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Cite as: [1998] IESC 11, [1999] 1 IR 186

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MacCarthaigh v. Éire [1998] IESC 11; [1999] 1 IR 186 (15th July, 1998)

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

Ó HAIMILÍN, PRIOMH-BHREITHEAMH

Ó FLAITHEARTAIGH, BREITHEAMH

Ó BEARAIN, BREITHEAMH

Ó MURCHÚ, BREITHEAMH

Ó LOINGSIGH, BREITHEAMH

379/95

IDIR

RUAIRÍ Mac CÁRTHAIGH

Iarratasóir/Achomharcóir

agus

ÉIRE, AN t-ÁRD AIGHNE agus STIURTHÓIR na n-IONCHUISEAMH POIBLÍ

Freagróirí

Breithiúnas a thus an Príomh-Bhreitheamh Ó h-Aimiltín, an 15ú lá d’Iúil 1998. [Nem. Diss.]

Acomharc é seo atá á dhéanamh ag an t-Iarratasóir/Acomharcóir Ruairí Mac Carthaigh i gcoinne Ordú na h-Ard Cúirte, 14/09/1994, ag diúltiú (agus costasaí dá gearradh air comh maith) don t-Iarratasóir iarratas athbhreithnithe a dhéanamh ar mhaithe leis na faoisimh seo a leanas, sé sin:

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1. Ordú choisc ag fógairt don Freagróir triú-luaite gan dul ar aghaidh le h-aon triail don Iarratasóir ach amháin os comhair giúire atá ar a gcumas Gaeilge a thuiscint gan cabhair ath-teangaire;

2. Ordú mandamus ag fógairt don Freagróir triú-luaite giúire feidhmiúil a thionól maidir le riachtanasaí triail de réir cirt a bheith ag an t-Iarratasóir in-luaite;

3. Dearbhú chomh maith nó ina ionad sin go bhfuil an Iarratasóir dteideal giúire nach bhfuil baill éagcumasacha páirteach ann de réir forálacha Acht na Giúirithe, 1976.

Cúisiodh an Iarratasóir i dteannta duine eile agus cuireadh ina leith:-

1. Go rinne sé, ar an 28ú 1á Bealtaine, 1990, ag Bóthar Suardais, Corballis, Iaistigh de Dhúiche Chathrach Atha Cliath, meascán seaclaidí agus milseogra go raibh luach iomlán £11,252.50 orthu a goid, contrartha d’alt 23 den Larceny Act, 1916, mar leasaíodh ag an Acht urn Dlí Coirúil (Dlinse), 1976;

2. Go rinne sé, ar an 1á in-luaite, le bagairt foirnirt, feithicil a ghabháil go neamhdleathach, contrartha d’alt 10 den Acht urn Dlí Coiriúil (Dlinse), 1976;

3. Go rinne sé, ar an 1á in-luaite, ag 5 Lána Henrietta, Baile Atha Cliath, in nDúiche Chathrach Átha Cliath, meascán seaclaidáí, milseáin agus

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milseogra, maoin John Nelson, go raibh luach iomlán £11,252.50 orthu, a ghlacadh agus fios aige gur maoin goidte a bhi iontu, contrartha d’alt 33(1) den Larceny Act, 1916

Tá sé socraithe go dtrialfar an Iarratasóir ar na cúiseanna sin os comhair breitheamh den Chúirt Chuarda agus giúiré, ach caithfear an triail a chur ar ath-1ó go dti go dtabharfaí breith ar an acomharc seo a leanas.

Tógadh an t-Iarratasóir i mBaile Átha Cliath, agus dearbhaíonn sé gur tógadh le Gaeilge é. Dá bhrí sin b’fhearr leis a chás féin a phlé tri Gaeilge. Mothaíonn sé nach mbeadh an éifeacht céanna le h-aon rud a deireadh sé féin, nó a deireadh dliodóir ar a shon, mura mbeadh cruinn-eolas na Gaeilge ag gach ball den giúire. Aighníonn an tIarratasóir go ndéanfar sarú ar a chearta bhunreachtúla, mura roghnófar giúire a mbeidh an Ghaeilge go líofa acu, gur féidir leo gach rud a bheas ráite in nGaeilge le linn na trialach a thuiscint, gan cabhair ateangaire.

Seo iad forálacha na Bunreachta a bhaineann leis an acomharc seo:

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Airteagal 8.

1. Os í an Ghaeilge an teanga náisiúnta is i an phriomhtheanga oifigiúil í.

2. Glactar leis an Sacs-Bhéarla mar theanga oifigiúil eile.

3. Ach féadfar socrú a dhéanamh le dlí d’fhonn ceachtar den dá theanga sin a bheith ma haonteanga le haghaidh aon ghnó nó gnóthaí oifigiúla ar fud an Stáit ar fad nó in aon chuid de.

Airteagal 38

1. Ní cead aon duine a thriail in aon chúis choiriúil ach mar is cuí de réir dlí.

2. ...

3. ...

4. ...

5. Ní cead duine a thriail in aon chúis choiriúil ach i láthair choiste tiomanta, ach amháin i gcás cionta a thriail faoi alt 2, alt 3 nó alt 4 den Airteagal seo.

Ins an Ard-Chúirt, rinne an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain coimriú ar chásanna ina raibh ceisteanna cosúla á chur phlé trí chéile - ó Éireann, ó Cheanada agus ó na Stáit Aontaithe. D’admhaigh sé go raibh céim speisialta ag baint leis an

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Ghaeilge mar phríomh-theanga, agus go raibh sé de chomhacht ag an Iarratasóir a chosaint a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge más mian leis. Ach ó thaobh roghnú an ghiúiré de, bhí bun-phrionsabal ag obair narbh fhéidir a chur ar leataobh, sé sin:-

“Ba chóir go bhfeadfaí a rá i dtaobh giúiré ar bith i ngach cás coiriúil go seasann siad do ghach aicme den phobal sa cheantar ma bhfuil an chúis le héisteacht.”

