Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform -v- Adach [2010] IESC 33 (13 May 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2010/S33.html
Cite as: [2010] IESC 33

[New search] [Help]

Judgment Title: Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform -v- Adach

Neutral Citation: [2010] IESC 33

Supreme Court Record Number: 413/09

High Court Record Number: 2008 153 Ext

Date of Delivery: 13/05/2010

Court: Supreme Court

Composition of Court: Hardiman J., Geoghegan J., Finnegan J.

Judgment by: Hardiman J.

Status of Judgment: Approved


Judgments by	Result	Concurring
Hardiman J.	By consent - appeal struck out	Geoghegan J., Finnegan J.

Outcome: Appeal struck out

THE SUPREME COURT

Hardiman J. 413/2009
Geoghegan J.
Finnegan J.

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM

Respondent/Applicant

and

RAFAL ADACH

Appellant/Respondent

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Hardiman delivered the 13th day of May, 2010.
This is the appellant’s appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court (Peart J.) of the 20th October, 2009, perfected the 22nd October, 2009. This ordered the appellant’s delivery to Poland on foot of a European Arrest Warrant issued on the 1st April, 2008 and subsequently executed in Ireland. The appellant brought his appeal by notice of appeal dated the 23rd October, 2009. The Minister then brought a motion dated the 19th November, 2009 seeking an order striking out the appellant’s notice of appeal and subsequently, on the 18th December, 2009, the Supreme Court directed that the following issues be tried as a preliminary issue:

“(1) Whether the provisions of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 are capable of application to the within appeal in circumstances where the appellant submits that the said Act was not published until after the High Court’s surrender hearing had concluded and after the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed in the within proceedings.

(2) Whether this appeal being an appeal brought in respect of a European Arrest Warrant endorsed by the High Court for execution and executed before the High Court, prior to the enactment of the said Act, is governed by the provisions of s.12(f) of the said Act.”

Procedural history.
The Minister contends that the present appeal is not properly before the Supreme Court because the appellant filed his appeal without seeking from the High Court the form of certification required by s.16(12) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 as amended.

The background to the case is as follows:
(1) The appellant was arrested on the 11th March, 2009 on foot of two European Arrest Warrants. He was brought before Mr. Justice Peart in the High Court. The learned judge fixed the 25th March, 2009 as the relevant date for the purpose of making a direction on the appellant’s surrender to Poland, pursuant to s.16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003. The appellant was then remanded from time to time before the High Court.

(2) On the 24th June, 2009, Mr. Justice Peart set the 20th October, 2009 as the hearing date in respect of both European Arrest Warrants. At that time the legislation governing the European Arrest Warrant procedure was the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.

(3) The President of Ireland signed the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 on the 21st July, 2009. On the 24th July, 2009 Iris Oifigiúil contained a notice stating that the 2009 Act “was signed by the President on the 21st day of July, 2009 and has accordingly become law”.

(4) On the 25th August, 2004, Statutory Instrument No. 330 of 2009, the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2009 (Commencement) (No. 3) Order 2009 brought into force the provisions contained in Part 2 of the 2009 Act relating to European Arrest Warrants.

On the 20th October, 2009 the case came before the High Court and Counsel for the appellant objected to reliance being placed on the provisions of the 2009 Act during the High Court proceedings on the basis that the Act was not published. The learned trial judge noted this objection. At the end of the hearing the appellant’s surrender to Poland was directed in relation to one only of the two European Arrest Warrants. According to the appellant, the learned trial Judge indicated that in the event of an appeal against his decision certification was not necessary.

(5) The appellant indicated that he wished to appeal from the High Court decision immediately after that decision was given. A notice of appeal was drafted and filed on the 23rd October, 2009.

On the 29th October, 2009, the matter was listed before the Supreme Court. Counsel on behalf of the Minister indicated that a motion would be brought to strike out the appeal on the basis that it was not validly before the Court.
(6) It was agreed between the parties that the Act first became available on the Oireachtas website on the 4th November, 2009, and not before.

Statutory provisions.
In what follows, only the statutory provisions precisely relevant to the matter presently before the court are considered.

Section 16(12) of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 provided as follows:

“An appeal against an order under this Section or a decision not to make such an order may be brought in the Supreme Court on a point of law only.”

That provision is amended by s.12(f) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 2009 which provides for the substitution for the words “on a point of law only” in s.16(12) of the 2003 Act of the words:

“If, and only if, the High Court certifies that the order or decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court.”

