Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. Charles Coonan, the above named Plaintiff (Mr Coonan), was appointed as State Solicitor for the area of North Kildare/ Wicklow in August, 1974, upon the terms of a document described as “Conditions of Appointment” dated the 14th day of August, 1974. The first paragraph of that document was expressed in the following terms:-

2. Unquestionably it had been the invariable practice before 1974 and for at least 20 years thereafter for a year by year extension to be granted up to the age of 70 years to any State Solicitor who applied for it. Mr Coonan was well aware of that practice.

3. On the 14th of January, 2000, Mr Coonan, who would attain the age of 65 years on the 5th November, 2000, applied for renewal. He met with the Chief State Solicitor in the same month who told him he was not going to be renewed after the age of 65 years. The Attorney General on the 5th February, 2000, in accordance with a change in policy, made a decision that no extension should be granted. On the 18th February, 2000, the Director of Public Prosecutions informed Mr Coonan that there would be no extension and by letter dated the 7th of March 2000 the Chief State Solicitor gave formal notice to that effect.

4. On the 4th October, 2000, Mr Coonan instituted plenary proceedings claiming a declaration that he was entitled to continue as State Solicitor for the area to which he had been appointed and an injunction restraining the Defendants from appointing any person as State Solicitor in his place. In addition to other relief, Mr Coonan claimed damages for breach of contract.

5. In the statement of claim delivered on the 13th November, 2000, Mr Coonan having asserted the material facts to which I have referred went on to say:-

6. The defence might be summarised by saying that the Defendants admitted the facts alleged in the statement of claim but denied the inferences and conclusions of law drawn therefrom. In particular the Defendants contended that the conditions of appointment conferred on the Attorney General “a lawful discretion” to extend the Plaintiff’s age of retirement with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance to any age not exceeding 70 years: that such discretion had been exercised lawfully to extend the Plaintiff’s age of retirement up to and including the 31st January, 2001, but no further. In the reply delivered on the 14th December, 2000, Mr Coonan denied (among other things) that the Attorney General had lawfully exercised the discretion aforesaid.

7. Because of the urgency of the matter for both the Plaintiff and the Defendants the matter was processed with commendable speed. It was heard by Ms Justice Carroll on the 23rd and 24th of January, 2001, and she delivered her judgment on the 31st of January, 2001, in pursuance of which it was ordered that Mr Coonan was entitled to recover against the Defendants damages in the sum of £100,000 together with the costs of the proceedings. It is from that judgment and order that the Defendants appeal to this Court.

8. The Defendants/Appellants submitted that no term could be inferred into the contractual relationship between the parties which would be inconsistent with the discretion expressly conferred upon the Attorney General . It was argued - and the evidence appears to have supported the fact - that Mr Coonan had not altered his position to his detriment as a result of the established practice concerning extensions and consequently a claim based on estoppel could not succeed. The Appellants submitted that an issue of legitimate expectations could not arise in what was in essence a commercial contract between the Attorney General and a solicitor for the provision of legal services by the latter. However, the main thrust of the argument made by Counsel on behalf of the Appellants was that nowhere - not in the pleadings, the particulars furnished or the written submissions in the High Court or this Court - had Mr Coonan specified the nature, scope or terms of the right on which he relied. Mr McDonagh, SC, for the Appellants, pointed out that the judgment of the learned trial Judge did not identify any such right. Mr McDonagh posed the question which was not merely rhetorical but, in the existing circumstances, hypothetical, namely:-

9. As the post held by Mr Coonan had been filled before Ms Justice Carroll delivered her judgment the possibility of referring the matter back to the Attorney General was not then a realistic option. Less still could that procedure be adopted now. Nevertheless it is, in my view, the difficulty in answering the hypothetical question which underscores the infirmity in Mr Coonan’s case.

10. It was conceded by Mr Condon, SC, on behalf of Mr Coonan that the word “may” in the Conditions of Appointment conferred on the Attorney General a discretion. Rightly, in my view, Mr Condon did not seek to argue that the word “may” should be interpreted as “shall”. What then is the limitation on the exercise of this discretion? Was it to be inferred that the Attorney General would afford every outgoing state solicitor an opportunity of being heard in relation to the decision to extend his term of office in a procedure analogous to that required by the decision of the House of Lords in The Council of Civil Service Unions .v. The Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. Did the alleged rights of Mr Coonan go beyond the merely procedural? Was the Attorney General bound to review the conduct and capacity of Mr Coonan and, if so, by reference to what standard? Did the Attorney General owe any duty to the office holder in relation to the exercise of the contracted discretion? Mr McDonagh explored some of these possibilities but with understandable frustration. He did not know with any degree of particularity the term which Mr Coonan claimed was implied in the contract or the restrictions allegedly imposed on the exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion.

