1. This
appeal is taken against the refusal of O’Donovan J to strike out, on the
ground of delay, an application brought by the liquidator of an insolvent
company pursuant to section 150 of the Companies Act, 1990 for an order
restricting its directors from acting as director or secretary or otherwise
participating in the promotion of a company for a period of five years.
2. That
section applies, by virtue of section 149, to any company shown to be unable to
pay its debts either at the commencement or during the course of its winding-up
and to any person who was a director at the date of or within twelve months
prior to the winding-up. It can be assumed, for the limited purposes of this
appeal, that the section applies.
3. The
most material potential relieving provision is that in section 150(2)(a) which
permits a court to decline to make a declaration if it is satisfied by a
director that he
“has
acted honestly and responsibly in relation to the affairs
of
the company and that there is no other reason why it would be just and
equitable that he should be subject to the restrictions imposed by this
section.”
4. Furthermore,
the severity of the restrictions mandated by the section is significantly
ameliorated by section 150(3). They do not affect participation in any public
company with an allotted share capital paid up in cash of £100,000. In the
case of other companies, the qualifying figure is £20,000.
5. The
liquidator, in the present case, (the Applicant, Respondent on the appeal)
having brought the application required by the section allowed it to lie in
abeyance for more than five years, before reactivating it. I will refer to him
as the liquidator. Accordingly, a chronology of the relevant facts is
essential to an appreciation of the present application.
6.
The liquidator by Notice of Motion dated 6
th
December 1994 returnable for 16
th
January 1995 gave notice to each of the directors of his intention to ask the
High Court to make an order pursuant to section 150. In his grounding
affidavit, he certified the insolvency of the company pursuant to section
149(1)(b) of the act.
7. The
application did not proceed in 1995. Two sets of legal proceedings between the
parties supervened.
8. Firstly,
the directors mounted a constitutional challenge to the relevant legislation
and in particular the power of the liquidator to certify insolvency. This was
done by means of a motion within the liquidation. In November 1995 an order was
made for the trial of this issue which was heard by Carroll J on 18
th
June 1996 and was determined by her against the directors in her judgment dated 3
rd
July 1996. (See
Carway
v Attorney General
[1996]
3 I.R. 300.)
9. Secondly,
the liquidator brought proceedings against the directors described variously as
being based on a fraudulent preference and for mismanagement of the company
(which I will call the damages claim). These proceedings were clearly serious.
They were also protracted and appear to have involved several interlocutory
motions and appeals to the Supreme Court. They were compromised on the
agreement of the directors to pay £500,000 and the costs of the
proceedings to the liquidator. The implementation of the settlement led to some
further difficulties which were not fully resolved until mid 1999.
10. The
liquidator gave notice on 10
th
March 2000 of re-entry of the Notice of Motion of 6
th
December 1994. The directors brought the present motion on 21
st
March 2000 to have that motion dismissed on the ground of excessive delay. They
said that the liquidator had delayed excessively. There was no reason for the
delay after the judgment of Carroll J in July 1996 and the liquidator had given
no satisfactory explanation for his subsequent delay of three years and nine
months. They also said that they had assumed that the matter of the declaration
was no longer being pursued especially after the December 1998 settlement.
11. O’Donovan
J noted that the directors accepted that the delay during the currency of the
constitutional proceedings was excusable. He also held that the delay during
the period of processing of the damages claim was totally reasonable. If the
directors had successfully defended those proceedings, they would probably have
succeeded also in resisting the section 150 motion.
12. The
directors have not contested that aspect of the decision of the learned trial
judge. Thus the crucial period is that between the conclusion of the damages
claim and the notice of re-entry. In this respect, the liquidator accepted that
the delay was inexcusable, but said that it was not inordinate. The learned
trial judge disagreed. He held that this period of delay was both inordinate
and inexcusable. The liquidator has not challenged that conclusion.
