Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) against an Order of the High Court, Mr. Justice Johnson, given on 16th June, 1997. By Notice of Motion dated 14th May, 1997 the Defendants moved to apply to the High Court for leave to amend the defence to include a counterclaim against the Appellant. The Affidavit which grounded the Motion was deposed by Paul Beegan who described that the proceedings arose out of an accident which happened on 11th July, 1992 when the Appellant was a back seat passenger in his own car driven by the first named Defendant. The Appellant’s claim is for damages for injuries suffered when the car collided with two other vehicles as a result of the negligence of the first named Defendant. The first named Defendant was driving the car with the consent of the Appellant because the Appellant had consumed too much alcoholic drink. Three other actions have been brought arising out of this accident and the total cost of the claims to date is £168,438.00. The second named Defendant (herein referred to as the M.I.B.I.) was joined to the proceedings pursuant to Clause 2(2) of the Memorandum of Agreement made on 21st December, 1988 between the Minister for the Environment of the one part and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland. It is the case of the M.I.B.I that the expense incurred by it arose from the fact that the Appellant permitted an uninsured person, the first named Defendant, to drive the Appellant’s car. It is the case of the M.I.B.I. that in the other actions arising from this accident the Appellant, as a Defendant, was vicariously liable for the negligent driving of the first named Defendant, that the monies paid by M.I.B.I. were monies paid for and on behalf of the Appellant and to the use of the Appellant and that the payment of these monies relieved him of a liability which would otherwise have attached to him. Further, it is the M.I.B.I.’s case that, it would be unjust to permit the Appellant having cost the M.I.B.I. a very large amount of monies by permitting an uninsured driver to

2. On the matter coming before the High Court on the 16th June, 1997, before Mr. Justice Johnson, it is clear, from Counsels’ agreed note, that the application was opposed by Counsel on behalf of the Appellant who referred to Order 19 Rule 2 and Order 21 Rule 14 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. It was argued by Counsel for the Appellant that it would not be convenient for the Appellant for the claim and counterclaim to be disposed of together, that there was insufficient connection between them, that the only issue in common between the claim and the counterclaim was whether or not the Appellant knew or ought to have known that there was no insurance. It was pointed out to Mr. Justice Johnson that the Appellant had suffered very substantial injuries and that there would be a considerable amount of evidence in relation to same. In addition, it was further stated to Mr. Justice Johnson that, there was a plea of contributory negligence including allegations that the Appellant allowed himself travel as a passenger in the car when it was defective, when the driver of same was drunk and without wearing a seat belt. Also, it was argued before Mr. Justice Johnson that, insofar as the counterclaim was concerned there Would be an issue as to whether or not the amount of the three settlements (£l68,000) was reasonable and that there would be considerable amount of dispute as to whether or not the M.I.B.I. were entitled in law to recover from the Appellant. Mr. Justice Johnson made an Order giving the Defendants liberty to amend their defence to include a counterclaim. He held that there was one common issue which was of considerable importance; that issue was the lack of insurance. He contended that it would not be proper to exclude the Defendants from making a counterclaim in these proceedings in respect of monies paid to the other parties.

3. The Appellant appealed on the following grounds:

4. Ms. Eileen Lydon, S.C., on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that the issue as to whether or not the counterclaim is allowed is a matter for the discretion of the Court but that in exercising its discretion the Court should look at all the circumstances. Once the Court is aware that the Appellant does not admit any allegations the Court should consider the action as a full fight. The question then becomes whether all the issues should be heard together. She submitted that in the circumstances it would not be convenient to dispose of the counterclaim in the Appellant’s action. She relied upon Order 19 Rule 2 of the Rules of the Superior Court which states:

5. Ms. Lydon also relied upon Order 21 Rule 14 which states:

6. Counsel submitted that it would not be convenient or just to the Appellant for the counterclaim to proceed within the Appellant’s action. She submitted that there was only one common issue, that is whether or not the Appellant knew or ought to have known that the first named Defendant was not insured. But that apart from the question of insurance, the Appellant had suffered very severe injuries and there would be extensive evidence as to that and there would also be, if the counterclaim was to be proceeded with at the same time, the complicated issues as to the settlements, as to whether they were reasonable, and also the liability of the parties. She stated that the Appellant had not given M.I.B.I. authority to settle on his behalf. Ms. Lydon stressed that it was not convenient to the Appellant for these matters to proceed in the one action. She urged on the Court that the separate issues be not dealt with by way of the counterclaim, that it was not convenient. She referred to South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord [1897] 2 Ch 487.

7. Mr. Felix McEnroy, S.C., on behalf of the Defendants, referred to Quinn v. Hession, (1879-80) 4 L.R. Ir. 35 and Arthur v. Arthu r (1879-80) 3 L.R. Ir. 1 . He urged three criteria for the Court:

8. He argued that the Appellant had not been caught by surprise and referred to a letter of 3rd February, 1994 to the Appellant’s solicitors from Irish National Insurance where reference was made to a “properly completed Mandate” from the policy holder’s driver, John McNulty, and that they would be defending claims made on behalf of M.I.B.I., and further:

9. As regards the issue of convenience he considered what it meant and suggested appropriate questions were:

10. He said that in this case there were the same parties litigating the same factual matter. The counterclaim was concerned with the consequences of the particular accident. He suggested that the same parties would be in Court on two occasions if the matter was not dealt with in the one action. He submitted that he did not see evidence before either the High Court or this Court that the Appellant is embarrassed by defending the counterclaim in these proceedings.

11. In reply Ms. Lydon said that this case raises issues that are both complex and difficult. She stated that it would be inconvenient, especially for the Appellant, if the counterclaim was permitted to proceed in this action.

12. The jurisdiction inherent in the High Court and this Court on appeal, together with the jurisdiction as established under the Orders of the Superior Courts, both Order 19 Rule 2 and Order 21 Rule 14, enable the Judge to act in accordance with his discretion. It is quite clear that having considered the case presented by the parties in the High Court that the learned High Court Judge considered the appropriate Rules of the Superior Courts and exercised his discretion in favour of allowing the counterclaim on the grounds as set out above. There was no evidence in the High Court or in this Court that the convenience of the Appellant would be seriously embarrassed. There was no evidence that it would be unjust to the Appellant. There is no doubt that it will be a complex action. There are serious issues to be tried, and it was stated that there will be much evidence on the injuries of the Appellant. However, the core of the case is the insurance issue. In considering the issues of convenience and justice the criteria proposed by Mr. McEnroy are relevant. It is desirable to have finality in litigation, multiplicity of suits should be avoided and it is very important to take steps to reduce the costs of litigation. In all the circumstances of the case it appears that the matters can be conveniently disposed of in the pending action and that the justice of the situation favours such an approach. Accordingly, I would affirm the Order of the High Court and dismiss the appeal.