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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Tweed v Amazon.com Inc & Anor (Approved) [2025] IEHC 313 (29 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC313.html
Cite as: [2025] IEHC 313

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 THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. HP2042/701]

[2025] IEHC 313

BETWEEN

PAUL TWEED

PLAINTIFF

AND

 

AMAZON.COM INC

AND

AMAZON SERVICES UK LIMITED

 

DEFENDANTS

 

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 29th day of May 2025.

Introduction .

1.                   The plaintiff is a solicitor who carries on legal practice in Dublin, Belfast and London. 

2.                  The defendants are related companies registered in the United States and in the United Kingdom respectively. The defendants operate online sales platforms on which they sell a large variety of goods, including books in both printed and electronic formats. 

3.                  The plaintiff alleges that he has been defamed in a book called "Subversion: The Strategic Weaponisation of Narratives" by Dr Andreas Kreig, published by Georgetown University t/a Georgetown University Press. The book is for sale on the US and UK websites owned and operated by the defendants. 

4.                  In proceedings bearing title and record number "Paul Tweed, plaintiff, v Georgetown University Press, defendant, Record No. 2023/3579P", the plaintiff has instituted proceedings in this jurisdiction seeking damages for defamation against the publisher of the book, Georgetown University Press (hereinafter referred to as 'the Georgetown proceedings'). 

5.                  In the present action, the plaintiff claims damages for defamation and injunctive relief against the defendants in respect of the allegedly defamatory statement in the book, which has been, and continues to be, available for sale on the defendants' websites and, when purchased, is delivered or downloaded by the defendants to customers in the Republic of Ireland. 

6.                  In this application, the defendants seek a stay of the within proceedings pending the outcome of the Georgetown proceedings. The defendants submit that the efficient use of judicial resources and court time and the issue of the saving of legal costs, are in favour of the grant of a stay of the present action pending determination of the Georgetown proceedings. 

7.                  The plaintiff resists the imposition of any stay on the further progression of his action herein. 

The Alleged Defamatory Statement.

8.                   The statement that is alleged by the plaintiff to be defamatory of him is contained on p. 1 64 of the book. The relevant portion is as follows:

"Beyond helping to disseminate narratives and building networks between like-minded academics, journalists and policymakers, public relations and lobbying companies help Abu Dhabi silence critical voices in the West. A London-based consultancy, Cornerstone Global Associates - according to the New York Times a part of the UAE's information network in Europe - closely works with a British libel lawyer to send aggressive cease and desist letters to academic publishers, universities, and social media companies in an effort to target individuals critical of the UAE and its regional policy. The libel lawyer thereby targets not just references to Cornerstone and its director but also mentions of other individuals closely aligned with Abu Dhabi's information nexus - most notably Mohammed Dahlan allegedly a key interlocutor for Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince and MbZ. This type of lawfare is meant to intimidate critics and provide the UAE's information network with ammunition to attack such critics."  

9.                  The plaintiff alleges that while he is not named in the book, he is named in the newspaper articles in the New York Times and the Irish News, which are cited in the footnotes to the extract quoted above. 

10.              The plaintiff has pleaded that the words stated in the book bear the following meanings: that he is a subversive, covert agent of the United Arab Emirates; that he writes warning letters or institutes legal proceedings for the improper purpose of intimidating critics of the UAE; that he uses his legal practice to unfairly and improperly target academic publishers, universities and social media companies in order to protect the interests of the political regime in the UAE; and that he is an unethical solicitor. 

 

Pre-action Correspondence.

11.               At the hearing of this application, the parties laid considerable emphasis on the content of the correspondence that has passed between them. That correspondence can be briefly summarised as follows: by letter dated 9 June 2023, the plaintiff wrote to the UK division of the defendant companies complaining that he had been defamed in the book which was for sale on their websites. He alleged that the statement made about him in the book was defamatory and had been made maliciously by the author of the book. He requested the defendants to cease publicising and distributing the book for sale until the offending content had been removed from it. 

