Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

Kennelly v. Cronin [2002] IESC 77 (18 December 2002)

THE SUPREME COURT

Record No. 241/01

McGuinness J.

Geoghegan J.

Fennelly J.

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1947

BETWEEN

SUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY KENNELLY

APPLICANT

AND

MARK CRONIN, CATHERINE CRONIN, AND MARIE CRONIN

RESPONDENTS

[Judgments delivered by all members of the Court]

Judgment of Mrs Justice McGuinness delivered on the 18th day of December 2002

1.      This is Consultative Case Stated sent forward to the Supreme Court by His Honour Judge Desmond Hogan a judge of the Circuit Court sitting in Limerick. The case arose out of the hearing of a District Court appeal in which the bail of the three Respondents was estreated by the judge of the District Court. In the body of the Case Stated it is said that that the case is stated pursuant to the provisions of section 52 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961. This is incorrect. The relevant section referring to the stating of a case by a judge of the Circuit Court to this Court is section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act 1947, which is in fact correctly recited in the title to these proceedings.
2.      The facts giving rise to the Case Stated and the issues in question are set out by the learned judge of the Circuit Court as follows:-

"This is a Case Stated by me Judge Desmond Hogan a judge of the Circuit Court sitting at Henry Street in the City of Limerick, pursuant to the provisions of section 52 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, (and in pursuance of an application made to me in that behalf by Michael D. Murray, State Solicitor for Limerick City (for the determination of the Supreme Court).

1. At the sitting of the Circuit Court held at Henry Street, Limerick, on the 14^th day of February 2001 I embarked upon the hearing of an appeal from an order of the District Court made by District Judge Michael Reilly at Limerick District Court on the 16^th November 1999 of Estreatment of bail and Forfeiture of money lodged in Court against the Respondents as follows:

(a) Mark Cronin in the sum of £5,000

(b) Catherine Cronin and Marie Cronin in the sum of £10,000 each and the forfeiture of the said sum of £10,000 lodged in Court by Catherine Cronin.

I beg to refer to the order of the District Court dated the 16^th November 1999 when produced.

2. At the hearing of the said appeal the following facts were proved or admitted:

(I) The Respondent Mark Cronin was arrested and charged with the murder of Georgina O'Doherty at Limerick District Court on the 27^th May 1998 on foot of Charge Sheet No. 334/98 of Henry Street and I beg to refer to a copy of the said Charge Sheet when produced. The Respondent Mark Cronin was remanded in custody on the 27^th May 1998 to Limerick District Court on the 3^rd June 1998.

(II) The Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin was granted bail in the High Court on the 22^nd June 1998. The said order of the High Court was varied by order made on the 26^th June 1998 and I beg to refer to copies of the said orders of the High Court when produced.

(III) On the 26^th August 1998 the Respondents entered into a Recognizance before District Judge Thomas E. O'Donnell at Limerick District Court and I beg to refer to the said Recognizance when produced. A sum of £10,000 was lodged by the Respondent Catherine Cronin when entering into the Recognizance as aforesaid.

(IV) The Respondent Mark Cronin was in breach of his bail terms and an order was made by the High Court revoking the bail of the Respondent Mark Cronin and I beg to refer to a copy of the High Court Order made by His Honour (sic) Mr Justice O'Donovan on the 18^th March 1999, the Warrant for the Arrest of the Accused issued on foot of the said Order and the subsequent Order of the High Court made by His Honour (sic) Mr Justice Cyril Kelly on the 22^nd March 1999 when produced.

(V) On the 29^th March 1999 District Judge John O'Neill sitting at the Courthouse, Merchant's Quay, Limerick certified non-performance of the conditions of bail of the said Mark Cronin and he endorsed a certificate in breach of recognizance on the original recognizance entered into by the Respondents herein. I beg to refer to the said Recognizance duly certified as aforesaid when produced.

