JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Fennelly delivered the 12th day of July 2011.
1. Acquisition of citizenship on marriage or “post-nuptial citizenship,” was permitted by section 8 if the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956 as amended by section 3 of the Act of the same name of 1986. Section 4 of the Act of 2001 repealed the procedure subject to a transitional provision for existing cases. To that extent, the present case deals with the application of a section of merely historic interest.
2. In the present case, the first-named appellant (whom I will call “the Minister”) rejected the declaration of post-nuptial citizenship made by the first-named respondent on the ground that the couple were not living together as man and wife for the required three years.
3. Hanna J, in an ex tempore judgment of 11th October 2005, held that the Minister had not observed fair procedures. The Minister now appeals against that judgment.
4. Section 8 of the Act of 1956, as amended in 1986, provided:
5. Sub-section 3 of the section is not relevant.
Appellants’ marriage and declaration
6. The first-named appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. The second-named appellant is an Irish citizen. The appellants were married to each other at the Hendon Register Office in the London Borough of Barnet on 3rd March 1999.
7. On 28th April 2002, the first-named appellant made a declaration of that marriage on a prescribed form. The declaration was, as required, supported by an affidavit sworn by the second-named appellant in which she swore that the appellants were then living together as husband and wife, that their marriage was subsisting and that no proceedings for divorce or annulment of the marriage had been or were about to be commenced.
8. The first-named appellant applied to the Minister for Irish citizenship on the basis of that declaration on 15th May 2002.
9. Following a lengthy period of correspondence, Mr Gerry McConnell, Assistant Principal of the Immigrant and Citizenship Division of the Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform gave notice on behalf of the Minister on 14th November 2003 to the first-named appellant that he was refusing his application. He stated that he was not satisfied that the appellants were living together as husband and wife on 28th April 2002, notwithstanding the fact that their marriage was subsisting at that time. The reasons for that conclusion are set out in the letter and will be considered later.
The proceedings
10. The appellants applied, by way of judicial review, for an order of certiorari of the Minister’s decision of 14th November 2003, thus conveyed, and a declaration that the first-named appellant is entitled to a declaration of post-nuptial citizenship.
11. The Statement required to Ground an Application for Judicial Review of 15th of December 2003 sought an order of certiorari of the Minister's decision setting forth 12 grounds which can be summarised as follows:
12. By order sated 20th May 2004, the High Court (O’Caoimh J) granted leave to apply for judicial review on the grounds advanced.
13. The appellants claimed before the High Court that the Minister’s decision was flawed because:
i) there was no, or no sufficient evidence before the Minister that the appellants were not living together as husband and wife;
ii) the Minister had granted residency permits to the first-named appellant accepting that the first-named appellant was resident at the home of the second-named appellant for most of all of the relevant three year period;
iii) the Minister had failed to observe fair procedures in not disclosing to the appellants evidence which was taken into consideration in determining the application;
iv) the Minister imposed an incorrect burden of proof.
14. Hanna J decided the application on the single basis that the Minister had not observed fair procedures. He noted that the Minister's decision was founded on a disbelief in the truthfulness of the appellants. This was particularly serious for the first-named appellant, since he is a solicitor. The learned judge thought that no effort had been made to confront him in any meaningful way and to enable the appellants to challenge the evidence offered against them. They should have been allowed an opportunity to cross-examine members of An Garda Síochána. The appellants had not, therefore, been afforded fair procedures.
15. In so far as the deciding officer had, at one point in the correspondence, indicated a requirement that he should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, Hanna J found that he had been corrected in this view and that he did not apply an inappropriate burden of proof. The learned judge was not satisfied, on the evidence, that there was any evidence of bias shown on behalf of the deciding officer.
16. In short, the learned judge was particularly concerned that the decision of the Minister amounted to a finding that the appellants were untruthful and that the Minister had not attached sufficient weight to the potential criminality thereby implied.
