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Judgment Title: Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform -v- Szall Neutral Citation: [2013] IESC 7 Supreme Court Record Number: 108/12 High Court Record Number: 2009 664 EXT Date of Delivery: 15/02/2013 Court: Supreme Court Composition of Court: Denham C.J., Murray J., Hardiman J., Fennelly J., Clarke J. Judgment by: Clarke J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Outcome: Allow And Set Aside | ||||||||||||||||
THE SUPREME COURT [Appeal No: 108/2012] Denham C.J. Murray J. Hardiman J. Fennelly J. Clarke J. In the Matter of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 as amended Between/ The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Applicant and
Robert Szall Respondent Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the 15th February , 2013. 1. Introduction 1.2 The respondent (“Mr. Szall”) is sought by the authorities in Poland. In a judgment delivered on the 17th February, 2012, Edwards J. refused to order the surrender of Mr. Szall to the Republic of Poland on foot of a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW") issued on the 21st April, 2009. The applicant/appellant (“The Minister”) wished to appeal to this Court against that refusal. It was, of course, pursuant to s. 16(11) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended), necessary for the Minister to obtain a certificate in accordance with that section in order to bring an appeal to this Court. 1.3 On the 9th March, 2012, Edwards J. certified that his order of the 17th February involved two points of law of exceptional public importance in respect of which it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to this Court. The two points as so certified were as follows:-
(ii) Is Section 6(2), Criminal Justice Act, 1960 capable of being a corresponding offence for the purposes of Section 5 European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended)? 2. The Polish and Irish Offences 2.2 In that context it should be noted that one single sentence was imposed by the relevant court in Poland in respect of all six offences. It was accepted on behalf of the Minister, therefore, at all material times, that it followed that Mr. Szall could only be surrendered in the event that there was correspondence in respect of all six offences, for in the event that there was a lack of correspondence in respect of any one offence, and having regard to the composite sentence imposed in respect of all six offences, a surrender of Mr. Szall would amount to a surrender for all six offences including any one or more of same in respect of which there was no correspondence. Obviously such a surrender could not be ordered. It followed that it was only necessary for Mr. Szall, because of the way in which the sentence in this case was imposed in accordance with Polish law, to satisfy the court that there was a lack of correspondence in respect of any one of the offences. 2.3 The net issue on this appeal, therefore, comes down to a consideration of whether there is correspondence between the offence specified at item VI in the relevant EAW and a relevant offence in Irish law. In that context it is appropriate to refer both to the offence specified at VI in the EAW and to the offence created by s.6(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1960 ("the 1960 Act"), which is said to be the corresponding offence in Irish law. 2.4 In the English translation provided to the Irish authorities, offence VI is set out in the following terms:-
2.5 Section 6(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1960 provides that a person "who is unlawfully at large shall be guilty of an offence under this section and on summary conviction thereof shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months." In addition s. 6(1) of the same Act deems a person who has been temporarily released under the 1960 Act to be unlawfully at large for the purposes of subs. 2 if:-
(b) a condition to which his release was made subject has been broken". 2.7 Second, and in the alternative, counsel urged that, even if her submission concerning the wider ambit of s. 6(2) was incorrect, it nonetheless remained the case that there was correspondence between the relevant Polish offence and an offence committed by a person who came within s. 6(1)(a) and thus was deemed to be unlawfully at large and thus, in turn, committed an offence under s.6(2). 2.8 It is also necessary to say something about the relevant Polish offence. In the course of further information provided by the requesting Polish court the text of article 242 of the relevant Polish criminal code was made available which, in the official English translation supplied, specifies as follows:-
(2) A person who, using a permit for temporary leaving of the penal or detention institution without supervision, does not return in three days from the passage of the fixed term without justified reason is subject to fine, limitation of liberty or imprisonment of up to a year. (3) A person who, using a break in serving the penalty of imprisonment, does not return to the penal institution in three days from the passage of fixed term without justified reasons is subject to penalty as specified in paragraph 2. (4) If the perpetrator of the acts specified in paragraph 1 acts in agreement with other people, uses violence or threats of using it or damages the place of detention is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years. 