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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Ahmed (a minor) -v- Longford Town Council [2014] IESC 46 (17 July 2014)
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Cite as: [2014] IESC 46
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Judgment Title: Ahmed (a minor) -v- Longford Town Council Neutral Citation: [2014] IESC 46 Supreme Court Record Number: 367/11 High Court Record Number: 2010 8292 P Date of Delivery: 17/07/2014 Court: Supreme Court Composition of Court: Clarke J., MacMenamin J., Laffoy J. Judgment by: Clarke J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
THE SUPREME COURT [Appeal No: 367/2011] Clarke J. MacMenamin J. Laffoy J.
Usaman Ahmed (a minor suing by his father and next friend Mohammed Iqbal) Plaintiff/Appellant and
Longford Town Council Defendant/Respondent Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the 17th July, 2014. 1. Introduction 1.2 In the High Court the proceedings were dismissed on the question of liability. An appeal has been brought to this Court against that finding. In order to properly understand the grounds of appeal relied on at the hearing, it is necessary to identify the reasoning of the trial judge in reaching his conclusions on liability. 2 The Judgment 2.2 The trial judge noted the evidence of Dr. Richard Webb who indicated that he had inspected the playground. Dr. Webb had given evidence that he considered the deviations in question to be, as the trial judge put it, "too minor to be of sufficient significance to do anything about them". The trial judge also noted the evidence given by a consulting engineer, Mr. O'Brien, called on behalf of Usaman Ahmed. The trial judge clearly preferred the evidence of Dr Webb as to whether it was foreseeable that, as a result of the identified and admitted deviations to which reference has been made, an accident might occur. The trial judge placed significant reliance on the fact that the playground had, apparently, been in use for a reasonable period of time without any accident or incident occurring. 2.3 Having reviewed that evidence, deValera J. came to the conclusion that he was:-
2.5 It follows that there were two key findings of the trial judge. First, the trial judge was not satisfied that there was any lack of appropriate care notwithstanding the deviations from standard which had been identified. Second, it is reasonable to infer that the trial judge took the view that, even if he was wrong in respect of that first issue, no causal connection with the actual accident and unfortunate injury suffered had been established. Clearly, in order to succeed on this appeal, it is necessary that it be established that both of those conclusions of the trial judge should be overturned for, in order for Usaman Ahmed to succeed in these proceedings generally, it would be necessary to establish both a breach of a duty of care and a causal connection between such breach and his accident and injuries. Against that background it is next necessary to turn to the appeal. 3. The Appeal
2. That the learned trial judge failed to have any sufficient regard to the weight of the evidence. 3. That the learned trial judge's findings as to fact were perverse and contrary to the weight of the evidence." 3.3 It is striking that, almost a quarter of a century ago, in the State (Gallagher Shatter & Company) v. deValera [1991] 2 I.R. 198, Finlay C.J., giving the judgment of this Court, commented, at p. 202, as follows:-
The notice of appeal in this case unfortunately does not contain specific grounds, but merely states in bald fashion that the judge misdirected himself and was wrong in law and in fact in allowing the sums claimed and in ordering and adjudging them to be allowed, and contains as a purported second ground "such further grounds as will be presented to this Honourable Court on the hearing of the appeal". 3.4 It really does need be noted by legal representatives of parties wishing to appeal to this Court that the time has long since passed when it is acceptable to express the grounds of appeal in such vague and generalised terms that they give no clue as to the true basis on which it is intended to argue that the judgment of the High Court was incorrect. Likewise, although given its sparseness it is not a criticism which could be made of the notice of appeal in this case, the time has long since passed when it could be considered appropriate to draft a notice of appeal that almost goes through the judgment of the trial judge as if it were a pleading and, point by point, almost in the manner of a defence which amounts to a full traverse, states that each point is wrong without giving any real indication of why that is said to be the case. 3.5 There is a duty on those bringing appeals to this Court to at least make a reasonable attempt to identify the true basis of appeal and set out, in a concise, non-repetitive, and focused way the true grounds which are to be pursued. It is accepted that a notice of appeal requires to be drafted within a relatively short period of time. For that reason some leeway as to precise points of detail must be allowed. However, it must also be recognised that a notice of appeal is drafted very soon after the case is concluded when the issues ought be clear in everyone's mind and the issues which it is considered justify an appeal ought, for like reason, be capable of reasonably precise identification. Appeals should not be filed unless the losing party has some identifiable basis for believing that they have a genuine appeal; otherwise it will be an abuse of process. But having identified some genuine basis for appeal, it is not too much to expect that the notice of appeal itself should set it out in a way which allows the respondent (and indeed, the Court) to at least have a reasonable picture as to what the appeal is all about. 