(VI) The applicant made an application to Limerick District Court on the 12^th April 1999 to Estreat the Recognizance entered into by the Respondents and to Forfeit the money lodged in Court by the Respondent Catherine Cronin.

(VII) The District Judge duly made an order Estreating the Recognizance and Forfeiting the monies lodged in court which said Order is now under appeal.

(VIII) On the 21^st October 1998 the Respondent Mark Cronin was remanded on continuing bail to Limerick District Court on the 18^th November 1998 and the District Judge ordered that the remand was peremptory as against the Prosecution, stating that if the Book of Evidence was not served the Charge Sheet would be struck out.

(IX) On the morning of the 18^th November 1998 the Respondent Mark Cronin duly appeared in answer to his bail, the Book of Evidence was not available and the Charge Sheet before the Court, Charge Sheet 334/1998 of Henry Street was struck out.

(X) Later on the same date, the 18^th November 1998, the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin was re-arrested and re-charged with the murder of Georgina O'Donnell on foot of a new Charge Sheet. It transpired that the Book of Evidence was in fact available but due to a misunderstanding had not been in Court when the case had been called earlier. Upon application on behalf of the solicitor for the accused the District judge vacated his earlier Order striking out the Charge Sheet No. 334/98 of Henry Street and re-entered the Charge Sheet. Having re-entered the Charge Sheet the District Judge remanded the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin to Limerick District Court on the 2^nd December 1998. The purpose was to avoid having to re-apply to the High Court for bail on foot of a new Charge Sheet which would also involve the relevant parties entering into a fresh Recognizance.

(XI) The accused was remanded on continuing bail on a number of occasions between the 2^nd December 1998 and the 10^th March 1999 until his bail was revoked whereupon he was remanded in custody until he was returned for trial.

(XII) Neither of the Respondents Catherine Cronin and Marie Cronin were present in the District Court on the 18^th November1998 and were not party to the application made on behalf of the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin to have Charge Sheet No. 334/98 of Henry Street re-entered. They were not on notice, did not consent in any way to the application, and they played no hand, act or part in the arrangements made to re-enter the Charge Sheet and they were complete strangers to that part of the proceedings.

3. It was contended by and on behalf of the Respondents that the Recognizance entered into on the 26^th August 1998 expired and was a spent force when the Charge Sheet 334/98 of Henry Street, Limerick was struck out on the morning of the 18^th November 1998 and that it could not be revived by the subsequent re-entering of the Charge Sheet later on the same date. In particular, it was contended that the Respondents Marie Cronin and Catherine Cronin were not present in the District Court on the 18^th November 1998, were unaware of the proceedings that took place on that date, had not consented in any way to what had happened. It was further contended that as the Recognizance had expired when the Charge Sheet was struck out and was not revived by the subsequent re-entry of Charge Sheet 334/98 of Henry Street and that it would be wrong in law to make any Order of Estreatment of bail or forfeiture of monies lodged based on the said Recognizance. It was contended in particular that once the Charge Sheet was struck out the Respondents Marie Cronin and Catherine Cronin were released from their obligations as Sureties under the Recognizance dated the 26^th August 1999 (should read 1998) and these obligations could not be re-imposed upon them by the subsequent application of the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin to have the Charge Sheet re-entered on the 18^th November 1998 with the consent of the prosecution but without any notice to the sureties and without giving them any opportunity to be heard.

4. It was contended for the applicant as follows:

(a) that the Recognizance entered into on the 26^th August 1998 was entered on foot of and as a consequence of the orders granting the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin bail made by the High Court dated the 22^nd June 1998 and 26^th June 1998 hereinbefore referred to and that the said Recognizance dated the 26^th August 1998 was clearly related to and referable to Charge Sheet 334/98 of Henry Street.

(b) That so long as Charge Sheet 334/98 Henry Street was properly before the Courts the Respondents were bound by the terms of the Recognizance.

(c) That the District Justice ...sic) acted within jurisdiction when on the 18^th November 1998 he vacated his earlier order striking out the Charge Sheet and re-entered same.