2.10 It should be noted that no other relevant provisions of the Polish criminal code were produced in evidence which gave the court any further information as to how a so called "break in serving the penalty" might arise or as to what the distinction was between a "break in serving the penalty" referred to in paragraph 3, and a "permit for temporary leaving" failure to comply with which results in a breach of paragraph 2. What is, however, clear from the EAW is that the break in serving the penalty in this case was as a result of an order of a court as the EAW refers to the break being granted by the Provincial Court, Penitentiary Department in Krosno. It is, I think, therefore, fair to say that there is some lack of complete information. What is, however, also clear is that Mr. Szall was convicted of failing to return to the relevant penal institution after the expiry of a fixed term break which, at least in his case, was ordered by a relevant court. Whether such a fixed term break can only be ordered by a court or whether there are any other methods by which such a fixed term break can be granted, is not clear. 2.11 Having set out the relevant Polish and Irish offences it is next necessary to turn to the judgment of the trial judge. 3. The High Court Judgment
4. Breach of Regime Cases 4.2 At the level of broad generality it can be said, therefore, that there are Irish offences where, at least so far as Irish criminal law is concerned, a necessary ingredient of the relevant offence requires a consideration of an Irish statutory regime. The broad question of principle raised by the first issue certified by the trial judge is as to the proper approach, in the context of correspondence for EAW purposes, which the court should take to such offences. 4.3 By definition it is improbable in the extreme that any offence specified in a EAW coming from a requesting country to Ireland would make reference to the Irish statutory scheme. Irish statutory schemes apply to Ireland. Other countries will have their own schemes. Save, perhaps, in very limited circumstances in some cases where both schemes derive directly from relevant provisions of European Union law, it is unlikely in the extreme that the same scheme will apply in two different countries. 4.4 Strictly speaking, therefore, an Irish offence which involves, as an important ingredient, reference to an Irish statutory scheme, cannot have a strict equivalent offence in any other country for the Irish statutory scheme will not apply in that other country even though that requesting country may have its own (and perhaps quite similar) statutory regime. The broad point of principle raised in the first certified issue is as to the proper approach of the court in those circumstances. 4.5 In that context counsel referred to the recent decision of the House of Lords in Norris v. Government of the United States of America [2008] 1 AC 920. In that case, the United States sought to extradite the defendant, Mr. Norris, to stand trial on an indictment containing four counts. The first count alleged that Mr. Norris had conspired with other producers of carbon products to operate a price fixing agreement, contrary to US legislation. This was a strict liability offence. The second, third and fourth counts alleged that Mr. Norris had conspired to obstruct the investigation of this offence. The Court was faced with the question of whether those US offences were extradition offences for the purposes of s. 137 of the United Kingdom Extradition Act 2003. 4.6 In respect of the first count it was held that, under English law, some form of aggravating feature, for example, deception or dishonesty, was necessary before a criminal sanction could attach to a person involved in a price-fixing agreement. Since no such aggravating features were alleged by the US authorities in respect of the first count, Mr. Norris’ involvement could not amount to an extradition offence. 4.7 In respect of the other three counts, counsel for Mr. Norris sought to rely on the proposition that, since Mr. Norris’s alleged involvement in price-fixing would not have constituted an offence if it had occurred in England, it could not be an offence for him to obstruct an investigation into that particular conduct. The House of Lords referred to a number of authorities in deciding the correct approach to be adopted. A single judgment was delivered. 4.8 At para. 95 of Norris, the single judgment cited the opinion of Lord Millett in R (Al-Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556. In that case, the United States sought the extradition of a Mr. Al-Fawwaz on charges of conspiring to murder American citizens, officials, diplomats and others, both in the United States and elsewhere. Lord Millett, at paras. 109 -110, said the following:-
4.9 Also, in Norris, reference was made to the Canadian case of In re Collins (No. 3) (1905) 10 CCC 80. The United States sought the extradition of Mr. Collins on a charge of perjury alleged to have been committed in California. It was contended that extradition should be refused on the basis that it was not unlawful under Canadian law to make a false deposition before a competent Californian tribunal or officer. This argument was rejected by Duff J., who stated at pp. 100 - 101:-
4.10 In light of these authorities, it was held in Norris that the proper approach was that outlined in In re Collins (No. 3). Applying that approach, the House of Lords stated at paras. 99-101:-
