Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. Seo achomharc ó bhreithiúnas agus órdú na hÁrd Chúirte (Laffoy B.) inar dhiúltaigh an Breitheamh léannta iarratas an Iarratasóra/Achomharcach Órdaithe Thoirmisc agus Órdaithe Dearbhaithe tré Athbhreithniú Breithiunach. Tá sé de bhuntáiste agam breithiúnais Hardiman B agus Geoghegan B. a léamh sul ar scríobhas an breithiúnas seo.

2. Tá fíricí an ábhair seo agus stair na n-imeachtaí leagtha amach go coimsitheach i mbreithiúnas Hardiman B. agus ní gá dom-sa iad a athrá arís go mion annseo.

3. Go h-achomair, tháinig an tIarratasóir/Achomharcach ós comhair na Cúirte Dúiche ar an 18 Meán Fomhair 1997 agus e cúisithe maidir le cionta i gcoinne Alt 49(3) agus (6)(a) den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1961, arna chur isteach ag Alt 10 den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994. Is cainteoir Gaeilge é an tIarratasóir ar seirbheáladh toghairm air ins an teanga Gaeilge agus a phlé i nGaeilge leis na Gárdaí Síochána i gcónaí maidir leis an ábhar seo. Chuir sé in iúl don Chúirt gur mhian leis e féin a chosaint i nGaeilge agus gur mhian leis go seirbheálfaí na cáipéisí cui air i nGaeilge. D'iarr sé go háirithe leagain Ghaeilge den Acht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994, an tAcht um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1995, agus Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997. Ní raibh ceachtar den dá Acht de chuid an Oireachtais ná na Rialacha le fáil i nGaeilge.

4. Dá bhárr seo cuireadh an cás ins an gCúirt Dúiche siar ó am go h-am chun deis a thabhairt do údaráis an Stáit na cáipéisí a chur ar fáil agus le na chintiú go mbeadh Breitheamh ag a raibh labhairt na Gaeilge ar fáil leis an gcúis a éisteacht. Bhí an cás liostaithe ós comhair an Chéad Fhreagróir ar an 13 Feabhra 1998. Um a dtaca sin bhí "dréacht" nó aistriúchán neamh-oifigiúil de na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre 1994 agus 1995 tugtha don Iarratasóir, ach ní raibh aon aistriúchán de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche curtha ar fáil.

5. Ar an 13 Feabhra 1998 rinne an tIarratasóir tríd a abhcóide iarratas ar an bhFreagróir céad luaite órdú a thabhairt don Fhreagróir dara luaite na cáipéisí cui a chur ar fáil. Dhiúltaigh an Breitheamh Dúiche léannta don iarratas seo.

6. D'eisigh an tIarratasóir ansin na h-imeachta athbhreithniú breithiúnach seo. Ar an 19 Marta 1998 thug an Árd Chúirt (Smyth B.) cead athbhreithniú breithiúnach a eisiúint ar lorg na bhfaoisimh seo leanas:

7. Teaspáineann na mionnscríbhinni forais atá comhadaithe ins na h-imeachta iarrachta attornae an Iarratasóra na cáipéisí a h-iarradh a fháil, agus na freagraí a fritheadh ó áisínteachta éagsúla an Stáit. Tá sé soiléar on gcomhfhreagras a teaspáineadh gur éiríodh as an gcleachtadh uathoibritheach aistriúcháin oifigiúla Gaeilge ar gach Acht de chuid an Oireachtais a chur ar fáil thart ar an mbliain 1980. Is é imleabhar 1980 de na Reachta an ceann deireadh a foillsíodh in Gaeilge agus i mBéarla. Is cosúil an cleachtadh atá anois i bhfeidhm a bheith bunaithe ar Chiorclán den dáta 23 Feabhra 1998 atá luaite ag attornae an Iarratasóra ins an mionnscríbhinn a mionnaíodh ar an 18 Márta 1999. Sheol príomh-aistritheoir Rannóg an Aistriúcháin de chuid Tithe an Oireachtais an ciorclán chuig gach Roinn Rialtais. Séard atá sa Chiorclán ná ráiteas nach n-aistreofar aon Ionstraim Reachtúil go Gaeilge de bharr ganntanas fóirne agus brú oibre muna gcuirfí teastas sainiúil ar fáil a déarfadh go raibh riachtanas trom nó gá phráinneach le aistriúchán Gaeilge de Ionstraim Reachtúil sainiúil agus sin sínithe ag oifigeach nach ísle a ghrád na Leas-Rúnaí Roinne.

8. Níor teaspáineadh an ciorclán seo leis an mionnscríbhinn ach in argúintí os comhair na Cúirte seo níor séanadh gur mar seo atá cúrsaí. Níor cuireadh aon fhianaise ós comhair na hÁrd Chúirte nó na Cúirte seo a thiúrfadh le fios gur eisíodh aon teastas den tsórt fós maidir le Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997. I mionscríbhinn freagrach thar cheann na bhFreagróirí dearbhaíonn an Ceannfort William Collins de chuid An Roinn Tráchta, Caisleán Bhaile Átha Cliath, go bhfuill fáisnéis aige ó Tony Fagan de chuid Oifig an Phríomh Attornae Stáit

9. Más fíor, mar is cosúil é a bheith, nach bhfuil aon teastas práinne eisithe fós, ní léir gur móide ar bith é go gcuirfear aistriúchán de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche ar fáil aon am gur féidir anois sin a mheas.

10. Tháinig athbhreithniú breithiúnach an Iarratasóra chun éisteachta ós comhair na hÁrd Chúirte (Laffoy B.). Thug an breitheamh léannta a breithiúnas forcoimeádta ar an 17 Meitheamh 1999. Ar an dáta sin dhein sí ordu ag diúltú an faoiseamh a bhí an tIarratasóir ag lorg. Ina breithiúnas thug Laffoy B. suntas do gur ghlac na Freagróirí go raibh dualgas ar an Stát tiontú oifigiúil de gach Acht den Oireachtas a chur amach (leathanach 4). Chuir sí ar shúile freisin nach raibh sé soiléar cioca ar admhaigh na Freagróirí nó nár admhaigh go raibh siad faoin oibleagáid chéanna maidir le Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997. Chuir na Freagróirí in iúl, áfach, don bhreitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte go raibh sé ar intinn acu aistriúchán oifigiúil de na Rialacha 1997 a chur ar fáil "as soon as possible" . Ina breithiúnas thagair Laffoy B. do bhreithiúnas Ó hAnluain B. i gcúis Delap v. An tAire Dlí agus Cirt agus Daoine Eile [1980 - 1998] Tuairiscí Speisialta 46 . Sa chás sin rinne an tIarratasóir, attornae a bhaineadh leas as an nGaeilge ina chleachtadh dlí, gearán nach raibh aistriúchán oifigiúil de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna 1986 ar fáil. Ina bhreithiúnas bhreathnaigh Ó hAnluain B. ar na cuntair ins an mBunreacht a bhain leis an teanga Ghaeilge agus chinn sé mar seo leanas (leathanach 50 den Tuairisc):

11. Dúirt Laffoy B. (ar l. 6) freisin gur thagair Ó hAnluain B. arís do na prionsabail a bhí i gceist i gcúis Delap i mbreithiúnas eile i gcúis Ní Cheallaigh v An tAire Comhshaoil [1980 - 1998] Tuairiscí Speisialta 52 mar seo leanas:

12. D'aontaigh an breitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte le O hAnluain B.ins an dá chás thuas luaite. Phlé sí leis an ábhar go bunbhriach mar cheist ionannais, mar a dhein O hAnluain B. i gcúis Delap. Dúirt sí (l. 7):

13. Ach thug Laffoy B. suntas do nuair a tháinig an t-ábhar os comhair na hÁrd Chúirte nach raibh teipithe fós ar an Stát a dhualgas maidir leis na Rialacha Cúirte Dúiche a chomhlíonadh. Is ar an 24 Feabhra 1997 a shínigh an tAire na rialacha agus is cáipéis an-fhada é ina bhfuil míle, céad agus nócha leathanach. Cuireadh chuig an bpríomh aistritheoir é ar an 25 Márta 1997. Thosaigh imeachta an Iarratasóir ar an 19 Márta 1998 agus tugadh breithiúnas ins an Árd Chúirt ar an 17 Meitheamh 1999.

14. Dá bhárr seo ba cheart tuilleadh ama a thabhairt don Stát le aistriúchán na rialacha a chríochnú. Dúirt an breitheamh léannta, áfach, go raibh sé fíor-phráinneach go rachfaí i mbun na h-oibre agus go gcríochnófar é chomh luadh agus a b'fhéidir sin.

15. Maidir le triáil an Iarratasóra féin ós comhair na Cúirte Dúiche, dúirt Laffoy B. go mbeadh ar na Cúirteanna gach iarracht a dhéanamh chun na deachrachtaí a d'fhéadfadh a theacht i gcoinne dlíthigh ar mhian leo a ngnó a dhéanamh i nGaeilge a laghdú agus deireadh a chur leo nó go mbeadh fáil ar aistriúchán oifigiúil ar Rialacha 1997. Dá réir sin dhiúltaigh an breitheamh léannta an faoiseamh a d'iarr an tIarratasóir.

16. Tá achomharc déanta ag an Iarratasóir i gcoinne an bhreithiúnais seo agus i gcoinne an órdú. Is mar seo atá a fhorais achomhairc leagtha amach ins an bhFógra Achomharc:

17. Thagair Séamus Ó Tuathail, Abhcóide Sinsear an Iarratasóra/Achomharcach go na hAirteagail den Bhunreacht a phléann go díreach leis an teanga Ghaeilge. Pléann Airteagal 8 leis an teanga go ginearálta. Tá a thioncar maidir le imeachtaí Cúirte soiléirithe ag an gCúirt Uachtarach i gcúis Ó Monacháin v An Taoiseach [1986] ILRM 660 . Glacadh leis sa chás sin go raibh an prionsabal é a bheith de cheart ag dlíthi go n-éistfí a chás i nGaeilge teoranta. Ceart a bhí ann taobh an dlíthigh féin a chur i nGaeilge. Ní raibh aon cheart ann tabhairt ar dhaoine eile an teanga Gaeilge a úsáid. Ghlac an tUasal Ó Tuathail leis cé go raibh sé de cheart ag an Iarratasóir a chuid imeachtaí Cúirte féin a reachtáil i nGaeilge, nach raibh sé de chead aige tabhairt ar dhaoine eile a bhí sáite ins na h-imeachtaí an teanga Ghaeilge a úsáid. Da mba gá sin chaifí teangaire a chur ar fáil. D'áitigh sé, áfach, nar mhór do Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche i nGaeilge agus na foirmeacha atá leo a bheith aige le go stiúrfadh sé cosaint iomlán sa Chúirt Dúiche, scairt ar fhinnéithe, fógraí achomharc a chomhadú agus nithe eile.

18. Maidir le Achta an Oireachtais, lua an tUasal Ó Tuathail Airteagal 25.4.4 den Bhunreacht a deireann

19. Ó 1980 i leith, ar seisean, theip go sonrach agus go callánach ar an Stát a dhualgas bunreachtúil a chomhlíonadh. Ins an Árd Chúirt rialadh Laffoy B. go gcaifí tréimhse réasúnach a thabhairt don Stát chun an dá Acht Oireachtais agus Rialacha na gCúirteanna Dúiche a aistriú. Maidir leis na Reachtaí, ní dhearna Airteagal 25.4.4 aon tagairt in aon chor do 'taobh istigh de thréimhse réasúnach' nó do aon leagan cainte dá chineál. Dualgas a bhí ann an obair a dhéanamh ar an toirt. Bhí focla an Airteagail soiléar agus ba chóir glacadh leo de réir bun bhrí na bhfocal.

20. Thagair sé do bhreithiúnas O'Higgins C.J. i People (DPP) v O'Shea [1982] IR 384 inar dhúirt a Príomh Bhreitheamh léannta (leathanach 397 den tuairisc):

21. Dúirt an tUasal Ó Tuathail go raibh sé soiléir gur séard a bhí i gceist in Airteagal 25.4.4 ná go mbeadh na Reachtai ar fáil i mBéarla agus i nGaeilge don phobal. Bhíodar ar fáil mar sin go dtí 1978. Ins an tréimhse ó 1937 go dtí 1978, is cosúil go an leagan Gaeilge le linn don téacs Béarla a bheith dá mheas, dá leasú, agus dá rith i dTithe an Oireachtas. Le fiche bliain, áfach, níor cuireadh aon aistriúchán ar fáil munar chuir duine éigin go tréan in aghaidh gan aistriúchán a bheith ar Acht áirithe. Dúirt sé nach bhféadfaí failí agus neamh-chúram fiche bliain a mhaitheamh tré aistriúchán dheifreach dena Reachtaí a bhí de dhíth a chur ar fáil ar an noiméad déannach sa chás seo nó in aon chás aonair eile. Ba cheart don Chúirt a rá go soiléir é a bheith de dhualgas ar an Stát na h-aistriúcháin a bhí de dhíth a chur ar fáil mar atá leagtha amach san mBunreacht.

