Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This is the Plaintiff’s appeal against the finding of the High Court (McCracken J.) which apportioned liability for an accident in which the Plaintiff had suffered personal injuries on the 1st May, 1995 in the proportions of two thirds against the Plaintiff and one third against the Defendant. The Plaintiff maintains that there was no contributory negligence on her part or, if there was, it was in a much smaller degree than the learned High Court Judge found.

2. The Defendant has cross appealed against the finding that the Plaintiff was an invitee as opposed to a licencee, on its lands at the relevant time.

3. The facts of this matter have been comprehensively set out in the judgment of the learned High Court Judge, which is now reported at [1998] 2 ILRM 74 .

4. The Plaintiff, together with her husband and three other people had travelled from England to take part in a ballooning event in Sligo. However, weather conditions prevented the event from going on on the 1st May, 1995 and the party went sight seeing instead. They had read about Glencar Waterfall in Co. Leitrim in the Michelin Guide and decided to go there.

5. The area around Glencar Waterfall had been purchased by the Defendant in 1986. It is a well known place of resort and an area of considerable natural beauty. Whilst in private ownership a concrete footpath was laid some thirty or forty years ago. The local authority developed a car park with toilet facilities across the road from the area of the waterfall. They also renewed all the footpaths. They made the area accessible, up to a point, to disabled persons. This occurred in 1991/92. The local authority also had the trees on the site inspected by Coillte Teoranta as a result of which four trees were removed. The premises were visited by or on behalf of the area Engineer “on a reasonably regular basis” and had been last visited on the 6th April, 1995. A lady was employed on a part time basis who looked after the toilet facilities. There was no full time maintenance staff because, according to the Engineer “It is the type of area that doesn’t need maintenance. It is left wild”.

6. On the evidence, the site was acquired by the County Council and developed in the way described “in order to provide an amenity within their administrative area”.

7. The Plaintiff and her party arrived at the area and went up a footpath which led from the road up the side of the waterfall to a viewing platform. It then continued at a sharp angle to the left and rose to its highest point. From there it descended again quite steeply by way of steps, turned to the left and rejoined an original pathway thus creating a roughly triangular loop. The pathway consisted of stone slabs 4ft. wide.

8. The Plaintiff and her party, having proceeded to the top of the path, began to descend again on the looped pathway. Towards the bottom of a steep part of that pathway, they came upon a tree which had fallen across the path completely blocking it. A row of trees made it impossible to pass the obstruction on the right hand side. To the left hand side there was a very steep bank leading downwards towards the bottom. This had been grassed but it had been used as a short cut to some extent and there were two distinct bare tracks on it, one on either side of a tree stump. There was a considerable amount of bare earth where the grass had been worn away.

9. When the Plaintiff’s party came upon the obstruction they were walking in single file, with the Plaintiff at the back. There was no discussion about what was to be done but the various members of the parties stepped off the path and on to the bank. It was necessary to go sideways down the bank and to hold on to whatever supports offered in order to keep one’s balance. The Plaintiff’s husband in fact slipped shortly after leaving the path but was not injured. It appears that just as he was getting up, the Plaintiff stepped off the path higher up and immediately or almost immediately slipped.

10. There is no doubt that the Plaintiff unfortunately sustained a serious injury to her ankle. Furthermore, having regard to her age, which was 62 years at the time of the accident, her occupation, her weight and build and her previously active lifestyle, the injury and its consequences have been serious for her. However this appeal is not concerned with the question of damages, which have yet to be assessed. The question is whether she can make the Defendant liable in whole or in part for her injuries.

11. As the case was argued on appeal, this general question involves several issues. Firstly, was the Plaintiff’s status on the lands around Glencar Waterfall that of an invitee or a licencee? Secondly, was the Defendant in breach of its duty to her as an invitee or a licencee? Thirdly, if they were in breach of their duty to her, was the damage suffered by her caused partly by her own negligence or want of care, and if so in what proportion?

12. The learned trial judge held that the Plaintiff was an invitee on the premises, on the basis that there was a material benefit to the Defendants in having Glencar Waterfall opened to the public. He held that the Defendants had been in breach of their duty of care to the Plaintiff in not ensuring that the pathway was kept clear and passable, particularly in an area where there was a steep and possibly dangerous bank at the side of the path. He went on to hold that the Plaintiff had decided to take the risk of going down what must have appeared to be a somewhat dangerous bank. He held that “she took a calculated risk in the knowledge that there was a danger of falling”. He held that this risk could have been avoided by simply retracing her steps, a distance of 178yds. He assessed the contributory negligence of the Plaintiff at two thirds.

13. This case was argued with great economy and precision on both sides. It was agreed that the question of whether the Plaintiff was an invitee or a licencee turned on whether the Plaintiff’s presence on the lands conferred a “material benefit” on the Defendants. Neither side took issue with the statement of the law contained in the second edition of McMahon and Binchy, Irish Law of Tort, page 213:-

14. This passage draws heavily on the judgments of the former Supreme Court in Boylan v. Dublin Corporation [1949] IR 60. In that case the Plaintiff had attended a social event promoted by a charitable society who had hired part of the Mansion House from Dublin Corporation for the purpose. It was held that his presence on the premises constituted a material benefit to the Corporation so as to make him an invitee, on the basis that the presence of persons in that capacity “helps to bring about continued profitable hirings as a natural probable and intended result and therefore the owners interest in it is the very reverse of remote”.