(d) That in so doing he effectively revived the Recognizance entered into by the Respondents and their respective obligations thereunder.

(XIII) I reserve my decision on the issue pending the determination of this Case Stated. The opinion of the Supreme Court is respectfully sought on the following questions:-

(a) did the Recognizance entered into by the Respondents dated the 26^th August 1998 expire and become a spent force for all intents and purposes on the 18^th November 1998 when Charge Sheet 334/98 of Henry Street was struck out by the District Court judge at Limerick District Court

or

b. Was the said Recognizance revived and become binding in every respect as against the AccusedRespondent Mark Cronin upon the granting of the application made on his behalf to have the said Charge Sheet re-entered?

c. Was the said Recognizance revived and become binding in every respect as against the Respondents Marie Cronin and Catherine Cronin when the said Charge Sheet was re-entered notwithstanding the fact that they had no notice of the application to re-enter the Charge Sheet and were not present in the District Court at the relevant time and did not play any part in this part of the proceedings?"

3.      The Cast Stated is dated the 22^nd November 2001. Exhibited with the Case Stated are the various documents referred to in the body of the Case Stated. Unfortunately the documents exhibited did not include the order or orders made by the judge of the District Court on 18^th November 1998 which are in fact the kernel of the case. Counsel for the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents provided this Court with a certified copy of the order made on 18^th November 1998 which is signed by Thomas E. O'Donnell, Judge of the District Court and the Court accepted that this was the order in question. The order sets out the name and address of the accused and the complaint set out against him in the Charge Sheet No. 334/98 of Henry Street (which is exhibited with the Case Stated). The order continues as follows:-

"IT WAS ADJDUGED AS FOLLOWS:

That the charges be struck out. On subsequent application by Mr Ted McCarthy, Solicitor for accused it was directed that said charges be re-entered by consent and it was further ordered that the accused be remanded on continuing bail to 2^nd December 1998."

Submissions

4.      Full written and oral submissions were presented on behalf of the applicant and on behalf of the second and third named Respondents. In addition oral submissions were made on behalf of the first named Respondent.
5.      Counsel for the applicants, Mr McDermott, submitted that when the judge of the District Court made his second order on the application of the first named Respondent re-entering the original charge he was in effect vacating his first order striking out that charge. When the strike-out order was vacated a situation was created whereby that order was rendered a nullity; counsel compared the position to that created by a decree of nullity which creates the position that a marriage never took place. If there had been any gap between the making of the strike-out order and the making of the re-entry order, the fact that the strike-out order was vacated closed that gap. In argument Mr McDermott accepted that this proposition was valid only if both orders were made during the course of one day. He submitted that the position of all three Respondents at the close of the Court's business on the 18^th November 1988 was precisely the same as it was at the beginning of that day; they were not in any way prejudiced.
6.      Mr. McDermott pointed out that it was common in the District Court for cases to be struck-out and subsequently re-entered during the course of a day. He relied on the concept of an order being "in the breast of the Court" and referred to a passage in O'Connor's Justice of the Peace where it was stated:

"The session of the Court is considered, in point of law, as one day, and the date thereof is the first day of holding….and therefor the Justices may alter their judgment at any time during the sessions…and this is even so where the first order has been recorded, for during the sessions such first order remains 'in the breast and power of the Court'."

7.      Counsel also referred to what he described as "the modern position" as set out by Davitt P. in The State (Kiernan) v De Burca [1963] IR 348 at 357:-

"When a Justice has pronounced his decision in a case in open Court he is not necessarily precluded from changing his mind and pronouncing a different one for, so long as there is a continuing of sitting, the order is'in the breast of the Court': per Holt J. in St. Andrew's Holborn v St. Clement Danes…he must, however, pronounce his altered decision also in open Court…"