12.              By letter dated 14 June 2023, a firm of solicitors in England responded on behalf of the defendants stating that they were in the process of reviewing the plaintiff's complaint. By further letter dated 19 June 2023, they replied on behalf of the defendants stating that the plaintiff's complaint would be more appropriately addressed to the author of the book, or to Georgetown University Press. The letter went on to state that if the plaintiff obtained a final and binding court order against the author, editor or publisher of the book, that found the book to be defamatory o f the plaintiff, then their client would take "appropriate action" upon receipt of a copy of such order. 

13.              By letter dated 4 July 2023, the plaintiff informed the defendants' English solicitor that they had been put on notice of the plaintiff's complaint about the defamatory content in the book. The plaintiff again requested that the defendants would suspend distribution of the book in all jurisdictions pending the outcome of such further investigations that they may deem appropriate. By further letter dated 25 July 2023, the plaintiff informed the defendants' English solicitors that he had issued legal proceedings in Ireland in respect of the defamatory statement in the book. He informed them that on 10 July 2023, he had obtained an order from the High Court in Dublin granting him leave to serve proceedings on the publisher, Georgetown University Press. The defendants were informed that similar correspondence had been sent to other sellers of the book, incl uding Wat erstones, WHSmith, Easons, World of Books, Dubray Books and Kennys.i.e., which had all taken the step of suspending distribution of the book in all jurisdictions. The letter went on to state that given the actions of the other online retailers and in light of the defendants' position as a market leading and reputable outlet, the plaintiff was disappointed that the defendants had not adopted a similar approach. 

14.              The defendants responded by letter dated 4 August 2023, in which their solicitors again stated that in the event of the plaintiff obtaining a final and binding court order against the author, editor or publisher, that found the book to be indefensibly defamatory of the plaintiff, the defendants would then take "appropriate action" upon receipt of a copy of such order. 

15.              By letter dated 15 August 2023, the plaintiff pointed out that the defendants had been put on notice of the defamatory content in the book and therefore could not rely on any defence of innocent dissemination. The defendants were urged to reconsider their position. By letter dated 6 November 2023, the plaintiff requested the defendants to provide details of all current sales figures relating to the book via the defendants' distribution network in the following jurisdictions: England and Wales; Northern Ireland; Republic of Ireland; and elsewhere. 

16.              The defendants responded through their English solicitors by letter dated 20 November 2023, stating that the information requested was confidential and therefore would not be provided. The letter again reiterated their undertaking to remove the book from sale to customers in the ROI once the plaintiff had obtained a final and binding court order against the original publisher. 

17.              By letter dated 21 November 2023, the plaintiff through his firm of solicitors, sent a formal pre–litigation letter to the defendants' solicitors in England, warning them that proceedings for damages for defamation and injunctive relief would issue. The letter also stated that the plaintiff was open to alternative dispute resolution in an attempt to resolve the matter in a timely and cost-effective manner. The defendants were informed that the action required of them was to suspend distribution of the book and to issue a suitable apology to the plaintiff in terms and in a manner to be first agreed by his solicitors. 

18.              By letter dated 29 November 2023, the defendants responded through their English solicitors stating that they remained of the view that the plaintiff's claim should be addressed to the author, editor or publisher of the book. They reiterated that the defendants would take such action as it considered appropriate following the resolution of the proceedings brought by the plaintiff against Georgetown University Press. The letter concluded with the English solicitors stating that they did not have instructions to accept service of any proceedings on behalf of their clients. 

19.              Subsequent to the issue and service of proceedings out of the jurisdiction on the defendants, the defendants' Irish solicitor by letter dated 15 March 2024, referred to service of notice of the plenary summons on their clients, which had been effected on 8 March 2024. They requested copies of the documents that had been filed in order to move the application seeking leave to serve outside the jurisdiction pursuant to O.11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. On 19 March 2024, those documents were sent via email to the defendants' Irish solicitor. 