15. The facts of this case do not reveal any such commercial interest on the part of the Defendant. However, the learned trial judge held that the presence of the Plaintiff and people like her conferred a material benefit on the Defendants on the following basis:-

16. The only evidence in relation to the purpose for which the Defendant acquired the relevant lands and improved them to the extent as they did, was that already quoted from the evidence of the area engineer that it was with a view to providing an amenity within their administrative area. In the course of cross examination, the same witness said that he would normally visit before bank holidays. He agreed that the time of his visit of the 6th April was when “You are just getting into the high use, the tourist season as such”. He was asked “You are just coming out of the winter and early spring and coming to Easter, so you are anticipating that the number of visitors is going to increase. Is that the idea?”, and agreed, though adding that there were visitors all year round.

17. He also agreed when it was put to him that “With Easter coming up and the tourist season about to start you would anticipate that there would be a big increase in the number of visitors coming along”.

18. In my opinion, this evidence does not establish on the balance of probabilities that the presence of the Plaintiff or similar persons conferred a material benefit on the local authority nor that the local authority viewed the amenity in that light. The predictable fact that the number of visitors to the site is likely to increase as the weather improves does not seem to me to provide any evidence of anticipated material benefit. More fundamentally, I do not accept that, when an amenity is developed, a local person visiting it would do so in the capacity of a licencee and a foreign visitor as an invitee. The evidence establishes only that the local authority has provided some amenities at a long standing place of public resort to which anyone, tourist or local, can have free access. No doubt it is for the public benefit, and is certainly within the powers of the local authority, that such access is guaranteed by the public ownership of a conspicuous site but I do not accept that it has been shown on the evidence that the local authority has a material interest in the access of an individual to the site, anymore than the previous private owners would have had.

19. I can find no support in the cases for the proposition that gratuitous entry for recreational or amenity purposes to lands confers a material benefit on the owner. In Sutton v. Bootle Corporation [1947] 1 KB 359 a public park had been developed and maintained by a local authority, which had installed a playground. A child who came into the playground was held to be a licencee only. The Plaintiff contended that this decision merely assumed the status of the child as a licencee but the report does not support this contention. Indeed Counsel for the Plaintiff had contended “The position of a person entering the public recreation ground as of right is different from that of a licencee...... The Defendants owed a higher duty than that of a licensor because what they were providing was an allurement to any child”. All three of the Lord Justices of Appeal held that the child was a licencee only and one, Asquith L.J., surveyed a number of authorities to the same effect.

20. I do not regard the evidence in this case as establishing that the local authority did not develop the amenity for any person who cared to visit, no matter where they were from, but developed it for the purpose of attracting tourists to Co. Leitrim. I agree with the submission of the Defendant that “The evidence is more, or at least as, consistent with the policy of bringing areas of natural beauty into the common ownership or enjoyment of everyone, than a policy of obtaining tourist money”. I consider that the act of developing an amenity by a local authority cannot be regarded as simply a means of “putting money into the pockets of local shopkeepers”. And, as noted above, I do not accept that a person’s status on a publicly owned amenity varies with whether he or she is a local or a foreign visitor. What is to be said, on that analysis, of the status of a person who comes from another part of Ireland?

21. The law relating to occupiers liability has been radically reformed by The Occupiers Liability Act, 1995. Had this law been in force at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident her position would have been a less favourable one than under the old law, which applies to this case.

22. The essence of the applicable law was a distinction between those whose presence on lands or premises was in pursuance of an interest common to them and the occupier, and all others, the position of trespasser does not arise here. Since this concept of interest or benefit is at the heart of the distinction, it cannot be ignored or unrealistically glossed without destroying the whole basis of the common law approach.

23. At an abstract level it is possible to gloss almost any permissive presence of a person on another’s lands with an element of benefit. The private house guest was the classic licencee. But even the relationship of host and guest might be analysed in terms of benefit: social amenity, relief of loneliness, or hope of reciprocation. An occupier might not himself fully analyse his reasons for offering hospitality.

24. But these putative benefits are simply too remote to amount to the material benefit which alone grounds the status of invitee. In cases governed by the common law, the distinction which lies at the heart of it must be given substance by realistic application. The provision of a public benefit to all comers is not less worthy of protection, by the attribution of a social or altruistic motive, than private hospitality. The provision of access to a naturally wild area should not require its being manicured to the degree required of commercial or industrial lands or premises. I would hold that the Plaintiff, and anyone else in her position, was a licencee on the Defendant’s lands.

25. Historically, the liability to licencees was restricted by the proposition that an adult licencee, in any event, must take the premises as he found them. The only duty of the occupier was not to set a trap: “subject to this, which involves, as has been decided, conduct bordering upon deceit or fraud, the licencee must take the premises as they are with all their imperfections whatever they might be” : Bohane v. Driscoll [1929] IR 428.