8.      Mr McDermott also referred to the terms of the order of the High Court granting bail where it is stated that the applicants be admitted to bail pending remand and if returned for trial on the said charge pending such trial and it was also ordered that the first named applicant should not "depart or be absent from such Court at any such remand or hearing without leave and also attend any other Court to which his trial may be transferred until the charges against him shall be duly disposed of according to law."
9.      On the 18^th November 1998 the trial of the first named Respondent had not yet taken place and the charges against him had not been duly disposed of according to law.
10.      As far as the first named Respondent was concerned, it was he himself, through his solicitor, who had applied to have the original charge re-entered rather than having the new charge proceeded with. It was in his interest so to do and he deliberately did so for the reason that such a course would save him from having to make a new application for bail before the High Court. Having acted in this way the first named Respondent could not be heard to say that he was no longer bound by his bail and that his bail could not be estreated.
11.      Senior Counsel for the first named Respondent, Mr O'Hanlon, pointed out that Mr. Cronin was free to leave the District Court following the strike-out order. In fact he did so, and went to his home, where he was later arrested on the new charge. He was then brought to the District Court on foot of the new charge. Once the original charge was struck out he was no longer on bail.
12.      Mr O'Hanlon referred to section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967. Under this section it was provided that the District Court had no power to grant bail where the accused was charged with murder; only the High Court could grant bail in those circumstances. He submitted that neither had the District Court power to revive a previous bail order made by the High Court. He conceded that the re-entry of the earlier charge had been on the application of the first named Respondent's own solicitor, and that the purpose of this application was to avoid the necessity of a new application for bail to the High Court. Nevertheless, Mr O'Hanlon argued, jurisdiction in the District Court could not be created by the consent of the first named Respondent where such jurisdiction did not already exist.
13.      Senior Counsel for the second and third named Respondents, Mr Gageby, drew the attention of the Court to the wording of the Recognizance that was entered into by the bailspersons. The first and primary condition of the Recognizance was that the accused defendant would "appear before the District Court at Civic Offices, Merchant's Quay, in the County of the City of Limerick on the 23^rd day of September 1998 at 10.30 a.m. and any adjournment thereof until his presence is no longer required." Once the order striking out the charge was made Mr Cronin's presence was no longer required. He was free to leave, which he did, and the duty of his bailspersons was discharged. The recognizances had expired and were a spent force; the bailspersons were released from their obligations as sureties thereunder.
14.      Mr Gageby also referred to the order of the High Court granting bail (Kinlen J. 22^nd June 1998) which provided that:

"The said Applicant be admitted to bail pending remand and if returned for trial on the said charge pending such trial"

and that

"the above named applicant shall appear before the District Court at each and every remand and if returned for trial on each day of the hearing of his trial and any adjournment thereof and at the final determination thereof and abide by the judgment of the Court and not depart or be absent from such Court at any such remand or hearing without leave and also attend any other Court to which his trial may be transferred until the charges against him shall be duly disposed of according to law."

Once the judge of the District Court had made his order striking out the charges against Mr Cronin there no longer was any trial pending, and the charges against him had been "duly disposed of accordingly to law."
15.      The second and third named Respondents had performed their duty as bails persons. Mr Cronin had appeared to answer his bail in the District Court on the 18^th November 1998. The charges against him had been struck out and the duty of the bailspersons was at an end. The second and third named Respondents were not present in Court on that day. There was no requirement for them to be present once they had ensured that Mr Cronin himself was in Court. Mr Gageby submitted that justice was not served in the present case as the Respondents had received no notice either of the strike-out or most importantly of the application by the accused to re-enter the proceedings after his re-arrest, which re-entry amounted to an attempt to re-impose serious obligations without the respondents' consent.
16.      Counsel also argued that the orders of the District Court made on the 18^th November 1998, which were at the centre of the case, did not support the finding of the Circuit Court judge at paragraph 2(X) of the Case Stated that the order striking out was "vacated". The order of the District Court of November 18^th 1998 showed only that the charges were struck out and subsequently re-entered. He submitted that if the original order had been vacated it would mean that the order to strike out had never occurred and in those circumstances there would be no need to e-enter any proceedings. Furthermore, the need for the applicant to argue that the Recognizance had been "revived" would not arise as revival of an order was only necessary after it had expired. If, as was argued by the applicant, the practical effect of striking out the charges was that there were no substantive proceedings in being but the obligations under the original Recognizance were nonetheless able to be re-imposed without notice of re-entry, there was a continuation of something which had de facto ceased to be. The issue of notice to the second and third named Respondents was essentially one of fair procedures.
17.      As far as the argument put forward by counsel for the applicant was concerned, Mr Gageby accepted that from time to time matters were struck out and re-entered on the same day in the District Court, frequently because parties had failed to appear at, for instance, a call-over. This was largely a technical matter and was done with the consent of all parties. In the instant case, however, there was a clear gap between the strike-out order and the re-entry of the charge. The strike-out order had not been vacated; had the judge intended to vacate the order that could readily have been stated on the face of the order. Instead, the judge made a new order re-entering the charge. This was a fresh commencement of the proceedings.