Consideration by the Minister
17. The Minister, in the form of Mr McConnell’s letter of 14th November 2003, gave the following reasons for his conclusion that the appellants were not living together as husband and wife:
(i) In June 2002, enquiries with the local Gardaí at Clara revealed that Ms Allen was living with Mr Billy Fitzpatrick at that time (some 6 weeks after the lodgement of the declaration). The Clara gardai were aware that Ms Allen had married a Nigerian national but were of the opinion that this person was not residing at the address in Clara;
(ii) On four occasions between September and November 2002, members of the Garda Síochána made unannounced visits to 30 Silverdale Estate, Clara Co Offaly. The appellant was not present on any occasion;
(iii) On 29th September 2002, the then Immigration Officer attached to Tullamore Garda Station formed the opinion, having spoken to Ms Elizabeth Allen, that the appellant and Ms Allen were not living together as husband and wife;
(iv) During the course of an interview with members of the Garda Síochána on 17 November 2002, Ms Elizabeth Allen stated that she and the appellant had lived together on and off for about a year after the marriage. She further stated that the appellant lived in Clara for about 3 months in 1999 and then went to the UK for 6 weeks after which he lived mainly in Dublin setting up his business. She went on to state that he and she had not been living together as husband and wife and that she was in a relationship with another man, Billy Fitzpatrick. Mr Fitzpatrick's home address, as recorded by the Gardai on 28 August 2002, was 30 Silverdale, Clara;
(v) The appellant’s two children, Christian and Cecilia (Chinenye), who commenced school in Dublin in September and October 2002, are registered with their schools as living at 5 Ballyowen Drive, Lucan, Co Dublin. This address is the home address of Celia Otubu, whom the appellant informed the Gardai was his “life” and business partner. When the appellant’s daughter Cecilia entered the State in June 2002, he stated to the Garda Síochána that she would live in Clara and attend school there. He stated in his letter of 25 June 2003, and confirmed over the telephone recently, that he had enquired about a place in school in Clara but that there were no places available. The letter have confirmed with Ard Scoil Chiarain in Clara, the one secondary school located in Clara for both girls and boys, that there was no admissions problem during the course of 2002 nor is there a recollection of an enquiry about a case for a Nigerian child for the 2002 -- 2003 school year.
(vi) Enquiries with the Department of Social and Family Affairs have revealed that Ms Elizabeth Allen has made a number of claims in the period 1999 to date: [These were set out and addressed to the appellant as follows:]
“9 April 1999
Only a matter of weeks after your marriage in the UK Ms Allen lodged a claim for one parent family allowance. This claim was supported by a declaration by your wife that if she went back to live with her spouse or if she married or started living with another person as husband and wife she would inform the Department. This claim was subsequently withdrawn.
“13 April 1999
Ms Allen made a claim for unemployment benefit. The claim was supported by a declaration to the effect that all details were true and complete. The relevant form required her to specify "spouse/partner.” She stated that her “spouse/partner” was Anthony Allen (from whom separated) and that he resided in England. She made no reference to her marriage to you.
“6 June 2001
Ms Allen made another claim for unemployment benefit supported by a similar type declaration. Similar type information was supplied but she stated that she did not know where Mr Allen was residing.
“21 May 2003
Ms Allen made a repeat application for unemployment benefit. On this occasion, she stated that Mr Fitzpatrick was her partner, that she was living with him and was dependent on him. Once again, she did not mention her marriage to you.”
18. The history of the Minister's consideration of the application of the first-named appellant for post-nuptial citizenship commences with the submission in May 2002 of the declaration of the first-named appellant, supported by the affidavit of the second-named appellant.
19. There is, however, a certain amount of relevant background. The first-named appellant says that he intended to reside with his wife at her home at 30 Silverdale Estate, Clara Co Offaly. However, at the time of the marriage in 1999, he was studying to become a solicitor in London. He says that he resided in London as well as in Clara from the period from September 2000 to January 2002. He completed his solicitor’s articles in London on 15 January 2002. He then returned to Clara. From that time, it appears that the local immigration officer registered him as resident there under the Aliens Order for successive periods, usually of a year, from 7 April 1999. He qualified as a solicitor in this jurisdiction on 20th March 2002. He set up his own firm and commenced practice principally in the area of immigration.
20. On 17 December 2002, a letter was written to the first-named appellant informing him that the Citizenship Section of the Department was "carrying out investigations concerning [his] entitlement to lodge a declaration of Post Nuptial Citizenship and that [his] file [would] not be processed until these investigations have been completed.” To that end the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) were asked to conduct enquiries which included the making of unannounced calls to the address at number 30 Silverdale Estate. On 1st April 2003, Mr McConnell wrote informing the first-named appellant that he did not propose, at that time, to go into the nature of the investigations that were being carried out. He confirmed that, where appropriate, the Department asks the Gardai from time to time to carry out investigations on its behalf.
