and the authorities and some further reflection on the complex issues thrown up by this case. The position is that the Court is now disposed to uphold the s. 45 objection having come to view that the submission of counsel for the respondent is in fact correct.
Notwithstanding its change of mind the Court was in any event satisfied, and remains satisfied, that because the respondent is wanted for second instance trial, and not to serve a sentence, it is correct to say that he is wanted for prosecution.”
37. The learned trial judge distinguished, correctly in my view, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Mayer (Unreported, 30th July, 2010, High Court, Peart J.)
38. The High Court considered article 5(1) of the Framework Decision and s. 45 (pre 2012) and held:-
“The first thing to be said is that the fact that article 5(1) of the Framework Decision is expressed differently to s. 45 does not assist in circumstances where the Framework Decision is not directly effective, and the domestic statutory provision appears clear and unambiguous in its terms. The Court cannot resort to trying to give it a conforming interpretation where the provision is clear on its face and there is nothing to suggest that a literal interpretation would fail to give effect to the intention of the Oireachtas. While article 5(1) envisages that conditions might be imposed before a person who had been tried in absentia is surrendered it is confined to cases where the warrant seeking that person’s surrender “has been issued for the purposes of executing a sentence or a detention order”, s. 45 contains no such limitation and there is nothing in the provision considered either alone, or in the context of the Act of 2003 as a whole, to suggest that Oireachtas intended other than to impose more extensive conditionality than that envisaged by the Framework Decision.”
39. It is not contested that the respondent was tried in his absence, and was not notified of the trial. Thus, prima facie, s. 45 is applicable to him as he was tried and convicted when he was not present, and had not been notified of the time and place of this trial. The wording of s. 45 is clear. I agree with the analysis of the High Court as set out above.
40. Further, the High Court considered the fact that the respondent would have an appeal. In analysing the respondent’s status in such a situation the learned High Court judge held:-
“It is clear to this Court that the [respondent’s] task is to persuade the court of second instance, if he can, that his conviction was wrong. However, it is also clear to me that he does not come into Court as an unconvicted person. He remains convicted, albeit not conclusively, and it is simply the case that the decision of the court below is effectively stayed pending ratification or overruling, as the case may be, by the court of second instance.”
41. The learned trial judge pointed out that the status of conviction has important implications under s. 45. He was satisfied that the condition in s. 45(a) was fulfilled and also one of the conditions in s. 45(b), and that thus surrender could not take place without an undertaking in writing being provided by the issuing judicial authority.
42. In this case the Hungarian authorities have stated that no undertaking would be provided. Consequently, the learned trial judge considered that he had no choice but to uphold the s. 45 objection, and to refuse to surrender the respondent.
43. The High Court concluded that as there was not an undertaking in the form required by s. 45, it must refuse to make an order of surrender, and to discharge the respondent from his bail.
44. I am satisfied that there was an evidential and legal basis upon which the learned trial judge could reach this conclusion. I would affirm his decision that an undertaking for a re-trial was required by section 45, in its unamended form.
45. I am satisfied that the High Court was correct in its determination of the case on the law as it was prior to the amendment in 2012. I make no decision on the issue as to whether the applicable law was that as stated prior to the 2012 amendment, or whether the applicable law was that as stated in the amendment of 2012.
46. Consequently, on this point also, I would dismiss the appeal.
Cross Appeal
47. The respondent brought a cross appeal from that part of the judgment and order of the High Court as decided that the surrender of the respondent to Hungary for the purposes of a second instance prosecution was not a breach of his rights as guaranteed by Article 2 of the 7th Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights and/or s. 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, as amended. However, as a consequence of my decision on the appeal brought by the Minister, it is not necessary to consider the cross-appeal.
Remit
48. In all the circumstances, this is not an appropriate case to remit to the High Court. For, amongst other factors, the matter has now been before the courts for a long time.
Conclusion
49. There was no right of general appeal to this Court from the decision of the High Court in this case. On application by the Minister to the High Court, the High Court certified a point of law of exceptional public importance. The Minister has sought to raise another issue. However, in accordance with the well established jurisprudence of this Court, such other issue may not be advanced in this Court, much less determined.
50. As the High Court decided the case by reference to the un-amended s. 45, and counsel for the Minister now argue that the amended version of s. 45 applies, a situation has arisen where the Minister wishes to argue a ground which was not argued in the High Court. It is not in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court to consider an appeal on issues not argued in the High Court, and further which were not part of the certificate providing for appeal to this Court, and nor were identified in the grounds of appeal.
51. On the issue of the application of s. 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, as amended, (prior to 2012) I would affirm the decision of the High Court that the surrender of the respondent was prohibited in the absence of an undertaking as required by section 45.
52. Consequently, for the reasons given, I would dismiss the appeal.
APPENDIX A
THE SUPREME COURT
Appeal No. 536/2013
Cross Appeal No. 32/2014
High Court Record No. 2011/184EXT
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
Appellant/Applicant
-and-
FERENC HORVATH
CHRONOLOGY
Respondent
2003 The warrants relate to events in 2003.
12.06.2007 First warrant issued.
05.09.2007 First warrant endorsed by High Court.
24.09.2007 Respondent arrested on foot of first warrant.
25.10.2008 Judgment delivered by High Court in relation to first warrant. Peart J.
30.06.2010 Appeal hearing before Supreme Court - first warrant.
02.08.2010 Receipt of second warrant by Central Authority.
07.10.2010 Supreme Court struck out proceedings and vacated endorsement of first warrant, on application of the Minister.
16.12.2010 Third warrant received in the State.
11.05.2011 Additional information: Letter from the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice Department of International Criminal Law
18.05.2011 Third warrant endorsed.
20.10.2011 Respondent arrested on third warrant.
19.12.2011 Points of objection filed.
14.02.2012 First affidavit of Ferenc Horvath.
12.07.2012 Affidavit of Gabor Magyar.
18.07.2012 Affidavit of Catherine Almond.
24.07.12 European Arrest Warrant (Application to Third Countries) and Extradition (Amendment) Act, 2012 came into force. Section 45, European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 (as amended by 2005 and 2009 Acts) substituted by section 23, 2012 Act.
26.07.12 Hearing commenced before Mr. Justice Edwards in relation to third warrant. Adjourned to seek additional information.
06.09.2012 Additional information: Letter: Central Authority, Ireland to Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, Hungary.
19.09.2012 Additional information: Letter: Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, Hungary to Central Authority, Ireland enclosing Judgment of County Court of Veszprem dated 3rd April 2008 together with legislative provisions governing Hungarian Criminal Procedure.
23.10.2012 Second Affidavit of Ferenc Horvath
20.10.2012 Second Affidavit of Catherine Almond.
27.09.2012 Additional information: Letter: Central Authority, Ireland to Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, Hungary.
01.10.2012 Additional information: Letter: Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, Hungary to Central Authority, Ireland.
29.01.2013 Third affidavit of Ferenc Horvath.
12.02.13 Judgment reserved by Mr. Justice Edwards.
04.06.2013 Additional information: Letter: Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, Hungary to Central Authority, Ireland.
08.08.2013 Additional information: Letter: Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, Hungary to Central Authority, Ireland
05.11.2013 Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Edwards.
03.12.2013 Judgment delivered in Minister v. Surma [2013] IEHC 618.
05.12.2013 Certificate of leave to appeal and cross-appeal granted by Mr. Justice Edwards.
16.12.2013 Notice of Appeal.
28.01.2014 Notice of Cross Appeal.
08.04.2016 Fourth affidavit of Ferenc Horvath.
