Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

[*2] This is an appeal by Thomas Bailey, Caroline Bailey and Bovale Developments Limited, the applicants/appellants, hereinafter referred to as the applicants. The applicants are appealing against the judgment of the High Court, Morris P., delivered the 6th March, 2000, in proceedings in which the applicants claim relief by way of judicial review of a decision of the respondent.

"I believe in the light of my knowledge of the issues and the events which have occurred to date that it is appropriate that the witnesses in question be called before the Tribunal to give evidence on oath of the matters which are relevant to the Tribunal's inquiries. It has been urged upon me that in view of the private nature of the proposed inquiry touching as it does upon the expenditure of money and acquisition of assets by the parties that such inquiries should be conducted in private. The Tribunal of Inquiries Evidence Act specifically provides for the evidence to be heard in public unless it is expedient to the public interest that I sit in private. I do not believe that there are sufficient grounds open to me to conduct the intended examination of the witnesses in private in the public interest and accordingly I believe that the examination of the witnesses should proceed."

(a) That the relevance of the evidence to be given had not been established.

(b) That the respondent was incorrect in concluding that he must hear the evidence in public rather than in private.

[*3] That the applicants have a constitutional right to privacy is beyond debate. It is equally well established that this is not an absolute right but one which must in certain circumstances be weighed against or balanced with the exigencies of the common good. Again, the common good may require that matters, resolved by democratically elected representatives in the Houses of the Oireachtas to be of urgent public importance, be inquired into by the tribunal. It is of the essence of such tribunals that the inquiries be held in public. If this is not done public disquiet, which lead to the appointment of the tribunal, could not be allayed. These principles have been established and reviewed exhaustively in recent years (see Goodman International v. Mr. Justice Hamilton [1992] 2 I.R. 542, Redmond v. Mr. Justice Flood [1999] 1 I.L.R.M. 241; Lawlor v. Mr. Justice Flood (Unreported, Supreme Court, 8th October, 1999); Murphy v. Mr. Justice Flood (Unreported, High Court, Geoghegan J., 30th April, 1999). These principles were correctly analysed and applied by Mr. Justice Morris in the judgment under appeal. The concept that public interest includes the interest of the public in the right of privacy of a person or persons was addressed by the President. He stated at page 30 of the transcript of his judgment:

"... I am prepared to accept, without deciding, that the protection of constitutional rights can constitute a public interest that might justify the exclusion of the public from the proceedings of a tribunal of inquiry."

tribunal itself. That decision must conform to the standard of reasonableness laid down by this court in The State (Keegan) v. Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 and O'Keefe v. An Bord Pleanala [1993] 1 I.R. 39. No doubt any determination of reasonableness would have regard to the subject matter and consequences of the decision as was so clearly illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Lord Saville [1999] 4 ALL ER 860. Those principles having been examined in full by the learned President, he stated at page 27 of the transcript of the judgment:

"The legislature has entrusted a broad measure of discretion to such tribunals, including the discretion to decide how the inquiry will proceed and what evidence will be admitted, and it is no part of the duty of this Court to whittle down that discretion, with the inevitable deleterious effects that would have on the effective discharge of the important public tasks with which tribunals of inquiry are burdened."