21. Although it does not finally form part of the subject matter of the High Court judgment and will not be necessary to discuss further, it is right to point out that, at this time, the first-named appellant was making wide ranging accusations of racist abuse and harassment against a number of members of An Garda Síochána. In particular, he accused one female member of endeavouring to frustrate his quest for citizenship. No less than six members of the force have sworn affidavits denying these accusations. They appeared to have been the foundation of the allegation of bias. The learned High Court judge found that claim unproven. I do not propose to make further reference to it.
22. The first-named appellant objected to the Minister carrying out any investigation. He maintained, in correspondence, that his entitlement to Irish citizenship was not discretionary but automatic upon meeting the statutory requirements, which he claimed to have met.
23. On 9th June 2003, Mr McConnell wrote to the first-named appellant saying that some matters had been brought to his "attention which raised questions about whether yourself and your wife were living together as husband and wife in a subsisting marriage at the time of your declaration i.e. 29th of April 2002.” Among these matters were the following:
“Despite unannounced visits by the Gardai to your address in Clara on four occasions in September and November 2002, you were not present in the house.
“Your two children Christian and Cecelia (Chinenye), who commenced school in Dublin in September and October 2002, are registered with their schools as living at 5 Ballyowen Drive, Lucan, Co Dublin. 5 Ballyowen Drive is the home address given by Celia Otubu, whom you informed Gardai was your life and business partner on several visa applications for her children and mother. You also informed Gardai on 15 June 2002, in relation to Cecelia, that she would be living permanently with your wife in Clara.
“Your wife, Ms Elizabeth Allen was unemployed for the period between June 2001 and January 2002 and received unemployment benefit. She informed the Department of Social and Family Affairs at that time that she was separated.
“During the course of an interview with members of the Garda National Immigration Bureau on 17 November 2002, Elizabeth Allen stated that you and she were not living together and (sic) husband and wife and had not then. She stated that she was in a relationship with another man, who was present in the house at that time.
“During the course of a telephone conversation with the undersigned you stated that yourself and Ms Allen are living together as husband and wife. Legislation governing post-nuptial citizenship requires that you and Ms Allen be living together as husband and wife in a subsisting marriage at the date of declaration i.e. 29th April 2002. Based on the information that has been given to me, I have strong doubts that you and Ms Allen are living together as husband and wife at the present time or that you fulfilled the aforementioned statutory requirement. In order to clarify the matters which I have outlined above, and to satisfy myself beyond reasonable doubt that you met the criteria set out in the Act, I would like yourself and Ms Allen to attend at this office on a mutually acceptable date for the purpose of being interviewed separately by myself and a member of the Garda National Immigration Bureau in relation to our concerns and any matters which we feel might finalise this matter.”
24. The letter concluded by providing a telephone number where the first-named appellant could telephone Mr McConnell if the arrangements outlined were to be unacceptable. It also invited him to respond in writing to any of the matters outlined.
25. The first-named appellant replied by letter of 25 June 2003. With regard to the visits to the house in Clara, he accused the Gardai in question, one in particular, of threatening to frustrate his application for citizenship. He accused her of blatant bias and prejudice as well as racist abuse. It is only fair to say that the Garda officer in question denies that she was present at the house on any of these occasions and says that she had never met the first-named appellant. He explained his own absence by saying that, on two occasions, he was out of the country on a business trip and on a third that he was staying in Dublin having worked late into the early hours at Dublin airport and on a third that he was engaged in distributing literature at churches in Dublin.
26. He said that his wife and he had never been separated, and claimed that he had himself voluntarily mentioned the presence at 30 Silverdale Estate of his "wife's friend Billy [who] was staying with us temporarily because he lost his home." He gave reasons for keeping his own African-born children at school in Dublin.
27. He said that his wife was entitled to make a claim for social welfare benefit and denied that she said that they were separated.
28. The letter concluded by saying that, if Mr McConnell wished to interview the appellants, they would attend provided they were both interviewed together in the presence of a legal practitioner and that the interview be recorded in writing or by electronic means. The reason he gave for this was "the climate of intimidation, mistrust and prejudice that has permeated the entire matter."