The Present Proceedings.

20.               The plaintiff obtained leave to issue and serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction on the defendants by order of the High Court dated 29 January 2024. 

21.              The plenary summons in this action issued on 13 February 2024. Notice of the plenary summons was served on the defendants pursuant to the provisions of the Hague Convention on 8 March 2024. 

22.              On 19 April 2024, a conditional appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants, which was limited to an appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the Irish courts to determine the matter. 

23.              On 18 June 2024, the defe ndants issued their notice of motion herein seeking a stay of the proceedings pending determination of the Georgetown proceedings. 

24.              On 25 June 2024, a statement of claim was delivered by the plaintiff. On 11 July 2024, an unconditional appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants. 

25.              By letter dated 27 September 2024, the defendants, through their solicitor refused to file their defences until the within application had been determined.

The Georgetown Proceedings.

26.                On 20 July 2023, the plaintiff issued proceedings against Georgetown University Press, as publishers of the book. A statement of claim was delivered on 25 July 2023. A defence was delivered on behalf of the defendant on 2 February 2024. A reply thereto was delivered on 22 February 2024. 

27.              The plaintiff issued a motion to strike out parts of the defence filed on behalf of Georgetown University Press. That motion was heard on 8th and 9th May 2025. Judgment has been reserved in the matter. 

28.              The defendant in that action issued a motion seeking to compel the plaintiff to make discovery of documents. That motion was returnable for 21 May 2025.

Submissions of the Parties.

29.               On behalf of the defendants, it was submitted that the present proceedings and the Georgetown proceedings shared many common factors: they were both brought by the same plaintiff in relation to the same statement alleged to be defamatory of him. It was submitted that the issues of whether the extract in the book actually referred to the plaintiff; whether it bore the meanings alleged by the plaintiff; whether on its true meaning, the extract could be said to be defamatory of the plaintiff; and the issue as to the truth of the statement, were likely to be common issues to both sets of proceedings.  

30.              It was submitted that the plaintiff's primary complaint was against the author and/or publisher of the book. It was submitted that the defendants in the present action were merely sellers of the book. They did not know, nor had they any means of knowing, whether the statement complained of was true or false. It was submitted that in these circumstances, it was entirely reasonable that the plaintiff's action against the primary culprits, being the author and the publisher of the book, should proceed to trial first. 

31.              It was submitted that allowing the actions to proceed in this order, would lead to a significant saving of court time and costs, because, in reality, the outcome of the Georgetown proceedings would have a major bearing on the conduct and outcome of the present proceedings. 

32.              It was submitted that the defendants had acted reasonably in giving the undertaking that they had given, to cease selling the book in the Republic of Ireland, if the plaintiff obtained a final and conclusive judgment against the author or publisher of the book. The defendants further submitted that the extract in the book which was complained of by the plaintiff, could not be said to contain any gross or obvious defamation of the plaintiff. It did not contain any gross slur on his reputation. It was submitted that the plaintiff was not even identified in the extract complained of. The reader would have to go to the trouble of reading the footnotes and then locating the articles referred to therein, in order to ascertain that the plaintiff was the person referred to in those newspaper articles. 

33.              The defendants further submitted that the sales figures for the book showed that it had extremely limited circulation worldwide. In relation to sales to customers in the Republic of Ireland, counsel stated that as of the date of hearing of this application, being 15 May 2025, only sixteen books had been sold to customers with addresses in this jurisdiction. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the offer by the defendants to remove the book from sale once the plaintiff obtained a judgment which recognised that the passage was defamatory of him, was a reasonable approach to the matter. 

34.              It was further submitted that as the plaintiff had sued the initial publisher of the book for damages in defamation for the entirety of the damage to his reputation in this jurisdiction, if he is successful in obtaining judgment against that publisher, that would have a major impact on the level of damages that he could recover in the present proceedings. 