Conclusions

18.      The three questions referred to this Court by the Circuit Court Judge in the Case Stated are as follows:

(I) Did the Recognizance entered into by the Respondents dated the 26^th August 1998 expire and become a spent force for all intents and purposes on the 18^th November 1998 when Charge Sheet 334/98 of Henry Street was struck out by the District Court Judge at Limerick District Court?

(II) Was the said Recognizance revived and become binding in every respect as against the Accused/Respondent Mark Cronin upon the granting of the application made on his behalf to have the said Charge Sheet re-entered?

(III) Was the said Recognizance revived and become binding in every respect as against the Respondents Marie Cronin and Catherine Cronin when the said Charge Sheet was re-entered notwithstanding the fact that they had no notice of the application to re-enter the Charge Sheet and were not present in the District Court at the relevant time and did not play any part in this part of the proceedings?

19.      It seems to me that in approaching these questions one must look in some detail at what actually occurred in Limerick District Court on the 18^th November 1998. The District Court Judge at the time of the previous remand on 21^st October 1998 had ordered that this remand was peremptory as against the Prosecution and stated that if the Book of Evidence was not served the Charge Sheet would be struck out. This was a serious step to take and all parties must have been aware of that fact.
20.      On the 18^th November Mr Cronin attended at the District Court in answer to his bail. I accept the submission of Mr Gageby that once they had ensured Mr Cronin's proper attendance there was no requirement for the second and third named Respondents to attend, and they were not, in fact, present in the Court. When the case was called on the Prosecution failed to produce the Book of Evidence. The learned District Court Judge, in accordance with his previous warning, struck out the charges against Mr Cronin. This was indeed a due disposal of the charges against him according to law. Mr Cronin left the Court a free man and went to his home.
21.      Had matters ended there, I have no doubt that at that point the Recognizances entered into by all three Respondents had expired and that they were no longer bound by them.
22.      In the Case Stated the Circuit Court Judge states (at paragraph (X)) that:-

"It transpired that the Book of Evidence was in fact available but due to a misunderstanding had not been in Court when the case had been called earlier."

As far as the immediate effect of the strike-out order is concerned, the fact that the Book of Evidence was not produced at the proper time due to a "misunderstanding" and that it was in fact available is neither here nor there; it is quite irrelevant.
23.      The next step was that later in the day Mr Cronin was arrested at his home on new charges (relating to the same alleged offences) and brought before the District Court. The new charges formed a new complaint to the District Court; one presumes that the normal procedure would have been to remand him on these charges and to order the preparation and service of a Book of Evidence. It is clear that if this course were followed bail orders and Recognizances connected to the original charges would not apply. Since a charge of murder was involved, under section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 the District Court could not have granted bail. It would have been necessary to remand Mr Cronin in custody unless and until he was granted bail by the High Court.
24.      The solicitor for the accused, Mr Ted McCarthy, then made an application to the District Court Judge asking him to re-enter the original Charge Sheet (No. 334/98) rather than proceeding on foot of the new charges. It is accepted by all parties that Mr McCarthy's motive for making this application was, in his belief, to ensure that his client would not be remanded in custody but would remain on bail.
25.      The judge acceded to this application and made an order re-entering the charges on Charge Sheet 334/98. As has already been pointed out, the wording of this order was as follows:

"It was adjudged as follows: that the charges be struck out. On subsequent application by Mr Ted McCarthy, solicitor, for accused it was directed that the said charges be re-entered by consent…."