22. Ghlac Abhcóide an Iarratasóra leis nar bhain Airteagal 25.4.4 le Ionstraimí Reachtúil. Cé gur mhian sé gur chóir gach Ionstraim Reachtúil a fhoillsiú ins an dá theanga oifigiúil, ghlac sé leis go bhféadfadh deacrachtaí praiticiúla a bheith ann i gcur ar fáil aistriúcháin ar lear mór cáipéisi. Ach maidir leis an gcás láithreach, chuir sé béim ar an ngá práinneach a bhí ann don Iarratasoir agus dá chomairleoirí dlí leagan Gaeilge a bheith ar fáil de rialacha nua-aoiseach na Cúirte Dúiche.

23. Thug sé suntas dó gur foillsíodh Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1948 i mBéarla agus i nGaeilge. Bhí sé de cheart ag saoránach ar bith a chás nó a cás a riaradh ins an teanga Gaeilge. Is cearta tréana, socraithe bunreachtúla an ceart dul chun na Cúirteanna agus an ceart triáil chothrom a fháil. Is cearta iad a bhfuil glactha leis ord-thosuíocht a bheith ann i measc cearta bunreachtúla. Is cuid lárnach den cheart dul chun na cúirteanna agus triáil chothrom a fháil go mbeadh fáil ar Rialacha na cúirte i dteanga an té a bhfuil liamhaintí ina leith. Ins an gcomhtéacs sin thagair an tUasal Ó Tuathail do na cearta atá leagtha amach in Airteagal 6 den Choinbhinsin Eorpach um Chearta Daonna.

24. Chuir Abhcóide an Iarratasóra a mhuinín i mbreithiúnas Ó hAnluain B.in Delap v An tAire Dlí agus Cirt [1980-1998] IR Tuairisci Speisialta 46 agus le na ais breithiúnas an bhreitheamh léannta chéanna in Stát (Mac Fhearraigh) v An Breitheamh Dúiche Neilan [1980-1998] IR Tuairisci Speisialta 38, agus thagair sé do na píosaí as na breithiúnais sin a lua Laffoy B.ina bhreithiúnas. Chuir sé in iúl freisin an leagan amach céanna a bheith ag Ó hAnluain B.i leith foirmeacha reachtúla faoi Achta Comhlachtaí i gcás Ó Murchú v Cláraítheoir na gCuideachtaí [1980-1998] IR Tuairisci Speisialta 42. Ins an cás sin bhí an tIarratasóir ag iarradh eagras den ainm Comhar na Muinteoiri Gaeilge a chorprú agus a chlárú mar chuideachta theoranta. Chun seo a dhéanamh d'iarr sí ar Oifig na gCuideachtaí na foirmeacha cuí ins an teanga Gaeilge. Ni raibh siad ar fáil. Tar éis moill agus deacracht i gcur na bhfoirmeacha ar fáil di, chuir sí tús le imeachta ins an Árd Chúirt chun iachall a chur ar Chláraitheoir na gCuideachtaí na foirmeacha cuí a sholathar di. Mhol an Freagróir sa chás sin (mar a bhí dá mholadh sa chás seo) go bhféadfadh an tIarratasóir a h-aistriúchán féin de na foirmeacha a sholáthar. Dhiúltaigh Ó hAnluain B. don mholadh seo agus dúirt sé (leathanach 44):

25. Mar fhocal deireannach, dúirt an tUasal Ó Tuathail go fiú is dá nglacadh an Chúirt seo le cinneadh Laffoy B. gur cheart tréimhse réasunta a thabhairt leis na rialacha a aistriú agus nach raibh deireadh leis an tréimhse sin ar lá a breithiúnais, bhí bliain caite anois ó thug Laffoy B. a breithiúnas. Ní raibh aon chomhthara ann ón Stát go raibh an obair aistriúcháin tosaithe, gan bacadh le é a bheith críochnaithe. Dá mba rud é nar tugadh a faoiseamh a bhí dá lorg aige don Iarratasóir bhí sé soiléir nach ndéanfadh na Freagróirí a dhath.

26. Phléigh Abhcóide Sinsear na bhFreagróirí, Maurice Gaffney, i dtús báire le ceist aistriúcháin na nAcht um Trácht ar Bóithre. D'admhaigh sé de bharr Airteagal 25.4.4 den Bhunreacht go raibh sé de dhulagas ar an Stát aistriúchán oifigiúil a sholáthar ar aon Bhille a bhí sínithe ag an Uachtarán i dteanga amháin den dá theanga oifigiúil. D'aontaigh sé nach raibh aon teora ama ar sholáthar a leithéid de aistriúchán ins an mBunreacht ach dúirt sé gur cheart glacadh as seo go mbeadh tréimhse réasúnach ar fáil leis an aistriúchán a sholáthar. Ba chir cúinsí ar nós ganntanas aistritheoirí nó easpa achmhainní a chur san áireamh, D'áitigh sé freisin nach ar na Freagróirí a bhí an dualgas sa chás seo aistriúchán na Reachtaí a sholáthar ach ar Thithe an Oireachtais, agus gur dualgas é go h-áirithe a Chléireach na Dála. Ins an aighneacht seo bhí sé ag braith ar Ordú 17(3) de Bhuan-Órdaithe Dáil Éireann a deir:

27. Dúirt an tUasal Gaffney gur chuid de fhoireann riaracháin Thithe an Oireachtais a bhí riamh Rannóg an Aistriúcháin, an rannóg a rinne aistriúcháin ar na Reachta thar na mblianta.

28. Ar aon nós, dúirt an tUasal Gaffney nach raibh anois ach ceist inargóinte nó inphléite in éileamh an Iarratasóra ar sholáthar aistriúcháin oifigiúla de na hAchtanna um Thrácht ar Bhóithre, mar go raibh aistriúcháin ar an dá Acht curtha ar fáil. Mar sin de, ní raibh aon riachtanas ann don Chúirt aon órdú a dhéanamh maidir leis an ghné sin den chás.

29. Maidir le Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche, ní raibh sé iomlán soiléir ar admhaigh na Freagróirí i ndáiríre a bheith de dualgas cinte ar an Stát aistriúchán ar na rialacha a sholáthar. Ach ó tharla gur rialaigh an breitheamh Árd Chúirte léannta go raibh a leithéid de dualgas ann agus nar chuir na Freagróirí achomharc ina aghaidh sin, sé mo bharúil go bhfuil ar an gCúirt seo glacadh leis go n-aontaíonn na Freagróirí go bhfuil sé de oibleagáid ar an Stát aistriúchán a sholáthar. Ach ba soiléar nach raibh aon iarracht á dhéanamh an t-aistriúchán seo a chur ar fáil mar ghnó práinneach, nó é a chur ar fáil in am do thriáil an Iarratasóra. Is léir go soiléar leagan amach na bhFreagróirí ar an "tréimhse réasúnta" ar thagair Laffoy B. dó a bheith soshínte.

30. Déanann an tUasal Gaffney idirdhealú freisin idir cás Delap agus an cás seo mar gur attornae é an tUasal Delap agus dá bharr sin go mbeadh leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna ag teastáil uaidh go rialta, b'fhéidir go laethúil, ina chuid oibre. Is gnáth bhaill den phobal é an tIarratasóir seo a bhí san am ag déileáil le liamhúint ina choinne sa Chúirt Dúiche. Cheana féin tugadh na caipéisí cuí dó ina phlé leis an Gárda Síochána; tugadh leagan Gaeilge de na Reachtaí cuí dó; dá mba rud é, mar shámpla, gur theastaigh uaidh fios a chur ar fhínnéithe, níl amhras ann ach go bhfuil ar a chumas féin agus a chomhairleóirí dlí a n-aistriúcháin féin de na foirmeacha atá ins na Rialacha a chur ar fáil.

31. I ndeireadh báire, dúirt an tUasal Gaffney nach raibh éileamh an Iarratasóra an Ordú Toirmisc deá-bhunaithe. Níl tosaíocht ag ceart an Iarratasoir ar leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche ar cheart an phobail coireanna a ionchúisiú. Ní raibh aon fhianaise ann i ndáiríre nach bhfuigheadh an tIarratasóir triáil chothrom de bhrí nach raibh fáil ar leagan Gaeilge de na Rialacha. Chinn an breitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte nach sárófaí cearta bunreachtúla an Iarratasóra agus nach gcuirfí aon constaicí ina bhealach ag a thriáil ins an gCúirt Dúiche. D'áitigh an tUasal Gaffney gur chóir don Chúirt seo seasamh le breith na hÁrd Chúirte.

32. Forálann Airteagal 25 den Bhunreacht mar leanas:

33. Ní bhaineann an chuid eile den Airteagal leis na h-imeachtaí láithreach.

34. Mar a chuir abhcóidí ar an dá thaobh ar shúile, ní leagann Airteagal 25.4.4 aon fhráma ama síos maidir le soláthar aistriúchán ar gach Bille/Acht. Ach is cosúil ón Airteagal ar fad gur nós imeachta sághach scioptha a bhí i gceist. In aon áit a bhfuil teoranna ama i gceist is teoranna gearr iad. Tá an modh oibre réamh-1980 trí na gcuirtí aistriúcháin ar fáil nach mór comhuaineach le achtú an Reacht, níos cosúla go mór le tiún ghinearálta an Airteagail ná an bealach atá ann anois nach gcuirtear aistriúchán ar fáil ach amháin nuair atá gá speisialta nó phráinneach leis, chomh fada agus is féidir les an gCúirt a dheimhniú. Ba mhó a bheadh cuma na macántachta ar argúint na bhFreagróirí gur cheart tréimhse réasúnta ama a thabhairt don aistriúchán marach an fhíric gur ar éigin atá aon aistriúchán oifigiúla curtha ar fáil le fiche bliain. Ní féidir "tréimhse réasúnta" a thabhairt ar sin. Go deimhin féin ní dócha go gcuirfí aistriúchán go deo ar na Reachta atá i gceist sa chás seo - Reachta atá dá n-úsáid go laethúil ins an Chúirt Dúiche - marach iarrachta an Iarratasóra agus a chomhairleoirí dhlí.

35. Níl deacrachta dosháraithe ag baint le aistriúchán; is obair í a dhéantar go rialta agus go minic ar fud an domhain. Ins an Aontas Eorpach aistrítear gach cáipéis ina lán teangacha - líon teangacha a bhéas ag méadú amach anseo de réir mar a mhéadós an Comhphobal. Cé gur mionlach i gCeanada a labhrann Fraincis, bíonn gach cáipéis oifigiúil, cáipéisí cúirte, fógraí, foirmeacha agus comhthoraí ina measc, ar fáil i bhFraincis agus i mBéarla. Níos gaire do bhaile, ní miste a rá gur fhoillsigh an Bord Seirbhíse Cúirte, ar a bhfuil dualgas reachtúil áird a thabhairt ar an bpolassí dhá-theangach maidir le Seirbhíse Cúirte, (féach ar an Acht Seirbhisí Cúirte 1998, Roinn 7) a chéad mhór phlean reachtúil straitéaiseach le fíor ghairid. Foillsíodh an phlean sin go comhuaineach i nGaeilge agus i mBéarla.

36. Ins na h-imeachta seo tá sé soiléir nach bhfuil an Stát sásta na h-achmhainní a sholáthar le n dulagas soiléir bunreachtúil a chomhlíonadh. Deireann an tUasal Gaffney nach ar a chlianta seisean ach ar Chléireach Dáil Éireann a thiteann an dualgas aistriúcháin na Reachta a sholáthar. Ní ar an Bunreacht ná ar aon údarás reachtúil a bhunaíonn sé an t-éileamh seo, ach ar Bhuan Ordaithe Dáil Éireann. Ní léir gur cuireadh an argúint seo ós comhair na hÁrd Chúirte. Im thuairim-se tá Buan Ordaithe na Dála ar chean de roint slíte chun na h-aistriúcháin riachtanacha a sholáthar. Má chuirtear na h-achmhainní atá riachtanach ar fáil, sin slí amháin; bheadh moladh an Aire Dlí, Cothramais angus Athchóiriú Dlí ina chomhfhreagras ins an gcás seo go mbeadh freagracht ar gach Roinn Stáit maidir le haistriúchán reachtú a tionsnaíodh san Roinn sin chomh sásúil céanna. Ach is ar an Stát féin, an ceathrú Freagróir ins na h-imeachta seo, atá an dualgas bunreachtúil. ,

37. Tá leagan Gaeilge de na Reachta cuí tugtha anois don Iarratasóir agus dá bhrí sin níl gá leis na h-ordaithe a h-iarradh in altanna (c) agus (d) de Fhógra Foriarratais an Iarratasóra.