35.              It was submitted that placing a stay on the present proceedings, would not take away the plaintiff's right of access to the courts to vindicate his good name and obtain damages for any damage to his reputation as a result of publication of the defamatory statement, because that would be dealt with in the Georgetown proceedings .  Insofar as the plaintiff may have any further entitlement to damages against the defendants, it was submitted that that could be litigated in the present action after the conclusion of the Georgetown proceedings. 

36.              The defendants submitted that having regard to the stage at which the Georgetown proceedings had reached, where a notice of trial had been served by the plaintiff, and notwithstanding that that had been set aside due to the interlocutory applications that had been brought by the plaintiff and the defendant in those proceedings, it was still the case that that action was much further advanced than the present proceedings. Accordingly, it was submitted that it made sense that that action should proceed to a hearing first. 

37.              It was submitted on behalf of the defendants that the court could have regard to the fact that the plaintiff had delayed in the institution of his proceedings. In particular, it was noted that an affidavit had been sworn by Mr Kelleher, a friend of the plaintiff, who had purchased the book from the defendants' website, which affidavit had been sworn for the purpose of the application for leave to serve outside the jurisdiction pursuant to O.11 of RSC; yet the plaintiff had delayed for a further six months in swearing his affidavit which was required to ground that application. It was submitted that the court was entitled to have regard to this delay by the plaintiff when considering whether it was appropriate to stay these proceedings so as to enable the Georgetown proceedings to conclude.

38.               Finally, it was submitted that the defendants, being the sellers of a vast quantity of books, would be placed in an almost impossible position if they had to determine an issue that arose between the plaintiff and the author as to the veracity of statements made in a book, when deciding whether or not they should permit it to be sold to members of the public. It was submitted that the author and the publisher of the book, being the parties who knew most about the accuracy of the statements contained in it, were the more appropriate parties to answer the charge of defamation initially; therefore, it was appropriate that the action against them should proceed to a hearing where the issue of defamation could be resolved by a jury. It was submitted that where there a subsequent action against an innocent seller of the book, it was appropriate that that action should go second in time. It was submitted that by so doing, it would lead to substantial savings in court time and costs, without in any way impairing the plaintiff's right of access to the courts to vindicate his right to his good name and, if successful, to obtain damages from the primary tortfeasors. 

39.              In response, counsel on behalf of the plaintiff submitted that it was settled at law that a plaintiff had a right of action in relation to a defamatory statement against all publishers of the defamatory statement. This included sellers of the book in which the statement was contained.

40.              It was submitted that in relation to applications for a stay of proceedings, the case law provided that the default position was that a party should be allowed to proceed with his action to trial, unless it could be clearly established by a defendant that there were good reasons why his action should be stayed to await the outcome of other proceedings. 

41.              Counsel submitted that there had been no culpable delay on the part of the plaintiff. It was alleged that the defendants had attempted to frustrate and delay the plaintiff's action in a number of ways: firstly, by not appointing any solicitor to accept service of the proceedings within the jurisdiction. That had required the plaintiff to bring an application for leave to serve outside the jurisdiction pursuant to O.11 of RSC. He had then been obliged to serve the documents formally in the method provided for in the Hague Convention. 

42.              Counsel further pointed out that once notice of the plenary summons had been served on the defendants, they had waited until the eve of the expiry of the applicable period to enter their conditional appearance. Thus, they had waited 41 days in so doing. At which stage, they had entered a conditional appearance contesting the jurisdiction of the Irish courts to deal with the matter; yet they had not proceeded to issue any motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Instead, they had issued the within motion seeking to stay the proceedings and only subsequently did they enter an unconditional appearance on 11 July 2024. Counsel further pointed out that there had been no response from the defendants to the offer by the plaintiff in correspondence to engage in ADR in an attempt to resolve the dispute. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the defendants had been guilty of delay and had attempted to frustrate the plaintiff in progressing the proceedings. 

