Judgment delivered on the 8th day of February 2012 by Denham C.J.
1. The primary issues on this appeal are: (a) whether the offence of buggery was a statutory offence under s. 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, referred to as “the Act of 1861”, or whether it was a common law offence; and (b) whether M.O’M., the notice party/appellant, referred to as “the appellant”, may be prosecuted for the offence of buggery in respect of acts constituting that offence, which were allegedly committed prior to the repeal of s. 61 of the Act of 1861.
2. The appellant was a priest who held a teaching post in a secondary school in the west of Ireland. He faces charges relating to a 13 year old boy and a 14 year old boy at the school. On the 20th June, 2007, the appellant was charged with the following offences:-
(i) buggery contrary to s. 61 of the Act of 1861 on a date unknown between 1st September, 1970 and 31st December, 1970;
(ii) indecent assault contrary to s. 62 of the Act of 1861 on a date unknown between the 1st September 1970, and 30th June, 1971; and
(iii) indecent assault contrary to s. 62 of the Act of 1861 on a date unknown between the 1st September, 1970, and the 31st December, 1970.
3. On the 20th June, 2007, the matter came before Judge Devins, the respondent, referred to as “the respondent”, evidence of arrest, charge and caution of the appellant was given, and the matter was adjourned for service of the book of evidence.
4. On the 18th July, 2007, the respondent indicated her doubts as to whether the charges were good in law, and she made no order in relation to the charges. It appears that the respondent was of the view that since the repeal of s. 61 and s. 62 of the Act of 1861 those charges were not grounded in law. The respondent made no order in relation to all three charges.
5. On direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions, referred to as “the D.P.P.”, the appellant was arrested and charged on the 19th September, 2007, with the following offences:-
(i) buggery contrary to s. 61 of the Act of 1861, as amended by the Statute Revision Act, 1892, on a date unknown between 1st September, 1970 and 31st December, 1970;
(ii) indecent assault contrary to common law on a date unknown between the 1st September, 1970 and the 31st September, 1970; and
(iii) indecent assault contrary to common law on a date unknown between the 1st September, 1970 and the 30th June, 1971.
6. On the 19th September, 2007, the matter came before the respondent and evidence of arrest, charge and caution was given. However, the respondent considered that she was not satisfied that the charges were grounded on good law and she would not accept the evidence of the arrest, charge and caution. The respondent made no order.
Judicial Review Proceedings
7. On the 19th November, 2007, the D.P.P. obtained leave to bring these judicial review proceedings.
8. The orders sought by the D.P.P. included:-
(i) An order of Certiorari quashing the decision made by the respondent on the 19th September, 2007, to make no order in respect of the three charge sheets against the appellant.
(ii) An order of mandamus requiring the respondent to accept the evidence of arrest, charge and caution that was given on the 19th September, 2007, and to proceed to deal with the three charges in the ordinary way.
(iii) A declaration that the offence of buggery contrary to s. 61 of the Act of 1861 is a valid offence recognised by law if it relates to dates of alleged offences that are prior to the repeal of the said s. 61.
(iv) If necessary, a declaration that the offence of indecent assault contrary to common law is a valid offence recognised by law.
(v) If necessary, an order of Certiorari quashing the decision made by the respondent on the 18th July, 2007, to make no order in the prosecution of the appellant.
High Court
9. On the 2nd December, 2009, the High Court (O'Keeffe J.) delivered a reserved judgment. The learned High Court judge stated that it was his opinion that the offence of buggery was a statutory offence, and that it was permissible to prosecute in respect of an alleged breach in the circumstances.
10. On the 17th December, 2009 the High Court ordered that:-
"In respect of the Order made by the Respondent on the 19th day of September 2007 at Castlebar in the County of Mayo in proceedings entitled The Director of Public Prosecutions at the suit of Garda Edward P. McLoughlin v. [M.O'M.] the Court doth grant
(i) an Order of Certiorari quashing the decision made by the respondent on 19th September 2007 to make no Order in respect of the three charge sheets against the notice party
(ii) a declaration that the respondent should accept the evidence of arrest charge and caution that was given on the 19th day of September 2007 and to proceed to deal with the three charges in the ordinary way
(iii) a declaration that the offence of buggery contrary to Section 61 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is a valid offence recognised by law if it relates to dates of alleged offences that are prior to the repeal of the said s.61.”
The High Court made no order as to costs.
Notice of Appeal
11. The appellant has filed a notice of appeal, including the following grounds of appeal:-
(a) The learned trial judge erred in law and/or in fact in determining that the offence of buggery prior to its repeal by s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993, was a statutory offence.
(b) The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in making the determination on the basis that he had been referred to "no superior authority than that of McWilliam J. in the Norris [Norris v. The A.G. [1984] IR 36] case where he states his conclusion is that offence of buggery is a statutory one".
(c) That the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in finding that s.61 of the Act of 1861, created the statutory offence of buggery.
Cross Appeal
12. The D.P.P. has served a cross appeal on the issue of costs. It was submitted that the learned High Court judge erred in law or in fact by making no order for costs in favour of the D.P.P., who was the successful moving party in the application for judicial review, and by departing from the principle that costs should follow the event, in circumstances where there were no exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the principle.
First Issue
13. The first issue to consider is whether buggery was a statutory offence or an offence at common law.
Legal Authorities
14. Legal authorities have written on the nature of the offence of buggery. In Pádraigh A. Ó Síocháin’s, The Criminal Law of Ireland (7th Ed., Fóilsiúcháin Dlí, 1981) the author states, of buggery, at page 143:-
“It is punishable under section 61 Offences against the Person Act 1861 …it is a felony at common law.”
In Peter Charleton’s Offences against the Person, (Round Hall Press, 1992), Peter Charleton (as he then was) stated at p. 296, paragraph 8.50:-
“Buggery is a felony at common law the penalty for which was fixed by section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.”
In Sean E. Quinn’s Criminal Law in Ireland, (3rd Ed., Irish Law Publishing, 1998) at p. 128, it is stated that:-
“Buggery is a common law offence; Section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 merely provides the penalty, it does not create the offence.”
15. One can also find legal authorities which refer to buggery as a statutory offence.
16. Thus it is necessary to construe the relevant statutes.
Legislation – Nature of Offence
17. The relevant statute is the Act of 1861. Section 61 stated:-
"Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable crime of buggery, committed either with mankind or with any animal, shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be kept in penal servitude for life or for any term not less than ten years."
The Statute Law Revision Act 1892, referred to as “the Act of 1892”, amended s. 61 of the Act of 1861 by deleting the words “at the discretion of the Court” and “or for any term not less than ten years.” Thus, there is no description of the offence of buggery and no ingredients set out. The section merely provided for sentencing options and upon amendment, it provided for one sentence, which was penal servitude for life.
18. Section 62 of the Act of 1861 provided for an attempt to commit "an infamous crime".
It stated:-
"Whosoever shall attempt to commit the said abominable crime, or shall be guilty of any assault with intent to commit the same, or of any indecent assault upon any male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the Court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding ten years and not less than three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour."
The Act of 1892 amended s. 62 of the Act of 1861 by removing the words “at the discretion of the Court” and the words “and not less than three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.” Thus a person convicted of the stated misdemeanours would be liable to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding ten years.
19. Section 61 of the Act of 1861 was repealed by s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993, referred to as “the Act of 1993”, where it was stated:-
"The enactments specified in column (2) of the Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in column (3) of that Schedule."
The schedule referred to:-
“Sections 61 and 62 (save in so far as they apply to buggery or attempted buggery with animals).”
20. Thus, s. 61, which is in issue in this appeal, and which determined the sentence for the offence of buggery, was repealed in 1993.
21. The offence of buggery itself was abolished also. Section 2 of the Act of 1993 stated:-
"Subject to sections 3 and 5 of this Act, any rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence is hereby abolished."
22. Section 3 of the Act of 1993 provided that a person who committed or attempted to commit an act of buggery with a person under the age of 17 years, other than a spouse, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to terms of imprisonment outlined, which varied depending on differing circumstances, e.g. the age of the person under the age of 17 years. Section 4 provided that a male person who commits or attempts to commit an act of gross indecency with another male person under the age of 17 years shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.
23. A consequence of this Act of 1993 was that the act of buggery committed consensually between adults was no longer criminalised, while the law protected minors by creating the above recited offences, which would apply prospectively.
24. I am satisfied that the offence of buggery was a common law offence. And, as with so many common law offences, such as murder, there was a statutory provision providing for sentence. Thus, s. 61 of the Act of 1861 provided the penalty for the offence of buggery. The repeal of s. 61 by s. 14 of the Act of 1993 meant that the provision for sentencing was repealed. The offence of buggery was not altered by s. 14 of the Act of 1993.
25. However, s. 2 of the Act of 1993 abolished the offence of buggery. In other words, the common law offence of buggery was abolished by s. 2 of the Act of 1993.
26. If s. 61 were, contrary to my view, the section maintaining the offence of buggery, it would have been repealed by s. 14 and there would have been no need for any other provision. However, it was not. The sentence alone was repealed by s. 14. Section 2 of the Act of 1993 abolished the offence of buggery.
27. The fact that the provision for sentence in s. 61 of the Act of 1861 was abolished by one statutory provision of the Act of 1993, and that the offence of buggery itself was abolished by another statutory provision, supports the view I take that s. 61 of the Act of 1861 provided only for sentence.
Second Issue: Legislation – elapse of time
28. The next issue for determination is whether in the circumstances the appellant can be charged with an offence which occurred before the statute providing for the sentence and the offence itself were abolished in 1993.