38. Bé barúil Laffoy B. ó tharla dualgas an Stáit a bheith cheana féin leagtha amach ins an mBunreacht gur saothar gan údar a bheadh ann an dearbhú a dhéanamh a h-iarradh in alt (e) de Fógra foriarratais an Iarratasóra. Deirim-se go bhfuil an Stát thar thréimhse fada ama ag sárú an dualgais bhunreachtúil seo go scannalach neamh-náireach agus go mbeadh ceart ag an Chúirt seo áird a dhíriú go poiblí ar nádúr sain ordaitheach a dualgais atá leagtha síos in Airteagal 25.4.4. Deonaím an faoiseamh a d'iarr an tIarratasóir in alt (e) den Fógra Foriarratais. Agus mé ag tabhairt an fhaoiseamh dhearbhaithe seo, táim ag glacadh leis go gcuirfidh an Stát chuige leis an fhaillí láithreach a leigheas taobh istigh de achar gearr.

39. Tá sé soiléar nach ionan ar chor ar bith ceist Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche agus ceist na Reachtaí. Glacann an tUasal Ó Tuathail leis nach bhfuil aon dualgas ar leith leagtha amach ag an mBunreacht ar sholáthar aistriúchán Gaeilge de Rialacha na Cúirtí. Bhunaigh sé a argúint go h-áirithe ar údarás chás Dela p agus ar dhúirt Ó hAnluain B. ina bhreithiúnais sa chás sin agus i gcásanna eile. Ina breithiúnas d'aontaigh Laffoy B. le leagan amach Ó hAnluain B. maidir le Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna is gcásanna Delap agus Ni Cheallaigh v an tAire Comhshaoil . Bhraith sí go h-áirithe ar na píosaí as breithiúnais Ó hAnluain B. atá thuasluaite agam. Dar liom, bhí an ceart ag an mbreitheamh léannta Árd Chúirte. Is ionann na cúinsí a bhain le soláthar aistriúchán Ghaeilge de Rialacha na nUaschúirteanna 1986 agus le soláthar aistriúchán Ghaeilge de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997 ins an gcás seo. Is ceist í seo faoi cheart dul chun cúirteanna daoine a labhrann ceachtar den dá theanga oifigiúil atá ainmnithe in Airteagal 8 den Bhunreacht.

40. Diúltaím do aighneacht Abhcóide na bhFreagróirí go bhféadfadh an tIarratasóir a aistriúcháin féin de na foirmeacha riachtanacha a sholáthar. Phléigh Ó hAnluain B. go coimsitheach leis an gceist seo ina bhreithiúnas in Ó Murchú v Cláraitheoir na gCuideachta ar thagraíos dó cheana. Tá cuínse den chineál céanna, nó níos láidre, i gceist sa chás seo mar a bhfuil an tIarratasóir dá chosaint féin i gcoinne liamnúintí coiriúla.

41. Ní dhearna Laffoy B. órdú dearbhaithe maidir le soláthar aistriúcháin Gaeilge ar Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche 1997 mar gur mheas sí gur chóir tréimhse réasúnach ama a cheadú chun cáipéis chomh fada sin a aistriú. Bhí a leagan amach iontuigthe agus ní chuirfinn ina aghaidh. Ach tá bliain goite thart idir an éisteacht Árd Chúirte agus éisteacht an achomharc seo; chomh fada agus is féidir a fháil amach, níl a dhath in aon chor déanta chun comhfhreagairt le cinneadh na hÁrd Chúirte.

42. Dá réir sin, im' thuairim-sa, ba chór don Chúirt seo an t-órdú dearbhaithe a h-iarradh in alt (f) de fhógra foriarratais an Iarratasóra a dhéanamh. Ar a laghad ar bith, bheinn ag súil go n-eiseadh na n-údaráis chuí ar an toirt teastas a déarfadh gur ábhar práinneach é aistriúchán an Ionstraim Reachtúil seo agus gur cheart tús a chur ar an bpointe leis an aistriúchán, agus go gcríochnófaí an obair aistrithe chomh luath ar fad agus is féidir sin.

43. Ní miste dom a rá go mbaineann an t-órdú dearbhaithe seo seo le Ionstraim Reachtúil Uimhir 93/1997 amháin. Ná glactar leis go bhfuilim ag rá gur gá gach Ionstraim Reachtúil a aistriú. Is cás ar leith Rialacha na Cúirteanna de bharr a dtábhacht don saoránach atá ar lorg a chearta nó a ceartú dul chun na Cúirteanna.

44. Tá an tIarratasóir ar lorg órdú ag stopadh aon leanúnachas ar a thriáil sa Chúirt Dúiche nó go mbeidh an t-aistriúchán riachtanach de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche ar fáil. Deireann an tUasal Gaffney gur ceist tosaíocht a thabhairt do cheart an phobail coireanna a ionchúisiú thar cheart an Iarratasóra leagan Gaeilge de Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche a bheith ar fáil dó. Tá ceist ceart tosaíochta an phobail chun coireanna a ionchúisiú meáite ag Denham B. i sliocht ina breithiúnas in D. v Stiúrthóir na nIonchúisiú Poiblí [1994] 2 IR 465 (ag l. 474) ar a mbíonn trácht go minic:

45. I sliocht roimhe sin ar leathanach 473 deireann an breitheamh léannta:

46. Dá mba rud é mar sin sa chás seo go raibh contúirt in dáiríre ann nach bhfuigheadh an t-Iarratasóir triáil chothrom, bheadh tosaíocht ar a cheart chun triáil chothrom thar cheart an phobail coireanna a ionchúisiú. Mar sin féin, is ceart tábhachtach ceart an phobail coireanna a ionchúisiú. Ba chóir don Chúirt seo machnamh cúramach a dhéanamh sul a ndéanfaí aon chinneadh arbh é a thoradh ní amháin toirmeasg a chur ar ionchúisiú na coireanna atá curtha i leith an Iarratasóra, ach, b'fhéidir, aoráid a chruthú ina mbainfí leas as cearta cinte tábhachtach fáil a bheith ar cháipéisí ins an teanga Ghaeilge le toirmeasc ollmhór a chur ar ionchúisiú coireanna.

47. Tá sé soiléir gur san teanga Ghaeilge a bhí na cáipéisí éagsúla a seirbheáladh ar an Iarratasóir go dtí seo ins an gCúirt Dúiche. Ní léir gur cuireadh aon bhac air ná go raibh aon deacracht aige ag plé leis na baill chuí den Ghárda Síochána i nGaeilge. Tá na Reachtaí cuí i nGaeilge curtha ar fáil dó anois agus is cosúil go bhfuiltear le na cheistiú gur cainteoir Gaeilge a bhéas ins an mbreitheamh a thriáilfear é. Má bhíonn sin de dhíth uair ar bith, beidh sé de cheart aige teangaire a bheith ar fáil don triáil. In ainneoin go bhféadfadh easpa Rialacha na Cúirte Dúiche roint deacrachta a chur ina bhealach féin agus i mbealach a chomhairleoirí dlí, ní é mo bharúil go mbeadh sin chomh mór le "a real risk that the Applicant will not get a fair trial" mar a bhí i gceist ag Denham B.

48. Dá bhrí sin, dhiúltóinn an faoiseamh a h-iarradh in alt (b) de fhógra foriarratais an Iarratasóra. Níl gá a thuilleadh leis an bhfaoiseamh a h-iarradh in alt (a).

49. This an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court (Laffoy J.) whereby the learned judge refused the application of the Applicant/Appellant for Orders of Prohibition and Declaratory Orders by way of judicial review. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of both Hardiman J. and Geoghegan J. prior to writing this judgment.

50. The facts of the matter and the history of the proceedings are comprehensively set out in the judgment of Hardiman J. and it is unnecessary for me to repeat them in detail here.

51. In summary, the Applicant/Appellant appeared before the District Court on the 18th September 1997 charged with offences contrary to Section 49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 as inserted by Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act 1994. The Applicant, an

52. Irish speaker who had been served with a summons in the Irish language and had dealt with the Gardai in regard to the matter in the Irish language throughout, informed the Court that he wished to conduct his defence in Irish and that he wished the relevant documents be served on him in Irish. In particular he sought Irish versions of the Road Traffic Act 1994, of the Road Traffic Act 1995, and of the Rules of the District Court 1997. Neither the two Acts of the Oireachtas nor the Rules were available in the Irish language.

53. As a result the proceedings in the District Court were adjourned from time to time, both to allow the State authorities to produce the documents and in order to ensure that an Irish speaking judge would be available to hear the case. The matter was listed before the first named Respondent on 13th February 1998. By that time the Applicant had been provided with a “draft” or unofficial translation of the Road Traffic Acts 1994 and 1995, but no translation of the Rules of the District Court had been produced.

54. On 13th February 1998 the Applicant through his Counsel applied to the first named Respondent to make an order directing the second named Respondent to produce the relevant materials. This application was refused by the learned District Judge.

55. The Applicants then issued the present judicial review proceedings. On 19th March 1998 the Applicant was granted leave by the High Court (Smyth J.) to issue judicial review proceedings seeking the following reliefs:

56. The grounding affidavits filed in the proceedings demonstrate the efforts made by the Applicant’s solicitor to obtain the requested documents in the Irish language, together with the responses received from the various agencies of the State. It is clear from the correspondence exhibited that the practice of automatically providing an official Irish translation of all Acts of the Oireachtas ceased in or about 1980. The 1980 volume of the Statutes is the last to be published in both Irish and English. The present practice appears to be governed by a circular dated 23rd February 1998 which is referred to by the Applicant’s solicitor in his affidavit sworn the 18th day of March 1999. The circular was sent by the principal translator of Rannóg an Aistriúcháin of the Houses of the Oireachtas to all Government Departments. The purport of the circular is that due to shortage of staff and pressure of work no Statutory Instruments will be translated into Irish unless a specific certificate signed by an officer not lower in rank than an Assistant Secretary is provided stating that there is a grave need or true urgency for an Irish translation of the specific Statutory Instrument. This circular was not exhibited with the affidavit but in argument before this Court it was not denied that this was in fact the state of affairs. No evidence was produced either before the High Court or this Court to suggest that any such certificate had as yet issued in respect of the Rules of the District Court 1997. In a replying affidavit on behalf of the Respondents Superintendent William Collins of the Traffic Department, Dublin Castle, avers that he is advised by Tony Fagan of the Office of the Chief State Solicitor

57. If, as it appears, no certificate of urgency has as yet been issued it seems unlikely that circumstances will permit the provision of a translation of the District Court Rules in the foreseeable future.

58. The Applicant’s judicial review proceedings came on for hearing before the High Court (Laffoy J.). The learned judge reserved her judgment which she delivered on 17th June 1999. On that date she made an order refusing the relief sought by the Applicant. In her judgment Laffoy J. noted that the Respondents “accept that the State has an obligation to supply an official translation of every Act of the Oireachtas” (page 4 of judgment). She also pointed out that it was not clear whether or not the Respondents admitted that they had the same obligation in regard to the Rules of the District Court 1997. The Respondents did, however, inform the learned High Court judge that they intended to make an official translation of the 1997 Rules available “at soon as possible” . In her judgment Laffoy J. referred to the judgment of O’Hanlon J. in the case of Delap v Minister for Justice and Others [1980-1998] IR (Special Reports) 46 . In that case the Applicant, who was a solicitor who used the Irish language in his practice had complained that there was no official translation of the 1986 Rules of the Superior Courts. In his judgment O’Hanlon J. surveyed the provisions of the Constitution which dealt with the Irish language, and concluded (at page 50 of the report):-

59. Laffoy J. also pointed out (at page 6 of her judgment) that O’Hanlon J. had commented further on the principles which governed the Delap case in a later judgment in the case of Ní Cheallaigh v An tAire Comhshaoil [1980-1998] IR Special Reports 122 as follows:-

60. The learned High Court judge was in agreement with O’Hanlon J. in the two cases cited above. She approached the matter in essence as an equality issue, as had O’Hanlon J. in the Delap case. She stated:-

61. However, Laffoy J. considered that at the time when the matter came before the High Court, the State had not yet failed to fulfil its obligation in regard to the District Court Rules. The Minister had signed the rules on the 24th February 1997 and the document was a very lengthy one consisting of some one thousand one hundred and ninety nine pages. It had been sent to the chief translator on the 25th March 1997. The Applicant’s proceedings had been issued on the 19th March 1998 and judgment in the High Court was given on 17th June 1999.