11. The learned trial Judge understandably expressed concern for Mr Coonan having regard to the impact of the Attorney General’s decision on his career and expressed her conclusions in law in the following terms (at page 11 of the transcript):-

12. It is difficult to reconcile that conclusion with the discretion expressly and admitted conferred on the Attorney General by the conditions of his appointment. It seems to me that this decision necessarily involves the substitution of an obligation for a discretion subject to the qualification that the discretion could be restored to the Attorney General on his giving reasonable, but undefined notice, to Mr Coonan and presumably all other State Solicitors. I cannot envisage the officious bystander postulated in Shirlaw .v. Southern Foundries [1926] LDD 1939 2 KB 206 (and more recently by this Court in Carna Foods Ltd .v. Eagle Star Insurance (Ireland) Ltd [1997] 2 IR 193) suggesting a provision to that effect. Less still could I envisage either party testily suppressing his intervention with a common “Oh of course”. At the very least such a suggestion would give rise to debate and the very existence of debate would preclude the implication of the suggested term. Nor can I see any basis on which the ill defined and inadequately explored doctrine of legitimate expectations could be invoked so as to prevent successive Attorneys General exercising or declining to exercise the discretion expressly reserved to them simply because a practice or pattern could be identified which indicated that for many years the discretion had in fact been exercised one way rather than another. Even in that context the question would arise “What was it that the office holder was led to expect?”. The much quoted case of Webb .v. The Attorney General [1988] 1 IR 353 Finlay CJ (at 384) seems to have cast doubt upon the existence of any such right of action when he said:-

13. It was in that context that Finlay CJ quoted with approval certain passages from the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Amalgamated Property Company .v. Texas Bank [1982] QB 84 on which considerable reliance was placed by Counsel on behalf of Mr Coonan. In his judgment in Wiley .v. The Revenue Commissioners [1993] ILRM 482 Mr Justice O’Flaherty repeated the observations which I have quoted from the judgment of Finlay CJ in the Webb Case and went on to analyse the evolution of the doctrine of legitimate expectations. In concluding that it had no application to the claim of the plaintiff to the repayment of excise duty in accordance with certain representations made to him O’Flaherty J said (at page 494):-

14. Even if the relationship between the Attorney General (or the Director of Public Prosecutions) and a state solicitor is to be seen as a matter of public law to which the doctrine of legitimate expectations applied, it would seem to me that the judgment of Mr Justice O’Flaherty would preclude Mr Coonan obtaining any substantive benefit.

15. At the end of the day the learned trial Judge awarded Mr Coonan a sum of £100,000 by way of damages. Of course the trial Judge had been placed in the difficult position that Mr Coonan could not be restored to his post so that any review of his circumstances by the Attorney General would have been meaningless. At the same time, Carroll J had received evidence that the remuneration of state solicitors had been, or was about to be, increased to £35,000 per annum. The award of £100,000 therefore would appear to represent effectively the full value of a claim for wrongful dismissal on the basis that the “employee” was entitled to three years notice of termination. Indeed recognising that Mr Coonan had given evidence, that in the event of his ceasing to be State Solicitor, he would discontinue the employment of one typist, it may be that the award represented the full amount of the loss which Mr Coonan would sustain over a period of five years. If the notice which it was held that he was entitled to receive of any change of policy was, say, twelve months - which would be the longest period that one could envisage as appropriate notice to determine a contract of employment from year to year - that computation could not be justified.

16. Whilst I share entirely the views of the learned trial Judge as to the harshness of the decision of the Attorney General and the effect which it had upon the understandable - if not legitimate - expectations of Mr Coonan, I do not accept that the Plaintiff has made out a case in law to recover damages for breach of contract or otherwise against the Defendants. I would allow the appeal.

17. On the 14th of August 1974, the plaintiff was appointed State Solicitor for the area of north Kildare/Wicklow. As in the case of all State Solicitors since the foundation of the State until quite recent times the plaintiff was required to sign a document under which he agreed to accept and comply with certain specified conditions of appointment. These were the same conditions of appointment as were invariably used. For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to consider the exact legal nature of the office of State Solicitor. Even if, for some purposes, his office might be regarded as being governed by public law (and I am expressing no opinion whatsoever on this matter) it is the contractual terms of his appointment and matters arising therefrom which are in issue in this case ,which was an ordinary action commenced by plenary summons and not, in any sense, an application for judicial review. For the most part in so far as the action is founded directly on contract paragraph 1 of the conditions of appointment is the relevant provision. I think it best to set out that paragraph and then in the light of it explain what the issues between the parties are. Paragraph 1 reads as follows:-

18. When the plaintiff was reaching the age of sixty-five years he applied, as most of his colleagues had done over many years, for an extension. Apart from a very minimal extension which the plaintiff was ultimately given this was refused and it was refused on the grounds of a new policy which the Attorney General was adopting. That policy was that there would be no more extensions after the age of sixty-five years unless there were exceptional circumstances. I do not find it necessary to set out in this judgment the history of how this policy came about. It is sufficient to state that the policy was decided upon.

19. There is a further refinement to be made in relation to issue No. 1. The contractual issue was argued on behalf of the plaintiff in the High Court effectively on two alternative fronts though it was never put like that. As it happens, the books of transcript from the High Court include argument as well as evidence and it emerges from Book 1 of the transcript that Mr. Condon, S.C. opened the case on behalf of the plaintiff on the basis that the Attorney General was contractually obliged to grant the extensions provided that there was no health problem and that the word “ may” in the first sentence of Condition No. 1 connoted merely an enabling provision allowing the Attorney General actually to grant the extension in such circumstances. On this interpretation the Attorney General would have no discretion. The question of the role of the Minister for Finance has never really featured and I think that it would be accepted by all sides that it would be fiscal matters with which the Minister for Finance would be concerned and I do not think that his role is relevant to the issue.