It will thus be seen that, under the 2003 Act, an appeal could be brought against an order such as that made in relation to Mr. Adach. This appeal could be brought to the Supreme Court but “on a point of law only”. As a result of the amending provision, quoted above, an appeal may be brought only if the High Court certifies that its order involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court.

Constitutional provisions.
Article 25 of the Constitution appears under the heading “Signing and Promulgation” of laws. Article 25.1 provides that:

“As soon as any Bill, other than a bill expressed to be a Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution, shall have been passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, the Taoiseach shall present it to the President for his signature and promulgation by him as a law in accordance with the provisions of this Article”.

By the next Article, the President is obliged to sign such a Bill not earlier than the 5th, and not later than the 7th, day after the date on which the Bill is presented to him.

Article 25.4 provides as follows:

“(1) Every Bill shall become and be law as on and from the day on which it is signed by the President under this Constitution and shall, unless the contrary intention appears, come into operation on that day.

(2) Every Bill signed by the President under this Constitution shall be promulgated by him as a law by the publication by his direction of a notice in the

Iris

Oifigúil

stating that the Bill has become law.”

It appears to me to follow from the foregoing that the process of promulgation consists exclusively of the publication of a notice in Iris Oifigúil, by direction of the President, stating that the Bill has become law. No other action appears to be necessary in order that the Bill becomes law and in particular the publication of the Bill itself, either in print or in electronic form, does not appear to be necessary. The Constitution might, of course, have prescribed another method of promulgating a Bill as law and it appears from an authority cited below that the European Union has in fact done so in relation to its laws. But that cannot take from the fact that the provisions of the Irish Constitution for the promulgation as law of a Bill signed by the President are as set out above.

Contentions of the Parties.
The appellant relies on Article 34.4.3 of the Constitution, which provides:

“The Supreme Court shall, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court...”.

The appellant cites from the judgment of Walsh J. in The People (AG) v. Conmey [1975] IR 341:

“I wish to express my view that any statutory provision which had as its object the excepting of some decisions of the High Court from the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, or any particular provision seeking to confine the scope of such appeals within particular limits, would of necessity have to be clear and unambiguous. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court from decisions of the High Court flows directly from the Constitution and any diminution of the jurisdiction could be a matter of such great importance that it would have to be shown to fall clearly within the provisions of the Constitution and within the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon any such legislative action.”

This passage, of course, has been approved several times since 1975 and may be regarded as uncontroversial.

The Minister, for his part, says simply that the provisions of the 2009 Act, amending those of the 2003 statute are clear and unambiguous, and were law before the hearing of the appeal.

Case law.
The respondent to the motion, Mr. Adach, relies on two decided cases. The first is a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Nolan and K. v. Russia (Application No. 2512/04; decision of the 12th February, 2009). There, the first applicant claimed inter alia that his right to liberty was infringed because he had been detained pursuant to border crossing guidelines that had never been published or made accessible to the public. The European Court of Human Rights held that:

“… Where a national law authorises deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.”

Nolan was a case where a missionary of the Unification Church (“Moonies”) was refused re-entry into Russia where his infant son awaited him. He was held overnight at an airport and was not given any reason for his detention or for the refusal to allow him back into Russia. He was later informed that he was detained because “the night shift is not too bright”.

It seems perfectly clear that that the breach of Article 5 of the Convention which was found related to the fact that a law under which the claimant was deprived of his liberty was not available to him and therefore was not sufficiently accessible, precise or foreseeable. There does not appear to be any direct comparison with the procedural law, regulating a right of appeal, which is in question in the present case.

The applicant also relies on the case of Gottfried Heinreich. This was a decision of the European Court of Justice on a preliminary reference from an Austrian Court on the question of whether a list of items prohibited from being carried as airline cabin baggage was binding on individuals if the list had not been published. It appears that Heinreich had tried to board a plane with tennis racquets in his cabin baggage.

The law in question here was a portion of Regulation No. 622/2003 laying down measures for the implementation of the “common basic standards on aviation security” as amended by Regulation 68/2004. It appears that neither of these had been published in the official journal of the European Union. Accordingly, the Court found they had no binding force insofar as they sought to impose obligations on individuals.

In so finding the Court referred to “the very wording of the provisions of Article 254(2) E.C., (one of the Treaties of the European Union), that a community regulation cannot take effect in law unless it has been published in the official journal of the European Union.