62. Accordingly the State should be given some further time to complete a translation of the rules. The learned judge did, however, add that it was imperative that the work be undertaken and finished as soon as possible.

63. With regard to the actual trial of the Applicant before the District Court, Laffoy J. held that until such time as an official translation of the 1997 rules would be available the Courts would have to make every effort to reduce and eliminate whatever difficulties might be encountered by those litigants who wish to conduct their business through Irish. She was satisfied that no obstacles would be placed in the way of the Applicant and that his constitutional rights would not be violated as a result of an official translation of the 1997 rules being unavailable. Accordingly the learned trial judge refused the relief sought by the Applicant.

64. The Applicant has appealed against this judgment and order. His grounds of appeal are set out in the Notice of Appeal as follows:-

65. Senior Counsel for the Applicant/Appellant Mr O Tuathail, referred to the Articles of the Constitution which dealt directly with the Irish language. Article 8 dealt with the status of the language in general. Its effect so far as Court proceedings were concerned had been clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of O Monacháin v An Toiseach [1986] ILRM 660. In that case it was held that the principle that a litigant had a right to have a case heard in Irish was confined to a right to conduct the litigant’s own side of the case in Irish. There was no right to compel others to use the Irish language. Mr O Tuathail accepted that, while the Applicant had the right to conduct his court proceedings in Irish, and to issue all court documents in Irish, he did not have the right to insist that others involved in the proceedings used the Irish language; if necessary an interpreter must be provided. However, he submitted that in order to conduct a full defence in the District Court, including such matters as summoning witnesses, filing notices of appeal, and so on it was essential for him to have an Irish version of the Rules of the District Court together with the forms that are annexed to them.

66. As far as the Acts of the Oireachtas were concerned, Mr O Tuathail referred to Article 25.4.4 of the Constitution which provides that:-

67. Since 1980, he said, the State had notoriously and blatantly failed to fulfil its constitutional duty in this respect. In the High Court Laffoy J. had held that a reasonable time must be allowed for translating both Acts of the Oireachtas and the District Court Rules. As far as the Statutes were concerned, Article 25.4.4 made no reference whatever to “within a reasonable time” or any comparable phrase. The duty was direct and immediate. The words of the Article were clear and should be interpreted literally. He referred to the judgment of O’Higgins C.J. in the People .v. (O’Shea) [1982} IR 384 where the learned Chief Justice stated (at page 397 of the report):-

68. Mr O Tuathail submitted that it was clear that what was intended in Article 25.4.4 was that the Statutes should be available in English and in Irish to members of the public. They were thus available until 1978. In the period from 1937 to 1978, it appeared that the Irish version was prepared while the English text was being considered, amended and passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas. In the past twenty years however no translation was provided unless somebody protested vigorously about the lack of such a translation of a particular Act. He argued that the neglect of twenty years could not be excused by producing at the last moment hasty translations of the Statutes required in this particular case or in any other individual case. The Court should make it clear that the State had a duty to produce the required translations as laid down in the Constitution.

69. Counsel for the Applicant accepted that Article 25.4.4 did not apply to Statutory Instruments. While he maintained the position that all Statutory Instruments should be published in both official languages, he acknowledged that there might be practical difficulties in the production of translations of such a large number of documents. For the purpose of the instant case, however, he stressed the urgent necessity for both the Applicant and his legal advisers to have available an Irish language version of the modern rules of the District Court. He noted that that the District Court Rules of 1948 were published both in English and in Irish. Any citizen had the right to conduct his or her case in the Irish language. The right of access to the Courts and the right to a fair trial were strongly established constitutional rights - rights which had been held to have a high priority among constitutional rights. The availability of the Rules of Court in the language of a person accused of an offence was an essential element in his access to the Courts and in his right to a fair trial. In this context Mr O Tuathail referred to the rights set out in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

70. Counsel for the Applicant relied on the judgment of O’Hanlon J. in Delap

71. Finally, Mr O’Tuathail submitted that even if this Court accepted Laffoy J’s decision that a reasonable time ought to be allowed for the translation of the rules and that such time had not yet elapsed at the date of her judgment, the situation now was that over a year had passed since Laffoy J’s judgment. There was no indication from the State that the work of translation had even begun, let alone being completed. It was clear that if the Applicant was not granted the relief which he sought no action whatever would be taken by the Respondents.

72. Senior Counsel for the Respondents, Mr Gaffney, dealt firstly with the issue of the translation of the Road Traffic Acts. He acknowledged that arising from Article 25.4.4 of the Constitution the State had a duty to provide an official translation of any Bill which the President had signed in one only of the official languages. He agreed that no time limit for the provision for such a translation was provided in the Constitution but he submitted that this should be taken to mean that a reasonable time should be allowed for the translation to be made. Such matters as shortage of translators or lack of resources should be taken into account.

73. Mr Gaffney also submitted that the provision of translations of Statutes was not a duty of the Respondents in the instant case, but was a duty of the Houses of the Oireachtas, and in particular a duty which lay on the Clerk of the Dail. In making this submission he relied on Order 17(3) of the Standing Orders of Dail Eireann which stated:

74. Mr Gaffney pointed out that historically Rannóg an Aistriúcháin, the section which had throughout the years translated the Statutes, had been a section of the administrative staff of the Houses of the Oireachtas.

75. In any event, Mr Gaffney submitted, the Applicant’s claim for the provision of official translations of the relevant Road Traffic Acts which now a moot, since translations of both Acts had now been provided. There was therefore no need for the Court to make any order on this aspect of the proceedings.

76. As regards the Rules of the District Court, it was not entirely clear from Mr Gaffney’s submissions whether the Respondents in reality acknowledged that the State had a definite duty to provide a translation of the rules. However given that the learned High Court judge had made a finding that there was such a duty and that the Respondents had not appealed against this finding, this Court must, in my view assume that the Respondents agree that the State is under an obligation to provide a translation. However, it was clear that no effort was being made to provide this translation as a matter of urgency, or to provide it in time for the trial of the Applicant. The Respondents’ view of the “reasonable period” to which Laffoy J. referred is clearly an elastic one.

77. Mr Gaffney also distinguished the Delap case from the instant case on the ground that Mr Delap was a solicitor and would therefore have a regular and perhaps daily need of an Irish version of the Rules of the Superior Courts in the course of his practice. The present applicant was an ordinary member of the public who, on this particular occasion, was facing a charge in the District Court. He had already been provided with documents in the Irish language throughout his dealings with the Garda authorities; he had been provided with Irish versions of the relevant Statutes; if he required, for example, to summon witnesses he and his legal advisers were no doubt capable of providing their own translations of the forms provided in the rules.

78. Finally, Mr Gaffney submitted that the Applicant's claim for an Order of Prohibition was not well founded. The Applicant’s right to an Irish version of the Rules of the District Court did not have priority over the community’s right to have crimes prosecuted. There was no real evidence that the Applicant would not receive a fair trial on account of the unavailability of an Irish version of the rules. The learned High Court judge had held that the constitutional rights of the Applicant would not be violated and that no obstacle would be put in his way at his trial in the District Court. Mr Gaffney submitted that this Court should uphold that finding of the High Court.

79. Article 25 of the Constitution provides as follows:

80. The remainder of the Article is irrelevant to the present proceedings.

81. Article 24.4.4, as was pointed out by counsel on both sides, does not provide any time frame within which an official translation of each Bill/Act is to be provided. However, the article as a whole seems to envisage a fairly rapid procedure - where time limits are provided they are short, and the former pre-1980 system of providing a translation virtually simultaneously with the enactment of the Statute seems considerably more in accordance with the general tenor of the article than the present system which, as far as the Court can ascertain, provides a translation only when a special or urgent demand is made for it. The Respondents argument for a reasonable time to be allowed for translation would ring more sincerely were it not for the fact that virtually no official translations of Statutes have been provided for the past twenty years. This could not be described as a “reasonable time” . Indeed it seems probable that the Statutes in question in this case - Statutes which are used daily in the District Court - would never have been translated were it not for the efforts of the Applicant and his legal advisers.

82. The making of translations is not a matter of insuperable difficulty; it is a task regularly and frequently carried out throughout the world. In the European Union all documents are translated into multiple languages - a number of languages likely to grow in the future as the community enlarges. In Canada, despite the fact that only a minority of Canadians are Francophone, all official documents, including Court documents, notices, forms and signs are provided in both French and English. Nearer home one might point to the fact that the Courts Service Board, which is under a statutory duty to have regard to the policy of bilingualism in relation to Courts Services (see the Courts Service Act 1998 Section 7), has very recently published its first major statutory strategic plan. This plan has been published simultaneously in Irish and English.

83. In the present situation it is clear that the State is simply unwilling to provide the resources to fulfil its clear constitutional duty. Mr Gaffney submits that the duty to provide translations of the Statutes falls, not on his clients, but on the Clerk of the Dail. He grounds this claim not on the Constitution or on any statutory authority, but on the Standing Orders of the Dail. It does not appear that this argument was made in the High Court.

84. In my view, the Standing Orders of the Dail provide for one of a number of possible means of providing the necessary translations. If the necessary resources are provided it is an acceptable means; equally acceptable would be the means suggested by the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform in his correspondence in this case - that each department is responsible for the translation of legislation initiated by that Department. The constitutional duty, however, is that of the State itself, the fourth named Respondent in the present proceedings.

85. The Applicant has now been provided with an Irish version of the relevant Statutes and there is therefore no requirement for the making of the orders sought at paragraphs (c) and (d) of the Applicant’s Notice of Motion.

86. Laffoy J. considered that, as the duty of the State was already set out in the Constitution, no purpose was served by making the declaration sought at paragraph (e) of the Appellant’s Notice of Motion. It seems to me that the State has been flagrantly and over a long period of time in breach of this constitutional duty and it would be desirable for this Court publicly to stress the mandatory nature of the duty set out in Article 25.4.4. I would grant the relief sought by the Applicant at paragraph (e) of the Notice of Motion. In providing for this declaratory relief I would assume that the State will take steps to remedy the present situation of neglect within a short time frame.

87. The question of the District Court Rules is clearly separate from that of the Statutes. Mr O Tuathail acknowledges that there is no specific duty laid down by the Constitution to provide an Irish translation of the Rules of Court. He relies in particular on the authority of the Delap case and the dicta of O’Hanlon J. in his judgments in that and other cases. Laffoy J. in her judgment agreed with the approach taken to the question of the Rules of the Superior Courts by O’Hanlon J. both in the Delap case and in the Ní Cheallaigh v Minister for the Environment case. She specifically relied on the passages from O’Hanlon J’s judgments which I have quoted above. It seems to me that the learned High Court judge was correct. The considerations which applied to the provision of an Irish translation of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 apply equally to the provision of an Irish translation of the District Court Rules 1997 in the instant case. The issue is one of the right of access to the Courts by persons who speak either of the two official languages named in Article 8 of the Constitution.

88. I reject the submission of Counsel for the Respondents that the Applicant could provide his own translations of the necessary forms. This question was comprehensively dealt with by O’Hanlon J. in his judgment in O’Murchú v Cláraitheoir na gCuideachtaí to which I have already referred. Similar, if not stronger, considerations apply in the instant case where the Applicant is defending himself against criminal charges.

89. Laffoy J. did not make a declaratory order as to the provision of an Irish translation of the 1997 Rules of the District Court because she considered that a reasonable time should be allowed for the translation of such a lengthy document. Her approach was understandable and I would not disapprove of it. However, over a year has elapsed between the High Court hearing and the hearing of this appeal; as far as can be ascertained no step whatever has been taken to conform with the findings of the High Court.

90. Accordingly in my view this Court should make the declaratory order sought at paragraph (f) of the Applicant’s notice of motion. At the very least I would expect that the relevant authorities should forthwith issue a certificate stating that the translation of this particular Statutory Instrument is an urgent matter and that an immediate start should be made on its translation, leading to completion of the translation at the earliest possible date.

91. I should point out that this declaratory order applies solely to Statutory Instrument No. 93/1997. I am not to be taken as holding that all Statutory Instruments require to be translated. The Rules of Court are a special case due to their importance to the citizen who seeks his or her constitutional right of access to the Courts.

92. The Applicant seeks an order prohibiting any further continuance of his trial in the District Court unless and until the required translation of the Rules of the District Court is provided. Mr Gaffney submits that this is a question of the priority of rights, and that the right of the community to prosecute offences should be given priority over the Applicant’s right to be provided with an Irish version of the Rules of the District Court.