The order does not on its face make any mention of vacating the previous order and in my view the wording of the order does not imply such vacation. On the contrary it sets out two distinct and separate actions by the judge. First, it was adjudged simpliciter that the charges be struck out, It is then stated specifically that "on subsequent application" it was directed that the charges be re-entered. The judge then ordered that the accused be remanded on continuing bail. In logic I would accept the submission of Mr Gageby that if the judge wished to vacate his original strike-out order it was open to him to do so, but that if he did so there would be no need to re-enter the charges as they would still be in existence.
26.      The second and third named Respondents were not present in Court for any of this procedure nor were they on notice of any of the relevant events.
27.      In the course of oral submissions it was established that the main plank of the applicant's argument was that any perceived "gap" between the strike-out order and the order of re-entry was closed by the fact that all the matters in question took place on one day, during a single sitting of the Court. In submitting this Mr McDermott relied on the passages cited above from O'Connor's Justice of the Peace and the dictum of Davitt P. in the State (Kiernan) v De Burca [1963] IR 348. While I accept that orders may well be altered by a judge in this way during the course of the day's session either on application by a party or of his own motion, I find it hard to accept that this practice is truly analogous to the course of events in Limerick District Court on the 18^th November 1998. It seems to me that there is a clear gap in time between the strike-out order and the re-entry order. This gap is significant precisely because during that time the first named Respondent was no longer an accused person before the Court, but a free man, and as a consequence his Recognizance and those of his bailspersons were discharged. In my opinion an alteration or later change of mind by the judge, even on the same day, could not retrospectively undo these facts. The re-entry of the charge was a fresh step by the Court which brought about a new situation.
28.      This affects the position of all three Respondents. There is, however, a vital difference between the position of the first named Respondent and that of the second and third named Respondents. Mr Cronin, through his solicitor, quite deliberately sought to create a situation where he was again bound by the Recognizance he had already given in connection with the original charges. He did so in his own interest. It seems to me that it would be verging on an abuse of process that he should now be heard to say that he is not so bound.
29.      As far as the second and third named Respondents are concerned., however, the situation is very different. Had they come into the Court after the charges had been struck out and before they were re-entered it would have been perfectly open to them to assume that their Recognizances were discharged and, on the part of Ms Catherine Cronin, to re-claim the money she had paid into Court. In that context I do not consider that it was open to the District Court judge to re-impose Recognizances on them without their agreement and without notice to them. Apart from any other considerations this is, as was submitted on their behalf by Mr Gageby, contrary to the principles of natural justice. Since I consider that these Respondents could not be bound by the order directing that the accused be remanded on continuing bail, I also consider that it is not open to the Court to estreat their bail.
30.      The answers which I would give to the questions posed in the Case Stated, therefore, are as follows:

(I) Yes.

(II) Yes.

(III) No.

THE SUPREME COURT

McGuinness J.

Fennelly J.

Geoghegan J.