20. Mr. Ercus Stewart, S.C., also acting for the plaintiff, argued the contractual points slightly differently in his closing of the case in the High Court. At p. 108 of Book 2 of the transcript he is reported as having said as follows:-

21. While therefore Mr. Condon was making the bolder argument that there was no discretion left to the Attorney General, if there was good health, Mr. Stewart was modifying that somewhat by arguing that even if the Attorney General did have a discretion under the contract, he was not contractually permitted to adopt a policy fettering his own discretion. At the hearing of the appeal Mr. Condon ultimately conceded that the Attorney General did have some discretion.

22. Carroll J., in the High Court, delivered a reserved judgment in which having referred to the evidence of a former Chief State Solicitor, Mr. Dockery, and the State Solicitor for Limerick, Mr. Murray, who was also President of the State Solicitors Association, which was to the combined effect that over many years renewals were more or less routine, she expressed strong adverse views as 1to the manner in which the plaintiff had been treated by the State and she held in his favour. The defendants have appealed that decision to this court. Carroll J., in her judgment, chose not to analyse what exactly the contractual terms were but preferred to base her decision on estoppel arising out of the manner in which the Attorney General, over many years, had exercised his contractual discretion. At p. 10 of her judgment she said the following:-

23. Counsel for the Attorney General, Mr. McDonagh, S.C., argued very forcefully by reference to case law that the doctrine of legitimate expectation had no place in private law but only in public law. But in view of the fact that the Amalgamated Property Company Limited was a private law case and not a public law case, I do not think that this issue really arises. It would seem that it was more on the basis of estoppel than legitimate expectation that the learned trial judge came to her decision.

24. Mr. McDonagh also drew to the attention of the court difficulties in the way of the plaintiff succeeding on the basis of estoppel and these are referred to in the judgment of Murphy J., but as I have formed the view that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed at any rate on foot of his contract with the Attorney General, I do not find it necessary to consider the application of the principles of estoppel.

25. I return therefore to the contract. It may be at least arguable, as originally suggested by Mr. Condon, that the Attorney General was contractually obliged to renew subject only to health problems but I am inclined to the view that that is not a correct interpretation, having regard to the use of the word “ may”. I find it difficult to follow how the word “ may” in the context could connote merely an enabling provision. In this exercise one is not construing a statute or a statutory instrument and it would be absurd to suggest that Mr. Coonan could enable the Attorney General to do something. I am satisfied, therefore, that over and above the health question the Attorney General does have a residual discretion which could be exercised against renewal in particular circumstances and in a particular case. But I am in complete agreement with the more modified contractual argument to the effect that the Attorney General was not entitled to introduce a blanket policy. When I say that he was not entitled to do so, I mean that he was not contractually entitled to do so. Obviously, the Attorney General can have any kind of policy and, indeed, such a policy may well have been very sensible. But he may, in any given instance, be precluded contractually from implementing it. I believe that that is the case here. During all the years that the plaintiff was a State Solicitor he might have from time to time looked at his own contract, and if he did so, it would have been clear to him that by the plain words of Condition No. 1 he was given, at the very least, the hope of being considered for renewal on his own individual circumstances if he should make an application for renewal after sixty-five. It would never have occurred to him that that discretion in the Attorney General for which he had been guaranteed in the contract would be at the relevant time effectively removed. In order to construe Condition No. 1 in this way, I do not think that it is necessary to imply any term. This would seem to be the natural interpretation of the express term but if it is necessary to imply a term, I would have no hesitation in doing so. It must surely have been an attractive feature for most applicants for State Solicitorships over the years that they would have the expectation, or at the very least, the reasonable hope that they could remain at the job until seventy. The absence of any pension made this of considerable importance.

26. I am firmly of opinion, therefore, that the Attorney General has been in breach of contract and I agree with the view of the learned trial judge that the only practical remedy now is damages. It is not entirely clear how Carroll J. arrived at the figure of £100,000, but I think that it was a reasonable figure. She had evidence before her of the annual salary which the plaintiff was receiving, a figure in the order of £27,000 and she had been told that a substantial increase was likely to emerge from the report of the Buckley Review Body. That report was published shortly before the judgment and it did recommend increases which would have brought the salary, if implemented, to £35,000. I do not think that the learned trial judge was making an exact calculation of loss of earnings. In arriving at her figure, the learned trial judge was entitled to have regard to the earnings. While there could have been no guarantee that the plaintiff would have been retained till seventy even if the Attorney General properly exercised his discretion, the learned judge was entitled to weigh up the probabilities especially in the context that the Attorney General had elected to defend the action solely on the basis of policy with no suggestion of ill health or unsuitability on the part of the plaintiff. In all the circumstances, the justice of the case is met by the award of £100,000 and I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.