It appears to me that Heinreich is quite simply a case where the legal measure in question had not been promulgated as a law in the manner laid down by the European Treaties. It would be a case of great significance if the law in Ireland had not been promulgated as required by Article 25 of the Constitution, by the publication of the relevant notice in Iris Oifigúil by the direction of the President. But this did not occur.
It thus appears to me that the two European cases relied upon do not assist the appellant, the respondent to the motion, in any way. The law in question here, the amendment of the 2003 Act effected by the 2009 Act, as set out above, is a procedural law regulating the right of access to the Supreme Court by way of appeal. It is not a law providing for or permitting the deprivation of liberty. I entirely agree with the observations of the European Court of Human Rights about the importance of accessibility, clarity and forseeability when considering laws mandating the deprivation of a person’s liberty, but this is not a law of that sort.

Further aspects of the facts.
The affidavit on behalf of the applicant here is that of his solicitor, Mr. Brendan Moloney. Mr. Moloney deposes, as is recorded above, that the Act did not become available on the Oireachtas website until a date in early November, 2009. He does not however aver that the appellant, the respondent in the motion, was unaware of the contents of the Act nor indeed that it was unavailable to him, for example by consulting the copy required to be registered in the Office of the Supreme Court, or that he tried to do this.

Indeed, as the point was expressed in the High Court, it seems to have been based to some extent on a misapprehension. There, counsel for the appellant, Ms. McGillicuddy said, speaking of the 2009 Act:

“It has been commenced, it has not been published because we are awaiting the translation in Irish. The fact that it is now law has not been mentioned in Iris Oifigúil as is required in Article 25 of the Constitution and I am not aware of whether or not it has been enrolled in the Offices of the Supreme Court.”

This Court has, however, seen the copy of the notice inserted in Iris Oifigúil and it has not been contended that it is not a valid notice within the meaning of Article 25 of the Constitution.

It is also indicated in the affidavit of the appellant’s solicitor that the learned High Court judge, Peart J., indicated that it would be unnecessary for the applicant to seek the leave of the High Court to appeal, in accordance with the amendment introduced by the 2009 Act. But in the transcript of the High Court hearing the learned judge is recorded as saying:

“I will make it clear for the record; that by granting a stay which allows for the possibility that a notice of appeal might be filed and delivered within fifteen days from today, that stay would endure until the hearing of that appeal,

I am not indicating or finding for one moment that the new Act does not apply and that there is no requirement therefore to make an application for leave to appeal under the provisions of the new Act

. It is something that is going to have to be decided perhaps before any notice of appeal would be filed in this case. There may be an argument in relation to that. That is as much as I can do, Ms. McGillicuddy, and I think you will probably have to, if you are considering a notice of appeal…”. (Emphasis added)

It appears to me from that paragraph, firstly, that the appellant can have been under no misapprehension that the learned trial judge was simply not dealing with the question of whether a certificate from the High Court was necessary or not and indeed there was no application before him which would have required that question to be addressed. Secondly it appears from the transcript that the purport of the relevant part of the 2009 Act was known to the High Court and to all parties before it. The passage cited from the learned trial judge admits of no other possibility. There is no evidence, nor is it even asserted, that the applicant or his advisers were in fact unaware of the terms of the amended provision: indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary.

Disposition.
The question of whether a Bill passed by the Oireachtas has become law is one to be answered exclusively in terms of the Irish constitutional arrangements, which are set out in Article 25. The fact, if such were to be established, that the European Union or the Council of Europe have adopted a different method for promulgating laws which these bodies are entitled to make is of no relevance to the question of whether an Irish measure has become law in accordance with the Irish Constitution. As we have seen, this envisages promulgation as a law by the publication of a notice in Iris Oifigúil stating that the Bill has been signed by the President and has accordingly become law. It is common case that this was done. If the nature of the law thus promulgated were to permit a citizen to be deprived of his liberty under a law which was not at all accessible, this might give rise to an issue under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I express no views on the merits of any such issue. But that is not the case here: the law in question is one regulating the right of access to the Supreme Court by way of appeal, which is a type of law envisaged by the Constitution itself. Moreover, it is plain from the transcript that the appellant could have made an application for leave to appeal and that this possibility was expressly drawn to his attention by the learned trial judge.

It thus appears to me, firstly, that the provisions of the Criminal Justice [Miscellaneous Provisions] Act, 2009 are capable of application to this appeal, and do apply to it. The provisions of the statute mentioned are, by the Constitution itself, part of the law of the land “as on and from the day on which [the Bill] is signed by the President…”. The Court is bound to uphold this law. Secondly, and for the same reasons, it is clear that this appeal is governed by the law which includes the amendment to s.16(12) of the 2003 Act effected by s.12(f) of the 2009 Act.

It thus appears to me that the present appeal is not properly before the Court, no application having been made to the High Court for the certificate envisaged by the last mentioned provision.