While price fixing in itself is not an offence under English law, Mr Norris accepts that, when combined with other elements such as deliberate misrepresentation, it can lead to various offences such as fraud or conspiracy to defraud. What the exact outcome of any investigation will be cannot be determined when it is in progress. Destroying documents to prevent them falling into the hands of the investigators may well affect the outcome of that investigation and is, indeed, intended to do so .So the mere fact that the result of the investigation in Mr Norris's case was a charge of simple price fixing, which does not constitute an offence under English law, is no reason to hold that it would not have been an offence under English law to obstruct the progress of an equivalent investigation by the appropriate body in this country.” 4.12 In that context it must at least be noted that part of the reasoning in In Re Collins derived from the specific wording of relevant Canadian measures which do not appear to be close in their terminology to the legislative provisions which govern European Arrest Warrants. However, the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Norris derives from a United Kingdom statutory regime which is broadly similar to the regime with which this Court is concerned. The overall approach adopted by the House of Lords in Norris in the case of breach of regime cases is, therefore, potentially of persuasive authority in considering the application of the European Arrest Warrant provisions to such cases. 4.13 Without necessarily having to go so far as suggesting that Norris represents, exactly, the law in this jurisdiction, I am satisfied that it is necessary to have proper regard to the fact that it is inherent in the concept of correspondence that the court is looking to compare two offences from different jurisdictions. To take but a simple example, it might be unlawful to carry out certain types of commercial activity without an appropriate permit from a relevant Irish Minister. An Irish criminal provision might make it an offence to carry out the activity concerned without the relevant permit and the relevant provision would, doubtless, be specified by reference to whatever statutory provision allowed for the permit to be granted by the Minister concerned. Assume there to be a very similar provision in the legal system of a requesting country which required the same type of commercial activity to be carried out only with the benefit of a permit by a relevant Minister in that other country. Could it be argued that there was a lack of correspondence in such a case simply because the Irish offence specified that it was unlawful to carry out the relevant activity without a permit from the Irish Minister, whereas the offence specified in an EAW, by reference to the law of the requesting country, made it a criminal offence to carry on identical activity without a permit from the relevant Minister in the requesting country? 4.14 It is, of course, necessary to start with a consideration of s. 5 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 ("the 2003 Act"), which provides for the basis on which a court is to consider correspondence. The section provides as follows:-
4.16 It is clear that the 2003 Act must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Framework Decision, insofar as possible, see The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Altaravicius [2006] 3 IR 148 and The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Brennan [2007] 3 I.R. 723. 4.17 In Attorney General v. Dyer [2004] 1 IR 40, Fennelly J. re-emphasised the principle, which can be traced back to State (Furlong) v. Kelly [1970] I.R. 132, to the effect that the comparison which requires to be conducted in order to determine correspondence is to be based on the acts or omissions which are said to constitute the offence. It should, of course, be noted that both Dyer and Furlong were decided under the Extradition Act, 1965. It also needs to be noted that the provisions of the Framework Decision permit, but do not require, a Member State to legislate in a manner, in some cases, that precludes surrender unless "the acts" specified in the EAW offence constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State. That permissive provision of the Framework Decision was adopted in Ireland and finds expression in s.5 of the 2003 Act. Thus the Framework Decision permits, and Ireland has adopted, a regime which requires correspondence (save in those cases expressly covered by para.2 of the Framework Decision) where correspondence is to be viewed by reference to "the acts" which constitute the respective offences. There is not, therefore, any material difference, so far as correspondence is concerned, between the law as it stood under the 1965 Act and the law as it now stands under the 2003 Act. 4.18 How then should one view an offence, which in Ireland is specified as occurring only by reference to non-compliance with an Irish statutory regime? To interpret the requirement of correspondence in a way which would exclude the possibility of correspondence in cases where the relevant Irish offence was defined by reference to compliance with or breach of an Irish statutory regime and where the offence in the requesting state did not also make reference to the relevant Irish statutory scheme would, as a matter of reality, exclude from the ambit of correspondence any offences which come within the scope of what I have described as breach of regime cases. 