26. This formulation was however criticised by Finlay C.J. in Rooney v. Connolly [1987] ILRM 768. Commenting on the passage just quoted the learned Chief Justice said:-

27. I propose to approach the issue in this case on the basis of the statement most favourable to a licencee which can be found in the authorities. This appears to me to be that of Lord Sumner in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Proctor [1923] AC 253 where it was said that licensor “must act with reasonable diligence to prevent his premises from misleading or entrapping the licencee......”. Similarly, in Aherne v. Roth and Ors. [1945] Ir Jur Rep 45, the duty to a licencee was being described as being a duty “to protect licencees against concealed dangers which he (the licensor) actually knows to exist”.

28. I do not consider that a formulation involving the concepts of deceit or fraud, even as those terms are used in a civil rather than criminal context, is helpful to the elucidation of duties to a licencee.

29. In this case, the Defendant has not sought to argue that it is entitled to be exempted from such duty as it may owe to the Plaintiff on the basis that it did not actually know of the danger represented by the fallen tree or the slope below the path. This was probably a wise concession having regard to the presence of a part time employee whose house, on the evidence, appears to overlook the site of the accident.

30. In applying the duty of an occupier, as stated above, to the facts of the present case, it does not appear to me that the fallen tree can be regarded as a concealed danger or a trap. While there was some dispute in evidence as to the point at which it would have become obvious, it was beyond dispute that it was actually observed prior to the Plaintiffs stepping off the path and was in fact the cause of that action. If, therefore, there was any misleading or entrapping of the licencee it must be found other than in the obvious fact of the tree’s collapse and presence as an obstacle on the path. Once the path was observed to be blocked by the members of the Plaintiff’s party it was necessary for them to take some alternative route in order to get back to their car. It was certainly open to them to retrace their steps and I do not accept the contention that the path was too narrow to allow them to do so safely having regard to the actual or possible presence of other people coming down the path. Firstly, the path was in my view wide enough to allow such persons to pass. Secondly, if the Plaintiff and her party had met such persons they would no doubt have informed them that the path ahead was impassable.

31. However, having read the transcript and considered the photographs I am of the opinion that the presence of two tracks across the slope was a significant factor in the decision of the leaders of the Plaintiff’s party to step off the path. When it was put to the Plaintiff in evidence that this was a foolhardy thing to do when she could have retraced her steps she said “not at that time, no. It seemed a natural thing to follow everybody down over the bank, which is what people had obviously been doing over the weeks, months, however long the tree had been there”.

32. I agree with the learned trial judge in his assessment of this decision. He said:-

33. He then concluded:-

34. It seems clear from another passage in the learned trial Judge’s decision that he would not have found the Defendant liable to the Plaintiff if he had considered her to be a licencee. He said:-

35. I agree that the nature of the risk was analogous to that undertaken to that undertaken by hill walkers. It is also clear from the evidence of Mr. Legg, one of the Plaintiff’s companions, that the party were in fact prepared to walk across unsurfaced terrain and were dressed to do so. However, their actual decision to do so at the point where the accident took place, which was taken quickly, was significantly influenced by the presence of the tracks which had been permitted to be made, and to remain on the ground, by the Defendants. They may, in my opinion, have misled the Plaintiff in altering her perception of the risk, though the course she embarked on was still obviously risky.

36. Applying the formulation already quoted of Lord Sumner in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Proctor, it is clear that on the evidence the trial Judge would have been entitled to arrive to the conclusion that the Defendant in his capacity as licensor had not acted with reasonable diligence to prevent the particular area from misleading the licensee, a failure which contributed, although in part only, to the accident.

37. Accordingly I find that each party was at fault in this accident.

38. Counsel for the Plaintiff, very realistically, confined his argument to the proposition that the apportionment was grossly disproportionate. He did not press the submission that there was no scope for any finding of contributory negligence. He relied on the well known case of O’Sullivan v. Dwyer [1971] IR 275 to the effect that “degrees of fault between the parties are not to be apportioned on the basis of the relative causative potency of their respective causative contributions to the damage, but rather on the basis of the moral blame worthiness of their respective causative contributions. However, there are limits to this since fault is not to be measured by purely subjective standards but by objective standards”.

39. This formulation was significantly qualified in a later case, Carroll v. Clare County Council [1975] IR 221, at 227. Commenting on the passage just cited, Kenny J. said:-

40. Kenny J. also remarks, in an unconnected portion of the judgment of some relevance to this case that “it is not a principle of law that a person who maintains or permits an unusual danger must bear a higher share of fault than that attributed to a person guilty of a casual act of negligence”.

41. I agree with the learned trial judge that the Plaintiff must bear the larger share of fault in this accident. If the Defendant had simply provided access to the site, without developing any paths, I do not believe they would have been negligent at all. The Plaintiff’s action in stepping off the path when she could have retraced her steps was both the immediate and the greater fault leading to the accident. The fault committed by the Defendant was limited to that of somewhat misleading the Plaintiff as to the negotiability of the terrain. But the terrains main features continued to be obviously dangerous.

42. I would therefore attribute two thirds of the fault involved in this accident to the Plaintiff and one third to the Defendant.