Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions

1. Mr. P.J. McEvoy was elected President of the Prison Officers Association (hereinafter “the Association”) on 6th March, 1992. The Association operates under a Constitution, the most up-to-date edition of which is that of April, 1990.

2. On 29th July, 1992, Mr. McEvoy presided at a meeting of the National Executive Council of the Association. Under the heading “any other business” the conduct of a prison officer, who was also assistant general secretary of the Association, was called in question. According to the evidence of Mr. McEvoy, the meeting got “very hot” and acrimonious. Mr. Noel Doyle, who did not agree with the accusations that were being made against the assistant general secretary, left the meeting. The plaintiff decided to “close” the meeting. He said in evidence at the trial:-

3. Mr. McEvoy then left the meeting, but the Vice President took charge. It appears that the climate cooled down and the meeting was brought to an orderly conclusion.

4. In the course of the resumed meeting a “vote of censure” was passed on Mr. McEvoy, seemingly arising on his decision to “close” the meeting.

5. Mr. Denis McGrath, who is general secretary of the Association (a paid official) wrote to Mr. McEvoy on the 4th August, 1992, as follows:-

6. To that letter Mr. McEvoy replied on 19th August, 1992, as follows:-

7. Mr. McGrath replied on the 31st August:-

8. A meeting of the Council was scheduled for 29th October, 1992, and, prior to that, on the 20th October, 1992, a member of the Council, Mr. Peadar Tumulty, notified the general secretary that he intended to propose a vote of no confidence in Mr. McEvoy under Rule 62 of the Association’s Constitution.

9. As set forth in the judgment of the learned High Court judge (McCracken J.) of 18th March, 1998:-

10. Rule 62(a) of the Association’s Constitution provides that “if the National Executive Council decides by a two-thirds majority of its members present and entitled to vote to pass a vote of no confidence in any member of the Administrative Council, that member shall cease to be a member of the Administrative Council and of the National Executive Council forthwith and shall not be entitled to attend any subsequent meetings of the Administrative Council or of the National Executive Council.”

11. Mr. McEvoy was a member of both the Administrative Council and the National Executive Council and, therefore, came within Rule 62. It is accepted on both sides that the effect of a vote of no confidence is that the officer in question would automatically cease to hold office.

12. Mr. McEvoy’s essential complaint, at trial and before us, was that the rules of natural and constitutional justice were not observed which would

13. The essential submission advanced by counsel for the Association is to say that the rule in question deals with the policy and “political” decisions that the Association may take from time to time. In contrast, there are specific rules dealing with how a charge of misconduct should be dealt with under Rules 95 et seq. They embody the safeguards that are now accepted as commonplace for a hearing to comply with the rules of natural and constitutional justice. But counsel for the Association submits that this was a matter of the internal working of the Association; Mr. McEvoy, as Chairman of the meeting, had closed or adjourned the meeting. Mr.Tumulty, in proposing his motion, said that the reason for putting down the vote of no confidence in Mr. McEvoy was that he did not agree with the way Mr. McEvoy had presided over meetings, and the way he had conducted them.

14. This case does not turn on the duties and obligations of a chairman of a meeting whether of a union, club, or other such association: much lore on this subject it to be found in the judgment of Megarry J. in John .v. Rees [1970] Ch. 345. It is conceded that Mr. McEvoy may have been within his rights to “close” or adjourn the meeting (I am not clear that there is any difference

15. The learned trial judge concluded that it was an extremely serious matter for Mr. McEvoy if his colleagues on the Council said that they had lost confidence in him as President. The position of President was a very prestigious one, and one carrying considerable responsibility. He considered that the law on this matter was governed by the principles set out in Glover . v. B.L.N. [1973] IR 388. He went on to hold that it was quite clear that the provisions of natural or constitutional justice were not complied with at the meeting of 29th October, notwithstanding the protests of the plaintiff. He was given no opportunity to prepare any form of rebuttal, as indeed he did not know what he had to rebut.

16. The learned trial judge adjudged that the plaintiff was entitled to damages (no other form of relief was available to him since time had passed so that he could not be restored to the position that he had held) and he awarded a sum of £10,000 damages.

17. The notice of appeal by the Association is confined to two grounds:-

18. It seems to me that there is a dichotomy between what is provided in Rule 62 which really concerns the policy of the Association: did the members agree with the President or did they not, and the rules dealing with alleged misconduct by any member of the Association. Provided there is no mala fides - and that is not suggested in this case - then it seems clear that Rule 62 is totally different from what is envisaged where there is an allegation of misconduct and which is governed by the provisions of Rule 95 et seq .

19. In the case of such a person as the President of a union or association such as this, or of a club, then the rules must form the contract between the various members. Such a contract will lay down how the affairs of the particular group should be conducted. In general, in the absence of mala fides or some disregard of the rules, the affairs of such a group should not be subject to judicial review.

20. It should be stated, in any event, that the reason given for proposing a vote of no confidence in Mr. McEvoy was that there was disagreement with the way that he conducted meetings. There was a plausible case for that; it would surely have been better if he had adjourned the meeting of 29th July, 1992, for some short length of time, to allow tempers to cool down. I make this comment not to attempt to judge the merits of the matter in any sense but

21. Since I decide the matter on the point of principle as regards the application of Rule 62, then there is no necessity to consider the question of damages because it does not arise.

22. I would allow the appeal.

23. I agree with the judgment of the President of the Court.

24. In the case of a private body like the respondent matters of internal management are for it. In the present case, the procedure required by

25. Rule 62 was followed. Of course, such procedures must be fair. What is required is that the resolution should be put before a properly convened meeting of those entitled to attend. Each person present including the person concerned should be entitled to speak and to be heard. Provided that the majority act bona fide in the sense that they are acting in the interest of the Association and not in accordance with some private agenda, they have done all that the rule requires of them either expressly or by implication.