4.19 It does not seem to me that such was the intention of the Oireachtas or, indeed, the Framework Decision. The proper approach is to regard an Irish regime case as amounting, for the purposes of correspondence and of s. 5 of the 2003 Act, to an offence where the act or omission concerned is defined by reference to a lawful regime rather than the specific Irish regime. Where, therefore, the offence specified in the relevant European Arrest Warrant involves the same acts or omissions by reference to a regime in the requesting state then, at least at the level of principle, correspondence can be established provided that there is a sufficient similarity between the respective regimes to justify the conclusion that the substance of the acts or omissions which amount to offences in the respective jurisdictions is the same even though the specific relevant regimes will necessarily be, as a matter of law, different, emanating as they will from the legal systems of the two separate jurisdictions. 4.20 Where, therefore, the court has to consider correspondence in such cases it seems to me that the question which the court must ask itself is as to whether the respective regimes meet that test. Are the two regimes, as a matter of substance, sufficiently similar that it can properly be said that acts or omissions which are rendered criminally unlawful by reference to those two regimes must in themselves be regarded as corresponding wrongdoing? 4.21 In that sense it seems to me that the first certified issue must be answered by determining that, where compliance with or breach of an Irish statutory provision is an ingredient of an offence in this State such offence is, at the level of principle, capable of amounting to a corresponding offence for the purposes of s. 5 of the 2003 Act provided that the relevant statutory provision or regime by reference to which the Irish offence is defined is sufficiently similar to an equivalent regime in the requesting state by reference to which the offence in the requesting state is defined. Against that view on the broad principle it is necessary to address the specifics of this case. However, in so doing it seems to me to be appropriate to commence by considering the proper construction of s. 6(2) of the 1960 Act for it is necessary to have a clear view of the ambit of that offence before approaching the question of correspondence. 5 The Interpretation of Section 6(2) of the 1960 Act 5.2 In that context it is important to recall that the principal focus of the 1960 Act was to introduce a regime of temporary release and to back-up that regime by imposing sanctions on those who failed to comply with the terms of their release under the scheme. If the offence created by s. 6(2) had not been included in the legislation then it would, of course, have remained the case that a person released on temporary release could have been arrested and brought back to prison either because they were in breach of any relevant terms of their release or because they had failed to return to prison after the period of temporary release afforded them had expired. However, in such an eventuality, it might be said that the person was not really any worse off because of their breach of the terms of their temporary release. Such a person would only be required to serve the balance of the sentence which had been imposed on them in the first place with no added sanction. It seems clear that the intent of the Oireachtas, in enacting s. 6(2), was to provide for the potentiality of an additional sanction above and beyond being required to serve the balance of the sentence which would have applied in any event, so as to discourage failure to comply with the temporary release regime. 5.3 Such an analysis is consistent with the narrower view of s. 6(2). On that basis the intent of the Oireachtas was to provide support for the temporary release scheme by providing for additional sanctions on those who abused it. While s. 6(1) is only a deeming section and thus gives rise to the possibility, at least in theory, that there might be other cases which would come within s. 6(2) beyond those specified in s. 6(1), it seems to me that, in the context of the 1960 Act as a whole, it is not appropriate to infer that the Oireachtas intended to create a wide-ranging and new criminal offence which would be committed by any person who was out of prison at a time when, as a matter of law, that person should be in prison, irrespective of whether the circumstances leading to that situation had anything to do with the temporary release regime. It must be recalled that s. 6(2) is a penal section creating a criminal offence. Had the Oireachtas intended s. 6(2) to have had the wider ambit contended for on behalf of the Minister, then it seems to me that, in order to provide some degree of certainty as to its parameters, it would have been necessary for the legislation to provide some guidance as to what the general meaning of unlawfully at large ought be, or the criteria by reference to which a court could judge whether a person could properly be said to be caught by that term. In the absence of any such guidance, s. 6(2) would, in my view, be impermissibly vague. 5.4 It seems to me to follow that the proper construction of s. 6(2) is that persons can only be guilty of an offence under that section if they come within the deemed definition requirements set out in s. 6(1). It was, of course, quite properly accepted by counsel for the Minister that s. 6(1)(b) could have no application to the facts of this case. For the purposes of this case, therefore, it seems to me that the relevant offence is committed by a person who, by reason of having been temporarily released under ss.2 and.3 of the 1960 Act, is at large after the period for which he or she was temporarily released had expired. The question which must be addressed, therefore, is as to whether there is correspondence between the offence specified in article 242 paragraph 3 of the Polish Criminal Code and the offence specified having regard to the proper interpretation of s. 6 of the 1960 Act in the manner which I have identified. 