43.              It was submitted that the assertion made by the defendants that the Georgetown proceedings were likely to come on for hearing far sooner than the within proceedings, was not correct. It was pointed out that while a notice of trial had been served, it had subsequently been set aside due to the interlocutory applications that had been brought by the plaintiff and the defendant in the Georgetown proceedings. Judgment had been reserved in relation to the plaintiff's application to strike out parts of the defendant's defence and the defendant's motion for discovery of documents from the plaintiff, was awaiting hearing on 21 May 2025. It was submitted that in these circumstances, there was no reason why the present proceedings could not catch up with the Georgetown proceedings, once the within application had been determined. 

44.              It was submitted that the plaintiff had acted entirely reasonably in requesting the defendants to suspend selling the book until the conclusion of the Georgetown proceedings. Other sellers had agreed to that course of action. The defendants did not agree to do that. Instead, they had said that they would continue selling the book and making profits from its sale, until the plaintiff was successful in the Georgetown proceedings, at which time they would take "appropriate action", which they belatedly clarified as meaning that they would stop selling the book to customers based in the Republic of Ireland. 

45.              It was submitted that in adopting this course of action, the defendants had not acted reasonably. They could not rely on the defence of innocent publication, due to the fact that they had been put on notice of the defamatory material in the book as far back as the letter sent by the plaintiff to them on 9 June 2023. It was submitted that where the defendants had elected, notwithstanding such notice, to continue selling the offending material, it was reasonable that the plaintiff should issue proceedings and should be allowed to prosecute them to a hearing as soon as possible. 

46.              It was submitted that the issues that would arise for determination in the Georgetown proceedings and in the present proceedings were not identical. The issue in relation to the availability of the defence of innocent publication provided for under s.27 of the Defamation Act 2009 would arise in the present case, but not in the Georgetown proceedings. Furthermore, the issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to aggravated and punitive damages against the defendants would fall to be determined in these proceedings.

47.              Finally, it was submitted that the fact that the plaintiff may obtain an award of damages from a jury against Georgetown, would not prevent the plaintiff obtaining an award of damages against the defendants; although it was accepted that the plaintiff could not recover twice over on foot of such judgments in respect of the same damage to his reputation. 

48.              It was submitted that in all the circumstances, it was not appropriate to place a stay on the proceedings. 

The Law.

49.               The principles that must be applied where there is an application by a defendant to stay proceedings so as to enable other proceedings to progress to a determination, has been decided in a number of cases in the High Court. In Kalix Fund Limited v HSBC International Trust Services (Ireland) Limited [2010] 2 IR 581, Clarke J (as he then was) noted that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to manage the conduct of a series of cases which were connected by reason of having significant factual or legal overlap for the purposes of bringing about a just and expeditious trial while seeking to minimise costs ( see para. 48). He went on at para. 49 to set out a statement of the relevant principles. It is not necessary to set these out here, as these principles were adopted and restated by McDonald J in Avoncore Limited v Leeson Motors Ltd [2021] IEHC 163, to which the court will refer presently. 

50.              Before leaving the Kalix case, it should be noted that at para. 58, Clarke J stated that a court should be most reluctant to prevent any progress at all-in-one party's case simply because it may be that some, or indeed many, or even all of the issues in that case, may come to be determined in another case which is more advanced and likely to come to hearing first. 

51.              In Avoncore Limited v Leeson Motors Limited & Ors. [2021] IEHC 163, McDonald J had to decide whether a stay should be placed on one set of proceedings, when there were multiple proceedings in existence arising out of a fire in a car park in a shopping centre in Cork. The fire had caused extensive damage. This had given rise to proceedings being instituted by the owners of various vehicles in the carpark and by retailers who were tenants of various units in the shopping centre and by the owners of the shopping centre. The learned judge adopted the principles that had been set down in the Kalix case and restated the applicable principles in the following way at para. 29 of his judgment:

"(a) The court has a broad power to give directions for the conduct of proceedings entered in the Commercial List. O. 63A, r. 5 makes this clear. Under that rule, the court can give directions "as appear convenient for the determination of proceedings in a manner which is just, expeditious and likely to minimise the costs of those proceedings";