93. The question of the priority of the community’s right to prosecute offences is considered by Denham J. in a much quoted passage in her judgment v D v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 2 IR 465 at 474 as follows:

94. In an earlier passage on page 473 the learned judge states:

95. If, therefore, in the instant case, there was a real risk that the Applicant would not receive a fair trial, his right to a fair trial would have priority over the right of the community to prosecute offences. The community’s right to prosecute offences is nonetheless an important right, and this Court should give careful consideration to any step which could have the effect not merely of preventing the prosecution of the offences with which this Applicant is charged but conceivably of creating a situation where the undoubtedly important right to be provided with documentation in the Irish language could be used for the purpose of wholesale prohibition of prosecution of offences.

96. In the course of the present Applicant’s trial to date in the District Court it is become clear that the various documents served on him to date have been in the Irish language. He appears to have encountered no difficulty in dealing with the relevant members of the Garda Siochana through the medium of the Irish language. He is now being provided with the relevant Statutes in Irish and it appears that steps are being taken to ensure that the trial judge is an Irish speaker. If at any stage it becomes necessary he will have the right to an interpreter to be provided for the purpose of his trial. While the lack of an Irish version of the District Court Rules may well create a degree of difficulty for him and for his legal advisers, I do not consider that this will amount to what is described by Denham J. as “a real risk that the Applicant will not get a fair trial”.

97. I would therefore refuse the relief sought at paragraph (b) of the Applicant’s Notice of Motion. The relief sought at paragraph (a) is no longer necessary.

98. The Applicant was summoned to appear before the District Court on the 18th of September 1997 to answer an allegation that he had committed an offence contrary to Section 49(3) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 as inserted by Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act 1994. He stated, through his solicitor, that he wished to conduct the case in Irish and that he wished all relevant documents to be furnished to him in Irish. It appears that he had conducted in Irish all his dealings with the Gardai during the investigation which led to the preferring of the above mentioned allegation against him, that he had been served with a summons in that language and that the result of an analysis conducted by the Medical Bureau of Road Safety on which the prosecution intend to rely had been communicated to him in Irish. This Court has not, however, seen the two last mentioned documents.

99. It appears that the judge presiding in the District Court on the return date of the summons ordered each side to prepare written submissions on the question of whether the Applicant was indeed entitled to the relevant materials in the Irish language. These materials were identified as The Road Traffic Act 1994, the Road Traffic Act 1995 and the Rules of the District Court. The Applicant prepared these submissions which are exhibited in the present proceedings. The State did not make written submissions either in the District Court or in this Court.

100. The case was then adjourned over a period of four months in the District Court in order to give the Director of Public Prosecutions or other State authorities an opportunity to produce the materials in question. The proceedings were eventually adjourned until 12th January 1998. This was a Monday. On the last working day before the adjourned date, Friday the 9th January, the Applicant received a document which was alleged by him to be a partial or draft translation of the Road Traffic Act 1994. This was admittedly not an official translation.

101. The case was then adjourned on a number of occasions and specifically at least twice on the basis that there was no Irish speaking judge available to hear it. On the 13th February 1998 the Applicant through his Counsel requested the first named Respondent to make an Order directing the Director Public Prosecutions to make the relevant materials available. The learned District Judge declined to make such an Order. On the 19th March 1998 the Applicant was given leave to apply for relief by way of judicial review. The terms of this Order will appear below.

102. Further information in relation to the Applicant’s attempts to procure copies of the relevant material in Irish appears from the affidavits filed in these proceedings and the documents exhibited therein. In an undated letter from the Government Publications Office, which is apparently a division of the Office of Public Works, the Applicant’s solicitor was told that the relevant materials:

103. In an affidavit of the 11th February 1999, shortly before the High Court hearing, Superintendent William Collins of the Garda Traffic Department, Dublin Castle, stated that official translations into the Irish language of the Road Traffic Act 1994 and the Road Traffic Act 1995 were available as of that date and that the Chief State Solicitor’s Office intended to provide copies to the Applicant’s solicitor. He stated that enquiries had been made as to when an official translation would be available of the District Court Rules and he was informed that:

104. He went on to say that there was a considerable body of primary legislation and Statutory Instruments which had not yet been translated; that it was the intention of the Secretariat of the Houses of the Oireachtas and of the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform that the Rules would be available in Irish “as soon as circumstances permit”.

105. In a replying affidavit Mr Synnott, the Applicant’s solicitor, referred to a circular dated the 23rd February 1998 which he said went to each Government Department from the principal translator of the Houses of the Oireachtas. This document was not produced to the Court but its contents were not denied. The document is quoted in Irish and it appears to state that it will not be possible, by reason of shortage of staff and the increase which has occurred in work in connection with primary legislation to attend further to requests from Government Departments to translate Statutory Instruments into Irish. A certificate signed by an officer not lower in rank than Assistant Secretary, stating that there is a grave need or true urgency for an Irish version is required before such work can be done. Mr Synnott says without contradiction that he believes that no certificate of that sort has been issued in relation to the Rules of the District Court.

106. In a further letter dated the 31st March 1998 the Private Secretary to the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform stated, in Irish, that he wished to convey that the Rules of the District Court had been signed by the Minister and had been sent to the chief translator on the 25th March 1997 for translation into Irish. He stated that there were more than 1,200 pages in the Rules and that it was not known as yet when the Irish version would be ready. He added that the question of Irish versions of the Road Traffic Acts 1994 and 1995 was a matter for the Minister for the Environment. This is a matter of some significance in view of one of the State’s submissions discussed below.

107. The present position in relation to the availability of the relevant materials in Irish appears to be as follows. A copy of the Road Traffic Act 1961 has always been available in the Irish language. It was printed together with the English version and in the bound volumes of the Statutes the English and Irish texts appear on facing pages. The Irish text is described as an “official translation” , which term is a reference to a constitutional provision discussed below. It appears that the production of bound volumes of the Statutes in this form ceased with the Statutes for the year 1979. Some Statutes have been produced in Irish since that time, although there is no evidence to show how many or on what basis Statutes are selected for translation. No translation, official or otherwise, of the Road Traffic Act 1994 or the Road Traffic Act 1995 was available (and apparently none was produced) at the time of the signing of these Acts into law by the President pursuant to the Constitution. No copy of the 1994 or 1995 Acts was available at the time of the issue of a summons against the Applicant. An unofficial or incomplete translation of the 1994 Act was provided to the Applicant having apparently been specially produced by virtue of his request, in January 1998. Official translations of that Act and the 1995 Act were produced at some stage shortly before the 11th February 1999. No version in Irish of the District Court Rules 1997 has been produced to date and it would appear that no work on such a copy can be commenced by the Chief Translators Office in the absence of a certificate from an official not lower in rank that Assistant Secretary of a Government Department. This is by reason of pressure of work and shortage of staff in the office of the chief translator in the Houses of the Oireachtas.

108. It was not seriously disputed that all of the relevant materials are of importance to a person defending an allegation that he contravened Section 49 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 as amended in the District Court. While section 49 of the Act of 1961 prohibited the offence colloquially described as drunken driving it made no provision for the investigation of suspected offences, and the proof of charges under that Section, with reference to breath tests and a blood or urine analysis. These matters were provided for in various statutory provisions from 1969 onwards: these provisions have been much repealed and amended. The present statutory form of the offence of driving with excess alcohol in the body, as established by proof of analysis of blood or urine, is provided in the 1994 and 1995 Acts.

109. The District Court Rules make numerous provisions affecting the conduct of summary trials in the District Court. They also provide numerous official forms for use by those in business before the District Court, including the forms for the summoning of witnesses and the giving of notices of appeal. It is a practical impossibility properly and effectively to conduct litigation in the District Court without a knowledge of and access to the rules and forms. The former (1948) Rules of the District Court were available in both languages.

110. It is both fair and relevant to remark that there is no question of a refusal to provide the Applicant with the Rules of the District Court: the Respondent’s case is that an Irish version will be provided, but none is now available and it is not possible to say when that position will change. Copies of all relevant materials are, of course, freely available in the English language.

111. The Constitution accords a special and unique position to the Irish language, as did its predecessor of 1922. In view of the continuity and consistency of judicial opinion over the period since 1922, it is relevant to set out both provisions.

112. Article 4 of the Constitution of Saorstát Eireann provided:

113. Article 8 of the Constitution provides:-

114. No such law as was envisaged in the last sentence of each article has ever been enacted. Scholarly opinion on these provisions for exclusive use of one language is to the effect that they were enacted “to provide for the contingency of the entry of Northern Ireland into (the State)” : See for example Kohn: The Constitution of the Irish Free State (London 1932) page 123 .

115. In relation to legislation, the constitutional scheme set out in Articles 20 and 25 of the Constitution envisages that a bill (other than a bill expressed to be a bill containing a proposal for the amendment of the Constitution), passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas shall be presented by the Taoiseach to the President for signature and promulgation as a law. Article 25.4. 3 and 4 provide as follows:

116. In relation to Article 8, I believe that the words of Kennedy CJ in

117. I consider that the learned former Chief Justice’s construction of the term “national” as being wider than, but including, the term “official” is applicable equally to Article 8. Indeed, in the dominant (Irish) text of the Constitution it is clear that the Irish languages status as the first official language arises from its status as the national language. This follows from the use of the causative word “ós” in the dominant text.

118. I believe that Kennedy CJ’s implication into the text of the 1922 Constitution of a binding obligation on the State in relation to the language, in the terms which he sets out, is appropriate also to the construction of Article 8. I believe that Article 8 gives rise, apart from any other effect it may have, to a Constitutional imperative requiring to be considered by the Courts in dealing with a case of this kind. I agree with the Judgment of O’Hanlon J in Ó’Murchú -v- Registrar of Companies and The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1988] I.R. S.R. (1980-1998) 42 when he said:

119. This Judgment was delivered in Irish: the translation is that of Professor Thomas O’ Malley.

120. It is of interest to note that when, on the 25th of May 1937, Article 8 of the draft Constitution was discussed by Dail Eireann in Committee, a proposal to confer equal national and official status on the English language was rejected. Speaking in explanation of the term “national” in this context, Mr. De Valera said:

121. Accordingly, the present version of Art 8 was approved for submission to the people.

122. The status of the language has also been obliquely considered by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Groener -v- Minister for Education and City of Dublin VEC (case 379/87, Judgment 28th November, 1989). Ms. Groener, who was a Dutch person, challenged the Minister’s refusal to appoint her as a permanent lecturer in painting at a VEC College on the basis that she had failed the Irish language test. She said that the requirement that a test in the language be passed was contrary to the provisions of European Community Law relating to the free movement of workers. The case was referred to the European Court under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome on a number of points one of which was “......is regard to be had to a policy of the Irish State that persons holding the post should have a competent knowledge of the Irish language, where such knowledge is not required to discharge the duties attached to the post?” The Court held:

123. In my view the Irish language which is the national language and, at the same time, the first official language of the State cannot (at least in the absence of a law of the sort envisaged by Article 8.3) be excluded from any part of the public discourse of the nation or the official business of the State or any of its emanations. Nor can it be treated less favourably in these contexts than the second official language. Nor can those who are competent and desirous of using it as a means of expression or communication be precluded from or disadvantaged in so doing in any national or official context.

124. The administration of justice solely in Courts established by law, by Judges appointed under the Constitution, generally sitting in public, is envisaged and required by Article 34 of the Constitution. The powers of such Judges are part of the powers derived from the people under Article 6 of the Constitution. The judicial power is part of the power of Government, together with the legislative and executive powers.

125. Accordingly, the institution by a statutory official, and subsequent adjudication by a Judge, of a criminal charge whether minor or otherwise is part of what I have called the public discourse of the nation and the official business of the State.

126. A citizen summoned under compulsory process (issued in Irish though this point is not essential) to answer a charge in Court, is plainly entitled to make such answer in Irish if he so wishes. Nor can he be disadvantaged in so doing, by reason of his lawful linguistic preference. Furthermore, he is entitled to make his answer in Irish regardless of whether or not he also understands English. See An Stát (MacFhearraigh) -v- MacGamhna [1984] I.R. S.R. (1980-1998) 38.

127. This result indeed had been anticipated in the much earlier decision of Attorney General -v- Joyce and Walsh (1929) IR 526 where, speaking of individuals who gave evidence in Irish at a criminal trial the Court of Criminal Appeal said:

128. It is also clear from the MacFhearraigh case that a litigant wishing to conduct his case in Irish cannot be ordered or constrained to do so in English on grounds of convenience, or because of the additional time taken by the necessity to translate his questions or submissions for the benefit of those without competence in Irish.