29. The issue is complicated by the fact that there were no transitional arrangements made in the Act of 1993.
30. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act, 1937 made provision for transitional arrangements. It provided:-
“(1) Where an Act of the Oireachtas repeals the whole or a portion of previous statute, then, unless the contrary intention appears, such repeal shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or not existing immediately before such repeal takes effect, or
(b) affect the previous operation of the statute or portion of a statute so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under the statute or portion of a statute so repealed, or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of any offence against or contravention of the statute or portion of a statute so repealed which was committed before such repeal, or
(e) prejudice or affect any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, pending at the time of such repeal in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, offence, or contravention as aforesaid.
(2) Where an Act of the Oireachtas repeals the whole or a portion of a previous statute, then, unless the contrary intention appears, any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under or any offence against or contravention of the statute or portion of a statute so repealed may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment in respect of any such offence or contravention may be imposed and carried out as if such statute or portion of a statute had not been repealed.”
(3) Where an Act of the Oireachtas or a portion of any such Act ceases by any means or for any reason (other than repeal by a subsequent Act of the Oireachtas) to be in force, the preceding sub-sections of this section shall apply and have effect in relation to such Act or portion of an Act as if such cesser were caused by a repeal effected by an Act of the Oireachtas, and accordingly, for the purposes of such application, every reference in either of the said preceding sub-sections to a repeal shall be construed as a reference to a cesser by any means or for any reason (other than such repeal) to be in force.”
31. Thus the Interpretation Act, 1937, contained a saving provision in relation to the situation where a statutory offence had been abolished. It enabled the institution of proceedings after the repeal of the statute. However, there was no such saving provision in relation to a common law offence. As buggery was a common law offence the saving provisions in the Interpretation Act, 1937 do not apply to that offence.
32. Section 27 of the Interpretation Act, 2005, is expressed in very similar terms. It provides:-
“(1) Where an enactment is repealed, the repeal does not—
(a) revive anything not in force or not existing immediately
before the repeal,
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything
duly done or suffered under the enactment,
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under the enactment,
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
respect of any offence against or contravention of the enactment
which was committed before the repeal, or
(e) prejudice or affect any legal proceedings (civil or criminal)
pending at the time of the repeal in respect of any such
right, privilege, obligation, liability, offence or contravention.
(2) Where an enactment is repealed, any legal proceedings (civil
or criminal) in respect of a right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under, or an offence against or contravention of, the enactment may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any penalty, forfeiture or punishment in respect of such offence or contravention may be imposed and carried out, as if the enactment had not been repealed.”
33. Thus a prosecution was enabled and envisaged as capable of being instituted in relation to a statutory offence alleged to have been committed prior to the date of the abolition of the offence. However, it is noteworthy that s. 27(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act, 1937 and s. 27(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act, 2005, both specifically provide that where an enactment is repealed the repeal does not revive anything not in force or not existing immediately before the repeal. Thus it is envisaged that there is a continuous stream of law addressing the issue, and that there was no gap or lacuna envisaged between a repeal of a statute and later legislation.
34. The matter of the abolition of offences at common law, and the effect on prosecutions, was addressed in the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997.
Section 1 provided:-
“(1) Where an Act of the Oireachtas abolishes, abrogates or otherwise repeals an offence which is an offence at common law, then unless the contrary intention appears, such abolition, abrogation or repeal shall not—
(a) affect the previous operation of the law in relation to the offence so abolished, abrogated or repealed or any other offence or anything duly done or suffered thereunder,
(b) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any such offence so abolished, abrogated or repealed or any other offence which was committed before such abolition, abrogation or repeal, or
(c) prejudice or affect any proceedings pending at the time of such abolition, abrogation or repeal in respect of any such offence or any other offence.
(2) Where an Act of the Oireachtas abolishes, abrogates or otherwise repeals an offence which is an offence at common law, then unless the contrary intention appears, any proceedings in respect of any such offence or any other offence committed before such abolition, abrogation or repeal of any such offence at common law may be instituted, continued or enforced and any penalty, forfeiture or punishment in respect of any such offence at common law or any other offence may be imposed and carried out as if such offence at common law had not been abolished, abrogated or otherwise repealed.
(3) This section applies to an offence which is an offence at common law abolished, abrogated or otherwise repealed before or after the passing of this Act.
(4) If, because of any or all of its provisions, this section would, but for the provisions of this subsection, conflict with the constitutional rights of any person, the provisions of this section shall be subject to such limitations as are necessary to secure that they do not so conflict, but shall otherwise be of full force and effect.”
35. Therefore, as the offence of buggery was abolished in 1993, it is necessary to construe the above section of the Act to determine whether the appellant may be prosecuted for the offence of buggery alleged to have been committed in 1970.
36. Section 1(1) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, provides that where an Act of the Oireachtas abolishes an offence at common law, then unless a contrary intention appears, such abolition shall not affect the previous operation of the law, affect any penalty incurred in respect of such offence, or prejudice any proceedings pending at the time of such abolition. In this case, no penalty had occurred, nor was any proceeding pending against the appellant, at the time of the abolition of the offence. Thus of s. 1(1) neither (b) or (c) are relevant to this case. Analysis of s. 1(1)(a) requires it to be done in the context of the section as a whole, and I shall consider the section as a whole later in this judgment.
37. Section 1(2) provides that where an Act of the Oireachtas abolishes an offence at common law, then unless the contrary intention appears, any proceedings in respect of such offence may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any penalty in respect of any such common law offence may be imposed as if such offence at common law had not been abolished.
38. Section 1(3) provides that the section applies to an offence at common law, abolished before or after the passing of that Act.
39. In this case, the common law offence of buggery was abolished in 1993, which was four years before the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997.
40. Thus, on the face of s. 1(1), (2) and (3) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, the Oireachtas stated that even if an offence at common law had been abolished before the passing of that Act, the Court could treat it as not having been abolished. This legislative provision was stated in a general sense. Individual offences were not identified. There was, for example, no reference to the offence of buggery.
41. However, the Oireachtas entered a caveat by s. 1(4). It provided that if, because of the provisions in s. 1, the section would, but for the provisions of s. 1(4), conflict with the constitutional rights of any person, the provisions of this section shall be subject to such limitations as are necessary to secure that they do not so conflict, but otherwise be of full force and effect. I understand this saving provision as to apply to protect constitutional due process, to protect a person where constitutional rights could be impugned.
An Analogy
42. An analogy may be drawn with the common law offence of assault and battery and litigation thereon.
43. The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, abolished, amongst others, the offences of assault and battery, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The relevant provisions came into force on the 19th August, 1997. It contained no transitional measures relating to situations where alleged crimes had been committed prior to the 19th August, 1997, but which had not yet been prosecuted.
44. In Grealis v. D.P.P. [2001] 3 IR 144, the Court considered a situation where the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, which, amongst others, abolished the common law offence of assault and battery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, came into force on the 19th August, 1997. It contained no transitional measures in relation to situations where alleged crimes had been committed prior to the 19th August, 1997, but which had not yet been prosecuted.
45. The Interpretation Act, 1937, contained saving provisions allowing for the maintenance of prosecutions of statutory offences after the statutes under which they had been constituted had been repealed; however, no such saving provisions existed where common law offences were abolished. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997 came into force on the 4th November, 1997, and purported to allow for the institution and maintenance of prosecutions after the common law offence had been abolished. However, section 1(4) provided that the Act would be subject to such limitations as are necessary to ensure that it did not conflict with the constitutional rights of any person.
46. The applicant in Grealis v. D.P.P. [2001] 3 IR 144 was charged on foot of two summonses for common law assault and on a third summons with assault causing actual bodily harm contrary to s. 47 of the Act of 1861. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, came into force after the proceedings were instituted. This Court held that the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 was clear and unambiguous and must be read as abolishing, amongst others, the common law offence of assault and battery and that the said Act contained no saving or transitional provisions in respect of common law offences. It was held that the offence of assault causing actual bodily harm was a common law offence for which there were specific statutory penalties.
47. It was held that the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, should be interpreted as having a prospective effect in order for it not to offend against the constitutional prohibition on retrospective penal legislation, contained in Article 15.5 of the Constitution. Thus, it was held that the Act did not apply to prosecutions, for repealed common law offences, initiated before the Act came into effect.
48. The facts are not the same as in this case. Indeed, Hardiman J. anticipated facts such as arise in this case. He queried whether the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, would operate to allow a prosecution of a common law offence committed prior to its repeal but where the prosecution was initiated after the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, came into force. It is that issue which is required to be determined in this case.
49. In Grealis v. D.P.P. [2001] 3 IR 144, Keane C.J. referred to judgments in England and Wales and the United States of America and, at p. 156 to 157 stated:-
“This formidable body of authority, it is said on behalf of the first respondent, applies only to the repeal of statutory offences. No logical or principled distinction was drawn, however, between the application of this well settled rule of law to statutory offences and to common law offences and, with good reason, since it is clear that there is no such distinction. Common sense, as well as authority, leads one inexorably to the conclusion that, where a common law offence is repealed by statute, in the absence of any saving provision it ceases to exist for all purposes and no prosecution can be maintained in respect of it after the repealing statute has taken effect.”