(b) The court has an inherent power to stay proceedings in a range of different circumstances. For present purposes, what is relevant is that the court has the power to stay one set of proceedings until another related case has been determined. A stay of this kind is, in essence, a procedural direction to the effect that no further steps should be taken in one set of proceedings until some other proceedings, or set of proceedings, have been heard and determined;

(c) In ordering its business, the court has a discretion to ensure that scarce court resources and the resources of parties to litigation are not inappropriately wasted by an unnecessary duplication of litigation. In addition, it is important that measures are taken to minimise the risk of any inconsistent determinations arising from different proceedings. For the latter reason, cases can be linked with a view to ensuring that a particular series of cases (which share common factors) are assigned to a single judge who will determine all relevant issues across the range of cases concerned;

(d) As part of its power to manage the conduct of a series of cases in which there is either a significant factual or legal overlap, the court should aim to bring about a just and expeditious trial while, at the same time, seeking to minimise costs and to ensure that scarce court resources are not wasted;

(e) Among the factors to be borne in mind in assessing how a series of cases are to be managed are the following:-

(i) The fact that each individual plaintiff is entitled to have the proceedings determined in an expeditious manner "subject only to ensuring that there is no disproportionate added expense or drain on court time imposed";

(ii) Consideration should be given as to the extent to which the first case to be tried is likely to bind all other cases in whole or in part.

(iii) It is important to ensure that any measures adopted which have the effect of preventing a case from progressing in the ordinary way must be no more than is necessary and proportionate to achieve the end of preventing unnecessary expense or use of court time.

(f) There is no reason, in principle, why a number of cases could not come to trial at the same time. Furthermore, in the context of a sequenced trial of all of the cases, there is no reason why the issues which arise in the various cases could not be tried in a logical way with only those parties who had a logical and legitimate interest in the particular set of issues in question, having an entitlement to be heard in respect of those issues."

52.              McDonald J also endorsed the statement that had been made in the Kalix case in relation to the default position. He stated that it was clear from the judgment in that case that the default position was that each individual plaintiff was entitled to have his/her proceedings determined, subject only to ensuring that there was no disproportionate expense or drain on court time. 

53.              In Brophy v Independent News and Media plc [202]1 IEHC 713, Simons J adopted the statement of general principles that had been laid down in the Kalix and Avoncore cases. He also stated that the default position was that a party who had invoked their constitutional right of access to the court to seek redress for an alleged wrong, should be entitled to progress their proceedings. He noted that the right of access to the courts implied a right to have one's claim heard and determined within a reasonable period. In that case, he refused to stay the proceedings on the basis that there was a statutory investigation proceeding into the subject matter of the action pursuant to part 13 of the Companies Act 2014.

 

Discussion and Conclusions.  

54.              It is clear from the case law cited above that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings when there are circumstances that make it fair and reasonable that one action should proceed to trial before another. This is done to ensure the efficient use of court resources and the saving of legal costs, while at the same time ensuring that the fundamental rights of individuals in having access to the courts are respected. 

55.              The relevant authorities clearly establish that the default position is that the plaintiff should be allowed to pursue his/her action before the courts, unless the defendants can establish a clear case why a stay should be imposed in the interests of justice and in the interests of the efficient running of the civil justice system: see Kalix (para. 58); Avoncore (para. 38); Brophy (para. 35). 

56.              The principles which the court must apply in considering this application have been set down in the Kalix case, as applied and restated by McDonald J in the Avoncore case; which statement of the law was accepted as being correct by Simons J in the Brophy case. While those cases involved applications by defendants to stay proceedings to await the outcome of other proceedings, and in one case a statutory investigation, being brought by different plaintiffs or third parties, I am satisfied that the general principles laid down in these cases apply to the present application, which involves multiple actions by the same plaintiff. 