5.5 Against that background it is necessary to turn to a comparison between the respective Irish and Polish offences and, in particular, any differences which might be said to lie between them. 6 Discussion 6.2 The real question which must be asked is as to whether those statutory regimes themselves are sufficiently similar so that breach of one may be taken to correspond to breach of the other even though the schemes are not, for obvious reasons, the same scheme. 6.3 The starting point has to be to note that there are obvious similarities between the two schemes. Both clearly provide for circumstances in which a convicted person, during the currency of a sentence of imprisonment, is entitled to be at large as a result of a decision of a competent body. In both cases, the breach alleged is failing to go back to prison when the period during which the prisoner is lawfully out of prison has expired. What then are the differences between the two regimes? 6.4 At what might be regarded as a relatively trivial level, the terminology used in respect of the permission to remain lawfully outside prison is different. Section 6 of the 1960 Act speaks of a period of temporary release while article 242 paragraph 3 of the Polish Criminal Code speaks of a break in carrying out a penalty. However, it seems to me that there is no material difference whatsoever between those two concepts. Both are concerned, however described, with a period of lawful absence from prison during the currency of an imposed prison term. 6.5 The first area where there might be said to be a material difference is the identity of the type of authority which has power to give permission to be absent from prison. It is clear that, under the 1960 Act, permission for temporary release is given by the Minister. As pointed out earlier, it is clear that on the facts of this case the permission for the break from the penalty of imprisonment which operated in the Polish statutory regime was granted by a court. As also noted earlier, there was insufficient information before this court to form a view as to whether such a break can only be granted by a court, so far as the Polish Criminal Code is concerned, or whether there are other bodies which have that authority. 6.6 I am not persuaded that the difference in the identity of the person or body which has lawful authority to allow a temporary release or break, as the case may be, is of sufficient materiality to render the two statutory regimes sufficiently different so as to exclude correspondence. The range of persons or bodies who may have decision-making power in respect of statutory regimes can vary enormously. Sometimes, as with Irish temporary release, the decision-maker may be a political office holder. Sometimes, for example, such as, on the facts of this case, applies under article 242 paragraph 3 of the Polish Criminal Code, the decision-maker may be a court. In other circumstances, the decision-maker may be a quasi judicial tribunal or a statutory body. Within each of those groups there can, of course, be variations in the designated decision-maker from country to country, so that even if the same type of person or body has decision-making power the precise identity of the person or body may vary. A decision in one country may rest with a Minister for Health whereas the same decision in a largely identical statutory regime in another country may rest with a Minister for the Environment. Even the precise parameters of the remit of Ministers and governmental departments, let alone statutory officers or bodies, varies enormously from state to state. The breadth of the remit of statutory bodies or quasi judicial tribunals can vary greatly. There will often not be an exact correspondence between such persons or bodies however described from one country to another. 6.7 There may, in some cases, be a question as to whether the identity of the person or body involved in a relevant statutory regime may itself be material to the question of whether correspondence can be made out. For example, the law of one country might specify that a certain type of inappropriate communication with a relevant judicial office holder might be an offence but not make like provision in respect of quasi judicial tribunals. A second country might take a broader view of the offence and apply it to a wide range of decision-makers. In those circumstances, there might be a real question of correspondence in the event that a person was charged, in the country which operated the wider remit, with inappropriate communication with a tribunal in circumstances where such communication would only be unlawful in the requested state if made to a judicial office holder. In such circumstances there may be questions as to whether there is a sufficient similarity between the respective statutory regimes so as to raise questions as to whether the acts or omissions which constitute an offence by reference to those respective regimes can be said to give rise to corresponding offences. 6.8 However, it seems to me that no such difficulties arise on the facts of this case. The power to release is simply given to different types of public office holders in, respectively, Poland and Ireland. The fact that it happens to be a judge in one jurisdiction and a minister in another does not, in my view, give rise to any material distinction between the two regimes. The fact remains that both regimes make provision for a temporary release or break during a custodial sentence and provide a designated person who is entitled to make a decision as to whether that release or break should be allowed. Those regimes make it an offence not to return to prison at the end of a fixed period release or break. For those reasons, it does not seem to me that the difference in identity between the person or body having power to allow the release or break creates a material difference. 