50. Keane C.J. considered several principles of construction of statutes, and he held that s. 28(1) of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, was clear and unambiguous, and that the only construction of which it is capable is that the common law offences to which it applied are abolished from the coming into force of the section. He stated at p. 158:-
“They cease to exist in law …”
51. The decision of this Court in that case was that the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997, was clear and unambiguous and must be read as abolishing, inter alia, the common law offences of assault and battery and that it contained no saving or transitional provisions in relation to those common law offences. It was held that the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, should be interpreted as having prospective effect in order that it not offend against the constitutional prohibition on retrospective penal legislation contained in Article 15.5 of the Constitution. Further, it was held that the said Act did not apply to prosecutions for repealed common law offences instituted before the Act came into force.
52. In this case, the alleged offence occurred before the offence of buggery was abolished and the prosecution was instituted after the said Act had come into force.
Analysis
53. It appears to me that the following analysis applies. The offence of buggery was a common law offence. It was abolished in 1993.
54. As Keane C.J., said in Grealis v. D.P.P. [2001] 3 IR 144 of an offence in a similar situation:
“… Where a common offence is repealed by statute, in the absence of any saving provision it ceases to exist for all purposes and no prosecution can be maintained in respect of it after the repealing statute has taken effect.”.
55. If this case was in the same situation as arose in Grealis that would be the end of the matter, the appeal would be allowed on this issue.
56. However, there was subsequent legislation by the Oireachtas. Four years after 1993 the Oireachtas enacted the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997.
57. There was thus a four year elapse of time during which the offence was abolished and no saving or transitional provisions existed.
58. A lacuna existed between 1993 and 1997. The appellant could not have been prosecuted for the alleged offence of buggery between 1993 and 1997. Between 1993 and 1997 there was no legal foundation to prosecute the appellant for the alleged offence of buggery. No transitional arrangements to prosecute earlier alleged offences were made in 1993.
59. In 1997 some transitional arrangements were made for prosecutions; the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, is set out earlier in the judgment.
60. However, the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, was a general Act. There was no specific reference to the offence of buggery. The legal position of a person such as the appellant was not clear. There is a well established requirement of clarity in the criminal law so that an accused may know his position. The situation from 1997 was not established in a clear and plain fashion.
61. Further, the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, if applied to the appellant, would be retrospectively re-establishing the offence for the purposes of prosecution of offences committed prior to 1993, for which the appellant would not have been liable between 1993 and 1997.
62. Section 1(4) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997 is set out in detail earlier in the judgment. It is a caveat. It provides that if the section would, but for s. 1(4), conflict with the constitutional rights of a person, the provisions of the section shall be subject to such limitations as are necessary to secure that they do not so conflict.
63. The appellant is entitled to due process of law. From 1993 to 1997 he could not be prosecuted for the offence alleged against him, the offence had ceased to exist and no prosecutions could be brought against him, nor could any penalty be inflicted for violation of that law while it had been in force.
64. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, introduced new law. It purported to retrospectively introduce law so as to re-introduce liability for the actions of persons under the law which had ceased to exist.
65. The Interpretation Acts of 1937 and 2005 made transitional arrangements for statutory offences. However, they specifically dealt with situations where there was no lacuna in time. They provided that where an Act of the Oireachtas repeals the whole or a portion of a previous statute then, unless the contrary intention appears, such repeal shall not revive anything not in force or not existing immediately before such repeal takes place, etc. No such provisions are to be found in the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997.
66. Constitutional due process is guarded by s. 1(4) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997.
67. A prosecution now for the abolished offence of buggery would conflict with a constitutional right not to be exposed to a prosecution for an offence where the Oireachtas had clearly abolished the offence, and where no transitional provisions were provided. The appellant has a constitutional right to be tried in due process of law. In all the circumstances it would be a breach of such a right to prosecute for an offence which was so abolished. Such a prosecution would apply the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, retrospectively, in breach of fundamental constitutional principles. Because of s. 1(4) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, that Act cannot be interpreted as validating the purported criminal proceedings against the appellant for the offence of buggery, which proceeding would have been unlawful prior to its enactment.
68. An attempt to revive a previously barred prosecution, after the lacuna of four years, would be counter to fundamental principles of the Constitution. Section 1(4) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, protects fundamental principles and procedures.
69. I am reinforced in this analysis by the consequences which would arise if the offence of buggery could be prosecuted now. If the offence of buggery was re-established, and liability re-established, in 1997, then liability could arise once again for acts between consensual adults that occurred prior to 1993.
70. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the Act of 1997 does not enable or permit the prosecution of the appellant for the offence of buggery.
Conclusion
71. Buggery was an offence contrary to common law for many centuries, until it was abolished in 1993. The abolition of the offence was complete, irrespective of age or gender. Section 61 of the Act of 1861 provided the sentence for the offence, prior to it being repealed in 1993 also.
72. There were no saving provisions for transitional prosecutions in the Act of 1993. Thus from that date the common law offence of buggery was abolished. An important consequence was that consenting adults could no longer be prosecuted. In 1993 the Oireachtas established statutory provisions prospectively protecting children and young persons.
73. In this case the alleged offences occurred in 1970 and 1971. The offence of buggery was abolished in 1993, and, while the Interpretation Act, 1937, had a saving provision in relation to a statutory offence, it had no such provision in relation to a common law offence, and it did not apply to the common law offence of buggery. Thus there were no transitional provisions in 1993. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, did have a saving provision regarding an abolished common law offence. However, this raises the issue as to whether it can retrospectively revive an offence which has been abolished four years previously.
74. A lacuna was created in 1993 with the abolition of the common law offence of buggery, when no provisions were made for the prosecution of earlier offences. While the Oireachtas continued a policy of protecting children and young people from such activity, the offence of buggery no longer existed.
75. From 1993 to 1997, there was no statutory provision preserving a right to prosecute for the offence of buggery or the liability to be so prosecuted for offences prior to 1993. This approach was consistent with the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186 and the European Convention on Human Rights. The previous offence would no longer apply to consenting adults.
76. The specific lacuna left was as to an alleged offence by an adult with children and young persons prior to the abolition of the offence. While the Act of 1993 created new offences protecting children and young persons, these offences were not retrospective.
77. I am satisfied that the Act of 1997 could not, and did not, revive the common law offence of buggery, for a number of reasons.
78. First, the law requires that criminal offences be established clearly and unambiguously. The position as to the alleged offence of buggery after 1993 is neither.
79. Criminal liability for the offence was removed by the Act of 1993. Thus, from 1993 to 1997, the appellant was not liable to be prosecuted for the offence.
80. If such an Act had made a transitional provision in relation to minors at the time of abolishing the offence there would be no lacuna, there would be no ambiguity, nor any question of retrospectivity.
81. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, may not be construed constitutionally as applying liability for an offence retrospectively, where criminal liability was removed from 1993, and where no transitional arrangements for prosecution were made.
82. If, contrary to my belief, the offence of buggery could be prosecuted after 1997 it would have a significant consequence. It would apply to consenting adults. Any such construction would be constitutionally frail and it would have the infirmity of applying the offence to consenting adults in respect of acts done prior to 1993, which was addressed in Norris v. Ireland in the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by the Oireachtas when the offence was so abolished.
83. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the D.P.P. may not prosecute the appellant for an offence of buggery, which was abolished in 1993. The situation in 1993, was clear, the offence of buggery was abolished. Further, it cannot be anticipated that the D.P.P. would now prosecute consenting adults, nor that such a prosecution was envisaged by the Oireachtas. All in all, I am satisfied that the offence of buggery was a common law offence, it was abolished in 1993, and no words of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, can retrospectively revive the right to the D.P.P. to prosecute, or the liability to be prosecuted, for this offence.
84. Consequently, I would hold that the learned trial judge erred in law in finding that the offence of buggery was a statutory offence and in finding that the Act of 1861 created the statutory offence of buggery. The offence of buggery was an offence at common law and was abolished by the legislature in 1993. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, does not permit the prosecution of the offence of buggery for acts committed prior to 1993, as, quite apart from the appropriate construction of the statute, such a consequence would not be consistent with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186, or the legislation abolishing the offence in 1993. Consequently, I would allow the appeal, insofar as it applies to the charge of buggery, and so the appellant may not be prosecuted for that offence.
85. No issue was raised, or argued, as to the two charges of indecent assault, which are not affected by this judgment.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Hardiman delivered the 8th day of February, 2012.
This case arises out of an attempt to prosecute the applicant for a number of sexual offences allegedly committed in 1970/71. This attempt was made more than 35 years after the alleged events. As will be seen, the case has become afflicted with difficulties of several kinds, mainly due to ill considered changes in the law without proper thought about future prosecutions.
Central Point.
The central point in this case was flagged to the prosecution by Judge Devins on the day the Book of Evidence was produced before the learned District Judge. She pointed out that the Section which the prosecution relied upon as creating the offence of buggery (s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861) had been repealed by the Oireachtas in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993. If the charge had been brought as “ buggery contrary to Common Law) she would no doubt have pointed out that the same Act provided that “… any rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence is hereby abolished”.
Very remarkably, no transitional provisions were contained in the Act of 1993. Such provisions are absolutely necessary if the Oireachtas desire to preserve the possibility of prosecuting for a repealed or abolished offence after the date of the repeal or abolition, unless this issue is covered by some general provision. The failure to include transitional provisions in the Act of 1993 is inexplicable, and no explanation has been attempted. Thus, the State has had to fall back on a general provision. But which general provision? Different provisions will apply depending on whether the offence in question is an offence contrary to statute, or an offence contrary to Common Law. This issue, which would normally be one of technical or historical interest only, has taken a great deal of time on the hearing of this appeal. The question then arises as to whether the general provision appropriate is effective to create a criminal liability in the Notice Party several years after the offence of buggery between persons had been “abolished”.