57.              Having considered the submissions of the parties and the relevant authorities, I hold that it is not appropriate to place a stay on the present proceedings until the conclusion of the plaintiff's action in the Georgetown proceedings. 

58.              I have reached that conclusion for a number of reasons: First, the plaintiff has separate causes of action against each of the publishers of the statement alleged to be defamatory of him. He has a constitutional right of access to the courts to vindicate his good name and obtain an award of damages against each individual publisher. This Court can only interfere with that right when it is clearly established that it is in the interests of justice to do so. 

59.              I am satisfied that the plaintiff has not delayed in the institution and conduct of the proceedings herein. Such delay as there was, was in large part caused by the decision on the part of the defendants not to nominate solicitors within the jurisdiction to accept service on their behalf. This necessitated the plaintiff bringing an application before the High Court for leave to serve outside the jurisdiction pursuant to O.11 of RSC. Thereafter, he had to proceed to serve the documents in a formal manner on the defendants in the US and in the UK pursuant to the provisions of The Hague Convention. 

60.              There is also merit in the argument put forward by the plaintiff that the defendant has delayed or attempted to frustrate the plaintiff in the timely progression of the within proceedings. As noted, the defendants refused to nominate solicitors within the jurisdiction to accept service on their behalf. Once served with the notice of the plenary summons, they waited until the eve of the expiry of the elongated period for entry of an appearance, to enter their appearance. This was entered on the forty-first day after service of notice of the plenary summons upon them. Thereafter, they entered a conditional appearance, which contested the jurisdiction of the Irish courts to deal with the matter. This effectively prevented the plaintiff from progressing the action, until the issue of jurisdiction had been determined. 

61.              However, instead of challenging jurisdiction, the defendants chose to issue the within notice of motion seeking a stay on the proceedings. Thereafter, they filed an unconditional appearance. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was culpable delay on the part of the plaintiff such that he cannot resist the defendants' application for a stay of the proceedings. 

62.              I am not satisfied that the Georgetown proceedings are that far ahead of the present proceedings. While notice of trial was served in those proceedings, it appears that that notice of trial has been set aside, due to the fact that there are interlocutory applications in that action which are presently pending before the court. The plaintiff's motion to strike out part of the Georgetown defence, was heard before the High Court on 8th and 9th May 2025. Judgment has been reserved in that matter. The defendant's application for discovery of documents by the plaintiff, was heard in the High Court on 21 May 2025. Judgments will have to be delivered in respect of both of those interlocutory applications. The losing parties may elect to appeal those judgments to the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Georgetown proceedings will definitely come on for hearing before the present proceedings.

63.              The court is satisfied that it is not permissible for a defendant to say to a plaintiff who has other proceedings in being, that they should progress their action against some other defendant; while in the meantime, that defendant will continue to make profits from selling the book which contains the alleged defamatory statement. 

64.              The seller has the choice of withdrawing the book from sale once he is put on notice by the plaintiff that he maintains that he has been defamed in the book; or he can decide that he will continue to sell the book. That is his choice. What he cannot do is decide to continue selling the book, thereby republishing the allegedly defamatory statement in the legal sense; while at the same time maintaining that the plaintiff cannot progress his action against him until he concludes other proceedings against other publishers of the alleged defamatory statement. 

65.              Insofar as the defendants sought to argue that because the nature of the defamatory statement in the book was not at all obvious, or because sales of the book in this jurisdiction were very low, the plaintiff's action herein ought to be stayed; I do not find that argument persuasive. It may well be that to date sales of the book in this jurisdiction have been limited. The evidence before the court is that as of 18 June 2024 there were only 12 sales to customers in this jurisdiction. This had risen to 14 customers by 1 April 2025. The court was informed that as of the date of the hearing of this application, being 15 May 2025, the total number of sales to customers in this country had risen to 16. While that may well be true, the court is satisfied that it is not relevant to the within application. A plaintiff is entitled to pursue an action for defamation, irrespective of whether there has been a very large or very limited publication of the defamatory statement by the defendant: see by analogy the decision in Gilchrist v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IECA 191. The issue of the extent of publication of the defamatory statement, does not go to the issue of liability, or to the existence of the tort itself; it is only relevant to the issue of damages in the event that the plaintiff establishes liability on the part of the defendant. 

