1. The applicant was unaware of the alteration in the plans until shortly before the institution of these proceedings.

2. On the 11th October 1999, the High Court (Barr J.) gave the applicant leave to apply by way of an application for judicial review for an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent to grant planning permission [*3] for the development. While leave was given on a number of grounds, those most strongly relied on by the applicant were:

3. Statements of opposition having been filed on behalf of the respondent and the notice party, the application for judicial review came on for hearing before Butler J. In a reserved judgment delivered on the 19th July last, he dismissed the applicant’s claim, holding inter alia that the development for [*4] which permission was granted was not materially different from that which was the subject of the application but that, in any event, a planning authority was entitled to grant permission for a development substantially different from that originally applied for. The learned trial judge also said that he was satisfied that anyone interested in retail warehousing in the area in question was properly put on notice that application was being sought for a permission for retail warehousing and that information as to the modified plans was available to the public. He also said that he was satisfied that the respondents took into account the substance of the policy criteria laid down in the relevant statutory instrument.

4. The applicant then applied to the learned High Court judge for a certificate that his decision involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to this court. That application was refused by the learned High Court judge on the 31st July last.

5. The applicant then brought this motion in this court in which it seeks

6. The application was heard by this court on the 19th December last, on which day the court announced that it would refuse to grant the order sought at (1) above and would give its reasons at a later date. It was indicated on behalf of the applicant that the application for the relief sought in (2) and (3) above was not being pursued. The court now gives its reasons for its refusal to grant the relief sought in (1) above. [*6] Section 19 of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1992, provided inter alia for new procedures in relation to applications for judicial review in respect of planning decisions. The major features of the new procedure were a requirement that any such application should be made within two months from the date on which the decision was given, without any provision for extension of that period, that the application for leave should be by way of notice of motion rather than ex-parte, and that such leave should not be granted unless the High Court was satisfied that there were substantial grounds for contending that the decision was invalid. In addition, s. 19 amended the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1963 by inserting in s. 82 the following provision:

7. The basis on which the applicant claims to be entitled to an order under (1) above can be summarised as follows. Article 34.4.3 of the Constitution provides that

8. It will be seen that the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant in that case was precisely the same as that put forward on behalf of the applicant in the present case. Barrington J. dealt with it as follows:

9. Assuming for a moment that the construction advanced of the section in that case and again in this case was at least arguable, that would not be [*11] enough to justify this court in declining to follow its earlier decision. As Henchy J. pointed out in Mogul of Ireland .v. Tipperary (NR) C.C. (1976) IR 261 at p. 272:-

10. In the earlier decision of Attorney General .v. Ryan’s Car Hire Limited (1965) IR 642, it had been held that, where the court was clearly of opinion that an earlier decision was erroneous, it should be at liberty to refuse to follow it, at all events in exceptional cases, such as where some point had been entirely overlooked or conceded without argument.

11. To say that the construction of the section which found favour with this court in the earlier decision is so clearly wrong that there are compelling reasons for now not following it is a wholly unsustainable proposition. The court has no hesitation in rejecting the invitation to overrule its earlier decision in Irish Asphalt Limited .v. An Bord Pleanála .

12. It remains to be noted, as was emphasised by Barrington J. in his judgment in Irish Asphalt , that the policy considerations underlying the relevant provisions of s. 19 are clear. The rigid time limit within which proceedings must be brought and the requirement that leave be granted for such proceedings only where substantial grounds are shown reflect the view of the Oireachtas that there should be a greater degree of certainty and expedition in the determination of such proceedings. The restriction of a right of appeal to this court to those cases where the High Court certifies that a point of law of exceptional public importance is involved similarly reflects that policy. It would be in the teeth of it if this court were to construe the provisions as enabling an appeal in every case to be brought from either the refusal to grant such a certificate or, indeed, the grant of the certificate. That would involve this court in at least some consideration of the merits of the substantive decision in the High Court, entirely contrary to the philosophy which clearly prompted the relevant provisions.