1. This
is an appeal brought by Michael Hynes from the judgment of the High Court
(McCracken J.) delivered on 22nd May, 1998, dismissing a claim whereby he
sought to challenge the decision of a tribunal of inquiry that affirmed the
decision made to have him dismissed from the Garda Siochana from 17th May, 1990.
2. It
should be said straight away that we are dealing with a very old case and are
concerned with the Garda Siochana (Discipline) Regulations 1971, which were
superseded by the Garda Siochana (Discipline) Regulations 1989.
3. As
recounted in the judgment of the learned High Court judge, on the 12th October,
1988, the appellant was served with a discipline form pursuant to
4. The
first thing to be noted about those charges is that they relate to different
dates, two different venues and two different forms of activity alleged against
the person arraigned.
5. A
tribunal of inquiry was set up under the relevant regulations and an inquiry
was held on the 11th and 12th May, 1989. The was that there was a
6. In
any event, the appellant appealed that finding and he sought a declaration that
the tribunal had erred in law in deciding that he was guilty of the breach of
the disciplines as alleged in charges (5) and (6). He also claimed that the
penalty imposed was excessive.
7. On
7th December, 1987, it is the fact that Mr. Hynes had been prosecuted in the
District Court with assault occasioning actual bodily harm and this related to
the matter referred to in charge (6) before the disciplinary tribunal. It had
been established in the decision of this court in
McGrath
.v. Commissioner of an Garda Siochana
[1990]
ILRM 17 that that cannot be done and indeed that is copperfastened now by the
1989 Regulations. They expressly provide that if a member is acquitted of a
charge in the court he
8. Mr.
Hynes’s approach was to take a simple appeal to the Appeal Board. When
they heard the submissions by Mr. Moylan - which in essence was to do the best
he could for his client by way of legal argument - their decision was to affirm
the Commissioner’s decision to dismiss Mr. Hynes from the Garda Siochana
in respect of breach
(5)
with
breaches (2) and (3) (these are minor matter of no relevance) taken into
consideration.
9. There
was a critical finding that they revoked the decision to find him in breach of
(6). So Mr. Hynes having come before the appeal board said in effect:
“Look I should not have been convicted on (6) because it should never
have been before the tribunal, I should now be acquitted of it”, and that
is precisely what they did.
10. The
case advanced on behalf of the appellant at trial and here is basically a
simple one. It is that by reason of having a charge before the tribunal which
should not have been there that that in some way polluted or vitiated the whole
proceedings so as to call in question the validity of charge
(5).
That
would be like saying that if there were two charges on a indictment before a
judge and jury and one should not have been there for lack of jurisdiction that
that would vitiate the whole proceedings.
11. Mr.
Mackey, S.C., has relied on a decision of the then President of the High Court,
Mr. Justice Davitt, in
The
State (Kelleher) .v. Galway County Council
[1958]
IR 142. The point of that case was that where a county medical officer had to
assess a person for possible entitlement to consideration under regulations
made under the Health Act, 1953, he could not take into consideration, or be
affected in his decision, by matters which were something that he should not
have taken into account. Davitt P. confirmed what was well settled law even
then that where an administrative tribunal has a duty to hear and determine a
certain question according to law takes into consideration and allows the
determination to be affected by matters which it has no right to take into
account, it can be held to have declined a jurisdiction and may be required on
mandamus
to
hear and determine the issue according to law.
12. There
is no question of anything being taken into consideration here. The Tribunal of
Inquiry had two distinct charges before them. They essentially found him guilty
on the more serious charge on any view, going into the dwellinghouse of the
people and abusing them. They said they were taking the other into
consideration. By that they meant that they were taking it into account: they
would not inflict a separate penalty on it.
13. Then
Mr. Hynes took the course of going to the Appeal Board and he made his case
there. His point was accepted that this charge should not have
14. The
judge found that count
(5)
did
not in any way deal with the assault but dealt with an entirely different
happening at a different time. It was not open to the plaintiff, the judge
held, that having chosen this course of action and made his arguments before
the court to come into the High Court six years later and argue that the entire
proceedings were annulled.
15. With
great regard to the judge, I could not agree more with every word he said. That
is as clear as could be, I think. It would bring the whole system of judicial
review of administrative action into serious question if we were to allow
points like this to prevail. I think the judge was perfectly right in
dismissing the case.
17. I
agree. It appears from the record of the decision of the Commissioner that what
he did was this in relation to the finding of the Board of Enquiry. The Board
of Enquiry having found Garda Hynes to be in breach of discipline as described
in Breaches No. 5 and 6, the Commissioner went on to dismiss Mr. Hynes in
respect of Breach No. 5 with Breach No. 6, taken into consideration. It was
from that decision that the appeal was taken to the Appeal Board. The Appeal
Board, quite properly having regard to the decision of this court, to which the
president has already referred, in effect set aside the finding in respect of
Breach No. 6 and affirmed the decision of the Commissioner to dismiss him in
respect of Breach No. 5,
with
two comparatively minor matters taken into consideration. That seems, for the
reasons which the president has