66.              The court has also taken into account the fact that these proceedings are at an early stage. No defence has yet been filed by the defendants. If a stay is placed on the proceedings at this point, they will have to be reactivated at some stage, with the result that there will be a further delay in closing the pleadings and in dealing with any interlocutory applications that may be brought, such as discovery of financial records, etc; meaning that the plaintiff would be very considerably delayed in getting the present action before a judge and jury for hearing. 

67.              Parties to litigation, whether as plaintiff or defendant, have a right to have their action brought to trial within a reasonable period. That is recognised as being a constitutional right and is also provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights. I am satisfied that to grant a stay in these proceedings, which are in their infancy, would be in breach of this right and would not be in the interests of justice. 

68.              It was submitted on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff's' constitutional right of access to the courts will be vindicated because if the plaintiff obtains judgment against Georgetown, he will have vindicated his good name and will have obtained an award of damages for the totality of the damage to his reputation in this jurisdiction. While that is correct as far as it goes, it does not mean that the plaintiff will be able to recover on foot of that award of damages 

69.              I accept the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is entitled to sue the individual publishers of the defamatory statement. It is of course accepted that when recovering on foot of any awards of damages that he may obtain, he would not be entitled to recover twice over for the same damage to his reputation or loss consequent thereon. 

70.              Even if I am wrong in that, that is an issue that will have to be teased out at the trial of the action brought by the plaintiff against Georgetown and in the present proceedings. 

71.              I also accept the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff that the decision of the jury on the issue of liability and any award of damages in the Georgetown proceedings will not be binding in this case. This is because both proceedings will be heard before separate juries. The verdict in the first case to go to trial, will not be binding on the jury in the second trial; in particular, because the issue of innocent publication may arise in the present proceedings, but will not do so in the Georgetown proceedings. 

72.              Furthermore, insofar as damages are concerned, there is a claim to aggravated and punitive damages in the present proceedings which is based on facts that are specific to the present defendants. These issues will not arise in that form in the Georgetown proceedings. Thus, while there are undoubtedly issues in common, the issues in the two cases are not identical. 

73.              The court is not convinced that placing a stay on the present proceedings at this stage would result in any significant saving of court time or costs. The proceedings are at an early stage. The filing of a defence and, if necessary, a reply thereto, will not give rise to significant costs. Interlocutory issues, such as seeking discovery of documents, can be dealt with on a voluntary basis. Even if they require a court order, such matters can be dealt with quickly and cheaply in the common law motion list, or if the motion is longer, in the non-jury/judicial review motion list. Accordingly, I am satisfied that permitting the action to proceed will not take up significant court time or involve substantial legal costs. 

74.              For the reasons set out herein, I hold that it is not appropriate to grant a stay on the proceedings herein. When the two actions are ready for hearing it may be that it would be appropriate that they be linked and heard before the same jury. I note that the plaintiff has indicated that he is agreeable to the actions being linked in some form. I note that the defendants are not agreeable to that course being adopted. I make no observations on that matter. It will be a matter for the judge in charge of the jury list when the actions are ready to be set down for hearing, to determine in what order they should be heard. 

75.              Finally, I should say that the fact that I have refused the defendants' application for a stay at this stage of the proceedings, does not prevent them renewing their application when an application is made to list the matter for hearing. 

Proposed Final Order.

76.               In light of the findings in this judgment, I would propose that the final order should record that the reliefs sought by the defendants in their notice of motion dated 18 June 2024 are refused. 

77.              As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the parties shall have three weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions of not more than 1000 words on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise. 

78.              The matter shall be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 24 June 2025 for the purpose of making final orders.

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