341/01

IN THE MATER OF SECTION 16 OF

THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT, 1947

BETWEEN/

SUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY KENNELLY

Applicant

and

MARK CRONIN, CATHERINE CRONIN

AND MARIE CRONIN

Respondents

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Geoghegan delivered on the 18th day of

December 2002

31.      This is a consultative Case Stated sent forward to the Supreme Court by His Honour Judge Desmond Hogan a judge of the Circuit Court sitting in Limerick. The title on the Case Stated refers to section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947 which is the correct enabling section, notwithstanding the erroneous reference to section 52 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 in the body of the Case.
32.      Mrs. Justice McGuinness has set out the relevant facts contained in the Case Stated and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
33.      The case potentially raises difficult questions as to the powers of a district court judge to reinstate charges already struck out by him whether with the consent or otherwise of the actual parties to the proceedings and whether with the consent or otherwise of bailsmen who might be affected by the reinstatement and as to the effect of such an order. As it is my opinion that on quite narrow grounds the second question in the Case Stated must be answered in favour of the applicant and the third question in favour of the second and third named respondents, I do not think it wise to consider or express views on those wider matters unless it was essential to do so.
34.      The nub of the problem confronting the learned Circuit Court judge is contained in paragraph 2(x) of the Case Stated. It is worthwhile citing it in full.

"Later on the same date, the 18^th of November 1998 the accused/respondent Mark Cronin was rearrested and recharged with the murder of Georgina O'Donnell on foot of a new Charge Sheet. It transpired that the book of evidence was in fact available but due to a misunderstanding had not been in court when the case had been called earlier. Upon application on behalf of the solicitor for the accused the district judge vacated his earlier order striking out the Charge Sheet number 334/98 of Henry Street and re-entered the Charge Sheet. Having re-entered the Charge Sheet the district judge remanded the accused/respondent Mark Cronin to Limerick District Court on the 2^nd of December 1998. The purpose was to avoid having to reapply to the High Court for bail on foot of the new Charge Sheet which would also involve the relevant parties entering into a fresh recognizance."