29. Mr McConnell replied on 8th August 2003. He gave his view that interviewing the appellants together would be of little usefulness and declined to proceed on that basis. He shared concern at the length of time the matter had taken but said that there seemed to him to be very little evidence that the first-named appellant had lived in Clara for any appreciable time and invited him to show his presence in Clara. He suggested that first-named appellant might provide evidence of attempts to register any of his children at school in Clara, any documentary evidence or verifiable written statements from residents of Clara that he was living there with the second-named appellant. He suggested evidence regarding a bank account showing regular transactions.
30. The first-named appellant replied on 22nd August 2003 providing some 50 documents and letters which he had managed to assemble tending to prove his residence at 30 Silverdale Estate. He demanded a decision without further delay and threatened judicial review.
31. Mr McConnell wrote on the 28th October referring to continuing inquiries and saying that he would write as soon as there were completed. On 14th November, he wrote conveying the Minister’s decision already quoted.
The appeal
32. The Minister draws the attention of the Court to a number of authorities to the effect that he retains power to decide whether a declaration made pursuant to section 8 of the Act of 1956 is correct and effective to confer Irish citizenship on a foreign spouse of an Irish citizen: Kelly v Ireland [1996] 3 I.R. 537; Akram v Minister for Justice (High Court unreported 21st December 1999, per Finnegan J); Akram v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law reform [2004] 1 IR 452.
33. The Minister accepts that the principles of fair procedures apply to an application for post-nuptial citizenship, but submits that the extent of fair procedures depends on the particular case and circumstances. In particular, the appellants were not entitled to an oral hearing or to the right to cross-examine members of An Garda Síochána who had provided information to the Minister. The appellants had been fully informed of the nature of the information which the Minister believed suggested that the appellants were not cohabiting as man and wife. They were offered the opportunity of interviews to deal with these matters but declined. They did not, prior to the decision, asked for copies of any documents; nor, did they ask for the right to cross-examine.
34. Counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, submit that the core of the High Court judgment was that, according to Hanna J, the statements of the various individual Gardaí implied that each appellant had committed perjury and this was of such seriousness that they were entitled to disclosure of documents and to challenge the evidence by cross-examination. They referred to In Re Haughey [1971] 1 I.R. 217.
Conclusion
35. Kelly v Ireland was a High Court decision concerning a very brief and impermanent marriage between an Irishman and a Sudanese woman in London. Although Barron J held that the burden was on the State to show the marriage was sham, he examined the evidence as to whether there had been a relationship between the parties; he found that there was. The Minister argues that the case is authority for the proposition that the burden of proof that there is a subsisting marriage is on the appellant for citizenship. This matter was more clearly established in Akram v Minister for Justice, cited above. In that case, a Pakistani citizen had married an Irishwoman. Subsequently, he married a Pakistani woman in Pakistan. The Minister declined to accept his declaration pursuant to section 8. Finnegan J referred to Kelly v Ireland and said:
"Implicit in this judgment is a finding that notwithstanding the absence of any express power being conferred upon the Minister by the Act the Minister nonetheless has power to decide whether a declaration pursuant to section 8 of the Act is effective to confer upon a spouse Irish citizenship and I am satisfied that this finding is indeed correct. The Minister is not bound to accept upon the sole basis that a declaration pursuant to the Act has been made that Irish citizenship has been acquired. He has the power to investigate the circumstances surrounding the marriage and if satisfied on the evidence, having complied with the requirements of natural and constitutional justice, that the requirements of section 8 have not been complied with he may determine that the lodging of a declaration pursuant to section 8 was ineffective to confer Irish citizenship.”
36. However, Finnegan J held that the Minister had failed to observe fair procedures in that he had not provided the appellant with a copy of the statement upon which he placed particular reliance. Accordingly, he granted an order of certiorari of the Minister's decision. The second application by Mr Akram, Akram v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, failed before Kearns J, as he then was, on grounds of res judicata. The learned judge cited the passage from the judgment of Finnegan J, which I have set out above.