Tá a thios ag an saol nach bhfuil morán daoine in Éireann faoi láthair gur féidir leo cúrsaí dlí a thuiscint as Gaeilge gan cabhair ateangaire. Tar éis staitistic a luadh ón daonáirearnh ón mbliain 1986, dúirt an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain:-

“Fagann san, dá mbeifí ag tabhairt faoi rolla giúire do chur le chéile agus gan éinne ar an rolla ach daoine go raibh eolas maith acu ar an dteangain labhartha, go gaithfí 75% ar a laghad de phobal Chathair Átha Cliath d’fhágáil ar leataobh ó thús, agus táim den bharúil go mbeadh an figiúr níos comhgaraí do 90% nó os a chionn nuair a bhiefi ag plé le daoine a bheadh ag dul i ngleic le ceisteanna casta san dlí choiriúil do phlé is do thuiscint.”

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De réir an breitheamh Ó hAnluain, dá ngéillfeá d’éileamh an Iarratasóra, ní bheadh formhór muintir na hÉireann in ann freastal ar giúiré i gcás mar sin; agus bheadh sé sin contrartha don chiall a bhain an Cúirt Uachtarach as Airteagal 38.5 den Bhunreacht i gcás de Béirca v. Attorney General [197ó] IR 38. Luaigh sé sliocht ó bhreithúThas an Breitheamh 0 Griofa sa chás sin:-

“Therefore, in my opinion, the jury should be a body which is truly representative, and a fair cross-section of the community. This is widely recognised and accepted in many jurisdictions and, in particular, in the United States, where, by reason of the diversity of the ethnic groups in the population, the question has been considered frequently by the Supreme Court in that country. I would adopt what was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company : -

‘Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case.... The broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.

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Séard a bhí i gceist i De Búrca ná Acht na nGiúrithe, 1927. D’ordaigh alt 2 den acht go mbeadh cáilíocht rátúcháin iosmhóideadh choisteoirí i ngach giúiré-dhúthaigh. De réir ailt 5 agus 16, ní bheadh mná in ann fónamh mar choisteoirí ach amháin ar a iarraidh sin dóibh. Bhí an Acht céanna á phlé i gcás The State (Byrne) v. Frawley [1978] IR 326

In a bhreithiunas dúirt an Breitheamh Ó hInnse ag paiste 347 agus 348:-

“The gravimen of the complaint made in the de Burca case against such jury lists was not that the system was unfair to those who, although eligible were excluded (for no excluded person has come ever come forward to complain) that his or her exclusion was unconstitutional but that such jury lists were so artificially shrunken and selective that an accused person was denied the representative jury source which is vital for the jury guaranteed by s.5 ofArticle 38 of the Constitution. The extent to which juries drawn from those lists were incapable of presenting a genuine reflection of community values and standards is shown when it is pointed out that the combined effect of the rating qualification and the exclusion of women meant that some 80% of the adult citizens in a jury district were shut out from jury service. The proposition that juries drawn from the remaining 20% were valid because no ineligible persons served on them I find no more supportable

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than a proposition that an election would be valid when 80% of those who should have had an opportunity of voting were barred from the polls

For that conclusion I would respectfully adopt (in addition to the reasons I gave in my judgment in the de Burca case) the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 US. 522 where that court, in condemning as unconstitutional a jury system which resulted in the exclusion of women jurors, said at p.530 of the report.

In a bhreithiúnas léigh an Breitheamh Ó hInnse an páirt so den bhreithiúnas:-

“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power to make available the common sense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or biased response of a judge. Duncan v. Louisiana at 155-156 This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive

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groups are excluded from the pool. Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.”

Aontaíonn an Chúirt seo leis sin, agus leis an méid a bhi le rá ag an mBreitheamh Ó hAnluain sa chás seo. Cinnte tá deacrachtaí ag baint le ateangaireacht - deacrachtai a luaigh Michael Shulman san Vanderbilt Law Review (1993) vol. 46, p175 at 177 mar seo:-

“When a defendant testifies in a criminal case his testimony is critically important to the jury ‘s determination of his guilt or innocence. The first noticeable difficulty in the present system of court interpretation is that non-English speaking defendants are not judged on their own words. The words attributed to the defendant are those of the interpreter. No matter how accurate the interpretation is, the words are not the defendant ‘s, nor is the style, the syntax, or the emotion. Furthermore, some words are culturally specific and, therefore, are incapable of

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being translated. Perfect interpretations do not exist, as no interpretation will convey precisely the same meaning as the original testimony. While juries should not attribute to the defendant the exact wording of the interpretation and the emotion expressed by the interpreter, they typically do just that.... Given that juries often determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence based on small nuances of language or slight variations in emotion, how can it be fair for the defendant to be judged on the words chosen and the emotion expressed by the interpreter?”

Tá sé sin fíor go leor, ach caithfear a rá, in Eireann faoi láthair, nach bhfuil réiteach níos fearr ann. Dá mbeadh ar gach ball den ghiúire bheith in ann cúrsai dlí a thuiscint as Gaeilge gan cabhair ateangaire, chuirfí formhór de mhuintir na hÉireann ar leataobh. Dhéanadh sé sin sarú ar Airteagal 38.5 den Bhunreacht, mar a mhinigh an Chúirt Uachtarach é i gcás de Búrca v. Attorney General agus The State (Byrne) v. Frawley .

Ar an ábhar sin, dúiltaíonn an Chúirt don acomharc seo.