13. The
learned trial judge cited the decision of this Court in
Primor
plc v Stokes Kennedy Crowley
[1996]
2 I.R. 459 to the effect that
“even
where the delay has been both inordinate and inexcusable the court must
exercise a judgment on whether, in its discretion, on the facts the balance of
justice was in favour of or against the case proceeding.”
Pointing
out that this passage showed that he had to exercise a discretion which
required him to take into account a number of considerations relevant to where
that balance of justice lay, he posed the question as to whether
“the
delay has given rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a
fair trial or is likely to cause or has caused serious prejudice to the
Respondents.”
In
his conclusion on this issue, the learned trial judge observed the very
general nature of the prejudice relied upon by the directors and referred to
the public interest, admitted by the directors, in seeing that unsuitable
persons should not be directors of companies. He did not consider the
defendants right to a fair trial had been compromised and dismissed the motion.
15. It
is common case that, in an appropriate case, the Court has jurisdiction to
dismiss an application of the sort at issue here on the ground of excessive
delay. The criteria are those laid sown in
Primor,
and
in particular in the following passage from the judgment of Hamilton C.J. (Page
475):
16. One
of the particular considerations to be taken into account in the present case
is the intrinsic character of the proceeding itself. It is right to point to
the mandatory character of the court’s jurisdiction. (See the judgment of
Murphy J in
Business Communications Limited v Keith Baxter and another,
unreported
21
st
July 1995.) The use of the word, “shall” connotes an obligation to
make the declaration in the ordinary case, though the relieving provision of
section 150(2) significantly qualifies that. It was fairly and properly
accepted on behalf of the directors both in the High Court and at the hearing
of the appeal that the section gives effect to a public interest in seeing that
persons should no longer enjoy the unqualified right to become involved in the
formation of companies, where they have been directors of companies which have
failed due to insolvency. That public interest diminishes, it was said, when
there is excessive delay such as in the present case. That proposition was
contested by counsel for the liquidator, though he ultimately accepted that
the public interest in question may be outweighed if there is such delay as to
put a just and fair hearing at risk.
17. While
it is true that there are a number of significant differences between section
150 and the provisions of the Companies Directors Disqualification Act 1986 in
England, none of them seems to me to affect the appropriateness of the approach
adopted in the Court of Appeal to the exercise of the jurisdiction to strike
out an application for a disqualification order under the legislation on the
grounds of delay. In
Re
Manlon Trading Ltd.
[1995]
BCLC 578, Staughton L.J. (at page 592) said that
“the
public interest in the disqualification of unfit directors may ...... have to
yield to the lapse of time.”
The
question he posed was
“whether
that public interest is outweighed by the requirements of justice in the
particular circumstances of the particular case.”
18. However
it is expressed, I think the result is the same. There is a public interest
represented by the section. However, excessive delay may render it unjust to
permit the liquidator to proceed with his application.
20. It
cannot be contested that the directors have had at all material times a right
to a fair and speedy trial of the issue as to whether their normal rights to
become directors and promote and take part in the formation of companies should
be limited restricted or taken away. It is unnecessary, in order to establish
the existence of this right, to resort to the European Convention, however
undisputed the value of the rights guaranteed by that instrument at
international level may be. It is inherent in the notion of fair procedures
guaranteed by the Constitution, as is clear from the passage from
Primor
cited
above, and identified in a long line of cases. (See, for example, in the field
of criminal justice,
S.F.
v Director of Public Prosecutions
[1999] 3 I.R. 235.)
21. In
the present case, it appears to me that the real question is not the existence
of the right but whether it has been violated. A court will not so readily
infer a violation of a right where its beneficiary had at his disposal the
means for its protection and failed to avail of them. This is apparent from
several of the subheadings, in particular (d) of the passage quoted above from
Hamilton C.J. Litigation, and more particularly civil litigation in our system
of law is, as the learned Chief Justice said
“a
two party operation.”