3.6 Happily, as indicated earlier, the written submissions filed on both sides did bring greater clarity to the real issues which were likely to arise on the appeal although, for reasons which it will be necessary to address, one significant legal issue which appeared from the written submissions to be likely to be highly to be contentious did not feature at the trial because of a concession which was (most correctly, in the Court's view) made by counsel for Longford Town Council at the oral hearing. I, therefore, turn to the written submissions. 4. The Written Submissions
(b) it was said that the trial judge placed too much emphasis on the fact that the playground had been used without incident. It was suggested that a reference in his judgment to its use by hundreds of thousands of children was incorrect whereas the evidence referred to thousands with emphasis also being placed on the fact that the evidence established that the playground had been open for four years and that it was conceded that there might have, in that time, been many falls which did not give rise to injury; (c) it was argued that a proper analysis of the evidence could lead only to the conclusion that there was a failure to meet an appropriate standard of care and that such failure caused the accident in question. 4.2 In their written submissions Longford Town Council addressed the standard of duty on the owner of a recreational facility. Reference was made to Weir-Rogers v. SF Trust Ltd [2005] 1 I.R. 47, in which Geoghegan J., in this Court, considered the consequences of the enactment of the Occupiers Liability Act, 1995 ("the 1995 Act") for the potential liability of owners of property in relation to recreational users. It was suggested that the effect of the criteria set out in s. 4(2) of that Act created a significantly more onerous threshold for a plaintiff. On that basis it was submitted that there was no evidence before the High Court which could have led to a proper conclusion that Longford Town Council had acted in such a way as allowed this case to meet that higher threshold. 4.3 However, at the oral hearing, as already noted, a concession was made. Counsel accepted that the proviso contained in s.4(4) of the 1995 Act applied. Under that provision the general effect of subs. (1), which is indeed to significantly increase the threshold by reference to which an occupier can be found liable, does not apply "where a structure on premises … for use primarily by recreational users" is present. In such a case the occupier owes a duty to recreational users "to take reasonable care to maintain a structure in a safe condition". While not conceding that s.4(4) is necessarily, in all cases, identical as to the duty which it imposes on occupiers to the common law duty, counsel accepted that, on the facts of this case, there was no material difference between the two tests. 4.4 Indeed, it is worthy of note that it does not appear that any case for a particularly enhanced threshold was advanced by Longford Town Council in the High Court. Be that as it may, there was, in reality, no significant difference between counsel as to the appropriate approach of the Court to the facts of this case. The test was either, as counsel for the plaintiff argued, the common law test, or, as counsel for Longford Town Council suggested, a reasonable care test under s.4(4) of the 1995 Act with neither counsel arguing that there was any significant practical difference between the application of the two tests at least so far as this case was concerned. 4.5 As to the facts, it was said on behalf of Longford Town Council that the trial judge was entitled to accept the evidence of Dr. Webb to the effect that any deviation from standard was too minor to be of sufficient significance to take action, and it was also argued that there was evidence from which it was open to the trial judge to conclude that there was no causal connection between any deviation from standard and the accident and injuries suffered in this case. 4.6 Thus, in the light of the written submissions and the adjusted position taken by Longford Town Council at the oral hearing, the real issues which remain for decision were as to whether, in the light of the principles identified in O'Hay v. Grady, there was evidence from which the trial judge could reach a sustainable conclusion both as to the materiality of the undoubted deviations from standard (in the context of whether reasonable care can be said to have, nonetheless, applied) and as to causation. I propose to