129. Two further cases deal specifically with the right to have legal materials provided in Irish. In Ó’Murchú -v- Registrar of Companies and the Minister for Industry and Commerce I.R., S.R. (1980-1998) 42 , the Applicant wished to incorporate a company in the Irish language. The necessary statutory forms were not, however, available in Irish and she sought an Order of Mandamus compelling the Respondents to provide them. The forms were subsequently provided and the sole issue in the case was that of costs. The authorities claimed that she was not entitled to costs on the basis that the State was not under an obligation to provide the documents in Irish and that she could, in any event, have made her own translation of the relevant forms. O’Hanlon J awarded the Applicant her costs and said:

130. I entirely agree with that view.

131. Of great relevance to the present case is Delap -v- The Minister for Justice Ireland and the Attorney General [1990] I.R. S.R. (1980-1998) 46. Mr. Delap, who is a Solicitor, wished to have available to him an official translation of the Rules of the Superior Courts and sought Mandamus and declaratory relief. In fact, the Court was eventually informed that a translation was in the course of preparation. A declaration of the constitutional obligation of the State to provide an Irish version of the relevant rules was granted. O’Hanlon J. also held that a citizen had under the Constitution a right to conduct his own side of any case entirely through Irish but, compared with those who are content to conduct their cases through English, such a citizen is at a disadvantage if the appropriate rules are not available in Irish.

132. I agree with the judgment of O’Hanlon J. in Delap and would respectfully follow it. In particular I agree with his description of the position of a citizen who wishes to conduct litigation in the High or Supreme Courts in Irish:-

133. I also agree with the judgment of the learned High Court judge in this case, Laffoy J., when she says:

134. It will be noted that in the two last mentioned cases, and in MacFhearraigh, heavy emphasis was placed on the right of those wishing to conduct their legal business in Irish to equality of treatment with those wishing to do so in English. Having regard to the status of the Irish language it seems to me that persons wishing to use it are absolutely entitled to do so and to be afforded every necessary facility in doing so at least to the extent that such facilities are available to those using the second official language. In the course of the hearing of the present appeal, Counsel on behalf of the State declined to express a view one way or the other on the question of whether the Applicant was entitled as a matter of law to an official translation of the District Court Rules. It will be observed that in the Ó’Murchú case the State positively denied that Mrs. Ó’Murchú was entitled to an Irish version of the forms under the Companies Act. In my view this negative or ambiguous attitude on the part of the State is inconsistent with the constitutional status of the national language, with the long-standing policy of the State itself and with the citizens right to equality before the law.

135. It remains to consider the judgments of the Supreme Court (O’Dáilaigh C.J. Kingsmill Moore and Walsh J.) in Attorney General v. Coyne and Wallace [1967] 101 ILTR 17. There, Kingsmill Moore J., with whom Walsh J. expressly agreed on this point, construed Article 8 of the Constitution, in the context of a notice of intention to prosecute under the Road Traffic Acts which had been served in Irish only, as follows:-

136. It appears to me that the effect of this finding is to confer on a person, whether an official or not, a right to choose which of the official languages he will use for any particular official transaction. This choice relates to his side of the transaction: no-one can dictate another’s choice of language. In Coyne and Wallace , the evidence was that in a particular part of the country it was usual to serve notices of intention to prosecute and summonses in Irish. This, however, could not exclude the right of a Defendant to conduct his case in English if he wished. Similarly a Defendant may conduct his defence in Irish, although proceedings might have been commenced against him in English. In view of the terms of Article 8, and the official policy of bilingualism to which the State is committed, the State must facilitate the use of either language without discrimination. The production of laws in one language only is totally inconsistent with bilingualism, and is not paralleled to my knowledge in any other bilingual country.

137. On the specific topic of the rules, I have no doubt that an Irish version of the Rules of every Court is an absolute essential for the conduct of litigation as effectively in Irish as in English. It would be the grossest negligence for any practitioner to approach a Court without a competent knowledge of the rules. If the equal right to litigate, whether as Plaintiff or Defendant, in Irish as in English is to be more than a shibboleth, this material must be provided. Nearly seventy years ago, in the case of Ó’Foghludha -v- McClean , cited above, Kennedy CJ addressed the need for a full set of the Rules of the Superior Courts separate and distinct from those inherited from the British administration. He said:

138. I am of the opinion that the same reasoning applies to the Rules of the District Court. These rules, as noted above, are extremely important for the conduct of litigation in that Court. In relation to the trial of summary offences, they contain provisions for such vital matters as service, powers of adjournment, powers of amendment, and the effect of variations between the offence alleged in the summons and the evidence actually given in Court. Furthermore, the rules provide the appropriate forms to be used for such basic purposes as the summoning of a witness and the giving of notice of appeal. In the absence of an official version of these forms in Irish an unwilling witness served with a summons in Irish might omit to attend and, if it were sought to compel him, object that the summons was not in the prescribed form. A party served with notice of appeal might take a similar point. Again, the document containing the result of the analysis conducted by the medical bureau of road safety must, if it is to be admissible in evidence, be in the statutorily prescribed form and a non-statutory translation might be the subject of objection. I express no opinion on the validity of any such objection as envisaged above: they are mentioned to illustrate the additional difficulties which may beset either party seeking, in the absence of official translations of Acts and orders, to conduct his or its legal business in the national language.

139. It is noteworthy that an Irish translation was provided for the former Rules of the District Court, made in 1948. It would appear that in this regard, as with the Statutes, there has been a grave shortfall in the provision of legal materials in Irish since about the year 1980. This can only be described as a failure to observe the constitutional imperative contained in Article 8, and a failure for which apparent lack of staff in the office of the Chief Translator in the Houses of the Oireachtas is no sort of excuse.

140. Apart from the constitutional imperative referred to, and the need to treat persons who wish to use the Irish language in official business on a footing of equality with those using English, the present state of affairs is at variance with the legally enshrined policy of the State over many years. The Legal Practitioners (Qualification) Act 1929 and the relevant portion of subsequent Solicitors Acts are designed to ensure that legal practitioners, whether Solicitors or Barristers, will be competent in the use of Irish. The judiciary is exclusively recruited from the legal professions. The Irish Legal Terms Act 1945 was, according to its long title “an Act to authorise the provision, for the purpose of law, of standard equivalence in the Irish language for certain terms and to provide for the publication of legal forms and precedents in the Irish language. ” Introducing the Bill, the Minister for Justice Mr. Boland said:

141. Pursuant to the terms of the Act, ten “Irish Legal Terms Orders” were made between 1947 and 1956 covering areas of the law ranging from criminal law to company law and probate and administration. These are now collected in the dictionary type publication “Téarmaí Dlí” . More recently, official encouragement, through the medium of Bord na Gaeilge was given to the researches of Fasach, a group of Irish speaking lawyers, in the compilation of their report “An Gaeilge agus an Dlí” in 1986. Order 120 of the Rules of the Superior Court (1986) provides for interpreters to be attached to the Superior Courts and for the translation of Affidavits filed in either official language into the other at the request of any party who does not understand the original language. Most recently, in the Courts Service Act 1998, the Courts Services Board is specifically obliged to have regard to the policy of bilingualism in relation to Courts Services.

142. Despite the Constitution provisions considered above and the consistent statutory policy illustrated by the various enactments referred to, spanning a period of almost seventy years, the present case unfortunately reveals a failure to provide the most basic materials mentioned above. This failure is at its grossest in the most recent times. Anyone with access to the printed statutes will be aware that since 1980 there has been a departure from the previous policy of preparing official translations of the great majority of bills which are passed in English as they progress through the constitutional stages ending with their promulgation as law. Only an uncertain but apparently small, number of statutes have been so translated, since 1980. On the evidence in this case, this state of affairs is due to a shortage of staff and pressure of work in the office of the Chief Translator of the Houses of the Oireachtas. The Road Traffic Acts must be amongst the most frequently invoked of the entire corpus of statutes, with, probably hundreds of thousands of prosecutions under them annually. Yet no attempt appears to have been made to translate the modern Road Traffic Code and the Acts of 1994 and 1995 were eventually translated only after the present Applicant instituted his proceedings.

143. It must be stressed that this policy of inertia is in clear and obvious breach of the express Constitutional requirement contained in Article 25.4.4: “where the President signs the text of a bill in one only of the official languages, an official translation shall be issued in the other language.”

144. To this accusation, when made in argument during the hearing of this Appeal Counsel for the State made two answers, both of them in my view unworthy. The first was that, while it is conceded that there is an obligation to provide a translation of Acts, the Constitution does not say when it is to be provided. According to this line of argument, years may elapse, during which the Statute in question is in daily use without any translation being provided, without the State being in breach of its obligation, just so long as the authorities sincerely intend to provide the translation at some future date. It must be obvious that this line of argument is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional status of the national language and with the long standing policy of bilingualism in relation to the business of the Courts, repeated in statutory form as recently as 1998. In my view, there must be implied into the terms of Article 25.4.4. at the very least a requirement that the official translation shall be provided as soon as practicable and there is clearly scope for the contention (not made in this case) that it must be available before the Act is sought to be enforced on a person competent and wishing to conduct his official affairs in Irish.

145. If Article 25.4.4. is construed in its constitutional context and in a purposive manner, this conclusion is still clearer. Article 25 relates to the steps whereby a bill which is passed or deemed to be passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas is promulgated as a law. The procedure laid down is a rapid one. In general, Bills presented to the President for signature and promulgation are to be signed between the fifth and the seventh day after such presentation. This period can be reduced in the circumstances envisaged by Article 25. Immediately after the provisions of Article 25.4. 2 and 3 and before the provision in Article 25.4.5., providing for the enrolment of the text of a law “as soon as may be” after signature and promulgation, there occurs the measure most directly in question here providing for an official translation.

146. Moreover, the only conceivable reason for requiring the issuing of an official translation is so that it can be used by those who are lawfully desirous of conducting their legal business in that one of the official languages which was not the language in which the Bill was passed. Since they are entitled to do this it is plainly unreasonable, in both the ordinary and the legal senses of that term, to withhold the translation from them for any period of time, and certainly for years and indeed decades as has unfortunately occurred in the case of many statutes.

147. There are many statutory provisions obliging the citizen to do particular things on request by a designated person. One of the commonest of these things is the obligation to give one’s name and address to a member of the Garda Síochána in certain circumstances. See for example Section 107 of the Road Traffic Act 1961, subsections (1) and (4) which permit a Garda to demand information and provide no specific time for compliance with the oral request. One can easily imagine the argument which would be made on behalf of the State if a citizen maintained that he was entitled to allow a period of hours, much less months or years, to elapse before complying. On precisely the same basis, that one must construe statutory or constitutional words with regard to their sense and manifest purpose, I would reject the proposition that the State can delay indefinitely providing official translations of Acts of the Oireachtas.

148. The second answer made by Counsel for the State was that, while there was an undoubted obligation to provide an official translation of Acts, this obligation rested exclusively on the Houses of the Oireachtas. The Houses of the Oireachtas, it was said, were not amenable to answer for their action or inaction in the Courts. Therefore, though there is an obligation to provide an official translation of all statutes, it rests upon a constitutional entity which cannot be impleaded in the Courts. Therefore, the right to an official translation is not one which can be enforced at law.

149. I can only describe this line of argument as gravely unworthy of State Authorities operating under the Constitution. It is also an argument which, even in its own terms, is wholly devoid of merit. Nowhere does the Constitution impose the obligation to provide an official translation on the Houses of the Oireachtas and I am not aware of any statutory provision which does so. The very correspondence exhibited in this case makes it perfectly clear that the view of the organ of the State to which the Applicant had resort in his efforts to obtain an official translation (The Department of Justice) was that the translation of Acts was a matter for the Department which had sponsored the legislation, in this case the Department of the Environment.

150. It is true that, in both texts of the Constitution, the obligation to issue an official translation is stated without indicating the name of any person or entity on whom this obligation lies. It is, however, an “official” translation which is to be issued. This suggests that the obligation devolves on the holder of some office and seems to me quite consistent with the view expressed by the Department of Justice that the office in question is the office of the Minister who introduced the Bill. If this is so, it does not of course imply that the translation need of necessity be prepared in that office or even by a civil or public servant: the wording is quite consistent with the translation being prepared by some other person acting under contract or otherwise, so long as the translation is officially approved.

151. Counsel for the State relied, in support of his submissions, on the terms of the standing orders of Dail Eireann (1986). This submission was not made in the High Court. Order 17 is entitled “Language” and provides as follows:

152. The imposition of this duty on the clerk, by standing orders adopted by the House, does not appear to me to excuse the non-compliance by the State, or any of its organs, with Article 25.4.4. The State, itself, under its constitutional name, Ireland, is impleaded in this action and no objection has been taken to this. The standing orders of the Dail, made pursuant to Article 15.10 of the Constitution are of course entirely a matter for the Dail and no attempt has been made in these proceedings to enforce them in the Courts. I do not accept that the imposition by the standing orders of the Dail of a duty on an officer the House which is not imposed upon him by the Constitution has the effect of precluding enforcement, as against the State itself, of a manifest obligation. The Dail and its members possess, and are entitled to possess, adequate powers and immunities for the discharge of their functions which are central to the form of Government required by the Constitution. But the rules and standing orders of either House do not appear to me to be capable of excluding the State’s liability to legal process at the suit of a citizen on whom events have conferred locus standi to complain of the breach of a constitutional obligation. To hold otherwise would be to hold that the Standing Orders of the Dáil have precluded a remedy for breach of the Constitution.