It is notorious that a defendant, in making the finely balanced decision as to
whether he should bring a motion to dismiss, is conscious on the one hand of
the possible preference for “letting sleeping dogs lie” and, on the
other, that he may be accused of lack of vigilance in the protection of his own
rights when he brings such a motion after a long delay by the opposing party.
Finlay P, as he then was, said in his judgment in
Rainsford
v Limerick Corporation
(unreported
judgment of July 1979, but now reported at [1995] I.L.R.M. 561]):
22. When
considering, in this context, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
it is important to recall that the parties in our adversarial system enjoy
greater rights to take the initiative to protect their interests than may in
some cases arising from legal proceedings in contracting states outside the
common-law tradition. For example, in
Capuano
v Italy
[
13 E.H.R.R. 271] a first instance court was considered responsible for a three
year delay in the preparation of experts’ reports. Nonetheless, where the
relevant codes of civil procedure leave matters to the initiative of the
parties, that will, in fact, be taken into account by that court. (See
Vernillo
v France
E.H.R.R. ?? Reference) Needless to say, it is also important to remember that
the decisions of the European Court concern the responsibility not of
individuals but of contracting states under the Convention. The court does not
concern itself with whether particular proceedings should be dismissed by
reason of delay.
23. In
the present case, the relevant period of delay is either from December 1998 or
mid- 1999 to March 2000. The directors, through the affidavit sworn by their
solicitor, claim merely to have taken for granted that the matter was not being
pursued. They made no enquiry from the liquidator, who had been pursuing them
for substantial damages for several years, as to whether this was correct. They
furnish no rationale for this conclusion. Indeed, to the extent that any
rationale can be deduced, it would seem to run to the contrary of this
argument. However, any comment on aspect of the matter should be reserved so as
not to prejudice the hearing of the motion. I am satisfied that this argument
is without merit.
24. The
other issue is prejudice. Only the most general prejudice is alleged. Firstly,
the allegation of the existence of prejudice by reason of the pendency of the
proceedings seems contradicted by two matters. Firstly, during the greater part
of the period, the liquidator was pursuing serious claims for damages against
the directors personally. That would appear, on the facts of this case, likely
to have been at least as prejudicial to their reputations as the effect of the
pendency of the section 150 motion, indeed probably more so. In any event,
prejudice arising from the pendency of the application is so some extent the
inevitable result of the expectation, even if an obligation is not to be
presumed, of the liquidator to bring an application under the section
(admittedly the section is silent on this – see Murphy J in
Business
Communications,
cited
below
).
It is only to the extent that the application is pending for an excessively
long period, that relevant prejudice can be invoked. Peter Gibson L.J. stated
in
Manlon
Trading: “Prejudice resulting from the mere pendency of proceedings if
not caused by such delay, seems to me to be irrelevant.”
In
the result
,
the
relevant period
in
the present case, is that which occurred after the conclusion of the
settlement of the damages claim. In respect of that precise period, the
directors have in fact said not that they were prejudiced but that they had
taken for granted that the application was not proceeding.
25. The
remaining matter is the claimed general prejudice necessarily occasioned by
delay in any civil action and consisting of the dimming of memories, the loss
of evidence and any other elements tending to compromise the fairness of the
hearing. Here, it is notable that the directors enjoy the right to seek to
persuade the court of their effective stewardship of the affairs of the company
– that they acted “honestly and responsibly.” They may bring
forward evidence to establish that fact. If they were truly placed at a
disadvantage in attempting to exercise that statutory right, that would be a
most relevant consideration on the hearing of a motion to dismiss the
liquidator’s application, but it is clear from the cases that the burden
of proof of that fact lies on the applicant, in this case the directors. As is
admitted, they have produced no such evidence. That is not surprising. The
directors were on notice from an early date of the existence of the
application. They were fully aware of its importance to the extent of bringing
a constitutional challenge to the validity of the section. Furthermore, they
were engaged for some four to five years in protracted litigation with the
liquidator about their management of the company. There is, in short, no basis
for presuming prejudice. In my view, prejudice will not be presumed.