35.      Subsequently the first-named respondent broke the conditions of his bail and the bail was revoked by the High Court. The first-named Respondent now seeks to argue that when upon his application the original charge was re-entered, his own recognizance did not revive. Since the whole purpose of the re-entry of the old charge rather than proceeding on the new charge was for the benefit of the first-named respondent so that he would not have to go through the bail procedure again, it would, be extraordinary if he could now successfully argue that he was no longer bound by his own recognizance. In my view it was implicit in his joint request with the State solicitor to re-enter the original charges that he would then be treating himself as continuing to be bound by the recognizance. Putting it another way, by actively encouraging the re-entry of the charges he was accepting that the proceedings were not finally disposed of and, accordingly, he would still be bound by his recognizance. I have arrived at this view applying general principles and without the benefit of any direct authority in point.
36.      Most of the argument at the hearing of the Case Stated related to the liability of the other two respondents. The position in relation to these two respondents is quite different. This was not a case where, for example, a proceeding was momentarily struck out because the moving party was not in court but re-entered a minute later when the moving party arrived into court and the other party was still there. In this case the judge had warned that if the State did not have its book of evidence ready by the 18^th of November, 1998 he would strike out the Charge Sheet 334/1998 of Henry Street. At the time that the judge did make the order striking out the charge, the information before him was that the book of evidence was still not available. He, therefore, did not make the order striking out the charge on foot of any mistake and he did so on substantial grounds. The bailspersons would have been entitled to believe that they were discharged of their obligations once the proceedings were struck out. Since they were not in court, the judge had no right to assume that they had any knowledge of the application to revive the charges. Clearly on the all the principles of natural justice they could not be bound by the revival order. In relation to the second and third-named respondents therefore I would answer the third question in the negative and that is sufficient to enable the learned Circuit Court judge dispose of the proceedings as against them.
37.      Mr. Paul Anthony MacDermott as counsel for the applicant and Mr. Gageby, S.C. as counsel for the second and third-named respondents have each made erudite arguments as to the jurisdiction or otherwise of the District Court judge to do what he did and as to the effect of what he did. My avoidance of any detailed treatment of those arguments is not intended as any disrespect but rather, because I think it dangerous to broaden the scope of the case unnecessarily. All sorts of contingencies happen in a District Court every day of the week. There are many circumstances in which District Court judges reinstate struck out proceedings rightly or wrongly. The District Court is a court of record and until an order made on a particular day has become the final record of that court, it cannot in all circumstances be assumed that a spoken order is the final disposal of the proceeding and, thereby in a case such as this rendering a recognizance a spent force. Perhaps I should more accurately say that this may not necessarily be the effect in all cases of a "strike out" followed by a reinstatement. I see no reason to regard the " in the breast of the court" jurisprudence referred to in the judgment of Mrs. Justice McGuinness and more fully elaborated upon at pp. 202 and 203 of O'Connor's "The Irish Justice of the Peace" 2^nd edition Part 1 should be considered outdated or no longer applicable. I am reinforced in that view by the reliance on it by Davitt P. in The State (Kiernan) v. de Burca [1963] I.R. 348 at 357.
38.      On the facts of this case and for the reasons which I have indicated, I have no doubt that the two bailspersons were released. There was a good deal of argument as to the difference between the vacating of an order and the re-entry of charges after charges had been struck out. It was the learned Circuit Court judge who used the term "vacate" and personally I do not accept Mr. Gageby's argument that it was necessarily inappropriate. In pure abstract logic of course, it is quite true that if an order striking out a charge has been vacated, then, as it were, the charge automatically stands entered. In theory, therefore, there is no need to have an express order for re-entry. Mr. Gageby argues that the reference to re-entry is inconsistent with a vacating order. I do not agree that the use of the word "re-entry" implied that it was not the vacating of an earlier order. There was nothing wrong in inserting those words for greater clarity. I also find the argument irrelevant. If a judge sets aside a charge and, therefore, in accordance with the judgment of Barr J. in Carpenter v. Kirby [1990] ILRM 764 effectively strikes out the complaint also that is a historical fact and it cannot cease to be a fact no matter what subsequent order is made. Therefore, if, for instance the first-named respondent, Mark Cronin, was entitled to go free following on that order that freedom cannot be retrospectively negatived by a subsequent order whether one calls it a vacating order or a reinstatement order or a re-entry order or anything else. In this case Mr. Cronin was brought back into the court on foot of an arrest for the purposes of a new criminal proceeding in relation to the same charge. The only real question which can arise in this case is whether on a revival of the original proceeding a recognizance can continue. I am satisfied that it can in the case of the first-named respondent and cannot in the case of the second and third-named respondent. But if, for instance, the second and third-named respondent had been present in court and had expressly agreed to the reinstatement (to use a neutral term) of the original charge I think that they would have continued to be bound by their recognizances as they would have acknowledged that the proceeding was not finally disposed of. But that question does not arise to be considered.
39.      I agree with the answers proposed by Mrs. Justice McGuinness in her judgment but in the context of the views which I have expressed in this judgment.

THE SUPREME COURT

Record No. 241/01

McGuinness J.

Geoghegan J.

Fennelly J.

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1947

BETWEEN

SUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY KENNELLY

Applicant

and

MARK CRONIN, CATHERINE CRONIN, AND MARIE CRONIN

Respondents

JUDGMENT of FENNELLY J delivered on the 18th day of December 2002

40.      For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to explain exactly which parts of the other judgments being delivered today I agree with. Firstly, it is agreed that the first two questions in the Case Stated should be answered in the affirmative and the third in the negative.
41.      I do not see any difference between the reasoning of McGuinness J and that of Geoghegan J with regard to the second question. I agree with both.
42.      With regard to the answer to the third question, I agree with McGuinness J. In reality, the central point in the case is that the second and third named respondents were entitled to be heard before they could be bound anew by the re-entry of the charges. That is a point in common between the judgments of McGuinness and Geoghegan JJ. I would simply add that I believe that, in the ordinary way, an order of a District Judge can indeed be recalled and altered in the course of the sittings in the circumstances mentioned in the applicant's submissions. That was not the problem here. It clearly could have been done, so long as the bails persons were permitted to be heard.