153. This case, taken in conjunction with the others cited, appears to establish that a situation has developed over a period of twenty years or so in which important legal materials have been provided in Irish only haphazardly and in many cases in response to litigation or threats of litigation. This applies not only to the materials for use in contentious matters, such as a criminal prosecution, but to statutory forms in common use such as those under the Companies Acts. The Fasach Report of 1986 states that “..... it has been almost impossible to obtain even the basic documents necessary to enable a simple commercial transaction to be completed in the first official language ”. It also states that:

154. I have to say that these strictures appear amply borne out by the history of the present case. Equally correct, I believe, is the observation that:

155. In my view, this has led to a situation which only a person of unusual independence of mind and pertinacity will attempt to conduct his or her legal business through the medium of Irish. If such a person seeks a Statute in Irish from the official Government outlet he or she is more than likely to be told it is not available. There is no Irish version of the forms required to institute a simple claim in Irish in the District Court, nor of the forms to enable a person, for example, to summon a witness or commence an appeal. The practical experience of the cases cited in this judgment indicates that, very frequently, only litigation or the threat of litigation will produce these documents. This state of affairs is a constant, officially tolerated, discouragement or actual preclusion from the conduct of legal business in the national language. In these circumstances it is no wonder that the Irish language and Irish speakers have made little progress in the routine use of the national language in the Courts. There have, it is true, been magnificent exceptions to this de facto policy of neglect, such as the production last year, under the aegis of the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, of a thorough and scholarly study of the Irish text of Bunreacht na hEireann. There is also the shining example of lawyers such as those engaged on both sides of the present case and of judges, pre-eminent amongst them Mr. Justice O’Hanlon, former judge of the High Court, who have demonstrated that elaborate and subtle argument and distinguished judgments are perfectly possible in the national language. One must also welcome the production by the Incorporated Council for Law Reporting of a special reports volume of the Irish Reports covering cases heard and decided in Irish between 1980 and 1998. But these are exceptions owing much to the inspiration and labours of dedicated individuals. They cannot at all contend with the stark reality that an individual who seeks basic legal materials in Irish will more than likely be conscious of causing embarrassment to the officials from whom he seeks them and will certainly become conscious that his business will be much more rapidly and efficaciously dealt with if he resorts to English. I can only say that this situation is an offence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. I am sure that it has not arisen by reason of any deliberate decision by any official person or body. But it has arisen and must be remedied if the law is to be administered as the Constitution intended that it should be.

156. Bilingualism, or multi-lingualism is a living reality in many countries and of course the European Union daily produces complex documents, many of them of a legal nature, in all official languages. I have no doubt that it is quite possible to produce all relevant legal materials in Irish. I have no doubt that the Applicant of this case is entitled to have an Irish version of the Rules of the District Court if he so wishes as it is clear that he does. What is lacking is a system which existed for many years: one which routinely produced legal materials in both official languages, as appears to happen in other countries with a policy of bilingualism or multi-lingualism and the continued failure to provide such a system is inconsistent with the Constitution. In this context the lip service paid to the national language can only be regarded, in the inimitable phrase of the late Professor John M. Kelly, as “focal scoir don Gaeilge” .

157. It is clear that the Delap case is a powerful precedent in favour of the Applicant in these proceedings. No attempt was made to distinguish it on the basis that different considerations apply to the rules of the District Court, as opposed to those in the Superior Courts. In my view the Defendants were correct to refrain from making any point of this nature since there is no sustainable distinction to be drawn. It was, however, submitted that the Delap case could be distinguished on the basis that Mr Delap was (and is) a solicitor engaged actually or potentially in a wide variety of cases before the courts and therefore had an interest, actual or potential in the rules as a whole whereas the present Applicant is simply a citizen with an interest in one case only. Perhaps, it was submitted, he or his solicitor could translate the relevant rules themselves.

158. In my view this point is manifestly unsustainable. The rules are the work of the District Court Rules Committee, consisting of representatives of the judiciary and both branches of the legal profession and aided by the professional services of a draughtsman and assistant draughtsman. Their work is painstaking, precise and specialised. It is not reasonable to presume that the Applicant or his solicitor either possesses the necessary skills to make a legally acceptable translation or has the resources to employ the specialised legal skills necessary to do so. In any event, why should this duty be imposed on him since it is not imposed on a citizen who is content to conduct his legal business in the second official language? Furthermore, in relation to a “home made” translation of a witness summons the State concede that such a document might be ineffective but submit that “the witness might come anyway” . This is plainly both an unsatisfactory situation and one perfectly illustrative of the position of inequality affecting a person who wishes to conduct his legal business in the national language. This possibility of the citizen making his own translation was unsuccessfully relied upon by the State in the Ó’Murchú case, in relation to Companies Act forms. I agree with the judgment of the High Court in that case and would for the same reasons reject the submission here.

159. It was further submitted that, even if the Applicant had a right to a copy of the Rules in Irish, he was not entitled to relief by reason of the absence of an Irish version unless he could demonstrate prejudice (dochair nó constaic). It seems to me that this point amounts, in practice, to a submission that it is incumbent on the Applicant to demonstrate that he is unable to understand the Rules in English. In MacFhearraigh the Employment Appeals Tribunal sought to compel the Applicant to conduct his case in English having established that he understood that language and so would not be prejudiced. I agree with the judgment of the High Court in that case rejecting the Tribunal’s view. I consider that a person in the position of the Applicant here is entitled to the materials in question in the national language whether or not he is conversant with, or comfortable in, the second official language as a matter of constitutional right.

160. The most fundamental of the points raised by Mr Gaffney S.C. with great suavity, is this: which is more important: the right of the public that the law should be enforced or the right of the citizen to use Irish? It is necessary, he submits, that one of these rights should yield to the other ( “is gá ceann acú geilladh don ceart eile” ).

161. I am firmly of the view that there is no such necessity that one of these rights should yield to the other. In a State in which Irish is the national and first official language, and which is committed to a statutorily mandated policy of bilingualism, it is necessary that the laws should be issued and, where requisite, enforced in each of the official languages. In a case such as the present, where there is no question as to the competence and bona fide desire of a citizen to use the national language it is in my view extraordinary to attempt to set up an antithesis between his right to do so and the public right that the law should be enforced. Furthermore, there is no insuperable difficulty in enforcing the law through the medium of the national and first official language and whatever difficulty there may be in this regard arises directly from the inaction of the State over a period of decades in relation to the national language. If these difficulties fall to be addressed in a haphazard and ad-hoc fashion, that is because the State has been unwilling to address them in any more coherent way.

162. The modern State necessarily imposes many onerous duties on citizens in relation to various aspects of life from tax compliance to planning law. Many of these duties are irksome, time consuming and expensive to comply with, but compliance is properly required. Equally the State itself must comply with its obligations, particularly those enshrined in the Constitution and can no more be heard to complain that such compliance is irksome and onerous than can the individual citizen. In particular, the State cannot be heard to complain that its non-compliance over a period of decades have now rendered present compliance even more difficult.

163. Despite the findings of the High Court in relation to the State’s obligations, with which I agree, the Applicant was afforded no relief for a variety of reasons. He was refused the declaration which he sought “that the Respondents named in the third and fourth paragraph of these proceedings have a constitutional obligation to supply the official translation of the Acts of the Oireachtas in the first official language when the President signs a bill in the second official language” on the basis that “the text of the Constitution confirms, in paragraph 25.4., the contents of (the declaration sought). It is my opinion that it would serve no useful purpose for this Court to confirm the same matter” .

164. No doubt it would normally be otiose for a Court to make a declaration confirming the plain purport of a constitutional article. But I think this Court should do so here because of the undeniable failure to comply with this mandatory constitutional provision, and in the hope that by so declaring this duty will at last be taken seriously. If this does not occur, it may be that some Applicant will eventually be driven to seek mandatory relief in this regard. It is, of course, to be assumed that the State, the fourth named Respondent, will not by continued inaction allow such a situation to develop.

165. In framing the declaration which he claims, the Applicant did so in general words, without limiting the Statutes to which the declaration would relate to those in question in his Road Traffic case. In my view he has the locus standi to do this, as a citizen able to and desirous of perusing the laws of his country in its national and first official language. Accordingly, I do not consider the fact that the Statutes with which he is most immediately concerned have in fact been translated to exhaust his standing to seek this relief.

166. The Applicant was likewise refused a declaration “that the Respondents named in the third and fourth paragraphs of these proceedings have a constitutional obligation to supply the official translation of (the Rules of the District Court) in the first official language” on the basis that although the State was obliged to make the official translation of the 1997 Rules available within a reasonable length of time, and the Applicant had a personal right to this obligation be fulfilled, the State had not yet failed to fulfil it. This was on the basis that the rules were lengthy, the chief translator had an enormous volume of work, and a reasonable period for the provision of an unofficial translation of the rules had not yet elapsed.

167. The High Court judgment was given on the 17th June 1999. Some one thousand two hundred and fifty days had elapsed between the adoption of the rules and the hearing of this appeal on the 10th July 2000. Even at that date, no indication could be given of when the official translation would be available. Moreover, it was not disputed that the official translator would not begin work on the translation in the absence of a certificate of the kind described earlier in this judgment, or that no such certificate had been issued. Accordingly, on the evidence, the work of translation is no further forward to day than on the date on which the Rules were approved, nearly four years ago. I believe that this is an unreasonable state of affairs, and one in which in all probability will continue, in clear and obvious defiance of the State’s obligation and of the personal right of the Applicant, unless this Court does something more than simply deplore the State’s inaction. I would accordingly make this declaration also and express the hope that further legal action will not be necessary to ensure compliance with it.

168. The final relief claimed by the Applicant was an Order of Prohibition restraining the continuance of the proceedings against him until the relevant materials were provided in translation. With considerable hesitation I have concluded that the Applicant should not be granted this relief. An Order of Prohibition is a discretionary remedy. The general rights of the Applicant as an Irish speaker have already been fully recognised by the declaratory reliefs granted. It is not obvious to me that his rights as an Irish speaker who is also a litigant will necessarily be denied in the pending District Court proceedings. The learned District Judge who hears the case will have wide powers to secure these rights and will if necessary be empowered to strike out the proceedings if that cannot be done. The burden of any irremediable difficulty arising from the failure to translate the relevant materials as Statutes rules, and any statutory forms which are/or become relevant - must fall on the prosecution rather than the defence. But it does not appear appropriate to assume in advance that any such difficulty will arise.

169. It would be gravely mistaken for the second to fifth-named Respondents to assume that the considerations which lead to the refusal of an Order of Prohibition in this case would apply to any similar case in the future. In limiting itself to declaratory relief the Court is making the assumption that the declarations will be acted upon both in the particular case and in general. In omitting, in this particular case, to confront the authorities with an emergency or embarrassment, subject to the powers of the learned District judge mentioned above, the Court is giving the fullest measure of respect to the arguments advanced in relation to the communities right to prosecute. If, most improbably, no action was taken on foot of the declarations made the balance of these rights affecting the exercise of discretion would be significantly altered. And this might arise in a case more urgent or sensitive than the present one. It is hoped that by making these declarations in a case where, for the reasons given, it is inappropriate to take further action in the way of prohibition, such an emergency may be avoided in the future.

170. The routine District Court prosecution in this case has been deferred for a period of almost four years. This has occurred for one reason only: the Applicant has been minded to assert his constitutional rights as an Irish speaker. The State has not denied these rights but it has been absolutely unwilling to take any positive step about according them except at the last possible moment and under the threat, or when faced with the reality, of legal proceedings. And in the proceedings themselves, the State has taken up some positions which are narrow, legalistic, petty fogging and reductionist. Ironically, legal submissions with these attributes are often described in shorthand as “drunk driving points” . It is disedifying to seem them taken by the State.

171. I would grant the two declarations set out above and refuse an order of prohibition.

172. Notwithstanding that this case including the appeal to the Supreme Court was heard in Irish I prefer to deliver my judgment in English as it is my vernacular and I can express myself clearly in that language. I am satisfied that there is nothing to preclude me from so doing as no legislative provision pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Constitution has been made requiring the exclusive use of any one of the two official languages for the purposes of a judgment in court. This does not mean, however, that a litigant conducting a case in Irish would not be entitled in some circumstances to require a translation into Irish of a judgment delivered in English if he or she was unable to understand English. This requirement could arise under the principles of natural justice. As a matter of courtesy, I hope to be able to provide an Irish translation of this judgment.