turn to the question of causation first, for if the decision of the trial judge in that regard was sustainable then the appeal would necessarily fail irrespective of the position in respect of the extent of the duty of care. 5. Causation 5.2 There was some debate at the oral hearing as to the evidence concerning how the accident actually occurred. Usaman Ahmed gave clear evidence that the immediate cause of his fall from the swing was that he hit his leg off the ground. In the course of their evidence both Mr. O'Brien and Dr. Webb agreed that such was the probable cause of his fall. There was no evidence to suggest that he was engaged in any form of inappropriate activity on the swing. In any event there was no finding by the trial judge which rejected his evidence in that regard. It seems to me to follow, as was urged by his counsel, that the only evidence which was before the Court was to the effect that the accident occurred as he described. 5.3 However, counsel for Longford Town Council suggested that there was an absence of compelling evidence which connected the undoubted deviation from standard as to seat height with the accident as described. It must be recalled that questions of causation are questions of fact. Where an issue as to causation arises it is for the trial judge to determine, on the balance of probabilities and as a matter of fact, whether any established or alleged wrongdoing on the part of a defendant actually caused the alleged harm to the plaintiff. In the context of a case such as this, it was for the trial judge to decide, as a matter of fact, whether the deviation from standard (if it was established to amount to negligence or a lack of appropriate care) actually caused or contributed to the accident and injuries which are the subject of these proceedings. The role of an appellate court in considering such a finding of fact is clear. 5.4 In Hay v. O'Grady McCarthy J. delivered the unanimous decision of this Court and dealt with the role of an appellate court in relation to facts. In particular, at p. 217, McCarthy J. set out a number of propositions which define the respective roles of a court of first instance and an appellate court in relation to factual findings. At item 2 the following is stated:-
5.6 It is also appropriate to note what this Court said in Doyle v. Banville [2012] IESC 25, where, having analysed Hay v. O'Grady, the following is said at para. 2.7 of my judgment:-
5.8 In that context a number of facts need to be noted. First, the deviation from standard was 20 millimetres. For those less attuned to the metric system in its detail that is a distance of approximately 4/5 of an inch. On the question of causation the real issue is as to whether it was open to the trial judge to conclude that a causal link between such a small difference in the seat height and this particular accident had not been established. In the context of the argument concerning whether there had been a breach of any duty of care counsel for Usaman Ahmed had made significant play of the fact that standards, particularly in the context of children's playgrounds, are designed to create a reasonable balance between the need for children to be able to play in a free and happy environment but also safely. In addition, in the context of swings, a balance between not having the seat too high for younger (and therefore, on balance, shorter) children with not having the seat too low for older (and on balance, taller) children needed to be struck. On that basis it was sought to argue that a seat height which was too low created a potentially increased risk for taller children, for this case does, indeed, involve a tall child. Whatever may be the merits of that argument, it seems to me that there is a separate question as to whether, in the circumstances of this accident, the evidence constrained the trial judge to find a causal connection between the 4/5 of an inch seat height deviation and the fall. 5.9 Second, it must be recalled that, on any view, the swing had been in use for some time (approximately four years) and had been used before the day in question by Usaman Ahmed and also used by him for some period of time before the accident actually occurred. In those circumstances it necessarily follows that there must have been something different about the way in which he was positioned on the swing when he fell as opposed to all previous occasions (including the earlier part of his use of the swing on the day in question) when no such problem had arisen. The real question on causation which arises is as to whether, as a matter of probability, an extra 4/5 of an inch would have made any difference on the day in question. 