Charges
The notice party was charged with three offences. The allegations were:
(1) That on a date unknown between the 1st September, 1970 and the 31st December, 1970 at St. Jarlath’s College, Tuam, Co. Galway, he indecently assaulted one P.D.
(2) That on a date unknown between the 1st September, 1970 and the 30th June, 1971 at the same location, he did indecently assault one C.D.
(3) That on a date unknown between 1st September, 1970 and 31st December, 1970 at the same location he did commit buggery with one P.D.
This case relates entirely to the third charge and neither the respondent nor the notice party has ever raised any difficulty with the prosecution of the first two.
History of Criminal Proceedings
This account is taken wholly from the prosecution evidence in the affidavit grounding this application.
On the 20th June, 2007, about thirty-six to thirty-seven years after the date of the alleged offence, the notice party was arrested and charged with the offences set out above. They all related to a time when the notice party was teaching at a school in Galway.
When the matter came before the District Court in Castlebar on the 20th June, 2007, a garda gave evidence of arrest, charge and caution. The notice party was represented by his solicitor, Ms. Fiona McAllister. The respondent, who was the District Judge presiding at the hearing, raised the question of jurisdiction. The prosecuting Garda Inspector, Inspector Murray, informed her that the D.P.P., who was the moving party in the proceedings, had elected for trial on indictment and he asked for an adjournment in order to allow a Book of Evidence to be prepared. An independent surety was accepted as a bailsperson and the matter was adjourned to the 18th July, 2007.
On the 18th July, the matter came before the respondent again at Castlebar District Court. The book of evidence was served on the defendant, the notice party in these proceedings, in court. The Inspector then called a sergeant Carroll to give evidence of service which he did. Inspector Murray told the Court that the D.P.P. had directed that the matter be tried on indictment pursuant to s.4(A)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. The District Judge asked him what his application was. He replied that his application was that the notice party be returned for trial to the current sittings of the Central Criminal Court in Dublin. The District Judge pointed out that the matter was not properly returnable to the Central Criminal Court but rather to the Circuit Criminal Court. The Inspector was then given some time to research the matter and the District Judge said that she would research the matter as well.
According to Inspector Murray he then took advice from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions which confirmed that the matter should be brought before the Circuit Criminal Court and not the Central Criminal Court. The D.P.P. also brought to his attention that an issue might arise as to whether the indecent assault charge should not have been brought “contrary to Common Law” instead of “contrary to s.62 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861”, as originally drafted. He said they were studying a recent High Court judgment on the topic and directed that Inspector Murray apply to adjourn the case until further instructions could be obtained. Subsequently, the Inspector returned to Court and told the Judge that he was conceding that the matter should be returned to the Circuit Criminal Court and not the Central Criminal Court. The District Judge was unhappy that the prosecution had been incorrect on this issue. He then asked for an adjournment, giving the reason which had been outlined to him by the D.P.P.’s office. Ms. McAllister, solicitor for the notice party, objected to the application and pointed out that the State had included the existing charges in the Book of Evidence and that the notice party should be sent forward on those charges.
The District Judge then intervened and said that she had been researching the points raised and that she had identified a further complication. She pointed out that s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 had repealed both s.61 and s.62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The offence of buggery contrary to s.61 had been charged. She put the matter back until after the luncheon adjournment so that the State could research it further.
When the Court resumed the Inspector said that he had again been in touch with the D.P.P.’s office and was renewing his application to have the matter adjourned to September. Ms. McAllister objected. The District Judge indicated that she would not accede to the application. The Inspector said that if the District Judge was refusing his application, he would then ask her to return the notice party for trial to the next sitting of the Castlebar Circuit Court. The notice party’s solicitor had no objection to this.
The learned District Judge then said that they were both missing the point. She repeated that s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 had repealed both s.61 and s.62 of the Act of 1861. She further said that s.8 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2006 had now repealed s.14 of the Act of 1993. She said the effect of all this was that all references to buggery had been repealed from the statute books save for a reference, irrelevant to the present case, in the definition of “sexual act” in the Act of 2006.
All that the learned District Judge said, summarised above, transpires to be accurate.
The Inspector then informed the Court that he had been informed by the D.P.P.’s office that s.27 of the Interpretation Act 2005 made it clear that even if a statutory offence had been repealed, that fact does not mean that a person could not be charged with it.
The learned District Judge indicated that she believed this to be wrong. She said it could not be the case. She then asked him to comment further on the legislation and the Inspector indicated that he did not have it with him and that he would need time to study the Acts to which he had referred in order to comment on it in any constructive manner.
The learned District Judge stated that she would make “No Order” in the case.
It thus appears that, at the end of the July, 2007 sitting of the Court, the prosecution had been stymied when the learned District Judge simply marked the case “No Order”. This is the correct order for a judge of the District Court to make when he or she has no jurisdiction to make any other order in the case.
Second Arrest
By direction of the D.P.P. the notice party was again arrested and charged on the 19th September, 2007 with the same offences but with some important differences in their legal formulation. He was charged in effect with:
(1) Buggery contrary to s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861,
(2) Indecent assault contrary to Common Law,
(3) Indecent assault contrary to Common Law.
This matter came before the District Court again on the same day and the Inspector was again prosecuting and Ms. McAllister, solicitor, again represented the notice party.
According to the Inspector’s affidavit, he called a member of the gardaí to give evidence of arrest, charge and caution. Before anything else happened, the learned District Judge asked if these charges were correctly founded in law. The Inspector referred to what had happened on the previous occasion. He said that the charges now before the Court were valid and that they had been directed by the D.P.P. He said that they were being brought as a result of the D.P.P.’s most recent instructions. He handed in to court a copy of s.27 of the Interpretation Act, 2005. The learned District Judge asked Ms. McAllister what she thought. Ms. McAllister said that the D.P.P had already brought the charges the result of which was that the learned District Judge had made no order and that the D.P.P. was now coming again with substantially the same charges despite the District Judge’s earlier decision.
The District Judge asked how she was to know whether the charges were correct in law or not. The Inspector relied on the Interpretation Act 2005. The learned District Judge queried then why the matter had been brought before the Court on the day appointed for the Annual Licensing District Court. The Inspector said that the D.P.P. had issued his instructions in early September and the matter could have been brought before an earlier court but the notice party had been ill.
The learned District Judge then adjourned for an hour to consider the matter and took possession of the various authorities handed to her.
When the learned District Judge came to deal with the matter again she said that it was her decision to make “No Order” in the case. She was not satisfied that the charges before her were good or were grounded in law. She said no argument had been opened to suggest to her that the charges were good. She said that one of the cases given to her,
Goulding v. Judge McVeigh and the D.P.P., an unreported decision of the High Court, was the relevant authority.
Accordingly, the result of the second appearance before the District Court in September, 2007, was again that the learned District Judge made no order. It is clear from what was attributed to the learned District Judge in the State’s affidavit that her grounds for this was that the offence of buggery had been repealed (in unusually trenchant terms, as will transpire), by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 and that she did not accept that the Notice Party could now be charged with this offence, alleged to have taken place before the repeal.
High Court Proceedings
On the 19th November, 2007, the High Court granted leave to the D.P.P. to apply for:
1) An Order of certiorari quashing the decision made by the learned District Judge on the 19th September, 2007 to make no order in respect of the three charge sheets against the notice party.
(2) An Order of mandamus requiring the District Judge to accept the evidence of arrest charge and caution that was given on the 19th September, 2007, and to proceed to deal with the charges in the ordinary way.
(3) A declaration that the offence of buggery contrary to s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 is a valid offence recognised by law, if it relates to dates prior to the repeal of the said s.61 of the Act of 1861, which occurred in 2003.
(4) If necessary a declaration that the offence of indecent assault contrary to Common Law is a valid offence recognised by law.
(5) If necessary an Order of certiorari quashing the decision made by the District Judge on the 18th July, 2007, to make no order.
For practical purposes, the relief set out at paragraphs 1 and 3 are those to which the great bulk of the argument before the Court was directed.
The grounds on which this relief was sought are:
(1) That the learned District Judge erred in law in holding that the offence of buggery contrary to s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 is not known to law or is not properly before the Court in the circumstances of the present case.
(2) The learned District Judge wrongfully declined to exercise her jurisdiction by failing to hear and deal with the charges which were properly and lawfully before her, and to send the notice party forward for trial.
(3) The learned District Judge acted without any proper legal basis and in excess of jurisdiction in making “No Order”.
(4) The learned District Justice erred in law and wrongfully refused jurisdiction in hearing evidence of arrest charge and caution and later purported to hold that she was then not accepting the evidence of arrest charge and caution.
By way of response the notice party claims that the offence of buggery is a Common Law offence, the penalty for which was provided by statute. He then says that this Common Law offence of buggery was repealed by s.14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993.
It is further claimed by the notice party that the said Act of 1993 did not provide any saver or transitional provision providing for the prosecution of offences repealed by it after the date of the repeal. He further alleged that the allegedly wrongful acts on his part are not now an offence in Irish law. Therefore, any prosecution of him for this offence now is a nullity. He could have been prosecuted for buggery before 1993, but the D.P.P. did not do so then.
By way of reply to the State’s reliance on s.27 of the Interpretation Act 2005, the notice party says that this section of the statute and its predecessor in the Interpretation Act 1937, are not applicable to offences contrary to Common Law. He further says that s.1(1) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997, which applies where the offence abolished is a Common Law offence, applies only prospectively and it is not applicable in retrospect. He claimed that the learned District Judge was acting within her powers and correctly in making no order in respect of the buggery charge.