173. In her judgment in the High Court, delivered on the 17th of June 1999, Laffoy J. sets out the nature of the reliefs sought by the applicant in this judicial review. But by the time the case came on for hearing before her, two of the reliefs had become redundant in that they referred to an alleged failure on the part of the State to perform a constitutional obligation to supply an official translation of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and the Road Traffic Act, 1995, which Acts were relevant to the charges against the applicant in the District Court. These charges related to allegedly having an excess of alcohol in the blood when driving a mechanically propelled vehicle in a public place. Before the case came to be determined by Laffoy J., however, official translations of the two Acts were in fact made available. That meant that for all practical purposes there were two reliefs being sought by the applicant. One was a declaration that the third and fourth-named respondents have a constitutional obligation to supply an official translation of the District Court Rules 1997 into Irish and the other is an order of prohibition against the first and second-named respondents from proceeding with the prosecution until such official translation is made available. It would appear, from the judgment of Laffoy J., that she accepted the principle that the State was obliged to make available within a reasonable time an official translation of the 1997 Rules but she took the view that such reasonable period of time had not yet passed. It can be reasonably inferred from her decision that she took the view that if a reasonable period had in fact passed, the applicant would have a constitutional right to an official translation of the rules but she refused the application for judicial review on the grounds that no violation of that right had been established given that the reasonable period of time had not elapsed.

174. The applicant has appealed the decision of Laffoy J. and is requesting this Court to make the declaration and the order of prohibition sought. I am of the view that the appeal should be dismissed but on grounds somewhat different than those on which the decision of Laffoy J. was based.

175. Before there can be any consideration as to whether a constitutional right has been violated it is essential to establish the constitutional right itself. I intend, therefore, to review the relevant provisions in the Constitution and the relevant case law in relation to this question. Any such review must necessarily commence with a consideration of Article 8 of the Constitution. That Article reads as follows.

176. I interpret paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 as meaning that for all legal and official purposes the Irish language and the English language are in an equal position. A constitution is not simply a piece of legislation. It embodies the aspirations and emotional feelings of the people who have enacted it. Not everything in a constitution therefore is intended to have legal implications. Long before the relevant Article was abolished by Referendum the provision as to the special position of the Roman Catholic Church was not considered by constitutional lawyers to have any legal implications. It was merely reflecting what was perceived to be a fact on the ground at the time of the enactment of the Constitution. I think that the reference to the Irish language as “ the national language” albeit aspirational rather than factual in Article 8 paragraph 1 is similar. The whole purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 is to make clear that for official and legal purposes English and Irish are in an identical position. That being so, I turn now to paragraph 3. This paragraph was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Coyne and Wallace (1967) 101 I.L.T.R. 17. The Court consisted of Ó Dálaigh C.J., Kingsmill Moore J. and Walsh J. Kingsmill Moore J. in referring to paragraph 3 said the following:

177. Walsh J. expressly agreed with the construction placed upon Article 8(3) of the Constitution by Kingsmill Moore J. From that construction of paragraph 3 it would seem to follow that unless there is a statutory provision saying otherwise, official business may always be conducted either in English or Irish in so far as any reliance is being placed upon Article 8. Of course natural justice requirements may, in any given instance, impose an obligation to provide a document or a translation in one particular language.

178. The second decision of this Court which is of some importance is Ó Monacháin v. An Taoiseach [1986] ILRM 660. In that case partly in reliance on Article 8 and partly in reliance on section 71 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, which required that so far as might be practicable, having regard to all relevant circumstances the Justice of the District Court assigned to a district which included a Gaeltacht area should possess a sufficient knowledge of Irish to enable him to dispense with an interpreter argued that the judge was not entitled to hear the case with an interpreter. The applicant failed but the facts are not really relevant to this case. What is material however is that the case seems to re-enforce the principle enunciated in some High Court decisions that the right to have a case heard in Irish is confined to a right to conduct one’s own side of the case in Irish. There is no right to compel others to use the Irish language. Griffin J. put it this way:-

179. The nature and extent of the right to conduct a case in Irish has never been fully considered by the Supreme Court and it is not necessary or desirable that this Court, being a court of three judges only, should embark on such an analysis. There have been obiter dicta from Supreme Court judges which clearly recognised the right of a litigant to conduct a case in Irish and it has always been generally accepted that such a right exists. However, a final determination on this matter must await a fully argued out case in the Supreme Court. For the purposes of this judgment I am assuming that such a right exists and that its extent is as set out above by O’Hanlon J. Although it is not necessary to decide it in this case, it may well be that the right to conduct a case in Irish is not an absolute one and that circumstances can arise where a court or a tribunal is entitled to insist on a case being conducted in English. This could arise for instance if there were insuperable difficulties about obtaining an interpreter within a reasonable time-scale.

180. If I am correct in the view which I have taken as to the extent of the right to litigate in Irish then it must follow that in a prosecution such as this, the State is entitled to prosecute in English even if the defendant wants to conduct his or her defence in Irish. Furthermore even if out of courtesy or for other reasons the Director of Public Prosecutions or other prosecuting authority in such circumstances decides orally to conduct the prosecution in Irish it does not mean that a document to be relied upon by the prosecution must itself be in Irish. By document I am including anything put in in evidence which would normally be described as a document, and also any statutory instrument including Rules of Court which are being relied on. For this purpose I am not including statutes as there is a separate constitutional provision relating to them and I will return to it later in the judgment. In expressing this view I am conscious that I may be in conflict with the views expressed by O’Hanlon J. in Delap v. An tAire Dlí agus Cirt , until recently unreported judgment in the High Court of 13th July 1990, but now reported in the Tuariscí Speisialta 1980-1998 at p. 116. In that case the applicant was a Dublin solicitor engaging in legal transactions in the Irish language on behalf of clients and he applied for a declaration and an order of mandamus compelling the State to provide a translation into Irish of the Rules of the Superior Courts. He argued that the non-availability of the rules presented a big obstacle to him and to his clients. It was held by O’Hanlon J. that he was entitled to the declaration but the making of an order of mandamus was postponed the Court having been informed that a translation of the rules was being prepared. O’Hanlon J. acknowledged that he was bound by the interpretation of Article 8(3) of the Constitution laid down by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Coyne and Wallace cited above, but the learned judge went on to hold that it was not necessary for the applicant to invoke the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution. He accepted that the rules-making committee had power, in conjunction with the Minister for Justice, to make the rules in the English language only and that there was no violation of Article 8 merely because the rules were made in one official language only without at the same time their being made in the other official language. He also accepted that Article 25, s. 4, sub-s. 4 of the Constitution applied only to Acts and not to statutory instruments. But he held nevertheless that the applicant was entitled to the declaration on the grounds that

181. I am assuming, as I think that I am entitled to assume, that the applicant being a defendant in a Dublin prosecution is able to speak and understand English and that, therefore, in so far as he is insisting on rules and forms to be in Irish he is not making any natural justice point. The judgment of O’Hanlon J. was not, of course, based on a natural justice point but on an equality point. I am afraid that if it is relevant to this case (which I rather doubt) I cannot agree with it. Once the interpretation of Kingsmill Moore J. on paragraph 3 of Article 8 is accepted then (apart from natural justice considerations) there can be no obligation on the State to ensure that statutory instruments and forms contained therein, whether they are to be availed of by a particular party or not, must be in both official languages. I find the equality argument quite unconvincing. If there is a prescribed form which has to be filled up by a litigant or party and the requirements of the form are in one of the official languages and it is a language which the party fully understands there is no inequality or injustice. Furthermore, in so far as a litigant or party wants to rely in argument on a provision in a statutory instrument or in the Rules of Court he should properly be referring to the form in which the instrument or rules were originally made at any rate irrespective of whether he had a translation or not. The Court cannot be expected to interpret a rule of the District Court made in English by reference to a translation into Irish.

182. It seems clear that the views of the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Coyne and Wallace , cited above first came to the attention of O’Hanlon J. in the Delap case. The learned editors of Kelly on the Irish Constitution 3rd edition at p. 59 referred to two earlier decisions of O’Hanlon J. in which he had enunciated a broad obligation on the State pursuant to Article 8 and they comment as follows.

183. The editors go on to point out that the same judge again rejected one of those earlier decisions in a more recent case of Ní Cheallaigh v. An tAire Comhshaoil formerly an unreported judgment of the 4th of June 1992 but now reported in Tuariscí Speisialta at

184. For the reasons, which I have indicated, I am of the view that the applicant/appellant has no right to have the 1997 District Court Rules translated before the prosecution can proceed. It follows obviously that a prohibition order should not issue. But I would add two further grounds on which in my view the appeal should be dismissed. Even if I am wrong in taking the view that there cannot be such a right then I am in agreement with

185. Laffoy J. that an infringement of that right has not been sufficiently established. There must be a reasonable time span allowed for making official translations. But even more importantly there is a third reason why I would refuse the reliefs. Article 34 of the Constitution contemplates that there be courts of law and that justice should be administered in those courts. Such justice includes criminal justice and the right of the public via the Director of Public Prosecutions to take all necessary steps to prosecute a person who appears to him to be guilty of the serious offence of drunken driving or its equivalent, that is to say, having an excess of alcohol in the blood or urine. Unless obviously there was some natural justice issue involved a court, in those circumstances, ought not to grant prohibition such an order being discretionary. In this connection I think it helpful to quote in full the first three paragraphs of the statement of grounds of opposition filed by the respondents. They read as follows:

186. I think that those pleas are well-founded and that they are in themselves a complete reply to the applicant’s claim, even if contrary to my view he was right about his theoretical entitlements. The due administration of justice is itself a constitutional requirement and must, I think, take precedence over an alleged constitutional right to procure an Irish translation of a statutory instrument in circumstances where the person seeking it can be presumed to be proficient in English. Under the well established principle that judges are entitled to take judicial notice of and assume facts of everyday obviousness, any judge trying a case in Dublin, in my view, is entitled to assume unless informed otherwise that a litigant is able to speak English. If it were the case, of course, that Mr. Ó Beoláin was not able to speak English the situation would be entirely different. He would be entitled to translations all along the line but not necessarily to something described as “ an official translation” .

187. Although the reliefs sought based on the non-furnishing of official translations of the Road Traffic Acts, 1994 and 1995 have become redundant, as I indicated, I think it important nevertheless to make some reference to Article 25.4(4) of the Constitution. That paragraph reads as follows:

188. Although apparently some official translations have been made of Acts passed from 1981 onwards the last bound volume containing Acts with the English and Irish versions is 1980. It would appear that official translations have not been “ issued” since then. On the face of it this would seem to be a gross breach by the State of a direct constitutional obligation. Indeed on one interpretation of Article 25.4(4) an official translation of the Bill, as passed by both Houses, might have to be available at the time the President signs the text. But for all I know at this stage there may be a complete answer to the apparent breach by the State of its constitutional obligation. First of all, of course, it has been suggested that it is under the Standing Orders of the Dáil that the legislation is translated. If that is so there might be “ separation of powers” issues involved in any court interference. But there is nothing in the text of the Constitution to suggest that the translation is a Parliamentary function. On the face of it it would appear to be an executive function and, indeed, in a later part of the same Article there is a provision for the Taoiseach from time to time as occasion appear to him to require to cause to be prepared under his supervision a text of the Constitution itself embodying amendments. But even if the State has been in breach of its obligations I do not think that it necessarily follows from that that there is some corresponding constitutional right conferred on a litigant in a civil or criminal case involving an Act of the Oireachtas not yet officially translated. A constitutional obligation placed on some organ of the State does not necessarily give rise to some corresponding constitutional right vested in an individual. But (without so deciding) I would be of the view that any citizen, irrespective of whether he is before the courts or not or whether he has need to use a particular Act or not would have locus standi to seek an order of mandamus directing the relevant authority to take all necessary steps to have official translation of Acts issued It does not, however, necessarily follow that the Court would automatically grant such a mandamus. If for instance there were reasons of cost involved in the delaying of the translations the Court would have to carefully consider whether it should order the State to incur expenditure in relation to one particular obligation albeit an express constitutional one when the State would be under numerous other obligations, some constitutional, in relation to health, education etc. that would also involve expenditure. At any rate such a mandamus proceeding would obviously have to involve the Attorney General and the matter would be fully debated probably before a court of five judges. Even if the translations had not been provided in this case, I am extremely doubtful that the applicant could have successfully invoked Article 25 to obtain an order of prohibition. If he could, it means that defendants facing serious firearms or drugs charges under post 1980 statutes or perhaps serious revenue offences under the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 could have their trials postponed pending the issue of official translation of those Acts. I cannot accept that any such constitutional right exists. For the reasons indicated I would dismiss the appeal.