37. I am satisfied that the true construction of section 8, as accepted by these judgments, is that the acquisition of post-nuptial citizenship could not be automatic; it could not follow as of course from the mere presentation of a declaration. The legislature could not have intended that there be no means of investigation of the existence of the conditions required for the operation of the section. Section 8(1)(b) lays down a requirement that “the couple are living together as husband and wife…” This is a matter to be determined following inquiry into the facts. It is not satisfied by the submission of the declaration and supporting affidavit.
38. The true question on this appeal is whether the appellants, and in particular the first-named appellant, were entitled to the form of fair procedures adopted by Hanna J. The learned judge appears to have been motivated particularly by his view that the questioning by the Minister of the subsistence of a marital relationship between the appellants implied untruthfulness on their part. For this reason, combined with the fact that the first-named appellant is a solicitor, the appellants should have been given an opportunity to challenge the relevant evidence "in a meaningful way" which would "include cross-examining members of An Garda Síochána.”
39. The Minister's function under section 8 is administrative. As already demonstrated, the burden was on the appellants to establish, to his satisfaction, compliance with the two statutory preconditions. For present purposes the relevant one is whether the parties were living together as husband and wife. Undoubtedly, the Minister was obliged to respect fair procedures in arriving at his own conclusion on the matter. The requirements of fair procedures are not set in stone. What is required is that the procedures be reasonably fair in the context of the nature of the decision and the facts which are relevant to it. The overriding requirement is that the person affected be given reasonable notice of matters which are of concern to the decision maker.
40. The Minister, when performing his function under section 8, is not performing a judicial function. He does not act as a tribunal of inquiry. The procedures mandated in the judgment of O’Dalaigh C.J. in In Re Haughey, cited above, related to the procedures of a tribunal of inquiry being conducted in public, where the appellant had been the subject of charges made against him in public, which reflected on his character and good name. They have no application to an administrative procedure of the kind at issue here.
41. The first-named appellant is an appellant for Irish citizenship to which he has no automatic right. He is required to place evidence before the Minister to satisfy him that he has met the statutory conditions. He is not a person accused of any offence.
Costello J, in Pok Sun Shun v Ireland [1986] I.L.R.M. at 599 “accepted that there are cases in which a person, whose position is going to be adversely affected, should be given an opportunity to know the considerations that may be used against him, but it is well-known that the extent and scope of natural justice depends on the facts of each case.” He added: “there is no general rule of natural justice that in each case where a decision might be made adverse to an applicant, there must be disclosure."
42. Flanagan v University College Dublin [1988] I.R. 724 concerned an accusation of plagiarism made against a student in respect of an essay for which the marks awarded would count towards her examination. She was summoned before a disciplinary committee. In the view of Barron J, she was not accorded fair procedures. In his view, expressed at page 731, "the principles of natural justice involved relate to the requirement that the person involved should be made aware of the complaint against them and should have an opportunity both to prepare and present their defence." Because of the criminal nature of the charge of plagiarism, the learned judge held that:
“The present case is one in which the effect of an adverse decision would have far-reaching consequences for the applicant. Clearly, the charge of plagiarism is a charge of cheating and as such the most serious academic breach of discipline possible. It is also criminal in its nature. In my view, the procedures must approach those of a court hearing. The applicant should have received in writing details of the precise charge being made and the basic facts alleged to constitute the alleged offence. She should equally have been allowed to be represented by someone of her choice, and should have been informed, in sufficient time to enable her to prepare her defence, of such right and of any other rights given to her by the rules governing the procedure of the disciplinary tribunal. At the hearing itself, she should have been able to hear the evidence against her, to challenge that evidence on cross-examination, and to present her own evidence.”
43. I cite this passage in full because of its mention of the right of cross-examination. The context is, however, that of a disciplinary hearing. That necessarily involves an adversarial proceeding, a quasi-prosecutor and a person accused.
44. A purely administrative procedure such as is involved in the present case is not adapted for the intervention of the intrinsically adversarial procedure of cross-examination. It would require the administrator or decision maker to sit in judgment. In order to do so, he would necessarily have to devise procedures approximating to a courtroom. In my view, that would be a drastic step. It would be cumbersome, potentially lengthy and inconvenient and would open up further avenues for judicial review.
45. The rules of natural justice require the decision maker to give reasonable notice to the affected person of the substance of any matters being raised which are adverse to his interest. It is not necessary that the entire of every detail of the case against him be notified. The test is whether he has a fair opportunity to prepare himself and to respond.