Decision of the High Court.
The D.P.P.’s application was heard in the High Court by Mr. Justice O’Keefe, who delivered judgment on the 2nd December, 2009. This Court acceded to the D.P.P’s application, held that buggery was a statutory offence, and quashed the learned District Judge’s order of the 19th September, 2007. From this decision the notice party now appeals.
Legal Context
It is first necessary to put the foregoing events in their statutory and legal context.
Statutory Context
It is alleged that the notice party, the defendant in the criminal proceedings, committed the act of buggery between the 1st September, 1970 and the 30th June, 1971. The parties are in agreement that, between those dates, buggery was an offence. I conclude, for reasons indicated below, that it was an offence contrary to Common Law the penalty for which was fixed by statute, s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. It was not a statutory offence.
The offence of buggery at Common Law was subsequently abolished by s.2 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (“the Act of 1993”) with effect from the 7th July, 1993. Section 2 of that Act provides as follows:
“… any rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence is hereby abolished”.
Section 14 of the same Act also repealed sections 61 and 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (“the Act of 1861”) save insofar as they apply to buggery or attempted buggery with animals. This offence had not been abolished: the abolition was only in relation to buggery “between persons”. Section 61 of the Act of 1861 had provided that the penalty for the “abominable crime of buggery” was penal servitude for life or a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years.
Crucially, the Act of 1993 contained no transitional provisions providing for the institution or maintenance of proceedings in respect of an act committed before the offence of buggery was abolished. This absence of any transitional provisions was an extraordinary omission and created a lacuna in the law. It is by no means the first example of unfortunate omissions in draftmanship apparently based on the illusion that criminal law is fundamentally simple and that the intention may be taken for the deed. This is a grave error. The language of the 1993 Act is quite consistent with buggery being an offence at Common Law. But the language of s. 2, referring to “any rule of law”… would be quite redundant if it were a statutory offence, and the statutory provision creating it were being separated repealed by s. 14.
It should be noted, for context, that the Act of 1993 followed certain decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, being Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 and
Norris v. Ireland (1988) 13 EHRR 186. The effect of these was to find the legal provisions criminalising buggery inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. This may account for the trenchant language of the repeal which, apart from repealing the relevant sections of the statute, provided for the abolition of “any rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence”. Having regard to the terms of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, it may be that the Oireachtas was concerned that, notwithstanding the decisions of the High Court and Supreme Court in Norris v. The Attorney General I.R. 36 any law criminalising buggery between consenting adults would be constitutionally vulnerable. But the repeal, as can be seen, extended not only to buggery between consenting adults, whether homosexual or heterosexual (which had previously been criminal), but also extended to buggery with minors. Buggery of any kind between persons ceased to be a criminal offence, just as buggery of any kind had previously been a criminal offence, without distinctions of age, sex, consent, or status. This left an enormous lacuna, as the legislature did not seem to notice that they had abolished the offence of buggery between and adult and a child as well as between adults.
On the 4th November, 1997, a belated effort was made to remedy this lacuna. This was the enactment of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997 (“the Act of 1997”) which entered into force on that date.
The Act of 1997 does not deal in specific terms with buggery or with any other offence: rather s.1 (set out below) contains transitional provisions of an entirely general, entirely non-specific, nature in respect of the statutory repeal of Common Law offences generally and provides that the abolition of a Common Law offence does not prevent the bringing of charges in respect of conduct committed prior to its abolition. At subsection (4) there is a general saver intended to prevent “conflict with the constitutional rights of any person”. It does not specifically address the difficulty that some Common Law offences may have been abolished because they are, or are thought to be, unconstitutional or a breach of the State’s international obligations.
The High Court Judgment and Later Developments
When the matter came before the High Court by way of judicial review, Mr. Justice O’Keeffe held that buggery was a statutory offence and that it was therefore possible to prosecute the applicant pursuant to s.27 of the Interpretation Act 2005.
However, during the argument on the hearing of this appeal it was apparently accepted by both sides that the offence of buggery was a Common Law offence. At one point the State submitted that Buggery had, perhaps been both a common law and a statutory offence.
The alternative view of the offence of buggery is that it is a statutory offence by reason of s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. This provides:
“Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable crime of buggery, committed either with mankind or with any animal, shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.
It will be observed that this form of words does not attempt to define particular acts and to criminalise them. Instead it refers to the “abominable” crime of buggery as something as already exists and lays down a maximum penalty for it. A previous statute of the former U.K. Parliament, 9 George IV Cap.31, “An act for consolidating and amending the statutes in England relative to Offences against the Persons” in s.15 stated that:
“Every person convicted of the abominable crime of buggery committed with either mankind or with any animal, shall suffer death as a felon”
It will be observed that this Act, too, proceeded on the basis that the offence already existed and merely laid down a penalty. The Act of 1861 strikes us today as a statute of remarkable severity, and as being quite strident in its terms, but of course it was in its day a reforming statute which at least relieved those prone to buggery of the prospect of the death penalty.
By a further statute, also passed in 1861, 24 and 25 Vict. Cap. 54, the Act of 1829 mentioned above was repealed in its entirety.
I do not consider it necessary, for the purpose of this judgment, to emulate the impressive historical analysis conducted by Fennelly J. in his judgment in this case in its entirety. This analysis is of the greatest interest and is revealing in itself but it does not alter my opinion as to whether buggery, as it existed prior to 1993, was a Common Law or a statutory offence. If, in 1993 it was a statutory offence this could only be so by reason of the provisions of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, quoted above. Other earlier statutes had repealed the pre-existing law, contained in the 1829 Act. The older preceding statute, of 1562, V Eliz. Cap. 17, “An act for the punishment of the vice of sodomy” had been previously been repealed by an Act of 1829. I therefore consider it quite sufficient, for any practical purpose, to pose the question whether the offence of buggery, as it stood in 1993, was a statutory offence created by s.61 of the Act of 1861, or, the alternative, was a Common Law offence.
Historical observation.
But, in deference to the elaborate historical analysis conducted by Fennelly J. in his judgment in this case, I venture a brief comment. There is no doubt that the offence of buggery was the subject of statutory intervention, both in this country and in England, from a remote date. That fact in itself does not render the offence a statutory one, since, for example, the offence of murder has been the subject of various statutory interventions which do not, however, take from the fact that the crime of murder is indisputably a Common Law offence.
The post medieval statutory interventions on the topic of buggery appear to go back, in England, to the year 1553, and in Ireland to 1634. Prior to 1533 the offence of buggery was considered an “offence against religion” and was accordingly an offence triable in the Ecclesiastical Courts. It must be remembered that, at that remote date and to some extent as late as the middle of the 19th century, the Ecclesiastical Courts had a large jurisdiction over matters which are now considered appropriate to the Common Law courts. From the point of view of a defendant in a criminal case there was a very practical aspect to the distinction: the Ecclesiastical Courts could award sentences up to and including life imprisonment, but could not impose the death penalty. A person claiming that he should be tried in the Church Courts was said to “plead his clergy” or to seek “benefit of clergy”, by asserting that he was a cleric.
Accordingly, the older legal history books including Stephens History of the Criminal Law (1883) and Pollock and Maitland (1911) History of English Law consider the offence of buggery under the heading of “Offences against Religion/Ecclesiastical offences”.
These works describe how, over a significant period of time, many crimes (but not the jurisdiction over what we would now call family law and probate, for instance) were removed from the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts. It appears that this happened in the case of the offence of buggery: in 1533 in England and in 1634 in Ireland, statutes were passed by the predecessors of the old United Parliament which do not define the crime of buggery, but which assimilate it to felony at Common Law in terms of procedure and penalty, and make it a felony without benefit of clergy.
This proposition is to my mind clear from what is said in Stephens monumental work, published in 1883:
“The whole of the Ecclesiastical ordinary jurisdiction did not fall at once, nor did it all remain untouched until the year 1640. It was always a recognised principle of law that the Ecclesiastical Courts should not try men for temporal offences and that if they did so they might be restrained by a writ of prohibition. As some of the crimes with which they concern themselves came to be regarded as temporal offences of importance, they were made felonies by statute, and thus the Ecclesiastical Courts lost jurisdiction over them. This was the case with several offences.”
This proposition is, in my opinion, amply and sufficiently illustrated by the terms of the first Irish Act about buggery, 10 Chas. I, Cap 20, entitled “An act for the punishment of the vice of buggery”.
Insofar as relevant this provided:
“FORASMUCH as there is not yet sufficient and condigne punishment appointed … for the detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast… be it enacted… that the same offence be from henceforth adjudged felonie, and such order and form of process therein to be used against the offenders, as in cases of felony at the Common Law; and that the offenders being thereof convicted… shall suffer such paines of death and loss and penalties of their goods, chattels, debts, lands, tenements and hereditaments, as felons be accustomed to doe, according to the order of the Common Law of this realme, and that no person offending in any such offence shall be admitted to his clergy…”. (Emphasis added)
This Act, which was itself repealed in 1829 by an Act later itself repealed in 1861, does not create an offence of buggery but appoints a penalty and form of procedure in respect of such offence. In this regard the Section is identical to the statutory treatment of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, which is undoubtedly a Common Law offence for the reasons set out later in this judgment.