6.9 That leads to what, in my view, is the most difficult aspect of the case. In the light of the interpretation which I have placed on s. 6(2) of the 1960 Act, I am satisfied that the only circumstances in which a person can be said to be in breach of that section is if the person has been in breach of a temporary release permitted under the provisions of ss.2 and 3 of that Act. Put another way, a person who is not in prison when they should be for reasons other than breach of temporary release (such as escape) is not guilty of an offence under s. 6(2) although they may well, of course, be guilty of other offences. That analysis raises a question as to whether there is any other form of release or break in the service of a prison sentence which is lawfully available in Ireland but which does not come within the terms of the 1960 Act. The reason why that question might be relevant is that it is argued on behalf of Mr. Szall that the 1960 Act governs some, but not all, of those cases where a person may be in breach of an obligation to return to prison following on from a period when that person was lawfully excused from being in prison. On that basis it was argued on behalf of Mr. Szall that, even if, contrary to the primary submission advanced on his behalf, it is necessary to compare the respective Irish and Polish regimes, any such comparison leads to the conclusion that there are significant differences between same which go beyond the mere identity of the relevant lawful authority in the respective jurisdictions. 6.10 I have to say that it is not immediately apparent that there is any other lawful basis on which a person can be temporarily absolved from an obligation to serve a prison sentence imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction beyond the temporary release provisions of the 1960 Act. It is true that there are cases where a judge, in imposing sentence, postpones the commencement of the sentence (normally by directing that the order of imprisonment be delayed or stayed for an appropriate period) for reasons such as to afford the convicted person an opportunity to put their affairs in order before going into prison. However, such an arrangement is not concerned with a release or break from a sentence already commenced, but rather is concerned with when the sentence is to commence in the first place. 6.11 There was some debate at the hearing before this court as to whether a sentencing judge retained, either at the time of sentence or thereafter, any discretion to permit a temporary break in the service of a sentence imposed. Without deciding the point, I remain unconvinced that any such jurisdiction does exist. Even if such a jurisdiction exists, it is one which is, in practice, most sparingly exercised. It is my understanding that most sentencing judges, if asked to provide for some specified period of temporary release (for example, to allow for attendance at a particular occasion) are likely to indicate that such decisions are a matter for the executive and, in any event, sentencing judges would be most unlikely to go beyond making an informal recommendation in such circumstances that favourable consideration might be given by the executive to an application for such release. 6.12 It is, therefore, in my view, reasonable to conclude that the circumstances in which a person can be temporarily but lawfully absent from prison during the currency of a sentence in Ireland are either exclusively to be found in the 1960 Act or, as a matter of almost universal practise, come within that statute. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a broad and close correspondence between the temporary release provisions of the 1960 Act and the break in carrying out a penalty provisions of article 242 paragraph 3 of the Polish Criminal Code. I am satisfied that those similarities are sufficient to render the acts or omissions which constitute a breach of the respective temporary release or break provisions substantially the same so as to satisfy the requirements of s. 5 of the 2003 Act. 7 Conclusion 7.2 It follows, therefore, that there is a corresponding offence in Irish law to the offence specified at paragraph VI of the EAW and on that basis that there are corresponding offences to each of the Polish offences specified in the EAW. 7.3 It follows, therefore, that there is a corresponding offence in Irish law to the offence specified at paragraph VI of the EAW and on that basis that there are corresponding offences to each of the Polish offences specified in the EAW. 7.4 Correspondence having been established and its absence being the only ground for opposition to an order for surrender which remained live at the time of the appeal before this court, it follows, in my view, that the appeal of the Minister should be allowed. The court was told that there is a remaining issue outstanding relevant to the question of whether Mr. Szall should be surrendered. That issue was not determined by the High Court in the light of the decision reached to decline to direct the surrender of Mr. Szall on the grounds overturned by this appeal. In those circumstances the case should be remitted back to the High Court for further consideration.
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