5.10 Much of Mr. O'Brien's evidence was directed towards the question of whether such a small difference could be said to have increased the risk. But whether it increased the risk or not does not answer the question of whether it, as a matter of probability, caused or contributed to this actual accident. If, for example, the way in which the swing was being used at the immediate point of the accident was such that, unfortunately, the ground would have been clipped anyway in a sufficiently serious way to cause a fall in much the same manner as occurred, even if the seat had been 4/5 of an inch higher, then there would, in truth, be no causal connection between that deviation from standard and this accident. Having carefully reviewed the transcript, I am not persuaded that this issue of causation was addressed in the expert evidence on both sides in a way which constrained the trial judge to find that there was a causal link. It might well have been open to the trial judge to reach such a conclusion. He was not, however, in my view, bound to come to that view. 5.11 For those reasons I am satisfied that the trial judge was entitled, on the evidence, to reach the conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, that the 4/5 of an inch deviation from standard in the seat height did not cause or contribute to this accident. 5.12 So far as the extent of the rubber matting issue was concerned, Dr. Webb, in giving his evidence, referred to recent research which seemed to show that the principal benefit of rubber matting was in the reduction of significant head injuries. Dr. Webb referred to research conducted by Prof. David Ball, who is Head of Risk Management at Middlesex University. Dr. Webb gave evidence that studies conducted by Prof. Ball seem "to show … that the incidents of head injuries has decreased but there hasn't been any significant fall off in long bone fractures…" Again, the principal focus of the cross-examination of Dr. Webb seemed to relate to whether, in the light of that research, it was reasonable to ignore a relatively small (approx. three inch) divergence from the recommended distance between the swing seat and the edge of the matting. However, that evidence was also relevant to the question of causation. If it is the case, as that research by Prof. Ball seems to suggest, that matting does not seem to have led to a significant reduction in long bone injuries, it was, in my view, open to the trial judge to take the view that it did not necessarily follow from the fact that Usaman Ahmed fell slightly outside the matting area that, as a matter of probability, he would not have suffered the same or broadly similar injuries had the mat area been three inches wider. 5.13 The plaintiff's case, as put through Mr. O'Brien, almost seemed to suggest that this was axiomatic. Falling onto a harder and unmatted surface was likely, it was said, to have led to very different injuries than if the fall was onto a matted area. However, the relevant research seems to cast significant doubt on that proposition. There also was no medical evidence which might have been of some assistance in determining whether it was probable that these injuries were attributable to falling outside as opposed to inside the matted area and, indeed, if that be so, whether significant injuries were likely to have arisen even if the fall had occurred completely within the matted area. 5.14 In the light of that review of the evidence I am satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that a causal connection between the scale of the matted area and the injuries actually suffered in this case had not been established. 5.15 In those circumstances I am satisfied that the finding of the trial judge, to the effect that no causal link between the two deviations from standard identified and the accident and injury actually suffered in this case, had been established on the balance of probabilities, was a finding which was open to the trial judge on the evidence. In the light of that finding the question of whether, in the context of s.4(4) of the 1995 Act, there was any actionable lack of reasonable care deriving from those deviations from standard is no longer relevant. 5.16 In fairness to the case made it is important to emphasise that there was credible evidence put forward on behalf of the plaintiff which could have persuaded the trial judge to find in his favour on the question of causation. This case is far removed from the type of proceeding which fails because the Court disbelieves an account of an incident given by a plaintiff. The problem in this case was that Longford Town Council also proffered credible expert evidence consistent with an absence of causation. This was quintessentially a case where the trial judge had to choose between two expert views on that question of causation. Given that there was credible evidence for both sides on that issue, the decision as to which to prefer was ultimately a matter for the trial judge and cannot be disturbed unless there was a clear significant and material error in the trial judge's approach. It was, of course, therefore, a case where the trial judge could have accepted the evidence of either expert. In the light of the fact that there were undoubted deviations from standard, there was clearly a stateable basis for seeking to put forward the claim in these proceedings. It is simply that there was also a stateable defence on the facts in relation to causation and the trial judge was entitled to prefer the expert evidence which formed the basis of that stateable defence. 6. Conclusions 6.2 For those reasons I would uphold the decision of the trial judge and dismiss the appeal.
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