Moreover, it can be seen that the removal of the ancient right of “benefit of clergy” wholly displaced the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts. As to ordinary people it was displaced in any event by making the procedure for its prosecution analogous to that used in the case of “felony at the Common Law”. In the case of clerics it was removed by the abolition of the right to “plead his clergy”, i.e. to assert that he was a clerk in holy orders and entitled therefore to be tried by the Ecclesiastical Courts. Nor was this a mere technicality, as witness the case of the Irish Anglican bishop John Atherton, hanged in Dublin for buggery in the year 1640, only six years after the Act was passed: he could prior to 1634 have escaped execution by asserting benefit of clergy. See Peter Marshal, Mother Leaky and the Bishop (Oxford University Press, 2007) for a comprehensive academic (but eminently readable) account of this interesting and instructive episode. It appears that the Bishop was taxed with buggery only after a falling out with some powerful interests over land in his diocese of Lismore (Waterford).
The need to decide the issue of Statutory or Common Law.
It is fair to say that this issue would normally be one of academic interest only. However, in the circumstances of the present case it is a question the Court is bound to ask. This is because, if the offence of buggery committed prior to 1993 is now prosecutable at all, it is prosecutable for one of two quite different reasons, depending whether the offence is statutory or a Common Law one. As mentioned above, the Act of 1993 contains no transitional provisions whatever. Therefore, if buggery is a Common Law offence, it is prosecutable now, if at all, by virtue of the provisions of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997, to whose applicability most of this judgment is devoted. But if it is a statutory offence it is prosecutable, if at all, by reference to those provisions of the Interpretation Acts, 1937 and 2005 upon which the Director relies. The terms of these two statutes are quite different. Accordingly, the Statutory Scheme itself compels an answer to the question: is the offence a statutory offence or an offence of Common Law?
Authority is not lacking on either side of this proposition. The modern United Kingdom authorities are not helpful because, in that jurisdiction, buggery has undoubtedly been a statutory offence at least since 1956. Reflecting this, the 1962 edition of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice suggests that an indictment for the offence should be laid in the following form:
“AB on the day of in the County of committed buggery with JN”.
In a footnote to this it is stated:
“It is submitted that since the coming into force of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956, this is the most convenient method of stating this offence in an indictment. As, however, buggery has always been a felony at Common Law, there would probably be no objection to stating the offence simply as ‘buggery’ without reference to any statute”. (Emphasis added)
This is consistent with, though not conclusive of, the position in Ireland. In Mr. Justice Charlton’s book on Offences against the Person, at p.296 it states that:
“Buggery is a felony at Common Law, the penalty for which was fixed by s.61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861”.
I respectfully agree with this dictum which cites in a footnote a statement to the same effect in O Síochán, The Criminal Law of Ireland, 6th Edition (1977).
I do not regard the case of Norris v. The Attorney General [1984] IR 36 as authority for the contrary proposition. In that case, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the provisions of s.61 and 62 of the Act of 1861 were inconsistent with the Constitution of Ireland and had not been continued in force by Article 50. He did this apparently, on the supposition that it was these Sections which criminalised buggery - see the judgment of O’Higgins C.J. at p.51. It appears to me that both the High Court and the Supreme Court judgments proceeded on that supposition, because that is the way the case was pleaded.
McWilliam J. in the High Court referred to the statute of 1634, which is discussed in this judgment and concluded that:
“Whether there was such an offence at Common Law in Ireland prior to the enactment of 10 Chas. I Cap. 20, or not I do not know. The opening passage of the statute with a reference to ‘the vice’ suggests that there was not, whereas the absence of any indication of the Acts required to constitute the offence suggests that there was.”
I regard this case as inconclusive at best, considered as an authority on the question of whether the offence of buggery was one contrary to statute or one contrary to Common Law.
A Precedent
Moreover, the wording of s.61 is for practical purposes indistinguishable from the wording of other provisions of the same statute, e.g. s.47, which relate to the offence of common assault and of various forms of aggravated assault. That is to say these offences are not expressly created by the statute but a penalty is provided for them. But these offences have always been regarded as offences at Common Law and that was confirmed by this Court in its decision in DPP v. Grealis, cited below. Moreover, it is plain from the report in that case that the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, to which s.47 relates, was not simply found by the Court to be a Common Law offence but had previously been described as such by the legislature in the statute bringing about its abolition.
We have seen, above, that the Notice Party in this case is charged with two counts of indecent assault. This is described by the Director of Public Prosecutions as being an offence contrary to Common Law and is described in the charges brought by the Director in this very case. Nevertheless, the offence of indecent assault is the subject of s.52 of the Act of 1861 and is in terms virtually indistinguishable from s.61, which relates to buggery. This Section, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“Whosoever shall be convicted of any indecent assault upon any female… shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.”
Since the offence of indecent assault is concededly an offence at Common Law, it appears to me perverse to argue that the offence of buggery, in relation to which the very previous Section of the same statute is in indistinguishable terms, is other than an offence at Common Law.
Accordingly it appears to me that if one is to construe the words of the statute in their ordinary and natural meaning, and consistently with the way in which indistinguishable Sections have been authoritatively construed, and to follow Grealis, one must necessarily regard the offence of buggery as an offence at Common Law and not a statutory offence.
On the hearing of this appeal the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions advanced the proposition that the offence was perhaps both an offence at Common Law and a statutory offence. I am of the view that the offence, like other offences, must be one or other of these things, and not both. The statutory scheme created by the Oireachtas for the prosecution of the offence of buggery after it has been repealed or abolished itself distinguishes sharply between offences at Common Law and statutory offences. This statutory framework lays down a distinction between the two which the Courts must accept and which would be redundant if it were possible for an offence to maintain a dual existence in both categories.
Consequences of the Foregoing Finding.
Accordingly, the question arises as to whether the notice party can now be prosecuted in respect of the alleged offence. It appears that if this Common Law offence is prosecutable at all, this is by reason of Section 1(2) of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997 (“the Act of 1997”).
A tabular summary of the foregoing position may be set out as follows:
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Fennelly delivered the 8th day of February 2012.
1. This case presents an unusual problem arising from the effects of the abolition, by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993, of the offence of buggery. The Act of 1993 was enacted in response to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights delivered on 26th October 1988 in Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186. In that case, the European Court found that the State had violated the rights of the applicant by maintaining in force legislation which made it a criminal offence to commit the act of buggery between consenting adults. The Act of 1993 did not, however, contain any saving provisions in respect of acts of buggery committed prior to the introduction of the Act of 1993 on 7th July 1993.
2. The case comes to the Court by way of appeal from the judgment of the High Court (O’Keeffe J) dated 2nd December 2009 and the order of 17th December 2009 quashing the decision of the learned District Judge, Mary Devins, who had declined to make any order in respect of the prosecution of the above-named notice party/ appellant (hereinafter called “the Appellant”) on charges of buggery and indecent assault.
3. On 19th September 1997 the Appellant was arrested and charged with the following offences:
4. The Appellant was, at the time, a priest, holding the position of Dean of Studies in a secondary boarding school in the west of Ireland. The alleged victim was then a 13 year old male boarder at the school. The allegation is that the Appellant, under the guise of treating him for pain following sporting activity, invited him to his room, where he caused him to remove his clothes, massaged his genitals and anal area and committed buggery on him. Although similar activity is alleged to have taken place on more than one occasion, there is only one charge of buggery. The Appellant has denied the charges.
5. These matters came on for hearing before the Respondent, District Judge Devins, on 19th September 2007. The learned judge raised with the prosecuting member of An Garda Síochána the question of the validity of the charges, since the laws governing them had, she suggested, been repealed in their entirety. The events at that hearing and at an earlier hearing, where similar charges had been laid, are described in detail in the judgment which has been delivered by Hardiman J. Evidence of arrest and caution was given. After discussion with the prosecuting garda and the solicitor representing the Appellant and, having considered written submissions, the learned judge ruled that she would make no order. She said that she was not satisfied the charges were good or grounded in good law and that no argument had been opened to her to suggest that the charges were good. She said that she was not accepting the evidence of charge and caution which had been given earlier.
6. It is clear that the concern of the learned District Judge was that, in view of the repeal by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993 of section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, the charges were not good in law. This repeal did not, however, on any view of the matter, affect the charges of indecent assault. Nonetheless, she declined to make any order in respect of any of the charges. The consequence of her ruling was that the prosecution could not continue.
7. On 19th November, 2007 the High Court granted leave to the applicant (hereinafter “the Director”) to apply for judicial review by way of an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the District Court to make no order in respect of the three charge sheets against the Appellant; and an order of mandamus requiring the Respondent to accept the evidence of arrest, charge and caution that was given on 19th September, 2007 and to proceed to deal with the three charges in the ordinary way.
8. In the High Court, as in this Court, the question of whether the prosecution of the Appellant can be permitted to continue depends on the resolution of two distinct but closely related questions. The first question is whether buggery was a statutory or a common law offence at the time of its abolition in 1993. If it was a statutory offence, it is not in dispute that, by virtue of section 21 of the Interpretation Act, 1937, any person can be prosecuted at any time after the passing of the Act of 1993 for an offence of buggery committed prior to its repeal. In that event, it is unnecessary to consider the consequences which would flow from its having had the character only of a common law offence. If, on the other hand, buggery was, contrary to what was held by the High Court, a crime at common law only, with the penalty being provided by statute, section 21 of the Act of 1937 does not apply. In this event, a second question arises: whether the prosecution can continue by virtue of the effect of section 1 of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, 1997 which applies saving provisions in the case of the statutory abolition of a common law offence.
9. O’Keeffe J, having considered all the statutory and historical references submitted to the High Court, and following, in particular, the judgment of McWilliam J in the High Court in Norris v. the Attorney General [1984] IR 36, held that the offence of buggery was a statutory offence when it was abolished in 1993 and not an offence at common law only.
10. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993 repealed and replaced the existing law relating to buggery. Section 2 provided that “any rule of law by virtue of which buggery between persons is an offence is hereby abolished;” Section 14 repealed the enactments specified in the Schedule, which included sections 61 and 62 of the Offences against the Persons Act, 1861. Thus, the language of the Act was comprehensive enough to cover and to repeal the offence of buggery, as it stood under the existing law, whether it was an offence at common law only or a statutory offence.
11. It should be noted, of course, that the Act of 1993 did not decriminalise buggery in all circumstances. In particular, section 3 of that Act provides for new criminal offences of buggery against persons under the age of 17.
12. It is common case that the repeal of an offence means that, in the absence of saving provisions, no prosecution can be brought for acts committed contrary to the repealed law, whether committed before or after the coming into effect of the repealing statute. Put simply, where a statute merely repeals a statute creating an offence or abolishes an offence at common law, no prosecution can be brought for the commission of that offence irrespective of whether the impugned act was committed before or after the repealing statute. In practice, however, this matter depends on transitional or saving provisions in the relevant Interpretation Acts. Section 21 of the Interpretation Act, 1937 contained saving provisions for the case of the repeal of statutes. Subsection 2 of that section provided:-
“Where an Act of the Oireachtas repeals the whole or a portion of a previous statute, then, unless the contrary intention appears, any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under or any offence against or contravention of the statute or portion of a statute so repealed may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment in respect of any such offence or contravention may be imposed and carried out as if such statute or portion of a statute had not been repealed.” (Emphasis added).
13. That provision was in force at the date of the passing of the Act of 1993 and the date of the charging of the Appellant. While the Act of 1937 has since been repealed by the Interpretation Act, 2005 and section 21 has been replaced by section 27 of the latter Act, I believe the events relevant to the present appeal continue to be governed by the Act of 1937, because of the transitional or saving provision in section 3(2)(b) of the Act of 2005. Section 3(2)(b) provides:-
“The repeal by this Act of an Act which provides for any matter…… in another enactment does not affect the matter so provided for if—
(i) in the absence of that matter being provided for in this Act, or
(ii) by the application to the other enactment of a matter provided for by this Act which corresponds to a matter provided for in the repealed Act concerned,
the other enactment would be changed in intent or become unclear or absurd.
14. In view of the public importance of the case, the Court invited the Attorney General to make submissions. The Court has, therefore, the benefit of submissions on behalf of the Appellant, the Director and the Attorney General.
15. The High Court and this Court had occasion in the course of consideration of the constitutional claims made in Norris v Attorney General to review the legal history of the crime of buggery. Whether it originated in the common law of England or of Ireland or in statute was not a relevant issue so far as the constitutionality of the prohibition of buggery was concerned. Nonetheless, the judgments, and, in particular, the judgment of McWilliam J in the High Court, represent the only modern examination of the legal history of the offence which was abolished in 1993. It is not surprising, therefore, that the wide-ranging submissions presented to the Court by the parties and the Attorney General make reference, in one way or the other, to those judgments.
16. The Appellant maintains that buggery was historically and at all times in Irish law a common law and not a statutory offence and that the significance of the Act of 1861 was limited to the fact that it provided a penalty. This, it is submitted, is confirmed by the wording of section 61 of that Act:-
“Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, committed either with Mankind or with any Animal shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for life or for any Term not less than Ten Years.”
17. It is argued that the section did not create the criminal offence or define its component acts. It presumes its existence and prescribes a maximum penalty. The Appellant cites the statements of several learned authors to the effect that the offence was a common law offence: “it is a felony at common law” (Ó Siocháin, The Criminal Law of Ireland, 6th Ed., (1977); “Buggery is a felony at common law the penalty for which was fixed by s 61 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861” (Peter Charleton, Offences Against the Person, (1992) at p. 296, para. 8.50)
18. The Director, supported by the Attorney General, submits that the offence was historically both a statutory and a common law offence and relies on the historical analysis contained in the judgment of McWillam J to the effect that it was statutory. He also cites Mr Tom O’Malley’s work on Sexual Offences, (Round Hall, 1996) at pp. 136-137) and the Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Child Sexual Abuse (Dublin, 1989) stating that the offence was created by the Act of 1861. The Attorney General submits that the offence was a statutory offence prior to the enactment of the Act of 1861 and that it continued to be so after that date.
19. The parties have cited a wide range of dicta, not all of them consistent, from successive editions of Halsbury’s Laws of England. It has to be borne in mind that the Sexual Offences Act 1956 repealed the Act of 1861 in England, while there were no changes in our law on the topic until 1993. The first edition of Halsbury (1909), Vol. 1, para. 1091, stated:-
“It is a felony by statute to commit the abominable crime of buggery either with mankind or with an animal. The punishment for this offence is penal servitude for life or for not less than three years, or imprisonment with or without hard labour and for not more than two years.” (Emphasis added)
20. O’Keeffe J noted that the authors based the first proposition on section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. For what it is worth, therefore, the authors of the first edition of Halsbury were of the opinion that buggery was a felony by statute, the relevant enactment being the Act of 1861. For the second proposition, however, the authors stated:-
“This offence was probably first made punishable by the Common Law Courts by statute (1533 – 4, 25 Hen. VIII, c. 6(2) Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, 429). (See however 1 Hawk. P.C., c. 4). The punishment by 25 Hen. VII c. 6, and so it remained until the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Section 61.”
21. The Appellant’s written submissions elaborate the distinction between unwritten law (lex non scripta) and written law (lex scripta) by reference to Blackstone and other renowned writers. However, the question is not whether buggery was historically a crime at common law. It probably was. What has to be decided is whether it was made a crime by statute and, more particularly, whether buggery was an offence contrary to statute at the time of its abolition by the Act of 1993.
22. The offence in the present case is laid as being contrary to section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, which is set out above at paragraph 16.
23. The section itself is inconclusive on the question. It does not purport to create the offence and can be read as impliedly referring to the common law for the origin of the offence itself. Whether that is a correct reading obliges us to consider the law on the subject prior to 1861.
24. Buggery was first made criminal by statute in England in 1533 by the Act of 25 Henry VIII., cap. 6, which did not apply to Ireland.
25. It appears that prior to 1533 buggery was treated as an offence against religion and was triable in the ecclesiastical courts. Many of the text books treat it under the heading ‘Offences against Religion/ Ecclesiastical Offences’. Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law, Vol. II, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge, 1911) state at p. 556 that it was “so closely connected with heresy that the vulgar had but one name for both”.
26. Although the Act of 25 Hen. VIII did not apply to Ireland, and has long since been repealed in England, that Act forms an important part of the history of the offence. Its provisions were, as we shall see, effectively re-enacted in an Irish Act of a century later. The statute passed at Westminster in the 25th year of the reign of Henry VIII (1533) provided as follows:-
“For as much as there is not yet sufficient and condign Punishment appointed and limited by the due Course of the Laws of this Realm, for the detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery committed with Mankind or Beast …it … be enacted … That the same Offence be from henceforth adjudged Felony, and such Order and Form of Process therein to be used against the Offenders as in the Cases of Felony at the Common Law; and that the Offenders being hereof convict by Verdict Confession or Outlawry, shall suffer such Pains of Death, and Losses and Penalties of their Goods Chattels Debts Lands Tenements and Hereditaments, as Felons be accustomed to do, according to the Order of the Common Laws of this Realm; and that no Person offending in any such Offence shall be admitted to his Clergy; and that Justices of Peace shall have Power and Authority, within the Limits of their Commissions and Jurisdiction, to hear and determine the said Offence, as they douse to do in cases of other Felonies...”
27. Following certain repeals during the reigns of Edward VI and Mary, the Act of Henry VIII was revived and made perpetual by 5 Eliz., cap. XVII (1562) and remained in force until 1828 when it was repealed in England by the passing of 9 Geo. IV, cap. XXXI.
28. What is of interest is that the Act of Henry VIII has been treated by distinguished writers over several centuries as providing the basis in statute law for the crime of buggery. It appears that it also involved depriving the ecclesiastical courts of jurisdiction over the offence. Thomas’ Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England (London, 1660) stated:-
“If any person shall commit buggery with mankind or beast, by authority of Parliament this offence is adjudged felony without benefit of Clergy.”
The text continued:-
“The Act of 25 H. 8. hath adjudged it felony, and therefore the judgement for felony doth now belong to this offence, viz. to be hanged by the neck till he be dead. He that readeth the Preamble of this Act, shall finde how necessary the reading of our ancient Authors is. The Statute doth take away the benefit of Clergy from the Delinquent…”
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, 5th Ed., (Dublin, 1765–1769), Book The Fourth: Of Public Wrongs, pp. 215 to 216, at the end of a lengthy passage on the crime of buggery, stated:-
“But now the general punishment of all felonies is the same, namely, by hanging: and this offence (being in the times of popery only subject to ecclesiastical censures) was made felony without benefit of clergy by statute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 6 revived and confirmed by 5 Eliz. c. 17.”
Deacon’s, Digest of the Criminal Laws of England (London, 1831), dealing with the form of the indictment stated:-
“The indictment should charge, that the prisoner “against the order of nature had a veneral affair with A.B., and then and there carnally knew the said A.B.:” but this is not sufficient, without also charging, that the prisoner “feloniously, &c. with the said A.B. did commit and perpetrate that detestable and abominable crime of buggery;” for this is the express term made use of by the statute.”