46. In considering the facts of the present case and the procedures followed by Mr McConnell, two things stand out. Both are to be found in the letter he sent to the appellant on 9th June 2003. The first is the content of the factual concerns conveyed to the first-named appellant. The second is the offer made to interview the appellants separately.
47. The most important general point to note is that, by that letter, the Minister clearly conveyed to the first-named appellant his concern as to whether he and the second-named appellant had been living together as husband and wife on the relevant date, 29th April 2002. In that way, the appellants were made aware that this essential fact was in question. It was the central issue of fact of which the other matters of fact mentioned are evidence. The Minister was not satisfied on the point and was drawing this to their attention.
48. What is more, the Minister in that letter expressly drew the attention particularly of the first-named appellant to three areas of evidence of the central issue of fact:
• on the occasion of several unannounced visits to the purported residence of the first-named appellant, he had not been present in the house;
• the Nigerian born children of the first-named appellant were residing in Dublin and not with him in Clara, Co Offaly;
• the Minister had information from that Gardai to the effect that the children were residing with Celia Otubu and that he, the first-named appellant, had described that person as his "life and business partner;”
• the second-named appellant, though married to the first-named appellant, had made applications for social welfare benefit over the period covered by the declaration on the basis that she was "separated" i.e., without mentioning her marriage to the first-named appellant;
• the second-named appellant had informed members of the GNIB that she was not living with the first-named appellant but was in a relationship with another man who was present in the house at that time.
49. The significance of these various statements of fact is not that any of them were necessarily accurate or true. The point is that the first-named appellant was put on notice of these points and given an opportunity to respond.
50. With the exception of the suggestion that the first-named appellant had described Celia Otubu as his life partner, the first-named appellant does not appear to have disputed these statements as matters of fact. In subsequent correspondence, he did not deny that he had been absent from the house on each occasion when the Gardai called. He offered explanations. He did not deny that his children were living at the address in Dublin. He did not even deny that the second-named appellant had made applications for social welfare benefit on the basis that she was separated. It was even accepted that Mr Billy Fitzpatrick was, in fact, living in the house at Clara though, again, an explanation was offered.
51. There is also an important procedural aspect to the letter of 9th June 2003. Mr McConnell offered the appellants the opportunity to be interviewed separately by himself and a member of the GNIB. The stated purpose was that Mr McConnell could be satisfied that the appellants met the criteria laid down in the Act. The appellants rejected this offer. They would only agree to be interviewed together.
52. In his letter of 8th August 2003, Mr McConnell invited the first-named appellant to provide further evidence in documentary form verifying his residence in Clara.
53. In my view, Mr McConnell did not depart from fair procedures. He put the appellants on notice of the substance of the matters of concern which ultimately took the form of the decision to invade on 14 November 2003. He gave the appellants an opportunity to meet him, to be interviewed about these matters and to deal with them. In circumstances where he had doubts as to whether the appellants were, in fact, cohabiting, it was reasonable to propose that he would interview them separately.
54. He did not offer the appellants any opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. For reasons I have given, that was not required. In any event, it was not requested.
55. It seems that the overwhelming concern of the learned High Court judge was that the Minister, by concluding that they were not living together as husband and wife, questioned their truthfulness: accordingly, the second-named appellant had sworn a false affidavit; the first-named appellant had provided false information which reflected on him as a solicitor. That, in my view, is a mistaken interpretation of the Minister's decision. The decision concerned the question of whether the couple were living together. It was for them to place evidence of that before him. The Minister did not set out to question their truthfulness. He was entitled to test the evidence and question it, if he had doubts. It is only indirectly that the truthfulness becomes an issue. This is quite different from the Flanagan case, where the core of the allegation against the student was of plagiarism, which was essentially dishonest.
56. I do not think that the Minister departed from his obligation to respect fair procedures. I believe that he conducted open and fair correspondence with the appellants in which he expressly drew their attention to matters which concerned him. He gave them every reasonable opportunity to respond extending to an offer of an oral interview. The reality is that the first-named appellant did not accept that the Minister had any right to investigate the correctness of the declaration. He believes that his right to citizenship flowed automatically from the making of the declaration. He was unwilling to engage in the investigative process.
57. I would allow the appeal and dismiss the application for judicial review.