Stephens, in his History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. 11, (London, 1883), at ch. XXV (Offences against Religion), pp. 429 to 430, explained how the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was lost and replaced by statute:-
“The whole of the ecclesiastical ordinary jurisdiction did not fall at once, nor did it all remain untouched till the year 1640. It was always a recognised principle of law that the ecclesiastical courts should not try men for temporal offences, and that if they did so they might be restrained by a writ of prohibition. As some of the crimes with which they concerned themselves came to be regarded as temporal offences of importance they were made felonies by statute, and thus the ecclesiastical courts lost jurisdiction over them. This was the case with several offences.
The earliest enactment of this kind I believe to have been 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533), which makes unnatural offences felony, reciting in the preamble that “there is not yet sufficient and condign punishment appointed by the due course of the laws of this land” for such offences...”
Pollock & Maitland, cited above at para. 25, in Vol. II, ch. VII, s.4 (Ecclesiastical Offences) at pp. 556 to 557, having made the observation, cited above, linking the crime with heresy, observed that the “statute of 1533 which makes it felony affords an almost sufficient proof that the temporal courts had not punished it and that no one had been put to death for it for a very long time past.”
As noted above at para. 19, the first edition of Halsbury (1909), published two years before Pollock & Maitland, took the same view.
29. These commentators were, of course, concerned with English law, in effect, originating with the Act of Henry VIII. While Irish statute law took a different route, it was closely parallel and, in any event, ended with the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, which applied to the entire of what was then the United Kingdom.
30. The first Irish statutory provision on the subject was an Act of the Irish Parliament 10 Charles I, Session 2, c.20 (1634), which is entitled “An Act for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery.” It was a short enactment and provided virtually in its entirety:
“Forasmuch as there is not yet sufficient and condigne punishment appointed and limited by the due course of the laws of this realme, for the detestable and abhominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast; it may therefore please the King’s Highnesse, with the assent of his lords spirituall and temporall, and the commons of this present Parliament assembled, that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the authority of the same, That the same offence be from henceforth adjudged felonie, and such order and form of processe therein to be used against the offenders, as in the case of felony at the common law; and that the offenders being hereof convicted by verdict, confession, or outlawry, shall suffer such paines of death, and losses … as felons be accustomed to doe, according to the order of the common lawes of this realme...”
31. The Irish Act was materially identical to the English Act of Henry VIII. It made the commission of buggery a felony by statute and provided that the processes of the common law were to apply to it.
32. As a matter of substance, English and Irish law thereafter followed parallel, though virtually identical, courses. The separate, though identical, Acts of the reign of Henry VIII of 1533 (repealed and re-enacted by the Act of 1562), and 1634 remained in effect until 1828 and 1829 respectively when the United Kingdom enacted separate Offences against the Person Acts, one applying to England and Wales and one to Ireland.
33. The Act of 1829, 10 Geo. IV, cap. 34, applicable to Ireland, was passed for the purpose of “consolidating and amending the Statutes……relating to Offences against the Person.” To that end it repealed a large number of enactments, including the Act of 1634 “for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery,” but replaced them. Amongst other provisions, it enacted section 18:-
“And be it enacted, That every Person convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, committed either with Mankind or with any Animal, shall suffer Death as a Felon.”
34. Although the form of the section differs from that of the earlier one —“adjudged felony”— I cannot see that there is any difference in substance and it would be inconsistent with the consolidating objective of the Act that it should make any radical change. The “abominable crime” to which it referred had been a crime, a felony, by statute since 1634. The act of buggery thus remained declared a felony by statute, as it had been for almost two hundred years. As McWilliam J expressed it at p. 41 of Norris, that, by virtue of section 18, the “offence was continued as a felony.”
35. An additional important aspect of the Offences against the Person (Ireland) Act, 1829 has been referred to by both Mr O’Malley and Mr Charleton (though they cite the English rather than the Irish legislation). Section 21 of the Act of 1829 provided:-
“And whereas upon Trials for the Crimes of Buggery and Rape, and of carnally abusing Girls under the respective Ages herein-before mentioned, Offenders frequently escape by reason of the Difficulty of the Proof which has been required of the Completion of these several Crimes: for Remedy thereof be it enacted, That it shall not be necessary in any of those Cases to prove the actual Emission of Seed in order to constitute a carnal Knowledge, but the carnal Knowledge shall be deemed complete upon Proof of Penetration only.”
36. As appears from that section and as is confirmed by the extract from Deacon, cited above at para. 28, the term “carnal knowledge” applies to the commission of both buggery and rape. Section 21 represented a crucial degree of statutory definition of the elements of the offence.
37. In 1861, the Acts of 1828 (England) and 1829 (Ireland) were replaced and repealed in two stages. On 6th August, 1861, both the English and the Irish Acts then in force (i.e. 9 Geo. IV, c. 31; and 10 Geo. IV, c. 34) were repealed by 24 & 25 Vict., c. 95: An Act to repeal certain Enactments which have been consolidated in several Acts of the present Session relating to indictable Offences and other Matters. The Act provided that the repealed Acts would continue in force up until 31st October, 1861 and it contained a saving provision in respect of offences already committed. On the same date, six statutes were passed to consolidate and amend the laws in respect various aspects of the criminal law. One of these was the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 45 Vict, c. 100), described as “An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland relating to Offences against the Person.” It was effective as and from 1st November, 1861.
38. Thus, up to the coming into effect of section 61 of that Act, the crime of buggery was, and had been since 1634 in Ireland, an offence by statute. As noted above at para. 16, section 61 provided:-
“Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, committed either with Mankind or with any Animal, shall be liable at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for any Term not less than Ten Years.”
39. Section 62 dealt with attempts and is not material for present purposes. Section 63 effectively re-enacted section 21 of the Act of 1829 (10 Geo. IV, c. 34) by providing:
“Whenever, upon the Trial for any Offence punishable under this Act, it may be necessary to prove carnal Knowledge, it shall not be necessary to prove the actual Emission of Seed in order to constitute a carnal Knowledge, but the carnal Knowledge shall be deemed complete upon Proof of Penetration only.”
40. As is clear from the above, the language of section 63 of the Act of 1861 prescribed the essence of the offence of buggery (as also of rape). It provided that the offence is deemed to be committed on proof of penetration only.
41. This history demonstrates that the offence of buggery appeared in the statute books in Ireland without interruption from 1634 until 1993. The Act of 1533 established it as a felony in England and the Act of 1634 did so in Ireland.
42. There were two consolidating phases in the nineteenth century: in Ireland in 1829; and in the United Kingdom as a whole in 1861. These did not involve any break in the statutory criminalisation of the Act. Furthermore, from 1829 the statute provided, and repeated in 1861, the essential sexual element of the crime, namely penetration.
43. In this respect, the Appellant says, firstly, that buggery was an offence at common law, i.e., prior to the enactment of the Act of Henry VIII and, secondly, that that Act did not make it a crime, but merely prescribed a penalty. It is, of course, perfectly possible that buggery was a crime at common law prior to 1533 in England, which I treat as being equivalent to 1634 in Ireland. It would not, however, follow from that supposition, that the act was not made a crime by statute. Indeed, the Appellant in his written submissions observes that section 12 of the (English) Sexual Offences Act, 1956 makes buggery a statutory offence by providing that “it is a felony for a person to commit buggery with another person… or with an animal.”
44. Distinguished commentators on the criminal law from Coke’s Institutes, through to Blackstone and Stephens and Pollock & Maitland have, as is clear from the extracts quoted above, treated the crime as statutory.
45. The first three editions of Halsbury took the same view. The Appellant, however, submits that the fourth edition arrived at the opposite conclusion. It said at para. 505 of the 4th Edition of Halsbury, Vol 11(1) that “at common law it is an indictable offence for a person to commit buggery with an animal or with another person. It is also a statutory offence for a person to commit buggery with another person or with an animal …” It is clear from the context that the statutory basis for the latter statement is the (English) Sexual Offences Act, 1956. I am not at all sure that this passage is inconsistent with buggery having been a statutory offence in England during the currency of the Act of 1861. The passage uses the present tense, i.e., buggery remained a common law offence even after the entry into force of the Act of 1956. Equally, therefore, it may have been a statutory as well as a common law offence before 1956.
46. I am satisfied that buggery was a criminal offence in Ireland by statute at all times from 1634 to 1993. It was a statutory offence when it was abolished in 1993. Consequently, section 21 of the Interpretation Act, 1937 applies to allow the prosecution of offences committed prior to its repeal by the Act of 1993. It follows from this that the possibility of prosecuting a person such as the Appellant for an offence allegedly committed prior to 1993 was preserved by that section. The learned District Judge was in error in declining to make an order on the prosecution of the Appellant. I would affirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss the appeal.
47. The majority of the Court is of the view that the offence of buggery was not a statutory offence when it was abolished in 1993. If that was so, of course, it is necessary to address the Appellant’s submissions as to the applicability and effect of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997. On this particular issue, I find myself in agreement with the judgments of the Chief Justice and of Hardiman J. Section 1 of the Act of 1997 should be interpreted in the light of the principle against doubtful criminalisation. Whatever meaning may be attributed to section 1(1) and (2), the meaning of subsection (4) is so obscure that it could not provide a sound basis for rendering criminal an act which had ceased to be criminal. Moreover, the section would have to be construed in such a way as not to render it incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. These matters are discussed in detail in the judgments of the Chief Justice and of Hardiman J.
48. I would add that, independently of the conclusion I have reached in respect of the crime of buggery, there was never any basis for preventing the prosecution for the other two offences of indecent assault.
